is there free will?

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

I just felt like I was repeating myself.

That's no need to get personal. If you feel that way you can either conclude I am stupid, that I am being deliberately obstructive, or that you are not explainging yourself so that I can understand you. In option 1 and 2 I should be ignored, option 3 behoves you to either explain better or concede the point as unsupportabe.

But this depends on how you define choice and options. If I leave the bar drunk, I do have the option of calling a cab instead of driving home. That's very easy and very doable--I am capable of it, and in fact with a minor change (say, having been told recently about the legal penalties) I might have made the right choice. Doing that is an option for my personality. It may be that, given my personality, I was always going to choose to drive home. But that doesn't mean I didn't have the option not to. I only didn't have the option if you see the laws that "govern" human behavior as proscriptive rather than descriptive.

"Choice" implies options and the ability to choose between them, "options" implies multiple available paths. If one says "you have no choice" that indicates only one option. Ergo, it is fair for me to say, "In a truly detministic system you have no choice". Even if theoretically there are multiple possible outcomes, or multiple decisions, the total causality inherrent in the system dictates that the same choice will always be made under the same circumstances.

So there is no actual choice, only a theoretical system. In this I think your philosophy shows a flaw, it imagines a system for its morality that it claims does no factually exist.

Do you see why I think they are compatible?

No, not in a pruely deterministic system, which is why I replied with a flat rejection last time. You claim appears non-sensical to me.

Fatalism assumes that that, for example, I don't need to wear my seatbelt because the date of my death is already set in stone. But of course, not wearing a seatbelt might be what kills you. Determinism says "I'll wear my seatbelt out of habit".

No, actually fatalism says, "I will wear my seatbelt until the day I decide not to and it kills me", while determinism says, "I will wear my seatbelt unless X conditions are met". The reason that determinism produces the same result as fatalism is that in a purely deterministic system whether or not X conditions would ever be met was predetermined long before you were born by the causality of the universe; whether X condictions would ultimately lead to your death was ultimately also already predetmined.

If you want to see how fatalism works, I suggest you look at Greek Myths, they are the best education in the subject; Oedipus is an excellent example.

Crucially, mortals cannot detect either Fate or Predeterminism.

But what I was disputing is that he was "subject" to anything. The laws don't govern us, they describe us. In the Greshem's law example, people aren't forced to hoard gold because of greshem's law, remember?

Well Greshem's Law demonstrates the problem, because not everyone hoards Gold. So, either the universe is not truly deterministic, or your laws refuse to take account of its interlocking complexity. In any case, it is not a question of being "subject" to these Laws, but to the system they seek to explain. If we are subject to a deterministic universe which (pre)determines our actions then we have no choice, and thence to Free Will.

You can hold him responsible for his character by the way. Someone who has the character to murder someone in an argument or for money etc can be deemed immoral, even with determism, don't you think?

No, because in your system his character is determined by his genetics and environment, he can be no more blamed for it than for his gender. This raises another problem with your system; why the system dictates that some beings punish others to begin with. This is where Calvinism picks up Augustinianism and argues that some beings are ordained to punish others for their Sins in the name of God.

Still, I digress.

Thanks, that does indeed seem to be the argument. But, the libertarian view and the compatibilist view can't both be correct, yes? I think the libertarian view has a lot to answer, and that if you can get your head around the compatibilist view you can see that determinism is no threat at all to free will.

In other words, I have my definition of free will, but I can't just claim that it is the correct one. Whether the definition is correct is a viable (and essential) source for argument.

the only way for Determinism to be compatable with Free Will is if the two are held in constant opposition, i.e. they oppose each other like the poles of a magnet. Even so, determinism is THE threat to Free Will, and to personal choice.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

That's no need to get personal. If you feel that way you can either conclude I am stupid, that I am being deliberately obstructive, or that you are not explainging yourself so that I can understand you. In option 1 and 2 I should be ignored, option 3 behoves you to either explain better or concede the point as unsupportabe.

