Treaty of Versailles - Modern Reappraisal

[Sarmatian]

Then they had a treaty imposed on them at gunpoint.

Which is kinda what happens when you lose the war...

[Louis VI the Fat]

Then they had a treaty imposed on them at gunpoint.

I think you'll find this has been the case ever since Knut the Cavemen waved his large club around and told Ugh-Ugh that no, he can not have the impala.

Or, just about every war is ended at gunpoint. Of course Germany had a surrender imposed on them at gunpoint. 'Pointing guns' at each other, sometimes even actually pulling the trigger and shooting at the other, is exactly what war is.
It is part of the bizarre Versailles lore that Germany was terribly injusticed simply by being subjected to the most basic principles of war.

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In fairness, the Armistice was based on Wilson’s 14 Points. Germany Agreed to them all.

No, this is simply not true.

Germany's surrender was not based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany neither agreed to them, nor had any reason to expect them.

Incidentally, tentative peace offers based on the fourteen points were offered in early 1918, which Germany did not accept, because it still hoped to win the war.

~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~

I am still curious - would these 21 points be at all aceptable as a Treaty, as conduct to make a workable peace?

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Preamble

1 The French original of this Treaty is the only authoritative one. English, German and other translations to be without legal consequence.


2 Germany requests, and the allies confirm, that Germany shall retain its place as Europe’s largest power.

Reconstruction Costs

1 – There shall be no demands of reparations.


2- Germany does not have to pay costs of any kind for the allied military expenditures, or any costs of the war effort.


3 - There shall be only financial claims for reconstructing civil damages


3a- An exception shall be made for the UK. Britain, having sustained no direct civil damges, but facing large pension and disability costs as a result of the war, shall receive a large share of the costs for reconstruction meant for France and Belgium


4 – The costs for reconstruction shall take into account civil damages on all sides, on both sides of the border, including Germany


5 – These reconstruction costs, for both sides of the border, shall be split between the allies and Germany.


6 – These costs must be limited to a small sum


7 – These costs must not be based on actual damage, but on what any of the parties can pay, so as not to obstruct economic recovery. We must look forward, not backward

8 – To prop up Germany, these reconstruction costs shall be divided thus: allies to pay 95%, Germany to pay 5%


9 – To help Germany pay for reconstruction costs, it shall receive aid amounting to 150% of what it will pay towards reconstruction of war damages. That is, for every DM Germany pays, it will receive 1.5DM.

War Guild

7 – There shall be no War Guilt clause, only a legal-technical framework setting and limiting legal liability for reconstruction costs.

Colonial Possessions

8 – Only foreign possesions that have been colonised in the three decades before WWI shall be taken away from Germany.


9 – No foreign possessions with meaningful German settlement shall be taken


10 – The entire amount of German nationals affected by territorial transfer must be limited to no more than 20.000, worldwide.

Territorial Changes

10 – German territorial integrity shall be respected. There shall be no split up of Germany.


12 – Annexetion of German territory to the victorious states must be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, in particular points six to fourteen


13 – In the west, transfer of territory must be striclty limited those territories which have been annexed by Germany since 1864. Traditional German lands must remain unaffected


14 – These territorial transfers must be in accordance with the wishes of the population affected.


15 - An exception to article 13 and 14 shall be made for Belgium. Belgium, whose neutrality was violated and suffered severly, shall be compensated territorially. This compensation will be limited to the two tiny rural villages of Eupen and Malmedy.


16 – In the east, with few exceptions, annexations must be limited to territories of overwhelming and traditional Polish majority

To Make and Retain the Peace

17 – The provisions in this treaty bear a temporary, comditional character. In due time, Germany shall be relieved of its obligations


18 – A United Nations shall be established. This institution shall deal with any disputes arising from this treaty in a peaceful manner.


19 This UN shall be empowered to deal with future conflicts. Reason and the rule of law, not the might of the victors of WWI, shall govern international relations.


20 – This United Nations shall be based in Geneva, Switzerland, and not in the territory of any of the victorious states


21 – Germany shall be made a full member of this UN no later than seven years after this treaty, to ensure Germany’s interests as a restored Great Power will be looked after.

[Fisherking]

Which is kinda what happens when you lose the war...

No, that is not it.

If you decide to buy a house and you sign an earnest money agreement based on a cost you expect the agreement to go through.

If the terms are changed and they say we are keeping your money and you are liable for the balance, don’t you think you might get angry? Especially if you find out you can’t take it to court.

That just might be why they got a little upset and why the Neutrals were asking what ever happened to the 14 Points of Mr. Wilson.

[Fisherking]

~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~

No, this is simply not true.

Germany's surrender was not based on Wilson's Fourteen Points. Consequently, Germany neither agreed to them, nor had any reason to expect them.

Incidentally, tentative peace offers based on the fourteen points were offered in early 1918, which Germany did not accept, because it still hoped to win the war.

~~o~~o~~<<oOo>>~~o~~o~~

If not, then why the additional three points?

What were they haggling over, play dates for the children?

[Pannonian]

No, that is not it.

If you decide to buy a house and you sign an earnest money agreement based on a cost you expect the agreement to go through.

If the terms are changed and they say we are keeping your money and you are liable for the balance, don’t you think you might get angry? Especially if you find out you can’t take it to court.

That just might be why they got a little upset and why the Neutrals were asking what ever happened to the 14 Points of Mr. Wilson.

