Is Caesar overrated as general?

[Macilrille]

There are many sources that refer to the pre-Caesarian conflict in Gaul. People often make the mistake in defining the war in Gaul with total war (which Gauls did NOT do) vs. military depletion on the battlefield. Theres a big difference in this as the former refers to total destruction basically anything of value including sometimes non combatants. The latter is primarily focused on the the actual fighters and those in the military.

Yes, as I said, the anthropologists has a fancy name for it, but I forgot- my brain is not working properly today. However, I fail to see this and your last statement as contradicting me. Except that I find it hard to believe that all the top-level warriors were gone. In my interpretation of things, the constant internal strife within the Gallic and especially German tribes and lands would keep the warriors well-trained and used to war. Veterans of a sort, and the urbanisation that preceeded the Roman takeover would be (as is the traditional interpretation of urbanisation) a step in the centralisation and strengthening of State(s).

I fail to see the sources for your quote 1, and do not know where you found it. What is his sources? If "A Short History of the Roman Republic" by W. E. Heitland; Cambridge University Press, 1911 I am sorry, but much new evidence and interpretations has been presented since then, so I do not know it it is much more valid than Gibbon's thesis on the collapse of Rome. It may be, but I find it suspect.


The quote on Ariovistus I believe would be this one

If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor.

in this translation.

However it is part of a much larger content, so let us look at that and apply the Historian's trademark, source criticism.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Chapter 39

While he is tarrying a few days at Vesontio, on account of corn and provisions; from the inquiries of our men and the reports of the Gauls and traders (who asserted that the Germans were men of huge stature, of incredible valor and practice in arms - that oftentimes they, on encountering them, could not bear even their countenance, and the fierceness of their eyes) - so great a panic on a sudden seized the whole army, as to discompose the minds and spirits of all in no slight degree. This first arose from the tribunes of the soldiers, the prefects and the rest, who, having followed Caesar from the city [Rome] from motives of friendship, had no great experience in military affairs. And alleging, some of them one reason, some another, which they said made it necessary for them to depart, they requested that by his consent they might be allowed to withdraw; some, influenced by shame, stayed behind in order that they might avoid the suspicion of cowardice. These could neither compose their countenance, nor even sometimes check their tears: but hidden in their tents, either bewailed their fate, or deplored with their comrades the general danger. Wills were sealed universally throughout the whole camp. By the expressions and cowardice of these men, even those who possessed great experience in the camp, both soldiers and centurions, and those [the decurions] who were in command of the cavalry, were gradually disconcerted. Such of them as wished to be considered less alarmed, said that they did not dread the enemy, but feared the narrowness of the roads and the vastness of the forests which lay between them and Ariovistus, or else that the supplies could not be brought up readily enough. Some even declared to Caesar, that when he gave orders for the camp to be moved and the troops to advance, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, nor advance in consequence of their fear.

