Roman tactics?

[Macilrille]

@Macilrille i feel alot of hostility from you so as not to make this personal:

No hostility at all, but as a professional historian I severely dislike people passing on hearsay and fantasy as facts. I expect you to dislike amateurs bungling your profession as well...
Competent amateurs is fine, I applaud that for I was once one before I got a degree and the good ones has much to contribute, but too many see something in a TV-Show, fantazise on it and pass their fantasies on as fact. Such must be rebutted firmly and my percieved hostility comes from that. Do not worry I treat everybody who has the misfortune of being misguided the same if they pass their misguidance on.


I shall try and adress your points one at a time.

- visit the blackforest and imagine how it would be like not being able to see 5 meters in front of you and looking up and 30 meters above you there´s only darkness in the mid summer day

Somebody else has already adressed this, but I encourage reading up a bit on the actual conditions in N. Europe in the Roman Iron Age, and perhaps to apply some source criticism to Tacitus, he has a reason for exaggerating- mostly Roman belief/tradition about the north, but also to contrast the sharper with his own Mediterennean, and in "Annals" to underline the difficulties of the campaign against the Cherusci. And if you have a look at my "Location" you will notice that I come from up here in N. Europe and I can assure you I know it well.

- read some of the units description in eb

How come you presume I have not? I love playing the Sweboz and I have in fact read the unit descriptions. However, I also have a bit of knowledge of our sources, and thus knows their scarcity. My best guess is that in order to make a playable faction the EB Team has had to use all sources we have from Pliny T. Elder to Beowulf and Sagas to get something resembling a faction rooster. Thus weighing playability over historical accuracy for once, for we have no sources! Or almost none...

- germania from tacitus

Unless you are a gifted amateur or trained pro historian you should keep well away from using Tacitus as a source. It does contain much useful and probably much accurate information. But sifting the nuggets from the dross is not easy even for the trained eye. It is not really a source you should employ. I will probably dwell a bit on that later.

- even you must admit that germania was a non profitable region and there was no unity in germania in terms of politics and you would have to defeat one tribe at a time cause none would surrender

This is so, but my quibble is with the "Germanic Superman" myth you pass on. Not by the fact that Germania would have been difficult to conquer. I agree it would, but your passing on myths makes my professional hairs stand on end.

so these are my sources the blackforest (in some parts it´s still almost as wild as before), eb (and i´m sure you´re not calling the eb team an inproper source ??), germania from tacitus (altough i find it wierd that it was such a small book), and some common sence (and yes i admit this source is very biased)

• I am in fact calling them an improper source here- because the scarcity of sources has forced them to use improper and non-contemporary (with EB timeframe) sources. And if they feel offended they can argue with me (but I have a suspicion they are themselves professional enough to agree with me. In fact I am certain they are).
• Germania too is an improper source for most people, as I have already specified.
• Common sense only works if applied with knowledge of former conditions- inasmuch as we have that knowledge.

Now, to your original post and my actual quibbles with it. Mostly that you propagate a "Germanic Superhuman" myth. I have a very high opinion of the ancient German tribes, but my reasons are founded on the sources we have, the fact that I am most likely descended from the Eudoses/Haerudi/Cimbrii, and my love for Vikings and Viking Fighting Re-enactment. In fact I like the ancient "Danes" (who actually probably lived in Skaane-Sjælland then, so more likely the Eudoses here in my area) so much that I run a roleplaying campaign there.

as for the above strategy spy´s caught in german forests wouldn´t survive very long, so their knowledge of the geography and the hability to see marching warbands 50 miles away wasn´t available back then

Consider the fact that a "Spy" in EB does not necessarily represent some sinister guy in a hood, but rather the establishment of contacts with segments of enemy or neighbouring populations- or the creation of such- and supporting them with funds, Divide et impera- Romans were experts as that. We know from archeology and our sources that many Germans were sympathetic to Rome. I expect there would be the same in other populations. That is what a spy represents. Just like a diplomat represents trading expeditions and political feelers and an assassin represents the cells actually sowing sedition and spreading mayhem.

also no german would fight a bridge batle they would ambush when half the army had just crossed and if need be they would swim undetected to the other shore and catch the romans in crossfire

Now there were no bridges across major rivers in Germany, so it would be impossible anyway. But what is your source for this? In fact in "The Annals of Tacitus, Book II, X-XI", he describes an opposed river crossing of the Weser,

The waters of the Visurgis flowed between the Romans and the Cherusci. On its banks stood Arminius with the other chiefs. He asked whether Caesar had arrived, and on the reply that he was present, he begged leave to have an interview with his brother. That brother, surnamed Flavus, was with our army, a man famous for his loyalty, and for having lost an eye by a wound, a few years ago, when Tiberius was in command. The permission was then given, and he stepped forth and was saluted by Arminius, who had removed his guards to a distance and required that the bowmen ranged on our bank should retire. When they had gone away, Arminius asked his brother whence came the scar which disfigured his face, and on being told the particular place and battle, he inquired what reward he had received. Flavus spoke of increased pay, of a neck chain, a crown, and other military gifts, while Arminius jeered at such a paltry recompense for slavery.