If the terms were so extravagantly unfair, the Germans could have resumed war. After all, that's what happened to the Russians. Once again, why is there such outrage over Versailles, but none over Brest-Litovsk? The treaty with the Russians was signed after the Fourteen Points was laid out. What did the Allies do that the Germans did not?

[Prince Cobra]

Louis, Sarmatian... The most basic principles of war, perhaps. The most basic principle of diplomacy, no. The problem with winner/loser is that sometimes situation changes and enemies of a certain war are expected to work together. Then this could create certain problems. Making peace is an art that is often underestimated. In addition, too much pieces of the mosaic were absent. Where was Russia (the reason can be obvious but you should always have it in mind) and you have Germany taken out of the Great Powers list (in the very same League of Nations). It is not a random thing somebody (can't remeber his name) called Eastern Europe "no man's land". Btw, this perception (for the perception rule the politics, not facts) led to the treachery to Czechoslovakia in Munich. Anyway, my point was that Great Britain and France as single pillars of the Versailles put it on a sand foundation.

[Prince Cobra]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption, the way I see it. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.

[Louis VI the Fat]

If not, then why the additional three points?

What were they haggling over, play dates for the children?

Meh, I'll let you do the work.

Can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?

I can't prove a negative. You shall have to show us the positive truth of your assertion.

[Pannonian]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.

With Brest-Litovsk, the territories west of a certain line were to be disposed of as Germany and Austria-Hungary saw fit, with the rider "with the agreement of their people", which is effectively worthless. That's the Baltics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine ceded by Russia, to be split up between Germany and Austria-Hungary. And people are arguing that Versailles was harsh and unfair on the Germans.

[TinCow]

Was is wise, or remotely reasonable, for Wilson to demand the Kaisar's abdication, and was the Allied call for him to be tried as a War Criminal justified?

I won't address the War Criminal part, but the abdication part seems to be a totally moot point. If the Kaisar had not abdicated, he would have been overthrown. The German Revolution had already begun before he stepped down, and it became clear very quickly that it had great popular support. That was not temporary support either, as Weimar survived the Kapp Putsch in 1920 purely on the basis of popular support. By late 1918, Germany was done with Kaisars, and nothing could change that.

[Husar]

Hey, losers can't be choosers.

(For some-reason, that came to mind.)

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny.

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

[Beskar]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny.

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

Though if you did that, you are taking it out of context. Unless as a German, you are advocating your nations historical treatment of the jewish population... as the Winners stopped the said Germans from doing those acts, thus they couldn't choose to continue. So arguably in that context, the losers couldn't choose to continue those acts.

Also, Versailles is not a harsh treaty and it never went to "well, fine it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana", it went to "You lost the war, the treaty was fair, there is nothing you could have done, unless you want to continue but lose even more..."

[Pannonian]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny.

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

Versailles was not harsh by the standards of its time, such as the treaty dictated by Germany the year before. If the Germans disliked it that much, they should have returned to arms, and come back to the table after they'd been beaten back another couple of hundred km. Maybe a peace treaty with a line stretching longitudally from Munich, and all German territory west of this to be disposed of by Britain and France, "with the agreement of its people".

[Louis VI the Fat]

I'll say that the next time Auschwitz, Palestine, 9/11 or slavery comes up and I'm sure everybody will find it funny.

It's funny how we went from "Versailles was not a harsh treaty" to "well, fine, it was harsh, but we had the guns, nananana"...

No we haven't gone from 'not harsh', to 'we had guns'.

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.


I am not sure Auschwitz and 9-11 are comparable to states waging war. You are getting uncomfortably close to reasoning that took hold 25 years after Versailles. That Auschwitz was merely justified revenge, a tit-for-tat, doing unto 'them' what they did to us. Then again, I said it before: it is not merely rhetoric to say that Versailles lore caused sixty million deaths.
This is part of the Versailles lore that no serious scholarship can overcome: Germany as the persecuted victim A state that simply loses a war - as states so often do, is not the same as inflicting terrible injustice upon it, never mind mass murder.

[Pannonian]

No we haven't gone from 'not harsh', to 'we had guns'.

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.


I am not sure Auschwitz and 9-11 are comparable to states waging war. You are getting uncomfortably close to reasoning that took hold 25 years after Versailles. That Auschwitz was merely justified revenge, a tit-for-tat, doing unto 'them' what they did to us. Then again, I said it before: it is not merely rhetoric to say that Versailles lore caused sixty million deaths.
This is part of the Versailles lore that no serious scholarship can overcome: Germany as the persecuted victim A state that simply loses a war - as states so often do, is not the same as inflicting terrible injustice upon it, never mind mass murder.

In the run up to Brest-Litovsk, the Russians considered peace, but were dissuaded by the terms demanded by Germany. As they resumed fighting and were pushed back, so the terms became more severe, until they finally agreed peace with worse terms than before.

[TinCow]

We are disputing both 'Versailles was harsh', and 'Versailles was unjust because forced at gunpoint'.
'Versailles was unjust because Germany was forced at gunpoint' - this is saying that Versailles was harsh simply by virtue of Germany losing the war. This is one of the many fundamentally erroneous views about the Treaty. Of course it is harsh to lose a war. But it is preposterous to say that a treaty was unjust simply because it came about based on one side's surrender. By that reasoning, all wars that have been lost and had a treaty based on that circumstance should be considered unjust.