Chapter 40

When Caesar observed these things, having called a council, and summoned to it the centurions of all the companies, he severely reprimanded them, "particularly, for supposing that it belonged to them to inquire or conjecture, either in what direction they were marching, or with what object. That Ariovistus, during his [Caesar's] consulship, had most anxiously sought after the friendship of the Roman people; why should any one judge that he would so rashly depart from his duty? He for his part was persuaded, that, when his demands were known and the fairness of the terms considered, he would reject neither his nor the Roman people's favor. But even if, driven on by rage and madness, he should make war upon them, what after all were they afraid of? - or why should they despair either of their own valor or of his zeal? Of that enemy a trial had been made within our fathers' recollection, when, on the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones by Caius Marius, the army was regarded as having deserved no less praise than their commander himself. It had been made lately, too, in Italy, during the rebellion of the slaves, whom, however, the experience and training which they had received from us, assisted in some respect. From which a judgment might be formed of the advantages which resolution carries with it inasmuch as those whom for some time they had groundlessly dreaded when unarmed, they had afterward vanquished, when well armed and flushed with success. In short, that these were the same men whom the Helvetii, in frequent encounters, not only in their own territories, but also in theirs [the German], have generally vanquished, and yet can not have been a match for our army. If the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls disquieted any, these, if they made inquiries, might discover that, when the Gauls had been tired out by the long duration of the war, Ariovistus, after he had many months kept himself in his camp and in the marshes, and had given no opportunity for an engagement, fell suddenly upon them, by this time despairing of a battle and scattered in all directions, and was victorious more through stratagem and cunning than valor. But though there had been room for such stratagem against savage and unskilled men, not even [Ariovistus] himself expected that thereby our armies could be entrapped. That those who ascribed their fear to a pretense about the [deficiency of] supplies and the narrowness of the roads, acted presumptuously, as they seemed either to distrust their general's discharge of his duty, or to dictate to him. That these things were his concern; that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones were to furnish the corn; and that it was already ripe in the fields; that as to the road they would soon be able to judge for themselves. As to its being reported that the soldiers would not be obedient to command, or advance, he was not at all disturbed at that; for he knew, that in the case of all those whose army had not been obedient to command, either upon some mismanagement of an affair, fortune had deserted them, or, that upon some crime being discovered, covetousness had been clearly proved [against them]. His integrity had been seen throughout his whole life, his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That he would therefore instantly set about what he had intended to put off till a more distant day, and would break up his camp the next night, in the fourth watch, that he might ascertain, as soon as possible, whether a sense of honor and duty, or whether fear had more influence with them. But that, if no one else should follow, yet he would go with only the tenth legion, of which he had no misgivings, and it should be his praetorian cohort." This legion Caesar had both greatly favored, and in it, on account of its valor, placed the greatest confidence.

Chapter 41

Upon the delivery of this speech, the minds of all were changed in a surprising manner, and the highest ardor and eagerness for prosecuting the war were engendered; and the tenth legion was the first to return thanks to him, through their military tribunes, for his having expressed this most favorable opinion of them; and assured him that they were quite ready to prosecute the war. Then, the other legions endeavored, through their military tribunes and the centurions of the principal companies, to excuse themselves to Caesar, [saying] that they had never either doubted or feared, or supposed that the determination of the conduct of the war was theirs and not their general's. Having accepted their excuse, and having had the road carefully reconnoitered by Divitiacus, because in him of all others he had the greatest faith [he found] that by a circuitous route of more than fifty miles he might lead his army through open parts; he then set out in the fourth watch, as he had said [he would]. On the seventh day, as he did not discontinue his march, he was informed by scouts that the forces of Ariovistus were only four and twenty miles distant from ours.

Now, of course it is all part of the larger context of showing the danger of the Germans in order to justify Caesar's actions against them, and highlight his skill as a commander. However, there can be little doubt that there was fear in the advancing Roman army. Not only is there always some sense of fear before battle, but there was also the well-known "Barbarian Fear" of Romans, most especially they feared the wild Germans, partly because they were largely an unknown factor and we always tend to let our imagination run wild about such. So, caesar gives a speech in which he calms the fears of the soldiers. he does this by making light of the Germans' prowess saying that they themselves had beaten the helvetii who often beat the germans, and that only the exhaustion of a long war had allowed them to beat the Aedui (though of course the Suebi campaigning away from their homelands would have been at least as bad off, living on campaign...). he then goes on to other encouragements. However, the crucial thing in his eulogi is the context. In such contexts exaggerations were often used, not least by Caesar (and in this very speech as well). It can be compared to the belief before "Market garden" and "Wacht am Rhein" that Germany was devoid of resources and had only boys and old men for defence. So as I see it, this is no evidence of how things were. the Aedui might have been weak, but were they more weak than usual and would their manpower have suffered worse than what the past three generations of Roman bloodletting had? We have no idea from this quote.


As for Caesar's Strategy in the Gallic War I must again ask for its sources and age. What sources makes its author state as he does? Where does he have his information from? It also sound pretty high on the rhetorical (and possibly biased) side, but that may just be sugaring the pill (most historians write as boringly as I), but blanket statements full of rhetoric... It is not my cup of tea. To me, it looks suspect and he states no sources at all. As long as he does not, I have to dismiss it again.