I think you are drawing too much from some smileys :/

"Choice" implies options and the ability to choose between them, "options" implies multiple available paths. If one says "you have no choice" that indicates only one option. Ergo, it is fair for me to say, "In a truly detministic system you have no choice". Even if theoretically there are multiple possible outcomes, or multiple decisions, the total causality inherrent in the system dictates that the same choice will always be made under the same circumstances.

So there is no actual choice, only a theoretical system. In this I think your philosophy shows a flaw, it imagines a system for its morality that it claims does no factually exist.

I think you are viewing the mind abstractly here, which is very counter-intuitive*. If you present options to me, and I go over them in my mind, consider things, think about it etc and pick one because of my thoughts and feelings, I have made a choice. That's what making a choice is. The fact that I was always going to make that choice doesn't mean that I didn't have a choice.

It seems like partly a language problem. Look at the following argument:

If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has to have at least two children.
Paul has two sons and a daughter.

Therefore: Paul has to have at least two children.

This conclusion is a false statement. He does not have to have any amount of children. He just happens to in this case. A better way to phrase it would be:

"It has to be that (if Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has at least two children)."
Paul has two sons and a daughter

Therefore: Paul has at least two children

And that's what determinism is saying. And the conclusion now allows for free will. The conclusion is no longer that Paul had to have two children, and thus had no choice. For human choices it would go:

It must be that (if certain conditions are met, then you will do A).
not:
If certain conditions are met, then you must do A.

*And I think in your own beliefs you don't view it that way (since you reject determinism)

No, actually fatalism says, "I will wear my seatbelt until the day I decide not to and it kills me", while determinism says, "I will wear my seatbelt unless X conditions are met". The reason that determinism produces the same result as fatalism is that in a purely deterministic system whether or not X conditions would ever be met was predetermined long before you were born by the causality of the universe; whether X condictions would ultimately lead to your death was ultimately also already predetmined.

But you are leaving out the key difference. Fatalism assumes that it doesn't matter what we do--that is patently false. What I do does effect when I will die. Fatalism says that determinism is a reason to act a certain way.

Well Greshem's Law demonstrates the problem, because not everyone hoards Gold. So, either the universe is not truly deterministic, or your laws refuse to take account of its interlocking complexity. In any case, it is not a question of being "subject" to these Laws, but to the system they seek to explain.

I don't understand what you mean with this bit. Not everyone hoards gold because Greshem's law describes a tendency on a certain scale. It's a different level of description than cause and effect on the atomic level.

No, because in your system his character is determined by his genetics and environment, he can be no more blamed for it than for his gender.

Well, I agree this is a digression from the free will argument. It has more to do with what morality is for.

I agree, that this dispute is best resolved now, since otherwise it's going to be impossible for people to understand each other. I agree that your definition of free will is the sum of the freedom which our will's possess in reality btw, but I see this as supporting purely determinsim and not free will (since I hold to the libertarian defintion of the term, which is how it has been traditionally used). I think we have the same ideas, but are just using different words for them.

I don't mind using different words if the ideas are the same

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

I think you are viewing the mind abstractly here, which is very counter-intuitive*. If you present options to me, and I go over them in my mind, consider things, think about it etc and pick one because of my thoughts and feelings, I have made a choice. That's what making a choice is. The fact that I was always going to make that choice doesn't mean that I didn't have a choice.

No, if you only have one choice, there is NO choice. You only have the illusion of choice, the outcome was always inevitable. I don't see anything abstract about that.

It seems like partly a language problem. Look at the following argument:

If Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has to have at least two children.
Paul has two sons and a daughter.

Therefore: Paul has to have at least two children.

This conclusion is a false statement. He does not have to have any amount of children. He just happens to in this case. A better way to phrase it would be:

"It has to be that (if Paul has two sons and a daughter, then he has at least two children)."
Paul has two sons and a daughter

Therefore: Paul has at least two children

And that's what determinism is saying. And the conclusion now allows for free will. The conclusion is no longer that Paul had to have two children, and thus had no choice. For human choices it would go:

It must be that (if certain conditions are met, then you will do A).
not:
If certain conditions are met, then you must do A.

