is there free will?

[Andres]

I tend to think the burden of proof must lie on determinism.

Me too.

I decided to post in this thread today. Prove to me that I did not post out of my own free will but that I did it because I was determined to do so. And even if you can prove that everything is determined: does it matter? I certainly don't feel like everything I do is determined. If my free will is but an illusion, then it's a damn good one. Maybe it's so good because it's not an illusion?

Filosophy is nice and fun and it offers good thinking exercises, but it often occupies itself with fruitless questions, "do we have a free will?" being one of them. Who cares if what I'm doing has always been determined or not?

Of course, there are some things we can't control. Some call it "luck" or "bad luck", others "coincidence" and others "destiny", but the fact that there are some things beyond our control doesn' mean that we don't have free will. I have a free will.

Feel free to convince me otherwise.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

[Andres]

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

Determinism is just an excuse for hippies and communists to be lazy

"It's not my fault that I'm lazy! I was determined to be so!"

Bah.

[The Stranger]

Quite, but why bother to try and prove us wrong if the world is deterministic. Then it doesn't matter either way.

u make a mistake here. if the world really was determined they have no choice. they just do it and why they do it is something we and they dont understand. i agree with you that if it was divinely determined there would be no sense in this argument, why would a god let his subjects talk possible heresy etc. but if its more bodily determined than there are no reasons only causes for what we do.

With determinism, your actions are merely predictable, not "externally directed"

what kind of determinism is that? they are not merely predictable, they are predictable because everything is cause and effect, so if you know that cause and of everything you can logically determine its effect and so on. so its indeed not neccesarily externally directed... hmm...

[Sasaki Kojiro]

you should google the deciscion inducer thought experiment.

This one?

Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened.

Well, I agree that not having the ability to do otherwise is not a threat to free will. I don't think you need the thought experiment though, although I guess it helps.

what kind of determinism is that? they are not merely predictable, they are predictable because everything is cause and effect, so if you know that cause and of everything you can logically determine its effect and so on. so its indeed not neccesarily externally directed... hmm...

I say "merely" because it's simply not bad thing if our actions are completely predictable by some sort of omniscient thing, even though people present as if it is a bad thing. The fact that you can predict what I'm going to choose, that I was always going to choose it, simply isn't that relevant. It doesn't change the fact that I'm the kind of person who would choose it in that circumstance, just as it doesn't make Jones not a murderer.

[The Stranger]

This one?



Well, I agree that not having the ability to do otherwise is not a threat to free will. I don't think you need the thought experiment though, although I guess it helps.



I say "merely" because it's simply not bad thing if our actions are completely predictable by some sort of omniscient thing, even though people present as if it is a bad thing. The fact that you can predict what I'm going to choose, that I was always going to choose it, simply isn't that relevant. It doesn't change the fact that I'm the kind of person who would choose it in that circumstance, just as it doesn't make Jones not a murderer.

yes that is an example of the experiment. i like it, though its a bit ethically related.

just a note, free will applies to the will of humans so far this discussion is concerned and indeed does allow for other parts of the world to be determined. such as when you drop a stone or when somethning happens on cellular level. there is a difference between that determinism and a determined will, ergo no free will at all.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

u make a mistake here. if the world really was determined they have no choice. they just do it and why they do it is something we and they dont understand. i agree with you that if it was divinely determined there would be no sense in this argument, why would a god let his subjects talk possible heresy etc. but if its more bodily determined than there are no reasons only causes for what we do.

Actually, I made a naughty rhetorical flounce and you caught me . However, if one admits that everyone here actually believes they have free will (otherwise why are the determinists arguing with me, regardless of whether their belief is determined they clearly believe they can argue with me.) then that begs the question of why we should think the world is deterministic. Cause and Effect does work, broadly speaking, but it's not reliable.

Increasingly we find that answers beget more questions, formulae end in curves rather than finite results.....

there's clearly something fishy going on.

