1. Hitler's death was not enough. To succeed the coup had to kill or neutralize Hitler, Himmler, Goering, Borman, and Goebbels.
Assume that they did.
2. Germany is now headed by a half-military/half-civilian junta. The Holocaust is happening on autopilot until countermanded. The Soviets are attacking. The Western Allies have taken Rome and are established in a bridgehead in Normandy. Germany sues for peace.
The Russians say no and continue -- which they will do regardless. They have no interest in stopping short of the Elbe and probably would have preferred to get to the Rhine. The Western Allies honor their alliance with the Soviets -- however grudgingly. The War continues and we end up with the same partition (though the Holocaust is quickly curtailed and some of the stupider "hold and die" orders are never given.
But suppose the West did make a separate peace (however unlikely).
3. The Russians get to the Rhine. Sorry PJ, but der Wermacht is a shell of what it was by this point. It is the Soviets who are punching holes with armored spearheads while the Germans use hastily trained conscripts and kampfgruppe "fire brigades" to stop them as best they can. German industry, revamped by Speer, is up to the task (especially if the Western Allies are not involved anymore) but the Germans simply do not have the time to train people or enough experienced cadre to use all the new wonders that had been cooked up. Moreover, the remaining elite formations are very likely being broken up by the new German government which cannot afford groups of SS troops or Luftwaffe troops of dubious loyalty to the new government. So maybe JV-44 sets an all time record for kills and we see that in competent hands the Jadgtiger really could knock out a JS-III, but it is still too little too late. The Soviets bleed a lot more, but they still get to the Rhine (or to the split line between them and the West).
was it ever known what the would be assassins intent was? were they hoping to attempt some diplomacy? did they simply want to conduct the war on their own terms? killing the chief is just a step, is their ultimate goal known?
Elections in Poland occupy vast part of my spare time, but since I am already here (didn't log in for two weeks - I think) I will quickly refute some ideas which emerged in this thread.
About the subject.
Hitler's termination would create shockwaves in Eastern Europe provided that no replacement was quickly found - which frankly was impossible.
I'd say a sort of I WW scenario could be replayed, but with whole nations quickly changing sides.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria are prime suspects in this case - I highly dout that it would be possible to occupy Hungary as it historically happened.
That would leave entire armies stranded in the south-east.
In Poland I am quite certain that the Uprising in 1944 would be successful.
It is nice that some people learnt there was any, but should be aware of the size of the entire movement - in addition to Warsaw Home Army launched over 20 similar actions in other places and majority was successful from military point of view e.g. Wilno (Vilnius), Lublin, Lwów (L'viv) were controlled by the Home Army for some time - and red Army launched no actions against those forces, NKVD did.
Anyway that was eastern half of Poland so what about western? Home Army numbered over 200 000 soldiers in this area and with Germany out of action in a way it would be a force with some combat value, especially considering it would be supported by civilian administration which was quickly recreated in 'our' history so it would be in this timeline.
I am talking about legal government taking power> Legal, recognised, supported by ALL political parties in Poland from right-wing nationalists to socialists and Jewish Bund and by the people of Poland.
So called 'Lublin commitee' was a rough collection of spooks, exiled comunists who survived Stalins liquidation of the communist party (small already) and various opportunists and ordinary traitors.
Really - I made extensive research recently from about 50 high commanders in Soviet controlled Polish Army only 3-4 were Poles from Poland with no incriminating past unlike for example future marschal of Poland Michał Rola-Żymierski who was discharged from the Polish Army after a corruption scandal and in 1932 became a NKVD agent attempting to provide information about Poland's defensive plans against the SU.
In other words - government supported by the people vs. bunch of guys noone knows or recognises transported in suitcases and ready to sign anything - just like they didn't protest in 1939 in any way.
The key moves would be political. Soviet offensive strenght was mostly spent in July in Poland after they suffered defeat close to Rembertów (to the east of Warsaw) and if the Allies acted quickly area to the west of the Vistula would be
easily secured.