Vercingetorix' levy is the most convincing hint. However, right before he is menyioned, lots of other nobles are and as the carnutes operate effectively already with their traditional warbands of nobles, this might again be rhetorics for the reason of underlining Caesar's deeds. It may also be by the simple explanation that in order to oppose the Legions the normal small elite warbands will not suffice and a levy has to be raised. This is the usual practise of barbarians after all, who cannot afford large standing armies. In fact Vercingetorix starts by summoning his dependents, IE the minor nobles in his alliance depending on his leadership and forming his retinue. the word desperate might be a mere trick of the author to show the folly of resisting Caesar. Thus, though tantalising, that quote presents us with no evidence that Gaul was exhausted, starving and depleted of warriors, and certainly not that the bloodletting in Gaul before the invasion was worse than that in Italy.

O' Hogain is right though. The germans and Romans both made inroad in the Celtic world and this might have led to internal strife, but external pressure is one of the things that is important in the formation of states; the communication of autopoietic systems if you will. And the combination Celtic-German did also lead to at least one very strong and thriving tribe, the Marcomanni, not merely to the annihilation of the Celts.

that has little to do with the original bones of contention:

1) Whether gaul was devoid of warriors and resources and Caesar thus merely had to waltz in and take what he wished from the few starving inhabitants. And thus Caesar not being a great general at all.

2) Whether the bloodletting in Gaul, which P2T1 has hinted might have been worse than usual in the last century before the conquest (but merely hinted), was worse than that of the late Roman Republic.

And in none of these do I see us actually contradict each other.

So thanks, but I feel little more enlightened than before and eagerly await Intranetusa's analysis and evidence on which he builds his statements.


Sorry, my shift key is not as it should be.

[Power2the1]

Yes, as I said, the anthropologists has a fancy name for it, but I forgot- my brain is not working properly today. However, I fail to see this and your last statement as contradicting me. Except that I find it hard to believe that all the top-level warriors were gone. In my interpretation of things, the constant internal strife within the Gallic and especially German tribes and lands would keep the warriors well-trained and used to war. Veterans of a sort, and the urbanisation that preceeded the Roman takeover would be (as is the traditional interpretation of urbanisation) a step in the centralisation and strengthening of State(s).

I fail to see the sources for your quote 1, and do not know where you found it. What is his sources? If "A Short History of the Roman Republic" by W. E. Heitland; Cambridge University Press, 1911 I am sorry, but much new evidence and interpretations has been presented since then, so I do not know it it is much more valid than Gibbon's thesis on the collapse of Rome. It may be, but I find it suspect.


As for Caesar's Strategy in the Gallic War I must again ask for its sources and age. What sources makes its author state as he does? Where does he have his information from? It also sound pretty high on the rhetorical (and possibly biased) side, but that may just be sugaring the pill (most historians write as boringly as I), but blanket statements full of rhetoric... It is not my cup of tea. To me, it looks suspect and he states no sources at all. As long as he does not, I have to dismiss it again.

Vercingetorix' levy is the most convincing hint. However, right before he is menyioned, lots of other nobles are and as the carnutes operate effectively already with their traditional warbands of nobles, this might again be rhetorics for the reason of underlining Caesar's deeds. It may also be by the simple explanation that in order to oppose the Legions the normal small elite warbands will not suffice and a levy has to be raised. This is the usual practise of barbarians after all, who cannot afford large standing armies. In fact Vercingetorix starts by summoning his dependents, IE the minor nobles in his alliance depending on his leadership and forming his retinue. the word desperate might be a mere trick of the author to show the folly of resisting Caesar. Thus, though tantalising, that quote presents us with no evidence that Gaul was exhausted, starving and depleted of warriors, and certainly not that the bloodletting in Gaul before the invasion was worse than that in Italy.

O' Hogain is right though. The germans and Romans both made inroad in the Celtic world and this might have led to internal strife, but external pressure is one of the things that is important in the formation of states; the communication of autopoietic systems if you will. And the combination Celtic-German did also lead to at least one very strong and thriving tribe, the Marcomanni, not merely to the annihilation of the Celts.

that has little to do with the original bones of contention:

1) Whether gaul was devoid of warriors and resources and Caesar thus merely had to waltz in and take what he wished from the few starving inhabitants. And thus Caesar not being a great general at all.