[The Stranger]

I think i found a way to say what i want about free will and irrationality. i had to read sartre for it so if things sound familiar thats why. its still unpolished, so spill your thoughts about it.


Rationality is not prerequisite for free will. Because it is the capability of humans to be irrational which is also part of our free will. Animals cannot be rational, but they cannot be irrational either. Their nature coincides entirely with their being, thus they always act optimally for their cause, which is the survival of their being. No animal will starve himself for a noble cause other than its own survival. Human nature however does not entirely coincide with their being, they have the ability or the choice so to speak, to be of another nature. Humans have the possibility, the choice, to be irrational. To not act optimally in regard of their cause, to play games while they should study, or to starve while the body demands food. This is because human nature allows for more causes than the survival of its being. However the survival of its being is the cause from which all other causes derive, so it is the primal cause. If one would (knowingly?) something which would harm this cause, like smoking cigarettes, this would be irrational, even though it is optimally in pursuit of a secondary cause, pleasure.


i also have a whole part about being conscious of these cause and desires but that part needs some more work. it all was very clear untill i started to right it down and got lost in the words...

[Sasaki Kojiro]

Actually, I made a naughty rhetorical flounce and you caught me . However, if one admits that everyone here actually believes they have free will (otherwise why are the determinists arguing with me, regardless of whether their belief is determined they clearly believe they can argue with me.) then that begs the question of why we should think the world is deterministic. Cause and Effect does work, broadly speaking, but it's not reliable.

Increasingly we find that answers beget more questions, formulae end in curves rather than finite results.....

there's clearly something fishy going on.

You keep starting with the assumption that having free will must mean that determinism is false...

Consider:

1) Unless there are special circumstances, people should be held morally responsible for their actions
2) If you can't reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, that would be one such special circumstance (e.g. if I pat you on the back and you die, I should not be called a murderer)
3) In order for you to be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, the world can't be random, it needs to be causally determined

Therefore: Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.

I just don't get why you are intent on dismissing determinism

The more random the world is, the less you can hold people responsible for their actions. If my choices are random, I'm not choosing them.

*****

Our actions being causally determined is no reason to say we don't have free will. Generally the argument goes something like

1) determinism means that under circumstances X, you must do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: if determinism is true we have no free will

When really it should go

1) determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: under circumstances X, you will do A (premise 2 is irrelevant)

So cause and effect doesn't force us to make the choices we will make, it simply describes the choices we will make. For comparison take Greshem's law:

[Gresham's Law is] the theory holding that if two kinds of money in circulation have the same denominational value but different intrinsic values, the money with higher intrinsic value will be hoarded and eventually driven out of circulation by the money with lesser intrinsic value.

So when a government starts printing money like bad, people will hoard gold. Do they do so because of Greshem's law? No. Greshem's law simply describes what people do in that situation.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

1) determinism says that under circumstances X, what will happen is that you will do A
2) if you must do A, you have no choice in doing A

Therefore: under circumstances X, you will do A (premise 2 is irrelevant)

So cause and effect doesn't force us to make the choices we will make, it simply describes the choices we will make. For comparison take Greshem's law:

So when a government starts printing money like bad, people will hoard gold. Do they do so because of Greshem's law? No. Greshem's law simply describes what people do in that situation.

I know, which is why people cannot be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic system. No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility. If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

I know, which is why people cannot be held responsible for their actions in a deterministic system.

I just explained why determinism is required to hold people responsible for their actions

No one ever acts, or chooses they merely react. Further, it goes against what we percieve to be true, that we make choices. To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility.

They can both be accepted because they are compatible with one another.

If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

That's fatalism, not determinism. They aren't the same thing

[Rhyfelwyr]

To borrow a Calvinistic principle, and thereby undercut Rhy, Free Will should be accepted against determinism because of utility. If we truly believe our choices are pre-determined by our environment we have no reason to act morally, or act at all.