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.' 'Harsh' and 'unjust' are subjective terms, and they are difficult to properly analyze due to changes in international law and diplomacy since 1918. To put it into historical context, the terms of Versailles were certainly far better than were offered to many heavily defeated nations in ancient and medieval times (i.e. Third Punic War), but they were far worse than would be expected today. So, it seems improper to try and impose our own judgment on whether it was right or wrong. The best analysis is simply what happened and why.

I think the key is that, if Germany had been presented with the final terms of Versailles on November 11, I do not believe they would have agreed to them. Germany signed the Armistice on the assumption that they would receive better terms than they eventually did. On that assumption, they began massive demobilization, with the result that they were no longer in a position to refuse any agreement whatsoever when they were presented with Versailles. Thus, Versailles was 'duplicitous' as it was a diplomatic exploitation of the altered German situation in 1919 as compared to 1918. I will not argue that such a maneuver was good or bad, only that it occurred. Indeed, such post-war but pre-treaty shifts in power are very common throughout all of human history and it was and is the normal course of business for nations to negotiate on the basis of present strength, not strength as it stood at some point of time in the past. One side may regard the changed situation as unfair, while the other says it is fair; it is possible that both sides are correct at the same time.

[Pannonian]

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.' 'Harsh' and 'unjust' are subjective terms, and they are difficult to properly analyze due to changes in international law and diplomacy since 1918. To put it into historical context, the terms of Versailles were certainly far better than were offered to many heavily defeated nations in ancient and medieval times (i.e. Third Punic War), but they were far worse than would be expected today. So, it seems improper to try and impose our own judgment on whether it was right or wrong. The best analysis is simply what happened and why.

I think the key is that, if Germany had been presented with the final terms of Versailles on November 11, I do not believe they would have agreed to them. Germany signed the Armistice on the assumption that they would receive better terms than they eventually did. On that assumption, they began massive demobilization, with the result that they were no longer in a position to refuse any agreement whatsoever when they were presented with Versailles. Thus, Versailles was 'duplicitous' as it was a diplomatic exploitation of the altered German situation in 1919 as compared to 1918. I will not argue that such a maneuver was good or bad, only that it occurred. Indeed, such post-war but pre-treaty shifts in power are very common throughout all of human history and it was and is the normal course of business for nations to negotiate on the basis of present strength, not strength as it stood at some point of time in the past. One side may regard the changed situation as unfair, while the other says it is fair; it is possible that both sides are correct at the same time.

How is that different from Germany exploiting the disintegrating Russia and imposing more severe terms than the 1917 Russia might have expected? It's not the Allies' fault if Germany demobbed to avoid furthering the economic strain it already couldn't stand. If Germany didn't like the terms, they could have taken up arms again as the Russians did, and get beaten again as the Russians did, and get presented with even more severe terms as the Russians did. Nothing the Allies did to Germany was in any way worse than what the Germans did to Russia.

[Prince Cobra]

With Brest-Litovsk, the territories west of a certain line were to be disposed of as Germany and Austria-Hungary saw fit, with the rider "with the agreement of their people", which is effectively worthless. That's the Baltics, Poland, Belorus and Ukraine ceded by Russia, to be split up between Germany and Austria-Hungary. And people are arguing that Versailles was harsh and unfair on the Germans.

No, I am almost 100 per cent sure the Central Powers planned to restore the Polish Kingdom, though ruled under a German prince (German dynasties ruled Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, so nothing unusual here).

[TinCow]

How is that different from Germany exploiting the disintegrating Russia and imposing more severe terms than the 1917 Russia might have expected? It's not the Allies' fault if Germany demobbed to avoid furthering the economic strain it already couldn't stand. If Germany didn't like the terms, they could have taken up arms again as the Russians did, and get beaten again as the Russians did, and get presented with even more severe terms as the Russians did. Nothing the Allies did to Germany was in any way worse than what the Germans did to Russia.

I do not claim that it is different.

[spmetla]

Meh, I'll let you do the work.

Can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?

I can't prove a negative. You shall have to show us the positive truth of your assertion.

Below is the German protest to the peace terms:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...anprotest1.htm

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Leader of the German Peace Delegation Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's Letter to Paris Peace Conference President Georges Clemenceau on the Subject of Peace Terms, May 1919

Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the observations of the German delegation on the draft treaty of peace.

We came to Versailles in the expectation of receiving a peace proposal based on the agreed principles. We were firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken. We hoped for the peace of justice which had been promised to us.

We were aghast when we read in documents the demands made upon us, the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we penetrate into the spirit of this treaty, the more convinced we become of the impossibility of carrying it out. The exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.

With a view to the re-establishment of the Polish State we must renounce indisputably German territory - nearly the whole of the Province of West Prussia, which is preponderantly German; of Pomerania; Danzig, which is German to the core; we must let that ancient Hanse town be transformed into a free State under Polish suzerainty.

We must agree that East Prussia shall be amputated from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, including Memel, which is purely German.

We must renounce Upper Silesia for the benefit of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although it has been in close political connection with Germany for more than 750 years, is instinct with German life, and forms the very foundation of industrial life throughout East Germany.

Preponderantly German circles (Kreise) must be ceded to Belgium, without sufficient guarantees that the plebiscite, which is only to take place afterward, will be independent. The purely German district of the Saar must be detached from our empire, and the way must be paved for its subsequent annexation to France, although we owe her debts in coal only, not in men.