Frankly there were three divisions already there in a form of Hungarian corps including elite 1st Hussar Division who historically attempted to prepare an agreement with the Allies to join the Poles in 1944 as so called 'Legion of st. Stephen' and who for many reasons would be a great asset in the area.
If Polish government in exile would show its presence in Poland quickly - in a form of some notable character travelling through German airspace for example, this together with strong presence of the Home Army and united smaller organisations, Hungarians, and civilian administration should be enough to secure this area.
I strongly doubt that Stalin would dare to advance more than to the great natural obstacle which is the Vistula river. In any case from logistical reasons it would be possible only in a limited manner and rather not worth not trying to go for something else instead - e.g. Romanian oil.
After that?
Eastern Prussia would be divided since destruction of Prussia was one of goals which would be easy to achive, wouldn't hurt Germany so much, would be perceived as important to secure future peace and because the Soviets would be able to advance out there.
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia - occupied and annexed. Finland - not sure, maybe would be annexed to save some wounded pride.
Norway - maybe northern part would be annexed as well - after all if you can create Moldavians in a month, so much you can do with 'Soviet Norwegians' - why not?
Romania - tricky, but Stalin would like it and there was alread an army concentrating and ready to attack.
Bulgaria - probably sovietised because the British would be busy in Greece, but maybe they could count on a form of 'finlandisation' - after all they were not even at war with the Soviet Union.
Hungary - most likely saved.
Yugoslavia - Tito in power, but most likely more moderate. Albania - maybe as a part of Yugoslavia or a UN protectorate for a time - if the UN would be formed.
Czechoslovakia - probably spared sovietisation, but certainly would lose Ruthenia. In worst case scenario part of Slovakia might be grabbed and made a 'socialist' state as well.
Poland - two state solution.
One Poland with the capital in Warsaw with Upper Silesia, Greater Poland and (obviously) Danzig + maybe something else Poles could grab quickly e.g. coastal towns such as Słupsk and silesian Opole - Breslau was too large and too far away, and noone really wanted it.
Eastern with capital in Lublin or Lwów (L'viv) - Stalin really didn't care much about the nonsense with the Curzon line and he would need something to give this annoying creation - Lwów and Grodno would be perfect. Przemyśl would be cleansed from Ukrainians, so would Volhynia and Wilno (Vilnius) from Poles which would be 'given' Ukraine and Lithuania.
Borders - really similar to R-M Pact according to the agreement in August 1939 (so along the river), maybe 'eastern Poland' would get some ex-German port e.g. Elbig because Koenigsberg would be too important for any suprisses such as III WW.
Would be eastern Poland 'independent' or annexed? I'd say the first after all it was still in theory only allied country unlike 'aggressors' such Romania or Finland. besides we have the entire German case as an example we can use.
Unification? Maybe in 1989 after the fall of border wall dividing western and eastern Warsaw?
@Brenus
Originally Posted by :
Well, you put a moral judgement on a political decision.
Was Stalin cynical? Most probably, however the decision to halt (if it was a decision as the Russian claim they were at their logistical chain end so they couldn’t push forward –this wouldn’t explain the lack of support in ammunition and weapons/air support) was a pure political –perhaps immoral- decision.
I'd leave the entire moral/immoral thing to a different discussion or at all because there is no morality which allowed something like this. After all trucks were used, but to transport arrested AK soldiers in eastern Warsaw while western fought.
Even Soviet fighters didn't show up untill late September.
In general - leave it because it is impossible to defend Stalins actions on any rational and moral grounds.
Originally Posted by :
From the Russian point of view, Poland was always an enemy.
Soviet in this case - Russia is not the Soviet Union which included also Georgia, Ukraine, Belorus etc.
Originally Posted by :
From the Communist point of view, same: The Polish Dictator in charge prior 1939 was openly anti-communist and even supported Germany policy during the Spanish Civil War.
Eeeee.... Not really.
First of all there was noone you could even call a dictator. Piłsudski died in 1935 so BEFORE the war started, besides calling him a dictator is problematic a bit.
Second - not anti-communist but
not communist. That the communist tend to treat everyone else as enemy is really noone fault.