Then began a controversy. The one spoke of the greatness of Rome, the resources of Caesar, the dreadful punishment in store for the vanquished, the ready mercy for him who surrenders, and the fact that neither Arminius's wife nor his son were treated as enemies; the other, of the claims of fatherland, of ancestral freedom, of the gods of the homes of Germany, of the mother who shared his prayers, that Flavus might not choose to be the deserter and betrayer rather than the ruler of his kinsfolk and relatives, and indeed of his own people.

By degrees they fell to bitter words, and even the river between them would not have hindered them from joining combat, had not Stertinius hurried up and put his hand on Flavus, who in the full tide of his fury was demanding his weapons and his charger. Arminius was seen facing him, full of menaces and challenging him to conflict. Much of what he said was in Roman speech, for he had served in our camp as leader of his fellow-countrymen.

Next day the German army took up its position on the other side of the Visurgis. Caesar, thinking that without bridges and troops to guard them, it would not be good generalship to expose the legions to danger, sent the cavalry across the river by the fords. It was commanded by Stertinius and Aemilius, one of the first rank centurions, who attacked at widely different points so as to distract the enemy. Chariovalda, the Batavian chief, dashed to the charge where the stream is most rapid. The Cherusci, by a pretended flight, drew him into a plain surrounded by forest-passes. Then bursting on him in a sudden attack from all points they thrust aside all who resisted, pressed fiercely on their retreat, driving them before them, when they rallied in compact array, some by close fighting, others by missiles from a distance. Chariovalda, after long sustaining the enemy's fury, cheered on his men to break by a dense formation the onset of their bands, while he himself, plunging into the thickest of the battle, fell amid a shower of darts with his horse pierced under him, and round him many noble chiefs. The rest were rescued from the peril by their own strength, or by the cavalry which came up with Stertinius and Aemilius.

So yes you can say that they attacked as the Auxilia had crossed, and they drew them into an ambush (both are sensible tactics and was probably used at many occasions by the Res Publica Romana), but I fail to see any superhuman Germans swimming across. Just a standard ambush on a part of a divided crossing force- that knew the Cherusci were there. I ask you please to come up with sources for the Germans doing anything else.

furthermore rtw engine doesn´t allow it but in the night the wolfwarriors would grind down whatever roman´s could send at them, and forts are extremly weak against fires and trust me no matter how high you build your fortwall there´s always a tree next to it high enough and to build the fort and a perimeter around it it would take days while being constantly harassed by wierdo lunatics dressed in wolf clothes that appear and disapear like if they where gosths

Wolf Warriors?? What were they? Source please. Further, you should be aware that until the establishment of the Limes with its garissions and patrols, the Romans rarely went out at night. They employed instead their standard tactic of establishing a fort. Now I ask you also to please come up with a source where Germans set fire to a Roman fort or use trees to get in. Romans, you see, were sensible people and did not allow Germans at the walls of their forts to set fires, nor built them in "closed" terrain. Forts up to Legion size was occasionally overrun, but more often withstood assault and repelled the attackers. Tacitus gives an example of this in his Annals, Book I, LXVII. Caecina's four legions, almost annihilated by Arminus' cunning tactics the previous day, are assaulted on Ingiumerus' advice, in the fort they have constructed despite their predicament.

So, at the break of day they began to demolish the fosses, threw in hurdles, and grapped the top of the rampart; ...

, no fires, no treeclimbing, just a standard impromptu assault. The Romans, ready the night before to give up because of Arminus' "Motti"* tactics, then sally and defeat them soundly. As for weirdo lunatics in wolf clothes appearing and disappearing like ghosts... let me quote in full Tacitus' description of how Arminu's Cheruscans harry the four legions under Caecina,

Soon afterwards Germanicus led back his army to the Amisia, taking his legions by the fleet, as he had brought them up. Part of the cavalry was ordered to make for the Rhine along the sea-coast. Caecina, who commanded a division of his own, was advised, though he was returning by a route which he knew, to pass Long Bridges with all possible speed. This was a narrow road amid vast swamps, which had formerly been constructed by Lucius Domitius; on every side were quagmires of thick clinging mud, or perilous with streams. Around were woods on a gradual slope, which Arminius now completely occupied, as soon as by a short route and quick march he had outstripped troops heavily laden with baggage and arms. As Caecina was in doubt how he could possibly replace bridges which were ruinous from age, and at the same time hold back the enemy, he resolved to encamp on the

spot, that some might begin the repair and others the attack.