For fifteen years Rhenish territory must be occupied, and after those fifteen years the Allies have power to refuse the restoration of the country; in the interval the Allies can take every measure to sever the economic and moral links with the mother country, and finally to misrepresent the wishes of the indigenous population.

Although the exaction of the cost of the war has been expressly renounced, yet Germany, thus cut in pieces and weakened, must declare herself ready in principle to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, which would exceed many times over the total amount of German State and private assets.

Meanwhile her enemies demand, in excess of the agreed conditions, reparation for damage suffered by their civil population, and in this connection Germany must also go bail for her allies. The sum to be paid is to be fixed by our enemies unilaterally, and to admit of subsequent modification and increase. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labour. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour.

In spite of the exorbitant demands, the reconstruction of our economic life is at the same time rendered impossible. We must surrender our merchant fleet. We are to renounce all foreign securities. We are to hand over to our enemies our property in all German enterprises abroad, even in the countries of our allies.

Even after the conclusion of peace the enemy States are to have the right of confiscating all German property. No German trader in their countries will be protected from these war measures. We must completely renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein.

We most thus renounce the realization of all our aims in the spheres of politics, economics, and ideas.

Even in internal affairs we are to give up the right to self-determination. The international Reparation Commission receives dictatorial powers over the whole life of our people in economic and cultural matters. Its authority extends far beyond that which the empire, the German Federal Council, and the Reichstag combined ever possessed within the territory of the empire.

This commission has unlimited control over the economic life of the State, of communities, and of individuals. Further, the entire educational and sanitary system depends on it. It can keep the whole German people in mental thraldom. In order to increase the payments due, by the thrall, the commission can hamper measures for the social protection of the German worker.

In other spheres also Germany's sovereignty is abolished. Her chief waterways are subjected to international administration; she must construct in her territory such canals and such railways as her enemies wish; she must agree to treaties the contents of which are unknown to her, to be concluded by her enemies with the new States on the east, even when they concern her own functions. The German people are excluded from the League of Nations, to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world.

Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence.

Germany knows that she must make sacrifices in order to attain peace. Germany knows that she has, by agreement, undertaken to make these sacrifices, and will go in this matter to the utmost limits of her capacity.

Counter-proposals

1. Germany offers to proceed with her own disarmament in advance of all other peoples, in order to show that she will help to usher in the new era of the peace of justice. She gives up universal compulsory service and reduces her army to 100,000 men, except as regards temporary measures. She even renounces the warships which her enemies are still willing to leave in her hands. She stipulates, however, that she shall be admitted forthwith as a State with equal rights into the League of Nations. She stipulates that a genuine League of Nations shall come into being, embracing all peoples of goodwill, even her enemies of today. The League must be inspired by a feeling of responsibility toward mankind and have at its disposal a power to enforce its will sufficiently strong and trusty to protect the frontiers of its members.

2. In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the greater part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Konigsberg, and Memel, by an agreement regulating the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to insure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order. The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be respected where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned. She is ready to subject all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as its mandatory.

3. Germany is prepared to make payments incumbent on her in accordance with the agreed program of peace up to a maximum sum of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, 20,000,000,000 by May 1, 1926, and the balance (80,000,000,000) in annual payments, without interest. These payments shall in principle be equal to a fixed percentage of the German Imperial and State revenues. The annual payment shall approximate to the former peace budget. For the first ten years the annual payments shall not exceed 1,000,000,000 gold marks a year. The German taxpayer shall not be less heavily burdened than the taxpayer of the most heavily burdened State among those represented on the Reparation Commission. Germany presumes in this connection that she will not have to make any territorial sacrifices beyond those mentioned above and that she will recover her freedom of economic movement at home and abroad.

4. Germany is prepared to devote her entire economic strength to the service of the reconstruction. She wishes to cooperate effectively in the reconstruction of the devastated regions of Belgium and Northern France. To make good the loss in production of the destroyed mines of Northern France, up to 20,000,000 tons of coal will be delivered annually for the first five years, and up to 80,000,000 tons for the next five years. Germany will facilitate further deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg. Germany is, moreover, prepared to make considerable deliveries of benzol, coal tar, and sulphate of ammonia, as well as dyestuffs and medicines.

5. Finally, Germany offers to put her entire merchant tonnage into a pool of the world's shipping, to place at the disposal of her enemies a part of her freight space as part payment of reparation and to build for them for a series of years in German yards an amount of tonnage exceeding their demands.

6. In order to replace the river boats destroyed in Belgium and Northern France, Germany offers river craft from her own resources.

7. Germany thinks that she sees an appropriate method for the prompt fulfilment of her obligation to make reparations conceding participation in coal mines to insure deliveries of coal.

8. Germany, in accordance with the desires of the workers of the whole world, wishes to insure to them free and equal rights. She wishes to insure to them in the Treaty of Peace the right to take their own decisive part in the settlement of social policy and social protection.

9. The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral inquiry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war. Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can leave the peoples lately at war with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

These are only the most important among the proposals which we have to make. As regards other great sacrifices, and also as regards the details, the delegation refers to the accompanying memorandum and the annex thereto.

The time allowed us for the preparation of this memorandum was so short that it was impossible to treat all the questions exhaustively. A fruitful and illuminating negotiation could only take place by means of oral discussion.

This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only.

The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle: "Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it out. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out.

Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades, again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties of peace has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord.

The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace of justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit.