2) Whether the bloodletting in Gaul, which P2T1 has hinted might have been worse than usual in the last century before the conquest (but merely hinted), was worse than that of the late Roman Republic.

And in none of these do I see us actually contradict each other.

So thanks, but I feel little more enlightened than before and eagerly await Intranetusa's analysis and evidence on which he builds his statements.


Sorry, my shift key is not as it should be.

No prob man. The article are rather 'old' and there is a reason for this. They hold their weight today and have certainly not been overruled. Compare the few new articles on this topic vs. the older ones, say pre 1960. You find much more information and a break down of paragraphs/passages in the older articles, this I guarantee. Newer articles are exceedingly brief and tend to rush through everything sadly. Again, this I have seen for myself. A class example is World of the Celts, by Simon James. He it states that Gaul was rather well off overall and alludes to the agricultural level and the infrastructure (which is not at all contested by newer or older sources), but here says nothing about the condition of the military, not even a paragraph or a couple sentences. The topic of the Gallic military in the Gallic War seems to be (but is not) taboo among modern authors. You'll be lucky to get more that two sentences about it, that is, detailing the warriors and the overall situation itself against their enemies.. The older ones,despite their 'age,' delve right in and give a great amount of opinions and facts which one surprisingly learns much more.

If you have access to academic databases like Blackwell, Wiley, and JSTOR, yo can read much on these things.

I cannot tell you how many time I have started, but stopped, on a .pdf with sweeping information about the Gallic military long before and leading up to and in the Gallic War. I really should stick with it next time. I can release it to the public without a copyright issue

Really, if you take the Gallic War alone, Caesar does mention the violent warfare between the Aedui and Arverni. This is not a 'hint' at all but a statement of fact. In 121 B.C. the Romans defeated, heavily, the Arverni. The power vacuum would have certainly resulted in typical warfare as he Arverni tried to maintain their control of trade and hegemony among the 'lesser' tribes and their allies and dependents. from there the conflict might have started, or it could have achieved impetus much later on. We do not know. We know the Cimbri and Teutone were no friends of the Aedui and Arverni either, but little is said about what went on in Gaul militarily, at this time (one would think that 100,000's of families and people moving through would need food, and the breadbasket was Gaul above all others). But what we do know is these two powers sought supremacy through warfare, and apparently the "many years" of this ongoing war were not going to end anytime soon. Thus Caesar ride in and saves the Gauls from themselves and the Germans.

[Macilrille]

The article are rather 'old' and there is a reason for this. They hold their weight today and have certainly not been overruled. Compare the few new articles on this topic vs. the older ones, say pre 1960. You find much more information and a break down of paragraphs/passages in the older articles, this I guarantee. Newer articles are exceedingly brief and tend to rush through everything sadly. Again, this I have seen for myself. A class example is World of the Celts, by Simon James. He it states that Gaul was rather well off overall and alludes to the agricultural level and the infrastructure (which is not at all contested by newer or older sources), but here says nothing about the condition of the military, not even a paragraph or a couple sentences. The topic of the Gallic military in the Gallic War seems to be (but is not) taboo among modern authors. You'll be lucky to get more that two sentences about it, that is, detailing the warriors and the overall situation itself against their enemies.. The older ones,despite their 'age,' delve right in and give a great amount of opinions and facts which one surprisingly learns much more.

Maybe, but the problem with the old fellows is that back then source critisicism was not really applied- or in its infancy. And that new interpretations have come forth. I know little of gaul, but if we look at the Danish viking and middle ages where I am an expert (and have myself had no little part in the new understanding), little of what was written 100 years ago has any usefulness. There are many reasons for this and things will get boring if I start rambling. But much has happened in historical scholarship the last century.

If you have access to academic databases like Blackwell, Wiley, and JSTOR, yo can read much on these things.

I do not, I probably could get it, but TBH I am not too keen on Celts. It is my own history I am interested in, IE Denmark-> Germans and Rome.

