Pyrrhos’ losses in the Battle of Cannae were limited. He had lost three of his prized elephants and though his Italian allies had suffered some more casualties, the core of his army remained in top strength. The victory over the Romans was clear, unlike the his last victory over this opponent.
It is my opinion that Pyrrhos now made a critical error. He had just beaten the main Roman force. The other legions were busy fighting over Rhegion and defending Ariminum from Celtic raids. The Roman tactic to counter his phalanxes had miserably failed and thanks to his Italian allies he had a well balanced and motivated army. The way to Arpi lay open, but Pyrrhos did not move.
The text:
[…]
The leader of the Samnites, a man called Paius, urged the Epirote king to move North and take Safinim [this is Samnium in the Oscan dialect]. Paius told the general he could invade Apulia, take Arpi and then push [west] towards Campania.
[…]
On hearing that the army was not going to do more than patrolling the border of the Tarantine territory, Paius stepped into the general’s tent, holding high a dagger on both his hand palms.
The guards worriedly pulled their swords, but the king stopped them and invited the Samnite to come closer. The man stopped, kneeled, put the dagger on the ground in front of Pyrrhos and left the tent without saying a word.
[…]
Pyrrhos’ forces thus lost between one forth and one third of their strength.
[…]
Notes:
Staying on the defensive had cost Pyrrhos his Samnites, who had fought so bravely in the Battle of Cannae. They did not want to fight for the cause of a Greek city, they wanted to be freed from Roman oppression. In Pyrrhos they saw a potential victor over the Romans, someone who could give them their homelands back.
In my view he should have marched upon Arpi right after the battle, taking the city undefended and demoralized after the news of the Roman loss. Pyrrhos failed to do so, perhaps because he preferred field battles over sieges, or perhaps because he was afraid the army in Rhegion would hit him in the back. We all know that this army could not have given up the siege of Rhegion. And the casualties it suffered during the actual taking of Rhegion were so high it made the army incapable to fight Pyrrhos anytime soon.
My view is that the decision not to attack Arpi, making him lose up to one third of his army through desertion and giving the Romans time to heal their wounds, was his greatest mistake as a general. And though my readers are of course free to think otherwise, I have yet to meet someone who does not agree with my view on this.
Book IV and the writings of P____ tell us that either late 269 or early 268 the veterans of Pyrrhos army were shipped back over the Adriatic Sea (see Book IV, 2). Pyrrhos now only had the Tarantine forces, backed up with some Lucanians and Bruttians, to defend Taras from the Romans.
We know through Roman annals Taras was besieged by a legion led by Marcus Curius Denatus, but the attack was soon repulsed by a sally led by Pyrrhos.
It seems that Pyrrhos spent the rest of 268 to patrol the border and defend the Tarantine territory from raiding parties sent out by the Romans themselves or their allies. It is an exemplifying for the state of ancient military reconnaissance that during such a border patrol the following could happen:
The text:
[…]
Achmetos the Tarantine had discovered the Roman camp only 4 miles away from theirs. Pyrrhos decided to attack during the night, since the Romans were low in number and apparently oblivious about the nearby Tarantine camp.
[…]
The twenty picked Bruttians climbed over the walls at the back of the encampment and started killing the sleeping men. The Romans woke up and soon killed the brave volunteers. Once they realized that these men were possibly only a small party of a larger force, they deployed in battle formation and marched out.
The moment the Romans marched out of the gate they were ambushed by the Lucanians[1] who charged them while the Tarantines showered them with missiles.
[…]
When every Roman lay dead, the bodies and the camp were plundered. Then latter was burned to the ground.
[…]
[1]
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Artist's impression of the Lucanians charging the Romans:
Aichmetai Leukanoi are deployed and used as most javelin-equipped skirmishers. They run forward to pepper an enemy with javelins, and then withdraw before a counter-attack can be organised. Their job is to screen the main force of the army, and harass the enemy with a shower of javelins to disrupt their formation, so the more heavier infantry can engage with better odds. The Aichmetai Leukanoi are equipped with javelins, a knife and nothing more. Their speed is their best and only armour. Any wise general should thus try to keep them unexposed to enemy cavalry, as in melee the light infantry will quickly rout.
Historically, the Leukanoi occupied the province of Calabria in the 4th century B.C, except for the Greek coastal colonies. They were either at war or allied with their neighbours throughout their history. They allied themselves with Pyrrhos of Epeiros when he invaded.
Book IV, 2.
The text:
[…]
And the veteran phalanx and the elephants there joined up with the new recruits. Ptolemaios, son of Pyrrhos, then joined them with half of the Illyrians. The other half he left in Pella.
This new army of 13700 men – 2800 of which were horsemen – was put together because news had reached Ptolemaios that the Antigonids had managed to put a puppet tyrant in Athena.
[…]
[Some information about Athena left out here, along with a long tirade about the loss of democracy as a result of the placement of the Antigonid tyrant.]
[…]
Ptolemaios must have known that, thanks to the taking of Athens in 268, the Antigonids could now focus all their resources at the retaking of Makedonia. It seems he wanted to launch a counter attack before the Antigonids had time to execute their plans.
However, the Antigonids moved faster than Ptolemaios and invaded Makedonia in the spring of 267, laying waste to much of the countryside and besieging the garrison left in Pella.
Ptolemaios, in the meantime, had marched through Thessalia, encountering little resistance, to Magnesia. There he set up camp some distance North from the Antigonid stronghold of Demetrias.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
D___ M____, Geographica Hellenica, VI Thessalia, 8, 35-38.
