Quote Originally Posted by Vladimir View Post
How does Britain's military spending compare to that of other EU nations?
By comparison, Britain's defense spending is enormous.


This Wiki list seems as good as any:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eu_military

France and the UK are the two countries with a will to power, and consequently spend enormous amounts of money on defense. Within Europe, their expenditure is surpassed only by Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria. (All three NATO members, with their arms pointed towards each other.
Or, in the case of Bulgaria, arms simply being absent.)

Eastern European spending is ever on the increase. Poland in particular is starting to make its weight felt. (No, no sarcasm. Poland is great to have at your side)


Note that numbers alone do not provide the full picture. For example, Greek spending is mostly on personel. Consequently, these are equiped with outdated, even antiquated equipment.
To a large extent, this is true for France as well. The UK military, despite having about similar financial means, has a far greater actual operational capacity. Also, the French military expenditure includes the Gendarmerie, which in other countries might be considered a police force and be included in the budget of the ministry of internal affairs.


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Does Europe enjoy a free ride? The Economist says this claim should not be made too rashly:
Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

HE argument about Jim Manzi's interesting article outlining a conservative vision for reestablishing American competitiveness has largely wound down by now. But something in a response by one of Andrew Sullivan's readers is still bugging me: "what Manzi has accurately characterized as Europe's free riding on the US for defense." Mr Manzi actually doesn't quite say this in such explicit terms, but it is a frequent assertion that European social spending is only made possible by implicit American subsidies on defence; so let's take a look at this claim.

Defence spending by Britain and France is around 2.5% of their GDP, which is about the world average. This is interesting in that neither Britain nor France, nor any other country in Western Europe, faces any conceivable territorial military threat. German defence spending is considerably lower, but (as Charlemagne noted in a 2008 column) it still fields the only other serious expeditionary force in Europe. In any case, Germany faces no military threat either, nor has there been any serious likelihood of military conflict anywhere in the region since the Yugoslavian wars wound down. The only European countries that face any risk of military conflict in the coming decades are those that border Russia, and indeed the Baltics are increasing their military spending; one could vaguely imagine Poland getting into a dicey situation someday (a blow-up involving Estonia's Russian-speaking minority leads to Russian intervention and Warsaw begins feeling the heat, or something), but it's a stretch, and Poland, too, is increasing its military spending to almost 2% of GDP.


America, for its own reasons, has decided to spend 4.7% of its GDP on its armed forces and on warfighting. But why should Europe match that? For the sake of comparison: India and Pakistan are actual nuclear-armed enemies with disputed territorial claims and huge armies facing each other across a hostile border. Each country is fighting active counterinsurgency campaigns inside its own territory. Yet Pakistan spends 3% of GDP on its military, while India spends just 2.5%, about as much as France. The world abounds in countries that enjoy no American security guarantees, yet spend no more than France does on defence: Brazil, Chile, Vietnam, South Africa, Nigeria, Ukraine, even, by some accounts, Iran. These countries are clearly not "free riding" on America; why should Europe be?


To say that Europe is "free riding on the US" implies that Europe is getting something. Yet those who make these kinds of claims never explain just what it is they think Europe gets out of America's colossal levels of military spending. Most Western Europeans don't see themselves as deriving any great benefit from America's disproportionate defence outlays; it is not clear how Europe's security would be harmed if America did cut its defence budget. And it is not clear how European security would be enhanced if Europe dramatically increased its defence spending. Now that China is ramping up its defence spending, American officials say they are troubled because Beijing does not explain what threats it seeks to counter. Anyone who wants Europe to increase its defence spending ought to do the same.


http://www.economist.com/blogs/bageh...uropes_defense



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Will European politicians finally listen NATO and to the military experts and embark on more European collaboration? Or will fears over 'loss of sovereignity' indefinately hold back European means to, like, actually preserve sovereignity?
Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

In a speech in December before NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly, Dr Adrian Kendry, NATO’s Senior Defence Economist, said that “a big disparity” was beginning to emerge between EU nations and the US and Canada and that while the European emphasis on domestic defence investment was a natural response to the economic crisis, it was “good for the local economy but not the best use of funds…we have to think about collaborative defence expenditure”. Echoing these comments, Canadian parliamentarian Leon Benoit said that if European budgets were proportionately 40% lower than the US, then due to the fragmentation of the European market, it would only be 20 % as effective as US investment.

“We cannot continue with the way things are now,” he said.

Falling budgets have led to increased calls for European collaboration. In a December speech on Europe’s naval defence technological industrial base (DTIB), European Defence Agency chief executive Alexander Weis said that “innovation does not come from the export but from the domestic market…the current naval DTIB is characterised by overcapacities, fragmentation and redundant structures”.

To illustrate his point, Weis said that despite a far inferior defence spend, Europe has 7.2 naval systems, overall, for each US naval system; the continent has seven different types of diesel submarines and 11 different frigates; and most starkly of all, there are 25 naval prime contractors, many of which encompass more than one shipyard.
>He outlined three scenarios which can be applied to the defence industrial base as a whole. In a worst case scenario, industry would continue in its current form, with no consolidation or cooperation; operating profits and costs would come under increasing strain and yards would eventually be unable to compete with cheaper equipment from Asian yards.

A 'single European market scenario' would see consolidation of demand and the creation of EADS-type companies in the naval sector. However, none of the major European shipbuilding countries would abandon their national capacities, making such a scenario unrealistic.

A third, 'realistic scenario' would see the launch of major co-operative projects, such as a logistics ship in the mid term and even an aircraft carrier project in the long term.

"On this basis the European naval industry increases project-oriented co-operation aiming at specialisation while avoiding duplication of capacities and technological capacities," Weis said.

The coming year will certainly see European countries cut their defence budgets even further. More optimistically, however, it could present a unique opportunity. The parlous state of the global economy could lead to more co-operation, less duplication and more rationalisation: a money-saving goal long cherished by many in the industry. With budgetary pressures also weighing heavily in Washington, there is also the potential for more transatlantic industrial co-operation.

http://ukdf.blogspot.com/2009/12/eur...lls-short.html