Really, if you take the Gallic War alone, Caesar does mention the violent warfare between the Aedui and Arverni. This is not a 'hint' at all but a statement of fact.

No it is not, as I have shown above the statement should not be taken at face value, but have source criticism applied to it. I did this in my last post and believe that I exhibited both how one applies S C (the tool of trade of any historian and the only thing distinguishing us from artists and writers of fiction), and that Caesar's statement does not hold up to scrutiny as a statement of fact. If you believed such statements consider that Hitler stated as fact that UK was finished and the war over in 1940. And that Montgomery et al stated as fact that the Germans had only old men and young boys left with which to defend. Find any veteran of Arnhem and ask him about the truth of that statement.
You cannot believe such, for the actual application of Source Criticism to Caesar, see my last post.

In 121 B.C. the Romans defeated, heavily, the Arverni. The power vacuum would have certainly resulted in typical warfare as he Arverni tried to maintain their control of trade and hegemony among the 'lesser' tribes and their allies and dependents. from there the conflict might have started, or it could have achieved impetus much later on. We do not know. We know the Cimbri and Teutone were no friends of the Aedui and Arverni either, but little is said about what went on in Gaul militarily, at this time (one would think that 100,000's of families and people moving through would need food, and the breadbasket was Gaul above all others). But what we do know is these two powers sought supremacy through warfare, and apparently the "many years" of this ongoing war were not going to end anytime soon. Thus Caesar ride in and saves the Gauls from themselves and the Germans.

The crucial thing here is, as you say, We do not know", it is all interpretation and guesswork. And again, you should not take the numbers of the Kêmbroz literally, the numbers given for them in the ancient sources would have comprised an estimated half to third of the population of Germany at this point. Ancient sources always exaggerate enemy nymbers and hide their own losses. In this very thread was mentioned L. C. Sulla's 20-man loss, as an evident example.

If the warfare and losses in Gaul were so bad we would not see a rising urbanisation and trade, quite the opposite. Urbanisation and trade cannot thrive in an environment of strife and violence. Cities are too juicy targets for enemies if there is no strong protection. Now, I do not know much about Gallic history, but I do know that we see an increase in urbanisation and trade. This would be evidence against the dearth of warriors and power vacuum. I also very well know the application of source criticism, I was good at it before I took my degree and it was hammered in further during the years at uni.

So, I persist in saying that we can say nothing of the losses of Gallic warriors on the basis of the sources cited. I also persist especially in saying that Intranetusa is mistaken to claim that Caesar had but to walk in and kick a few old men and starving women and Gaul was his. And lastly I definately persist in claiming that Caivs Ivlivs Caesar deserves praise as one of the great military and political minds of our history.

[Power2the1]

There are more critcisms of Caesar and classical authors than one can imagine...its everywhere. I do not keep up with roman things of that nature unless it deals directly with the Celts. I fully agree with the view, that you echo, about new interpretations coming to light. I laugh to myself when I see Celtic info from the 19th century; good stuff that is! Let me ask you something so I can gauge your own 'discipline' on historical interpretations: If published material is not modern, yet hold views that are either accepted, or not overturned through new discoveries, do you accept it or give it a skeptical slant? Just curious is all and I am not forcing anyone to subscribe to anything, however, whats interesting to me at least is my old EB1 predecessors in the Celtic area all agreed that from what Caesar said, and did not say (indirect evidence), that the Gauls were worse off against the Romans and Germans due to what warfare/conflict had already been going on for some great length of time between themselves.

I honestly wish there was some kind of effort to publish a nice article on the Celts/Gauls by those who have more time than I do to do so.

[Macilrille]

I treat all sources and interpretations of sources the same. I filter them through my own critical eye and test them as much as I am able to against other sources and information. that is, after all, what I was brainwashed to do at uni- and did already ;-)

At the H-War mailing list there was just (is still in fact) a discussion on how to treat david Irvine's work as Unis in Australia directly downgrade students who quote him no matter what they quote him on. Now David irvine is a Holocaust denier and revisionist and as such I spit upon him and refuse to believe that part of his work, but some of his earlier stuff is actually good scholarship, so where it has nothing to do with revisionism and Holocaust denial, it is usable. Everything must always be reviewed by the critical eye of the scholar before he uses it. Nothing accepted at face value or taken for granted.