*And I think in your own beliefs you don't view it that way (since you reject determinism)

I fail to see the point, you are using the concrete to try to describe the conceptual. Paul's children were born to him, three were born to him, that is more than two. Paul's children are already born when you say "he has at least two." However, that bears not at all on the question of determinism because it describes the present, not the future.

But you are leaving out the key difference. Fatalism assumes that it doesn't matter what we do--that is patently false. What I do does effect when I will die. Fatalism says that determinism is a reason to act a certain way.

I think you're confusing fatalism and prophecy, which is the expression of fatalism. To borrow you example, "Paul will have two children" is a prophetic statement, when he then has three the prophecy was fulfilled, even though he has an extra child. Fatalism is not detectable from within the system.

I don't understand what you mean with this bit. Not everyone hoards gold because Greshem's law describes a tendency on a certain scale. It's a different level of description than cause and effect on the atomic level.

Not everyone reacts in a given way to a given situation, this is either because A: they are different parts of the deterministic system and therefore function differently or B: because they have Free Will and make different choices.

The crucial point is this, a "Free" Will is unbound, it is not subject to any outside force, though it may take such forces into account. What you are describing is a "Will" which is merely an intellectual expression of a predetermined desire for a predetermined outcome.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

No, if you only have one choice, there is NO choice. You only have the illusion of choice, the outcome was always inevitable. I don't see anything abstract about that.

But the word "choice" has always referred to what I described and what you call the illusion of choice. It seems abstract to me because it doesn't acknowledge the complexity of the mind. Would you admire a van gogh, or say that he didn't really paint it, his arm was forced to?

It's essentially a semantic disagreement, but I don't get your insistence that free will must be unbound. That would require omnipotence, yes? And presumably no sense of right and wrong, else our will would be bound by our conscience. It seems to me like you add up all the external forces that push us around, and say that despite them, we have free will. But that if our brain has a definite process by which it decides things, we don't. The freedom in my free will comes from our ability to do what our psychological selves want--and your description of that as unfree boils down to "we have to do what we want, so we don't choose it".

I think you're confusing fatalism and prophecy, which is the expression of fatalism.

Isn't that how it was described originally? "I don't need to work because it's all determined anyway" is an expression of fatalism right? Because it can matter if you work.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

But the word "choice" has always referred to what I described and what you call the illusion of choice. It seems abstract to me because it doesn't acknowledge the complexity of the mind. Would you admire a van gogh, or say that he didn't really paint it, his arm was forced to?

I don't think so.... Generally the mind has been considered a discerning faculty which performs a decision making process, choosing between multiple options.

It's essentially a semantic disagreement, but I don't get your insistence that free will must be unbound. That would require omnipotence, yes? And presumably no sense of right and wrong, else our will would be bound by our conscience. It seems to me like you add up all the external forces that push us around, and say that despite them, we have free will. But that if our brain has a definite process by which it decides things, we don't. The freedom in my free will comes from our ability to do what our psychological selves want--and your description of that as unfree boils down to "we have to do what we want, so we don't choose it".

I think you are mistaking the ability to express our Will, and its Freedom. Let us be clear, "Freedom" in any context means "to be unfettered" To be free is to be unconstrained. Now, the Will if it is truly Free must be uncontrained and able to make choices in spite of external pressure. Now, the expression of the Will is something else, I can exercise my Free Will and decide I want to fly, but I can't carry through that Will because I don't have wings. Of course, man continued to Will this, wholly against his nature, and thence built himself wings.

So the Will is Free but the Action isn't. Freedom of Action is a preserve of the Divine, whether man has Free Will within himself is a seperate question. Is the distinction I am making clear, now?

Now, the Will can allow itself to be bound by, for example, morality and be held accountable for such a decision. However, because the Will is Free such notionally binding, or rather submission, is voluntary.