Only the cooperation of all nations, a cooperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before.

The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my distinguished consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

[Louis VI the Fat]

I would say Versailles is best described, not as 'harsh' or 'unjust' but rather as 'duplicitous.'

I myself do not think the German leadership was this extraordinarily naive.

The eventual treaty was not going to be nothing but a temporary breathing space for Germany. No German could've expected this. In fact, I think the German leadership expected a far, far harsher* treaty than they received. Something along the lines of, indeed, Brest-Litovsk, if slightly mpore civilized since not even the Germans expected the West to be as brutal as Germany. Yet for the most part, Germany expected that would be done onto it, as it did unto others. This did not come about, not in the slightest. As for what did come about, any German knew that Alsace-Lorraine was going to be returned, that there would have to be compensation paid for the ravaged territories, that Poland woulod be restored (all of which were incidentally part of the 14 points), that Germany would have to return looted art and equipment.

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

[Sarmatian]

The treaties of Versailles and Brest Litovsk are on a different presumption, the way I see it. By Brest Litovsk Germany granted a freedom a potential satelite of Poland and Ukraine (national states). Germany was one national state, there is difference. Once again, I think Saint Germain treaty for Austria can be a better source for comparing.

No. Those territores were forcefully taken from Russia, there were no plebiscites, nobody asked the population anything. Nobody asked Ukranians and Belorussians whether they want to live in Poland or Russia or want to have their own respective countries. It was simply a matter of the loser being forced to relinquish control of territory because the winner demanded it. There was no liberation there.

[Louis VI the Fat]

Below is the German protest to the peace terms:

http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/...anprotest1.htm

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Leader of the German Peace Delegation Count von Brockdorff-Rantzau's Letter to Paris Peace Conference President Georges Clemenceau on the Subject of Peace Terms, May 1919

Mr. President:

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the observations of the German delegation on the draft treaty of peace.

We came to Versailles in the expectation of receiving a peace proposal based on the agreed principles. We were firmly resolved to do everything in our power with a view of fulfilling the grave obligations which we had undertaken. We hoped for the peace of justice which had been promised to us.

We were aghast when we read in documents the demands made upon us, the victorious violence of our enemies. The more deeply we penetrate into the spirit of this treaty, the more convinced we become of the impossibility of carrying it out. The exactions of this treaty are more than the German people can bear.

With a view to the re-establishment of the Polish State we must renounce indisputably German territory - nearly the whole of the Province of West Prussia, which is preponderantly German; of Pomerania; Danzig, which is German to the core; we must let that ancient Hanse town be transformed into a free State under Polish suzerainty.

We must agree that East Prussia shall be amputated from the body of the State, condemned to a lingering death, and robbed of its northern portion, including Memel, which is purely German.

We must renounce Upper Silesia for the benefit of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, although it has been in close political connection with Germany for more than 750 years, is instinct with German life, and forms the very foundation of industrial life throughout East Germany.

Preponderantly German circles (Kreise) must be ceded to Belgium, without sufficient guarantees that the plebiscite, which is only to take place afterward, will be independent. The purely German district of the Saar must be detached from our empire, and the way must be paved for its subsequent annexation to France, although we owe her debts in coal only, not in men.

For fifteen years Rhenish territory must be occupied, and after those fifteen years the Allies have power to refuse the restoration of the country; in the interval the Allies can take every measure to sever the economic and moral links with the mother country, and finally to misrepresent the wishes of the indigenous population.

Although the exaction of the cost of the war has been expressly renounced, yet Germany, thus cut in pieces and weakened, must declare herself ready in principle to bear all the war expenses of her enemies, which would exceed many times over the total amount of German State and private assets.

Meanwhile her enemies demand, in excess of the agreed conditions, reparation for damage suffered by their civil population, and in this connection Germany must also go bail for her allies. The sum to be paid is to be fixed by our enemies unilaterally, and to admit of subsequent modification and increase. No limit is fixed, save the capacity of the German people for payment, determined not by their standard of life, but solely by their capacity to meet the demands of their enemies by their labour. The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour.

In spite of the exorbitant demands, the reconstruction of our economic life is at the same time rendered impossible. We must surrender our merchant fleet. We are to renounce all foreign securities. We are to hand over to our enemies our property in all German enterprises abroad, even in the countries of our allies.

Even after the conclusion of peace the enemy States are to have the right of confiscating all German property. No German trader in their countries will be protected from these war measures. We must completely renounce our colonies, and not even German missionaries shall have the right to follow their calling therein.

We most thus renounce the realization of all our aims in the spheres of politics, economics, and ideas.

Even in internal affairs we are to give up the right to self-determination. The international Reparation Commission receives dictatorial powers over the whole life of our people in economic and cultural matters. Its authority extends far beyond that which the empire, the German Federal Council, and the Reichstag combined ever possessed within the territory of the empire.

This commission has unlimited control over the economic life of the State, of communities, and of individuals. Further, the entire educational and sanitary system depends on it. It can keep the whole German people in mental thraldom. In order to increase the payments due, by the thrall, the commission can hamper measures for the social protection of the German worker.

In other spheres also Germany's sovereignty is abolished. Her chief waterways are subjected to international administration; she must construct in her territory such canals and such railways as her enemies wish; she must agree to treaties the contents of which are unknown to her, to be concluded by her enemies with the new States on the east, even when they concern her own functions. The German people are excluded from the League of Nations, to which is entrusted all work of common interest to the world.

Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence.

Germany knows that she must make sacrifices in order to attain peace. Germany knows that she has, by agreement, undertaken to make these sacrifices, and will go in this matter to the utmost limits of her capacity.

Counter-proposals

1. Germany offers to proceed with her own disarmament in advance of all other peoples, in order to show that she will help to usher in the new era of the peace of justice. She gives up universal compulsory service and reduces her army to 100,000 men, except as regards temporary measures. She even renounces the warships which her enemies are still willing to leave in her hands. She stipulates, however, that she shall be admitted forthwith as a State with equal rights into the League of Nations. She stipulates that a genuine League of Nations shall come into being, embracing all peoples of goodwill, even her enemies of today. The League must be inspired by a feeling of responsibility toward mankind and have at its disposal a power to enforce its will sufficiently strong and trusty to protect the frontiers of its members.

2. In territorial questions Germany takes up her position unreservedly on the ground of the Wilson program. She renounces her sovereign right in Alsace-Lorraine, but wishes a free plebiscite to take place there. She gives up the greater part of the province of Posen, the district incontestably Polish in population, together with the capital. She is prepared to grant to Poland, under international guarantees, free and secure access to the sea by ceding free ports at Danzig, Konigsberg, and Memel, by an agreement regulating the navigation of the Vistula and by special railway conventions. Germany is prepared to insure the supply of coal for the economic needs of France, especially from the Saar region, until such time as the French mines are once more in working order. The preponderantly Danish districts of Schleswig will be given up to Denmark on the basis of a plebiscite. Germany demands that the right of self-determination shall also be respected where the interests of the Germans in Austria and Bohemia are concerned. She is ready to subject all her colonies to administration by the community of the League of Nations, if she is recognized as its mandatory.

3. Germany is prepared to make payments incumbent on her in accordance with the agreed program of peace up to a maximum sum of 100,000,000,000 gold marks, 20,000,000,000 by May 1, 1926, and the balance (80,000,000,000) in annual payments, without interest. These payments shall in principle be equal to a fixed percentage of the German Imperial and State revenues. The annual payment shall approximate to the former peace budget. For the first ten years the annual payments shall not exceed 1,000,000,000 gold marks a year. The German taxpayer shall not be less heavily burdened than the taxpayer of the most heavily burdened State among those represented on the Reparation Commission. Germany presumes in this connection that she will not have to make any territorial sacrifices beyond those mentioned above and that she will recover her freedom of economic movement at home and abroad.

4. Germany is prepared to devote her entire economic strength to the service of the reconstruction. She wishes to cooperate effectively in the reconstruction of the devastated regions of Belgium and Northern France. To make good the loss in production of the destroyed mines of Northern France, up to 20,000,000 tons of coal will be delivered annually for the first five years, and up to 80,000,000 tons for the next five years. Germany will facilitate further deliveries of coal to France, Belgium, Italy, and Luxemburg. Germany is, moreover, prepared to make considerable deliveries of benzol, coal tar, and sulphate of ammonia, as well as dyestuffs and medicines.

5. Finally, Germany offers to put her entire merchant tonnage into a pool of the world's shipping, to place at the disposal of her enemies a part of her freight space as part payment of reparation and to build for them for a series of years in German yards an amount of tonnage exceeding their demands.

6. In order to replace the river boats destroyed in Belgium and Northern France, Germany offers river craft from her own resources.

7. Germany thinks that she sees an appropriate method for the prompt fulfilment of her obligation to make reparations conceding participation in coal mines to insure deliveries of coal.

8. Germany, in accordance with the desires of the workers of the whole world, wishes to insure to them free and equal rights. She wishes to insure to them in the Treaty of Peace the right to take their own decisive part in the settlement of social policy and social protection.

9. The German delegation again makes its demand for a neutral inquiry into the responsibility for the war and culpable acts in conduct. An impartial commission should have the right to investigate on its own responsibility the archives of all the belligerent countries and all the persons who took an important part in the war. Nothing short of confidence that the question of guilt will be examined dispassionately can leave the peoples lately at war with each other in the proper frame of mind for the formation of the League of Nations.

These are only the most important among the proposals which we have to make. As regards other great sacrifices, and also as regards the details, the delegation refers to the accompanying memorandum and the annex thereto.

The time allowed us for the preparation of this memorandum was so short that it was impossible to treat all the questions exhaustively. A fruitful and illuminating negotiation could only take place by means of oral discussion.

This treaty of peace is to be the greatest achievement of its kind in all history. There is no precedent for the conduct of such comprehensive negotiations by an exchange of written notes only.

The feeling of the peoples who have made such immense sacrifices makes them demand that their fate should be decided by an open, unreserved exchange of ideas on the principle: "Quite open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly in the public view."

Germany is to put her signature to the treaty laid before her and to carry it out. Even in her need, justice for her is too sacred a thing to allow her to stoop to achieve conditions which she cannot undertake to carry out.

Treaties of peace signed by the great powers have, it is true, in the history of the last decades, again and again proclaimed the right of the stronger. But each of these treaties of peace has been a factor in originating and prolonging the world war. Whenever in this war the victor has spoken to the vanquished, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, his words were but the seeds of future discord.

The lofty aims which our adversaries first set before themselves in their conduct of the war, the new era of an assured peace of justice, demand a treaty instinct with a different spirit.