As for Celts, they do not hold much interest for me; they got third place in the competetion with Germans and Romans for power in N Europe. All very simplified off course. Thing is, for some reason it is Germans and Rome that interests me- perhaps because the merger of those two made Europe of today, perhaps because I am a war-liking psycho, perhaps because the Celts lost, perhaps because I am a "German", I dunno.

An in-depth analysis of Gallic history with all known evidence taken into account would be interesting though. I might read that as Celts did have a huge impact on Germans and was conquered by one of my favorite Romans.

[Parallel Pain]

If the warfare and losses in Gaul were so bad we would not see a rising urbanisation and trade, quite the opposite. Urbanisation and trade cannot thrive in an environment of strife and violence. Cities are too juicy targets for enemies if there is no strong protection. Now, I do not know much about Gallic history, but I do know that we see an increase in urbanisation and trade. This would be evidence against the dearth of warriors and power vacuum. I also very well know the application of source criticism, I was good at it before I took my degree and it was hammered in further during the years at uni.

Sorry I have to disagree with this. The city walls are great protection against an enemy army. Trade goods are a necessity of war.

During prolonged period of war, like say over a century of constant warfare, someone somewhere down the line would realize that centralizing power would allow them to mobilize more troops which means they have a higher chance of winning. Cities aid in administration, which increases centralization. Warfare requires improving travel/communication infrastructure for troops/information travel, which both increases centralization and is made better by a centralized government. This also allows merchants to travel around better. Governments also need food to feed troops, iron to make weapons and armors for troops, and money to pay troops. What better way to get these stuff than making merchants do it? Even during times of Total War warring nations could agree not hindering merchants of any party unless they were caught as spies. This is because trade is paying everyone, and it would hurt one's own nation more to blockade and stop trade than increase its chance of victory over rivals.

During these periods urbanization would also increase. Against a squad of 10 pillaging soldiers a farming family is just prey. But what about 10 farming families? What about 30 gathered together in a small village with pallisades around it? What about a citiy with thousands of families and a huge wall? The people would gather together for mutual protection. They would also take advantage of trading/administrative opportunities to go to towns and cities, further increasing urbanization.

I bring you the Chinese Spring and Autumn/Warring States period and the Japanese Sengoku Jidai, both of which could be classified as "Total War"

Now I am not saying that's what happened in Gaul. I am saying you can't say because there was an increase in urbanization and trade it is impossible for the period to have been during or immediately after a period of extremely bloody conflict and civil strife. I think what determines whether the "civil wars" leads to "ruralization" and "power vacuum" leads to "power sharing", or if they lead to "urbanization" and "centralization of power (locally)" is population number. Whether or not during this time of conflict there has been enough babies being born to replace the ones dying of violence, famine, and disease which all inevitablly increase during such periods. If the answer is yes, or that there is more than enough and population's actually increasing (centralization+ urbanization = better irrigation/agricultural project = increase food output = increase in population) then prolonged periods of war leads to urbanization and centralization.

However I do have to agree that such a long period of warfare would have created a large number of fighting professionals and maintained or even increased that number compaired to previous. Constant warfare lasting multiple generations would not have decreased this number (at this percentage wise) in general but increased it. The only time when it would decrease would be after a certain devastating battle/campaign/war that is part of the general period. And that number would recover (though it would take time).

In the end what made the difference I believe (besides Caesar's personal genius) was that the Celtic military AFAIK comprised of a core and relatively small number of professional fighting elites backed by large number of seasonal untrained levies. This was the system during many age and place in the far east as well. The bad side being of course the untrained farmer levies are unreliable, their quality varied greatly, lower morale, seasonal campaigning, and depending greatly on the cores of elites for inspiration. Facing these the Romans had a professional conscript force with at least basic training, better logistical organization, year round (in theory) campaigning ability, and a heck of a lot of other edges over the former kind of military.