Now, if the decisions the Will makes are actually bound by the environment, rather than influenced by it, then the Will is un-Free because its choices are make independent of it. Essentially, the Will is commanded by the system to want a certain thing. With Free Will the Will merely aquiences, it is never commanded.

My complaint with your system is that it boils down to, "We have to want what we want" rather than, "we choose what we want".

Isn't that how it was described originally? "I don't need to work because it's all determined anyway" is an expression of fatalism right? Because it can matter if you work.

Not really, its more like, "whether I work or not has been determined, so I don't have to think about it". Such a situation as you describe happens when someone who actually has Free Will gives up and becomes fatalistic. Remember, all my objections to the way Determinism impacts society come from a Free Will perspective.

[Sasaki Kojiro]

My complaint with your system is that it boils down to, "We have to want what we want" rather than, "we choose what we want".

Ah, but it is in the moment so to speak that we have to want what we want. Although it is true that we don't choose many of our wants (you in no way chose to like food over non-food, or music over screeching sounds, etc) we can want to choose/change certain wants of ours. You can point one step back on the chain and say that we can't choose to want to choose our wants, but for what purpose? We are still fettered at some point, because we exist.

I think you are mistaking the ability to express our Will, and its Freedom. Let us be clear, "Freedom" in any context means "to be unfettered" To be free is to be unconstrained. Now, the Will if it is truly Free must be uncontrained and able to make choices in spite of external pressure. Now, the expression of the Will is something else, I can exercise my Free Will and decide I want to fly, but I can't carry through that Will because I don't have wings. Of course, man continued to Will this, wholly against his nature, and thence built himself wings.

So the Will is Free but the Action isn't. Freedom of Action is a preserve of the Divine, whether man has Free Will within himself is a seperate question. Is the distinction I am making clear, now?

I see. But intuitively it feels like the will has constraints on it. You mentioned that we can't fly because we don't have wings, but aren't their many things that we want to do but can't that are more internal? I may want to stay awake, but not be able to. There are many internal forces.

I don't think your freedom of will is inherently different from mine. You are still supposing an individual with a self and everything that comes with that. That has inherent constraints.

Now, the Will can allow itself to be bound by, for example, morality and be held accountable for such a decision. However, because the Will is Free such notionally binding, or rather submission, is voluntary.

But we have innate moral instincts that we don't choose. And as a child there is much we don't choose.

[Philippus Flavius Homovallumus]

Ah, but it is in the moment so to speak that we have to want what we want. Although it is true that we don't choose many of our wants (you in no way chose to like food over non-food, or music over screeching sounds, etc) we can want to choose/change certain wants of ours. You can point one step back on the chain and say that we can't choose to want to choose our wants, but for what purpose? We are still fettered at some point, because we exist.

I see what you are saying, but I think you are trying to reduce the argument back through time to create an ad absurdiam effect. Also, your examples are defective I'm afraid, some people choose not to like food and therefore starve themselves to death, others listen to sounds that I defy anyone to actually call "music" for pleasure.

I see. But intuitively it feels like the will has constraints on it. You mentioned that we can't fly because we don't have wings, but aren't their many things that we want to do but can't that are more internal? I may want to stay awake, but not be able to. There are many internal forces.

I don't think your freedom of will is inherently different from mine. You are still supposing an individual with a self and everything that comes with that. That has inherent constraints.

These are all [i]physical]/i] examples and threfore belong to the realm of Action, not Will. What you are essentially saying is that we cannot control our physical beings in every sense, but that is irrelevant when our Will is not itself physical. I know you are going to say that it is, because it is contained in our brain, but I would point out here that the brain is merely the organ which houses the electrical impulses that make up our conciousness.

But we have innate moral instincts that we don't choose. And as a child there is much we don't choose.

actually, I agree with you, though I believe they originate outside ourselves. However, many people disregard these, so they clearly aren't binding either.