Under a genuinely dterministic philosophy a human being would be unable to make choices and would simply grind to a halt.

I object to the idea that the inevitability of our actions removes personal responsibility. Maybe you could not have done things differently, but that does not change the fact that you are what you are. If you are a sinner, you sin. If regenerated, good works should follow. The notion that in order to be responsible for something, we must make a rational choice to do it, is a very modern one based on the idea of all people being rational agents with free will. If someone gets drunk and kills a guy in a bar fight, he is still held responsible, even if he was unable to use his rational faculties, and acted purely on his animalistic instincts. If a dog bred for fighting mauls a baby, you put it down. It didn't make a reasoned decision, it was just being what it is.

To put a more theological perspective on things, "Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?" (Romans 9:20)

@Sasaki: I think maybe part of the confusion we are all having is due to what we mean by free will. When PVC and myself debate the issue, we always tend to refer to the idea of 'libertarian free will', where freedom is defined as the ability to take more than one path. I get where you are coming from in your arguments, but the issue is that with compatabilitist views, they don't tend to make allowance for the possibility of alternative time lines, or different paths through our lives.

In the reality you describe, everything is inevitable. I was always going to be here typing this post, not one detail of it could be different. This is freedom insofar as we can act according to our nature and our will, but it is not freedom in the sense that the term 'free will' has always been used in philosophical circles, since that suggests a choice. With your view of freedom, everything is inevitable. With libertarian free will, there are countless possible outcomes for the future.

[The Stranger]

You keep starting with the assumption that having free will must mean that determinism is false...

Consider:

1) Unless there are special circumstances, people should be held morally responsible for their actions
2) If you can't reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, that would be one such special circumstance (e.g. if I pat you on the back and you die, I should not be called a murderer)
3) In order for you to be able to reasonably foresee the consequences of your action, the world can't be random, it needs to be causally determined

Therefore: Moral responsibility requires causal determinism.
.

actually that is why that kind of moral responsibility requires causal determinism. because that kind of moral responsibility is based on its consequenses and not on its intentions. moral responsibility based on intentions doesnt require causal determinism.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

actually that is why that kind of moral responsibility requires causal determinism. because that kind of moral responsibility is based on its consequenses and not on its intentions. moral responsibility based on intentions doesnt require causal determinism.

But is having "good intentions" enough? I don't think so. You have to have good reason to back it up. And without causal determinism, you can't be reasonably expected to know what your actions will do.

And even your intentions would change randomly without causal determinism...

The free will you would have without determinism is the type no one would really want.

[Rhyfelwyr]

Determinism:

"I'm lazy, but so what, everything is determined anyway, so I can just as well be lazy."

And yet, we had the Calvinist work ethic.

I decided to post in this thread today. Prove to me that I did not post out of my own free will but that I did it because I was determined to do so. And even if you can prove that everything is determined: does it matter? I certainly don't feel like everything I do is determined. If my free will is but an illusion, then it's a damn good one. Maybe it's so good because it's not an illusion?

Why should the burden of proof lie on determinism as opposed to the free wil argument? Determinism is the simplest explanation of why things are the way they are today. Free will requires all sorts of abstract reasoning for alternative timelines, allowing different paths through time for different choices.

With determinism, you chose to post in this thread because given the conditions which you took into consideration when deciding whether or not to do so, you went with the option that appeared best to you. With free will, you need something that goes beyond the way science sees our brains as being sorts of computers that run by generating electric signals, and you have to add it some sort of spiritual/metaphysical element that we have no proof of whatsoever.

You say that your participation in this thread is proof of your free will. But surely all you can know is that you wanted to participate in the thread. Can you provide any evidence to suggest that you might ever have not participated in this thread?

[The Stranger]

science is not as a whole in favor of determinism. or free will for that matter. what science says about the brain or sees it etc is not a valid argument in this discussion untill more is known.