Only the cooperation of all nations, a cooperation of hands and spirits, can build up a durable peace. We are under no delusions regarding the strength of the hatred and bitterness which this war has engendered, and yet the forces which are at work for a union of mankind are stronger now than ever they were before.

The historic task of the Peace Conference of Versailles is to bring about this union.

Accept, Mr. President, the expression of my distinguished consideration.

BROCKDORFF-RANTZAU

Source: Source Records of the Great War, Vol. VII, ed. Charles F. Horne, National Alumni 1923

1) Yes, but - I am going to be a pest here - can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?


2) "The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour
Germany's sovereignty is abolished.
Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence."
[/I]
These are the conclusions of the protest. Hysteria, I have no other word for it. Yet this hysteria was the first, and final, verdict of Germany about the Treaty and formed the basis of Germany's ceaseless obstruction of the peace, no matter how ungrounded, nor what concilliatory measures the allies took. Here is the culprit. Not the Treaty, but nationalist agitation and hysteria.

[Beskar]

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

As TinCow says, go back a hundred years or so, and Germany would have become "North France". World War 1 was the beginning of the liberation process, where there are no longer big Empires, but coalitions of nation states. Germany had to surrender the land it gained from Russia, and West Prussia and return land to France from the Franco-prussian war. Compared to what happened to the Habsburg Empire, this was nothing in comparison. On top of this, they have to pay reperations at the sum of 2% GDP per year. Oh and Germany had to disarm, which is good news economically, as it reduces state-spending.

In return, Germany was left basically in one piece.

A pretty low price, considering the *the long list I could be put here quite easily*.

[TinCow]

I myself do not think the German leadership was this extraordinarily naive.

The eventual treaty was not going to be nothing but a temporary breathing space for Germany. No German could've expected this. In fact, I think the German leadership expected a far, far harsher* treaty than they received. Something along the lines of, indeed, Brest-Litovsk. The Germans expected that would be done onto them, as they did unto others. This did not come about, not in the slightest. As for what did come about, any German knew that Alsace-Lorraine was going to be returned, that there would have to be compensation paid for the ravaged territories, that Poland woulod be restored (all of which were incidentally part of the 14 points), that Germany would have to return looted art and equipment.

* 'Harsh', while indeed a troubled and subjective term, is important here. Because I think your verdict of the 'harshness' is very different from mine. Me, I see Versailles as very lenient, which left Germany fully intact as Europe's greatest power.

No, the German leadership were not that naive, but that is part of the reason why I do not believe they would have signed the agreement. To sign such a treaty when German soil had not even been occupied would have spelled political (and possibly physical) death for those leaders. The question for the German leaders was not whether the treaty was realistic, but whether it would be accepted at home. I do not believe that the German people would have been content with the reparations levels set in Versailles, nor with the War Guilt clause. They had not experienced sufficient suffering yet to support such a treaty.

The important factor in all of this is not the German leadership, it is the German people. 1918-1939 is not Feudal Europe where the national leaders made all the decisions. Public support was required for the Nazis to gain power, and thus it was public perception that was most important. In this case, the public perceived Versailles as being a 'cheat' by the French which exploited German 'good will.' The Stab-in-the-back Myth worked because sufficient people believed it, not because it was true.

In fact, I would say that had Germany been presented with the Versailles terms on November 11 and continued to fight, the final treaty would have been harsher (agreed on its use here) than even Versailles was, for the same reasons cited by others for Brest-Litovsk. However, if the Germany population had been forced to personally experience the horrors of war on their own territory, they likely would have been far less willing to believe the propaganda that led them to WW2. In the long run, it might actually have saved more lives if WWI had continued into 1919.

[spmetla]

1) Yes, but - I am going to be a pest here - can you show us the treaty / ceasefire / surrender where Germany agrees to the Fourteen / Seventeen points? Or show us any part of any treaty which left any room to expect it was based on these 14/17 points?


2) "The German people would thus be condemned to perpetual slave labour
Germany's sovereignty is abolished.
Thus must a whole people sign the decree for its proscription, nay, its own death sentence."
[/I]
These are the conclusions of the protest. Hysteria, I have no other word for it. Yet this hysteria was the first, and final, verdict of Germany about the Treaty and formed the basis of Germany's ceaseless obstruction of the peace, no matter how ungrounded, nor what concilliatory measures the allies took. Here is the culprit. Not the Treaty, but nationalist agitation and hysteria.

While I can't find a document that explicity says that the Germans signed the armistice based on the fourteen points just about every source I've read points or alludes to it. Here, I'll try to post some.

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401800255.html

German military leaders acknowledged in October 1918 that their country had been defeated and, seeking more favorable terms than they were likely to obtain from Britain or France, appealed to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson for an armistice based on the Fourteen Points.

http://www.answers.com/topic/1918-armistice

In October the Austro-Hungarian and German governments separately proposed an armistice to US Pres Wilson, preliminary to a peace conference based on his ‘Fourteen Points’.

I do understand though that Wilson's 14 points ammounted to no more than propaganda and that he did not have the authority to decide peace terms for the British Empire and France. I'll try and find a souce for it but from what i understand is that Prince von Baden proposed the 1918 offensive because he actually found the 14 points unacceptable and was hoping that by grabbing more French territory that he could negotiate from a position of strenght, though this of course failed utterly and caused a tremendous reversal.