Communist party hovewer posed some danger to the security of the state and its existence - politically it was the ONLY entity which
opposed independence of Poland, fought on Soviet side in 1919-20 and even managed to organise a series of terrorist attacks in later years such as the campaign of bombings in 1923.
It really is difficult to have a conversation with people who are attempting to ruin everything.
Nevertheless the party was allowed to exist and in fact was liquidated by Stalin himself, with a vast majority of their members (those high ranking characters who survived were usually in prisons in Poland such as Gomułka).
Third.
Not the authorites, but also a vast majority of population supported Franco which considering the big blob in the east is no suprise, BUT here is a suprise for you -
Poland was the second largest arms supplier to the Republic after the Soviet Union!
I can give you numbers if you need them e.g. majority of hand granades used in the war on this side was from Poland, overall there was enough equipment for 10 full divisions.
Of course no political support and no volunteers - but to neither side while 90% of sold equipment exported by Poland was sold to the Republic.
For profit of course which greatly helped in modernization of the Polish Army, but a fact is still something which counts.
Poles in International Brigades mainly came from Polish community - mainly coal miners in France who BTW later joined the Podhalan Brigade fighting in Norway in 1940 whch was supposed to fight the Soviets in Finland.
Those guys actually learnt a thing or two about Soviet commisars and NKVD in Spain so were quite keeon on kicking Soviet asses in Finland.
Originally Posted by :
So Poland was anti-Stalin before Katyn (reason why Katyn happened, somewhere).
That is true, but so was Finland and everyone else for that matter. Stalin simply chose one option which was not rational anyway.
I know that he knew who Poles are - he actaully had some reasonable (completelly immoral and inhuman, but still) ideas in 1920 which were overruled.
There are several examples that he was capable of rational desicions in this matter e.g. didn't decide to place a red star over the white eagle, change the anthem or similar opposing various ideas presented by his lapdogs so he had to understand that his inaction and actions during the Uprising would backfire.
Originally Posted by :
In term of politic and post war politic, and Stalin knew the war was won just didn’t know how much lands he would be able to do.
There is no single approach Stalin followed during the war. First he openly refused Hitler to establish any form of 'rump state' under the name of Poland.
Next he annexes the eastern territories of Poland (sorry no bullshit about 'former Russian territories would hold here). Later he orders the Katyn 'solution'.
And after that he suddenly moves to create a rifle division from Poles to be sent to occupied territories of Poland - in early
1941.
I'd call his approach flexible with no obvious long term goal, even despite he openly hated Poles (several example in 'the Court of the red Tzar') and knew history well.
About territories - he actually opposed ideas to move Ukrainian SRR's border to the San river (so including mainly Ukrainian Przemyśl he got in 1939) or annexing Białystok with its sizable Belorussian minority claimed Russian by Lenin in 1918
Originally Posted by :
So resolving the Polish political future in letting the Germans to eradicate part of the Polish elite and in the same time denying to the anti-communist Partisan a propaganda victory in liberating their Capital was a typical communist decision.
That is definetely true, but also typically stupid.
For later 45 years it was another recent minefield which required considerable resources and would backfire if Poland was not sandwitched in some way.
No danger of German revanchism + Katyn and the failure of the Uprising = anger directed at Moscow and 'saddling the cow' was as Uncle Joe already said impossible.
More clever would be to use Czechoslovakian scenario - after all German occupation was not a sunny day in a park so there would be some ground to built some support for the Soviets in the future.
That would be more clever and from my point of view more dangerous.
I guess he either overestimated Poles or underestimated them.
Recently I've read interesting interview with a Russian historian from Memorial organisation who explained Katyn as extermination of elite which in Stalin's eyes would be a seed of Poland whenever they came so whatever it would be - Siberia, Poland or Venus.
In this light not supporting Warsaw was a bit a gamble - he might think that let's say 1/4 was eliminated in Katyn, 1/4 is in London (more in Scotland actually) and Italy with Anders, 1/4 removed Germans and 1/4 is there in Warsaw.