@Intranetusa
I have to say that is not the best point to argue against Caesar. It has been repeatedly mentioned in this thread that the Gallic Wars are not Caesar's only triumph. He did pretty much completely flatten all opposition in the Civil Wars.
Also he killing off all remaining resistence has nothing to do with military ability. Was it cruel? Sure. But it was a more or less exceptable practice. And it would only darken his reputation as a conqueror, not as a military genius.

[Power2the1]

However I do have to agree that such a long period of warfare would have created a large number of fighting professionals and maintained or even increased that number compaired to previous. Constant warfare lasting multiple generations would not have decreased this number (at this percentage wise) in general but increased it. The only time when it would decrease would be after a certain devastating battle/campaign/war that is part of the general period. And that number would recover (though it would take time).

In the end what made the difference I believe (besides Caesar's personal genius) was that the Celtic military AFAIK comprised of a core and relatively small number of professional fighting elites backed by large number of seasonal untrained levies. This was the system during many age and place in the far east as well. The bad side being of course the untrained farmer levies are unreliable, their quality varied greatly, lower morale, seasonal campaigning, and depending greatly on the cores of elites for inspiration. Facing these the Romans had a professional conscript force with at least basic training, better logistical organization, year round (in theory) campaigning ability, and a heck of a lot of other edges over the former kind of military.

Well said. I do see where you are coming from, however, I am in slight disagreement with the statement of prolonged war would equate to more fighting professional warriors. Its undisputed that the Gauls at this time were under the fist of a small group of powerful nobles within their respective state or tribe. When the Arverni and Aedui go to war, certainly the main deaths would be from this circle of professionals (Marines go ashore to engage the enemy and people die, its not to be guys still on the ship becoming casualties). These professionals were the main ones soaking up the losses and if they did levy a host of other non professionals, they would have soaked up the casualties too. Loss of life would be the major effect of this warfare. Gauls were not big on extending the war to non combatants generally, nor demolishing and rampaging everything in their path, and I know for a fact that theres no sign of large scale burning and destruction in the archaeological record at this time. Replacement of skilled and professional warriors cannot sustain casualties when you are already a small group to begin with and waiting 16 years for a son of a noble to grow up learn the ropes is too long to reinforce your ranks. The only logical thing to do is go and help where you may be weak in numbers, such as the Germans, to supplement your already worn out forces. When you look at ancient warfare, mercs are generally not hired in if you have all the means to get the job done and achieve you goals without spending tons of money on those mercs. They are hired to bolster you forces and/or replace your losses, or even tip the numbers of warriors in your favor.

Regardless, your overall premise is what I agree with as it jives with what is known overall in publications about the Celts and the Gallic War.

No it is not, as I have shown above the statement should not be taken at face value, but have source criticism applied to it. I did this in my last post and believe that I exhibited both how one applies S C (the tool of trade of any historian and the only thing distinguishing us from artists and writers of fiction), and that Caesar's statement does not hold up to scrutiny as a statement of fact. If you believed such statements consider that Hitler stated as fact that UK was finished and the war over in 1940. And that Montgomery et al stated as fact that the Germans had only old men and young boys left with which to defend. Find any veteran of Arnhem and ask him about the truth of that statement.
You cannot believe such, for the actual application of Source Criticism to Caesar, see my last post.

P2T1 has already mentioned sources that I by and large dismissed

Which is fine, but I must ask you for sources that counter or refute all of this in the context of the Gallic War.

Of all the source criticisms I have ever read about Caesar and the Gallic War (I hate Caesar and equate him with the likes of Hitler and Stalin in the similar methods of war, so I love seeing him get ripped), and thing pertinent to this topic, none of these reviews have ever denied this event, much less mentioned the Aedui v. Arverni warfare as being something other than what it is.


EDIT: It should also be said that Gaul was a very divided place. Theres mention of pro and anti Roman factions within the tribe, and Caesar (or was is Posidonius?) mentioned that these divisions go much deeper that political circles, but go down to clans and families as well. I doubt that every warrior in Gaul was pro Roman, but when you look at how little resistance Caesar received initially, you can tell that the Gallic aristocracy all over were not exactly hostile to Romans right at the start, especially as its thought that the upper class was largely Romanized. Thus, it was years into the campaign before serious resistance became realized. One could argue it was a manner of who do you want as your master?: The backstabbing power hungry Roman, or the backstabbing power hungry Gaul.