The barbarians attempted to break through the outposts and to throw themselves on the engineering parties, which they harassed, pacing round them and continually charging them. There was a confused din from the men at work and the combatants. Everything alike was unfavourable to the Romans, the place with its deep swamps, insecure to the foot and slippery as one advanced, limbs burdened with coats of mail, and the impossibility of aiming their javelins amid the water. The Cherusci, on the other hand, were familiar with fighting in fens; they had huge frames, and lances long enough to inflict wounds even at a distance. Night at last released the legions, which were now wavering, from a disastrous engagement. The Germans whom success rendered unwearied, without even then taking any rest, turned all the streams which rose from the slopes of the surrounding hills into the lands beneath. The ground being thus flooded and the completed portion of our works submerged, the soldiers' labour was doubled.

This was Caecina's fortieth campaign as a subordinate or a commander, and, with such experience of success and peril, he was perfectly fearless. As he thought over future possibilities, he could devise no plan but to keep the enemy within the woods, till the wounded and the more encumbered troops were in advance. For between the hills and the swamps there stretched a plain which would admit of an extended line. The legions had their assigned places, the fifth on the right wing, the twenty-first on the left, the men of the first to lead the van, the twentieth to repel pursuers.

It was a restless night for different reasons, the barbarians in their festivity filling the valleys under the hills and the echoing glens with merry song or savage shouts, while in the Roman camp were flickering fires, broken exclamations, and the men lay scattered along the intrenchments or wandered from tent to tent, wakeful rather than watchful. A ghastly dream appalled the general. He seemed to see Quintilius Varus, covered with blood, rising out of the swamps, and to hear him, as it were, calling to him, but he did not, as he imagined, obey the call; he even repelled his hand, as he stretched it over him. At daybreak the legions, posted on the wings, from panic or perversity, deserted their position and hastily occupied a plain beyond the morass. Yet Arminius, though free to attack, did not at the moment rush out on them. But when the baggage was clogged in the mud and in the fosses, the soldiers around it in disorder, the array of the standards in confusion, every one in selfish haste and all ears deaf to the word of command he ordered the Germans to charge, exclaiming again and again, "Behold a Varus and legions once more entangled in Varus's fate." As he spoke, he cut through the column with some picked men, inflicting wounds chiefly on the horses. Staggering in their blood on the slippery marsh, they shook off their riders, driving hither and thither all in their way, and trampling on the fallen. The struggle was hottest round the eagles, which could neither be carried in the face of the storm of missiles, nor planted in the miry soil. Caecina, while he was keeping up the battle, fell from his horse, which was pierced under him, and was being hemmed in, when the first legion threw itself in the way. The greed of the foe helped him, for they left the slaughter to secure the spoil, and the legions, towards evening, struggled on to open and firm ground.

I fail to see any weirdos in wolf clothing playing ghosts here. In fact we are again dealing with a fairly standard, if sound and very well applied, ambush and harrasment tactic, concluded by major assults.

it´s a bit like calling the saba weak and ignoring that anyone foolish enough to attack the saba would be fighting in the midle of a desert if they moved they would get shoot if they didn´t move after 1 or 2 hours they would start dehidrating (not even considering stuff like malaria or the poor knowledge of the terrain)

Certainly, but though great warriors well adapted to their environment the Germans were not the superhumans, loonies or anything else you portray them as. My quibble is with that. The determining factors in this case are as in Saba, terrain/geography/demography, and a large part fo the population being unwilling to submit even to their greatest hero when he starts acting like a King.

furthermore to subdue all the tribes of germania one by one would cost something that today would mean billions and for a very litle profit cause most germans where actually very scatered and had a fighting feral spirit that an example like what happened in numantia wouldn´t work it would only make the german tribes fight with more fury

See above, though the Eastern German tribes were in the Roman Iron Age quite a bit more friendly to the Romans than the western ones. Archeology tells us that they did not resist and that the Romans probably employed Divide et impera to pacify the Germanic area by keeping them infighting.

for that same reason it took the romans so long before they decided to conquer gaul and even then it took one of the roman world greatest mind (not just military but also political and somewhat economical) 10 years to subdue it and after killing or enslaving half of the gaulish/belgium population they still had problems (and i must remind you that even then the senate was against such an endeavour cause they knew how much it would probably cost)

Hard to disagree with for anyone and generally accepted since Tiberius called Germanicus home with the following words, "

to return for the triumph decreed him: there had been already enough successes, and enough mischances. He had fought auspicious and great fields: he should also remember the losses inflicted by wind and wave — losses not in any way due to his leadership, yet grave and deplorable. He himself had been sent nine times into Germany by the deified Augustus; and he had effected more by policy than by force. Policy had procured the Sugambrian surrender; policy had bound the Suebi and King Maroboduus to keep the peace. The Cherusci and the other rebel tribes, now that enough has been done for Roman vengeance, might similarly be left to their intestine strife."

So with misunderstandings corrected the conclusion remains the same. But please do not paint the Germans as supermen. They were doubtless great warriors and exceedingly brave, but superhuman they were not.

*Ask Watchman what Motti tactics means, or any Finn;-) Edited to add, or Google even, there are numerous pages on it.