[Beskar]

In fact, I would say that had Germany been presented with the Versailles terms on November 11 and continued to fight, the final treaty would have been harsher (agreed on its use here) than even Versailles was, for the same reasons cited by others for Brest-Litovsk. However, if the Germany population had been forced to personally experience the horrors of war on their own territory, they likely would have been far less willing to believe the propaganda that led them to WW2. In the long run, it might actually have saved more lives if WWI had continued into 1919.

You could argue that the government had the foresight to know that continuing was simply futile. All in all, you are completely outgunned, surrounded, and only one left in your alliance still able to fight and America just joined the war on your enemies side. Isn't going "hey, we surrender." Leaving your country pretty much intact and lesser terms the best thing to do?

Otherwise, you are simply saying the allies would have been justified in destroying half the nation and imposing significantly tougher terms on Germany and allowing far more causalities and deaths in an already bloody war.

[Louis VI the Fat]

No, the German leadership were not that naive, but that is part of the reason why I do not believe they would have signed the agreement. To sign such a treaty when German soil had not even been occupied would have spelled political (and possibly physical) death for those leaders. The question for the German leaders was not whether the treaty was realistic, but whether it would be accepted at home.

But...the treaty did spell political suicide and that is why the then German leadership did not sign it indeed. That's why the emperor abdicated, and that is why the Prusiian military caste - this state within a state, this state over the state which had assumed control over Germany - who realised perfectly well what was coming, quickly retreated politically and left the handling of the treaty to the civil government. Which therefore became forever tainted. And who thus sought to regain and maintain legitimacy by undermining the treaty and the peace.

The rest of the post I think I agree with. Certainly with the part that even a few more months of war - two, three - would've sufficed. Alternatively - rather than waste a million German lives in this manner - the German government and especially the military caste could've made clear to their people that indeed Germany had been fully defeated. Instead of trying to pass the buck and encourage dangerous fairy tales.

While I can't find a document that explicity says that the Germans signed the armistice based on the fourteen points just about every source I've read points or alludes to it.

To be fair: you won't find any such document. It is a fable. One of many that keeps being repeated in spite of cold, hard fact.
Germany did seek, at several instances, 'peace without victory'. This it did after it was defeated, hence obviously was an illusion.

We all dream of 'wage aggressive war with plenty of spoils in victory, but no consequences in defeat'. But it takes a Prussian Junker to mewl like a piglet about it when it is not granted.



Edit: good points, Beskar.

[TinCow]

You could argue that the government had the foresight to know that continuing was simply futile. All in all, you are completely outgunned, surrounded, and only one left in your alliance still able to fight and America just joined the war on your enemies side. Isn't going "hey, we surrender." Leaving your country pretty much intact and lesser terms the best thing to do?

Otherwise, you are simply saying the allies would have been justified in destroying half the nation and imposing significantly tougher terms on Germany and allowing far more causalities and deaths in an already bloody war.

You ascribe to those that made the decision the ability to have absolute foresight of the result. That ability has never been blessed on any human, particularly not on diplomats or politicians. All that would be required would be the belief in the leaders that if they continued to fight, they could get better terms that would outweight the costs of that fighting. That is a reasonable response, and many nations at war have improved their final circumstances by holding out and inflicting horrible casualties on the enemy, even when their own defeat was inevitable. It is even possible that it could have happened in this case. Like I said above, I believe that Germany would have ended up in an even worse situation had they continued fighting, but there is sufficient doubt in war to allow for the possibility that the Germans could have bled the Allies sufficiently in 1919 to make them relax their demands somewhat. It is that possibility that would have factored into the cost-benefit analysis that the German leaders would have to have considered.

It was clear in 1919 that the German public strongly believed that it would have been better to continue fighting than to agree to Versailles, except that they no longer had the military strength to continue the fight. Had they had that strength, as they did on November 11, they would almost certainly have rejected the peace and gambled on the improvement in 1919.

[Fisherking]

Okay Lewis, here goes. I will stand corrected.

The whole thing is a bag of worms worthy of the condemnation of everyone involved...

Germany opened negotiations based upon the 14 points. In having to democratize the government the German Army cynically contrived to place the blame on the political parties.

The Entente on the other hand had no intentions of agreeing to the 14 points because they were only a propaganda instrument. They didn’t come out and say that to the Germans however, they just imposed more conditions.

The Army was left to negotiate the ceasefire and they panicked and agreed to just about anything.

After the Armistice the civilian government expected to negotiate dealing with the 14 points. (the additional 3 were all military).

They got a surprise when they showed up at the peace conference and were told they were not permitted to negotiate, the terms were what ever the Allies said they were, take it or leave it.

You can say that the Germans were stupid or that the Entente was duplicitous and both would be correct.

I would say it is a low point for international relations and there is more than enough shame to go around for all the principals.

You have a choice. You can condemn the German reaction, because they were actually not promised anything. Or you can say it was a stab in the back because the Germans were duped.

There was no small amount of dissention on the allied side either, over what had been done. Diplomats resigned during the drafting of the treaty. Books were written telling how Germany was being betrayed.

It was not Germanys views that they had been betrayed that took root in allied nations, it was the view of many in the diplomatic service of the allied countries.

So duplicitous is not a bad term in describing the allied position.

So, who was in the right? Nobody! Or maybe the victims were the German People, but in a Nationalistic Rage they brought more suffering to themselves.

I would have imported much of the text but for some reason it won’t let me...so if you really, really want to know...never mind...you don’t actually want to go through this disgusting crap.