Maybe together with loyal reports about 'thousands' of communist fighters ready to strike (indeed there were thousands - 300 in Warsaw, c. 6-18 000 overall compared to 600 000+ in the Underground) he thought it is almost there and everything is done...
But allowing a million large capital to be literally
completely destroyed is something people tend to remember.
Originally Posted by :
What I learned in studying another Communist war (Indochina) is the Communists always favour the political (long term) effect even in a war. If a defeat gave them upper hand in the propaganda/media war, they will scarify men in order to achieve it.
If you judge Stalin’s decision from this, this decision makes sense.
Not a cynical decision but a plain battle field full of sense decision.
Only if we take into account the world they were living in.
The world where everyone is conspiring against you, where multilayered paranoia supports certain decision and the state aparatus provides proofs that Switzerland is imparialist power trying to overthrow Soviet government.
Why? Because some 'duce' somewhere said so and any agent's report, any confession which didn't support it could end up badly for the agent or the persecutor.
So according to this world view it is indeed clever, but fails in reality which doesn't realise it should behave as some guy wrote in his report.
And now - really guys, this view is already obsolate. August can be explained, but September cannot - while complete lack of any other support or allowing such is just impossible to defend.
Originally Posted by :
@Sarmatian
So basically, what Stalin did in Poland was not different to what Allies did in Italy, and according to Glantz, Red Army was indeed at the end of their logistical supply and was unable to mount a huge operation of capturing a huge city such as Warsaw at such short notice...
Capture from whom?
I wish I could imagine German troops defending Warsaw in August-September 1944, but I cannot.
@Pannonian
Originally Posted by :
According to Montefiore, Stalin was worried about the reaction of his allies, and pressed his generals (ie. Rokossovsky) to make that extra push, but was told it wasn't possible. Stopping short of Warsaw was a military decision, not a politically-based one.
In July and August.
Not in September when eastern Warsaw was occupied quickly.
In any case even in August it was still
possible because similar operations were launched later during the war in Slovakia and Hungary because political decisions were different.
Hard, but possible to link with the capital or endanger German positions out there with later success in mind.
@Panzerjeager
Originally Posted by :
Stalin had the largest army in Europe. He had far greater quantities of armor, artillery and airplanes than Germany. He had brilliant military minds and a sound doctrine. Despite Western historiography, the Soviet military was second only to the Wehrmacht in quality, even in 1941. Due to his intelligent decisions, his brilliant officer corps was systematically murdered by their own leader directly before the war and the vast majority of this force was destroyed by the Germans in the first year of the war, having to be rebuilt from scratch. Stalin's best decision was when he decided to stop making decisions and leave it to the professionals.
My sources aren't Western and they portrait a different picture using Russian data I am afraid.
The Red Army was simply created large too quickly (so for example 80% of tanks would have to be replaced in 1942-43) and never came over numerous problems such as terrible technical support of fast divisions,
In short:
- Soviet paratroopers were numerous, but lacked proper transports, support to continue fighting for longer time and were poorly trained,
- Soviet armor had poor technical support resulting in numerous technical breakdowns in a matter of 24 hours,
- its logistic were very poor, especially fuel was running short very quickly because it was not delievered in time,
- Soviet soldiers were afraid to fight at night resulting in numerous incidents between different divisions camped close to each other identifying their neighbours as enemies with predictable results,
- poor recon of all branches of the military,
- poor training of important personell such as drivers or pilots,
- design flaws of equipment and poor reliability of mass produced weapons especially the tanks which suffered from very poor visibility,
And finally egomaniacs in power. How can you comment Tukhachevsky's plan to invade Poland with 150 000 tanks and 80 000 airplanes presented by him around 1932?
No, the numbers are all ok - he thought it is all all right and reasonable and there were similar 'great minds' everywhere making Stalin rather positively sensible.
And so on and so forth...
Definetely one of top three, but frankly speaking competition isn't too hard... because who else could compete?
Top 8 in 1939 would include Germany, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Italy, Poland, United States (because of the navy) probably in that order.
Top 12 in 1938 would also include Czechoslovakia (after Poland), Romania, Yugoslavia, Nationalist China - in no particular order.