A statesmanship which can still think of the final catastrophe of another European war in terms of key positions and strategical risks is a matter for tears, but the tears can only turn into hysterical laughter when we are told what the key position is. We imagine the German General Staff, on the eve of invading France through Belgium, reassuring the Kaiser by saying: “Don’t forget, Sire, that we hold the key position of Tanganyika.” We imagine Lord Haig, when warned of the danger of a German break-through in 1918 saying: “Ridiculous! Think of the strategical risks they would be taking; we hold Tanganyika now.” And no doubt the British Cabinet, during the darkest days of the submarine campaign, often unrolled its map of Africa and renewed its confidence with the thought that Tanganyika was still there…
It should still be possible for [the British] to understand how the British Empire appears to the “other fellow.” Not only do we own, as it were, property all over the world, but we insist that there shall be an “all-red route” to that property; and on no account must the all-red route be “threatened.” Luckily for the comparative peace of the world our trade is still borne in ships, and we are content with a selection of ports and islands along its waterways; but in 50 years’ time our “vital need” will be for all-red airways, and the Amery [referring to Leopold Amery whose original letter generated this response by Milne] of the future will contemplate with horror the restoration to Greece of the key position of Athens…
We who announced a little while ago that we would not risk “one single ship” for the greatest ideal of the age, the ideal of collective security, have since announced that we will fight “to the last man” in the defense of any “British interest.” Wherever the foreigner looks, he sees a British interest, wherever he moves, he is reminded that in one step he will be endangering a British interest. Barred from Australia, he enters China: the massacre of women and children begins: and our Ambassador voices the Cabinet’s indignation that on the sacred British Embassy “22 splinters of bombs” were allowed to fall. So peace-loving are we.
There would be more hope, then of what Lord Allen calls “an all-round peace settlement” if we began by realizing that to the rest of the world the British Empire is not a guarantee of peace but a guarantee of trouble; and will continue so to be until for our present motto, “What we have we hold,” we substitute the more gracious one, “Noblesse oblige.” It would also be an advantage if just occasionally we could discard that hypocrisy which, to the foreigner, is so infuriatingly characteristic of England. We announce complacently that we have done all we can for peace: we offered to disarm; we set the example… and so on. Just so might the great landowner offer to reduce the number of his man-traps if the starving villagers threw away their guns and stopped poaching the preserves which he had appropriated from the common land…
Above all, Sir, let us remember, when we talk of strategic risks and key positions, that the tragedy of the next world war will not lie in the result of it but in the happening of it. Compared with the war itself, victory or defeat will be a triviality. To endanger, in however small a degree, the chance of a peace settlement by an intransigent insistence on the key positions in the ensuing war would be criminal folly. To endanger it for a key position in the middle of Africa – O God! O Tanganyika! – there is nothing left to say.
A. A. Milne, The London Times, 21 October 1937, p. 10.
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