Perils of Finlandization

[Adrian II]

This is a spin-off of the Ossetia thread in the backroom, hopefully in a different style. I have always appreciated the scholarly tone in the Monastery and will stick to it.

At issue was the question whether Georgia should be 'finlandized' and whether that would be beneficial for the country, as some members advocated, or not, as I tend to think.

So let's debate Finnish neutrality, particularly with regard to the Soviet Union.

My position is that it resulted in a truncated country with a truncated democracy. Soviet influence stifled national debate and free choice in policies. And it didn't only stifle debate and free choice in contemporary matters, it also stifled historical debate about Finland's own part in the run-up to its finlandization.

Finlandisation was not a matter of choice, as some Finnish proponents have long maintained. It was not a sequel to Finland's supposed policy of splendid neutrality in the pre-war years or during WWII. The fact that Finland ended up being finlandized was because the country had allied with nazi Germany from 1941 to 1944 in the so-called 'Finnish-German Brotherhood of Arms' (leading, among other things, to a British declaration of war).

Finland believed that Germany was the powerhouse of the future. It was wrong, and it had to accept strict Soviet peace conditions after the war.

Finnish historians have long preferred to defend their country's policies during 1939-1945 instead of critically investigating them. They refused to look into the 'Finnish-German Brotherhood of Arms' episode of 1941-44 and ignored available sources.

True, after the war the responsible politicians were put on trial and convicted, but the trial was heavily manipulated behind the scenes by the Soviets. Neither the prosecution nor the defence could speak freely, thus leaving the pain and the lessons of this episode in national history unaddressed.

In fact they weren't addressed at all until the 1960's. American historian Lundin wrote the first critical study of the episode in 1957. British historian Upton followed in 1964, and in 1967 American historian Krisby uncovered essential new records and other documents. Essentially Finnish scholars were told the truth by outsiders. That is not unique. The same would apply to for instance France (American historian Paxton was the first to write critically about 'Vichy'). But it did not, remarkably, apply to Germany itself where the issue of war guilt and responsibility led to fundamental debates.

The same kind of self-censorship has long stifled debate about the 'finlandized era' itself, particularly the period of the lat 1970's when Finland was aligning itself ever closer with the Soviet Union, without proper debate in its media. Many Finnish intellectuals believed that the USSR was the powerhouse of the future. Wrong again.

The main illusion that should be shed is that it was Finnish 'neutrality' during the Cold War that allowed the country to emerge more or less unscathed from that period. It was Nato and particularly the U.S. that kept the Russians from invading again.