As soon as Demetrios Poliorketes became king of Makedonia in [294] he unified the small villages in the region of Pagasae. The new strategically well positioned town, called Demetrias, formed the base for most of the political interference and military attacks against Thessalia and Southern Hellas by Demetrios and his successors.
The text:
[…]
After the messengers from Pella had reached Ptolemaios, he became eager to fight the battle and to return to relief Pella. Each day he deployed his troops for battle, but the old and cunning Antigonos Gonatas stayed behind his walls.
This he did not do because of cowardice, but because his garrison was slightly outnumbered and lacked heavy foot. Furthermore, he knew that the veterans from the battle of Athens were marching back to Demetrias.
[…]
Ptolemaios’ agents inside the town had been unable to open the gates. He did receive message that one brave man, whose name was Rhouphos Bouthrotios, had broken into the house of Hieronymos of Kardia[1], who was known to have close ties with Antigonos and had written propaganda against Pyrrhos, and taken the old man with him as a hostage to his hiding place.
[…]
Great clouds of dust showed up in the distance to the South. It were the veterans, 10000 seasoned fighters, marching under the command of one Amphion.
[…]
After the front screen of skirmishers had retreated to the back of the Antigonid army, the two battle lines slowly closed the gap between them. The two phalanx bodies pushed against each other while the hoplite infantry attacked the Illyrians and Celts. Meanwhile, on the other flank the skirmishing continued.
[…]
After that bold move, much of the army of Amphion was routing. This however caused great disorder in the part of the Epirote line that had been fighting in the woods, which was soon ambushed by the skirmishers who had retreated at the beginning of the battle. The Celts and the Illyrian horsemen were all slaughtered.
[…]
On the other flank Antigonos and his skirmishers had also reached the Epirotes. This was where the light horse and elephants had joined the battle against Amphion’s troops.
Antigonos led the charge in the proper Makedonian fashion; spear in hand, at the head of his Hetairoi. It is said that when Ptolemaios saw the old king pass a few passes away, he threw his Xyston at the king. It hit him in the eye and he was thrown from his horse, where he was trampled by his own men.
Oh the horror, oh the tragedy, the great man was no more. Antigonos II Gonatas was on his way to Hades.
Oh the horror, oh the tragedy, woe all those who indulge in the sin of Hubris, for they shall fall. Ptolemaios, who had always been rather full of himself, was ecstatic after his kill and plunged into the melee, now armed with only his sword.
It was only a short time later that also this great man was no more. Ptolemaios Aiakides, son of Pyrrhos king of Epeiros, was on his way to Hades.
[…]
The losses of human live were appalling. Of the 13700 Epirotes only 2800 were able to return to Epeiros through the mountains of Thessalia. Among the fallen were all of Pyrrhos’ precious elephants.
The Antigonids had suffered too. They had lost their king, seven thousand of the veterans under Amphion’s command were slaughtered and of the garrison of Demetrias 4000 men lay dead.
[…]
[1]
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Some information about Hieronymos. I'm sorry for the bad quality of the photo-copy.
Source: Sir T____ H_____, History's Histories, London, 1823, p.65.
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
Possible deployment of the troops at the start of the Battle of Demetrias:
Thanks for the following! I wonder what all those lurkers think of this AAR. Criticism is welcomed too, even saying it's plain bad - as long as you say why.
Damn indeed.
It was a great battle to play, except indeed the death of Ptolemaios, which was completely unexpected. Before his death the Galatians had been annihilated and one unit of Illyrians was routing, but when Ptolemaios fell all hell broke loose. Several units started to rout including the peltastai which were fighting together with my elephants. The elephants were slaughtered and then all but three units routed. I gave up and retreated those three.
And now, a small update.
Book IV, 20-23.
Background:
It seems that the siege of Pella was called off when the army there heard about the death of Antigonos, since we now read that this Rhouphos Bouthrotios – the one we read about in Book IV, 4 – had escaped Demetrias with his prisoner and arrived in Pella during the autumn of 267.
Although we lack the sources about the why and when exactly, we can be certain that it was also in this autumn that Krateros the historian, older brother of Antigonos, succeeded him as King of Hellas, Thessalia and Makedonia and Strategos of Lesbos.
In fact only Southern Thessalia was really directly governed by Krateros. Lakonia was still completely independent and although the poleis in the rest of the Poleponessos and Attica did have Antigonid puppets as tyrants or high officials, they still retained a certain level of independence.
Makedonia of course was in Epirote hands and the plan to reconquer it had been dropped when the news of Antigonos’ death had reached the besieging force.
The text:
[…]
After being smuggled out of Demetrias by Rhouphos Bouthrotios, Hieronymos was transferred from Pella to Ambrakia, where Alexandros, son of Pyrrhos, was residing for the winter.
[…]
In spite of the nearing winter, Alexandros crossed the Adriatic Sea to see his father. He took with him the news of the death of his older brother and the captive old historian, Hieronymos.
[…]
Pyrrhos did not react well to news of the death of his oldest son and heir. He praised him for his bravery, but did not accepted his arrogant overconfidence after killing Antigonos Gonatas.
He is said to have warned everyone there about the dangers of hubris and then retreated to his private quarters. For the next 20 days there he remained, only to exit to offer to the gods. During those days, a period of mourning was declared in Taras.
[…]
Pyrrhos, still full of vengeance, declared that Hieronymos, who was by then in his eighty seventh year, should be locked up and be tortured every day. Throughout his torture he was to be told over and over again about all the lies he had written about Pyrrhos and the Aiakid family.
[…]
Re: - Never near Argos -
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Originally Posted by gamegeek2
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