Nature of the alliance between Japan and Germany in WW2

[Tsar Alexsandr]

It was a pretty loose alliance. They had some common enemies, and needed more allies. I think both nations had plans on fighting the other in the end.

[Sarmatian]

It was a pretty loose alliance. They had some common enemies, and needed more allies. I think both nations had plans on fighting the other in the end.

Wut? Care to elaborate?

[Tsar Alexsandr]

Wut? Care to elaborate?

Well Hitler had made some statements about the inferiority of Japanese people, as well as other Asian peoples. So.... I doubt peace could have been maintained between them. And the Japanese knew this. But for the time.... it was a situation that would benefit both sides.

[ReluctantSamurai]

It's pretty much the way PanzerJaeger described except that the German invasion of the SU came as a complete shock and surprise to the Japanese, and one which they very upset about.

[PanzerJaeger]

It's pretty much the way PanzerJaeger described except that the German invasion of the SU came as a complete shock and surprise to the Japanese, and one which they very upset about.

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

However, Berlin made it well known to the Japanese that the Germans were going to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler courted the Japanese for nearly a year before the invasion, hoping to get a commitment. In reaction to that knowledge, there was a major strategic disagreement between the army, which wanted to pursue the Hokushin strategy of a combined attack against the Soviet Union with Germany, and the navy, which fought to keep the southern Nanshin doctrine. As I mentioned before, the southern strategy prevailed.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Not exactly. The Japanese leadership were angered because they were not provided the exact date and time of the attack. IIRC, Prime Minister Konoe felt betrayed because the Germans did not trust them enough to warn them ahead of time.

While Japan might have had an inclination to believe that Germany was going to invade the SU, the general consensus in the Japanese AGS was that the information coming from sources in Germany were nothing but misinformation. News of the attack came from press releases and caused Konoe to consider, for a brief time, withdrawing from the Tripartite.

The biggest opportunity for cooperation would surely have been a combined attack on the Soviet Union. Hitler always hoped for such a situation, and did all that he could to make it happen, including declaring war on the United States with the expectation of reciprocation.

Nothing truer could be said than the first sentence. It was indeed the best opportunity for Germany and Japan to actually have some sort of working relationship. But the rest of that statement is rather puzzling. If Hitler wanted active Japanese co-operation, surely he would have let them in on his plans? Or at least given some notification of H-hour? And Germany's declaration of war on the United States had nothing to do with the attack on the SU, and in fact could be considered counterproductive to Barbarossa because it now qualified the SU to begin receiving LL aid.

However, Berlin made it well known to the Japanese that the Germans were going to attack the Soviet Union. Hitler courted the Japanese for nearly a year before the invasion, hoping to get a commitment.

Could you expand a bit on how this was done?

[PanzerJaeger]

While Japan might have had an inclination to believe that Germany was going to invade the SU, the general consensus in the Japanese AGS was that the information coming from sources in Germany were nothing but misinformation. News of the attack came from press releases and caused Konoe to consider, for a brief time, withdrawing from the Tripartite.

It was far more than an inclination. There were many discussions between the two nations via diplomats about the upcoming German invasion. The anger was over not being told of the specific date and time, so as to prepare for possible hostilities with the Soviet Union.

Nothing truer could be said than the first sentence. It was indeed the best opportunity for Germany and Japan to actually have some sort of working relationship. But the rest of that statement is rather puzzling. If Hitler wanted active Japanese co-operation, surely he would have let them in on his plans? Or at least given some notification of H-hour? And Germany's declaration of war on the United States had nothing to do with the attack on the SU, and in fact could be considered counterproductive to Barbarossa because it now qualified the SU to begin receiving LL aid.

It may be puzzling, but it is the truth - as is often the case with Hitler. He hoped that Japan would feel obligated to reciprocate his solidarity by attacking the Soviet Union.

Could you expand a bit on how this was done?

There were never any specific agreements set up as the Japanese always remained non-committal, but Hitler continually made overtures to the Japanese through diplomatic channels.