[mrjade06]

a few quick thoughts on this. I personally believe that Rome had VERY few great leaders. Their remarkable military success was brought about by their far superior weaponry, logistics, training, discipline, and tactics which were essentially unmatched at that time and place in the world. In most modern armies, the most crucial element outside of logistics for a particular nation's success is not the general leading it, but instead the junior officers and NCOs leading it. These were/are the most respected, experienced men in the military who lead at the front rather than plan grand tactics from the rear. In fact due to the Iraq/Afghanistan war, the US military has grave concerns over the turnover of men who would make NCO if they reupped, and NCOs leaving the service, thus the average NCO in the US military today has a lot less service time in the military compared to 10 years ago. Now why do I bring this up you ask? The Romans also had a system of Junior officers and NCOs, and these men were usually hardened veterans with years of experience and training...thus by the time Caesar faced Gaul, it wasnt even close to a fair fight. This wasn't due to any tactical brilliance on Caesar's part (although there was some no doubt), but due to military machine that Rome had created. The Gauls had vast amounts of levies and great individual warriors, but the romans had a well drilled, well supplied military machine led by experienced and grizzled veteran NCOs and JOs from the front that fought as a unit rather than as individuals. NUMBERS mean NOTHING in warfare, however training and leadership from the front means EVERYTHING. A good more modern example of this would be the South's fight against the North in the American Civil war. While certain Southern leaders such as Lee and Jackson stand out were undoubtedly brilliant, the overall argument which I made as part of my graduate thesis was that the South had the majority of the experienced and trained NCOs and Junior officers at the start of the war, which helped lead to many of the early victory's of the South, as the two army's average soldier had about the same background and training, and the casualty figures for many of the battles were about the same. Which leads to my next point...

For the most part, Generals throughout history receive far too much of the credit for victories, and all the blame as well. Alexander was a brillant military leader no doubt, but you also must understand that his military was unrivaled in training, tactics, and leadership compared to those of his opponents. Therefore, in my book, Caesar was a brilliant politician, a great opportunist, and leader of an unrivaled and unparalleled military machine. Must other 'great' Roman generals were much the same. The notable exceptions in my book may be Scipio and Marius. However if we want to talk about the ONE truly great Roman general who to me stands out above all generals in history, although some may say calling him Roman may be a bit of a stretch, we must talk about Flavius Belisarius. He managed to make Justinian out to be a great emperor, reconquering much of the Roman empire with ZERO logistics, no hope of resupply or support, being badly outnumbered, and with a military machine which had passed its zenith and was equaled by many of his opponents. He won victory after victory against all comers, and I don't believe there is a general in history and especially in the Roman Empire who equals him in sheer tactical brilliance, and being able to essentially create victory where there should have been statistically no chance.


I would also say that Quintus Sertorius was a far above average Roman leader...and Macilrille if you would like sources on the things you ask for I would gladly PM you them when I get back to the states as I have many many many. Caesar...great leader, politician, opportunist even visionary YES, a General? Eh not so much. He was a product of the machine, not the creator...

[Mulceber]

@ MrJade06 - Just wanted to point out that at the start of the Gallic war, much of Caesar's army was raw recruits - as Proconsul of Gaul he was given 2 legions, and then he gave citizenship to and conscripted 2 more legions. So half his army was inexperienced. I imagine that his junior officers had experience, but probably not a whole lot - although I could be wrong. So Rome's war machine going into the Gallic war wasn't quite as experienced as you portray. Also, with regard to the claim that Caesar just had great logistics behind him, I'd like to contest that. Many modern analyses of Pompeius argue that he wasn't really a great tactician, but instead had experience and a great eye for logistics. In other words, he is someone just like what you describe. Yet he was decisively defeated by Caesar. There were also plenty of Roman commanders of Caesar's era who had that same logistical system behind them and failed miserably (Crassus leaps to mind). So I think we should give Caesar more credit for tactical skill. -M