Was there a Kingdom of Britain before Caesar?

[SlickNicaG69]

As for the dismissal of the power of the Catuvellauni..... errmmm, how much more "We are conquered" can you get than running to a Roman commander pleading for help in regaining your position, because you've been conquered. I'm not sure what, exactly, the son of the 'King' of the Trinovantes pleading for Caesar's help because Cassivellaunus has killed his father and taken his lands, might imply other than a 'conquering'.

I have understood a kingdom to be one where a central monarchy exercises its direct authority not just over a portion of its people's, but all of them. Hence, the trick is in the very names they used themselves... When you hear the title of King of the "Trinovantes," it is a misnomer: He should actually be called "Chief." Theoretically, once a chief is fortunate enough to another tribe, he would then call himself Chief of "Picts," for example. Eventually, if he is successful enough to the point where there are no rival chiefs, then his status is automatically elevated by the fact that there is no dispute to his authority and, hence, he becomes King.

This is why, along with their political structure, the Aedui should never be considered a kingdom, because they lacked the type of authority over their own people that is typical of a kingdom, as there was always a #2 around, despite their dominance.

As for the "diluted" statement, it may be that my accentuation might have crossed the line of hyperbole, but my intention was to illustrate that Rome's main instrument in conquering others was not its diplomacy but rather its military, as you seemed to suggest:

Rome didn't just possess some all defeating, invincible army of demi-gods..., they worked hard at ensuring that their enemies were ...... diluted. They could only "demolish their enemy to the pulp of extinction" because those enemies were weakened by political infighting, by divisions.

Carthage, I know for a fact to be a more formidable and more politically-stable opponent (factional politicking aside), and they're people ceased to exist.

As for Rome's status, to further explain, it too could only really have been considered a kingdom up until it dominated all the native oscan/italian lands (some would argue it would exclude the Po in this time period), although it still would've not been considered one as its political structure was an oligarchy as opposed to a monarchy.

[Gaius Sempronius Gracchus]

I think the term king has to be viewed, in terms of the Celts and Gauls, in context. I don't think you can attribute such a specific definition as you have offered here to the term. As to whether one might be considered king "..where a central monarchy exercises its direct authority not just over a portion of its people's, but all of them."..., what constitutes "all"? The 'king' of the Suessiones referred to by Caesar was described as commanding a large part of Britain and much of Gaul (though, given the timeframe, I'm not sure how this would have tied in with the proto-'states' of the Aedui, Arverni, Pictones, Lemovices, Sequani and Helvetii. But, as I said, this might give some context to the use of the term 'king'. I don't, of course, mean that there was a King (in the way that we are meant to understand it now) over all of Britain; I was suggesting that there was a powerful chief with power over many tribes - another such 'king' of the period would be Ariovistus, for example.

Carthage, I know for a fact to be a more formidable and more politically-stable opponent (factional politicking aside), and they're people ceased to exist.

And Carthage was defeated on a purely military basis?

What of Sertorius in Hispania? Look at the bloody nose that Caesar got when he tried invading Britain - even after diluting the power of Cassivellaunus. Look how close he came to defeat by Ariovistus - saved only by the timely intervention of one of his legates; and again at Alesia. What about Crassus in Persia? What of the three legions that marched into Germany and never came back?

Roman military might was oly one tool in the Roman tool-box. A very good tool, but rarely used on its own. Can't defeat an irritating rebellious general? Get him assassinated. Don't want to face a half a continent of barbarians under one flag? Make alliances of various natures with them and play them off against each other....

Rome didn't become the predominant force in the West by simply shouting ug and killing lots of people; having a great army will get you so far; having the reputation of a great army, the political/diplomatic nouse to play your enemies as if they are allies.... that gets you a whole lot further.

[SlickNicaG69]

And Carthage was defeated on a purely military basis?

Yes, my friend, especially in the First Punic War, the action was always military. Hiero, you can argue, was a cheap, "diplomatic" steal, but he only switched sides after both he and the Carthaginians, under Hanno, were defeated. After that, it was a prolonged struggle of attrition over land and sea that pretty much was devoid of any foreign influence or interference.

What of Sertorius in Hispania? Look at the bloody nose that Caesar got when he tried invading Britain - even after diluting the power of Cassivellaunus. Look how close he came to defeat by Ariovistus - saved only by the timely intervention of one of his legates; and again at Alesia. What about Crassus in Persia? What of the three legions that marched into Germany and never came back?

Roman military might was oly one tool in the Roman tool-box. A very good tool, but rarely used on its own. Can't defeat an irritating rebellious general? Get him assassinated. Don't want to face a half a continent of barbarians under one flag? Make alliances of various natures with them and play them off against each other....

Rome didn't become the predominant force in the West by simply shouting ug and killing lots of people; having a great army will get you so far; having the reputation of a great army, the political/diplomatic nouse to play your enemies as if they are allies.... that gets you a whole lot further.

How on earth is this not just a totally subjective opinion and a statement that takes the discussion out of context? How does the fact that such contests were difficult diminish, in any way, the accomplishments done by Rome compared with any barbarian tribe? Son, if it wasn't for Rome there probably would be no such thing as a modern Europe. France, Spain, and Italy, are all products of the social, political, and cultural structures that the Romans established. The barbarians were always just outside the manageable range that civilization allowed @ 0 AD.

I doubt if Romans knew how to fly planes or make bombs, they would've had any trouble defeating mighty barbarians... unfortunately for them, the times were still largely dependent on pure, raw manpower... unlike today...

But really, about the topic, Britain = Land of the Chiefs.

[MisterFred]

Yes, my friend, especially in the First Punic War, the action was always military. Hiero, you can argue, was a cheap, "diplomatic" steal, but he only switched sides after both he and the Carthaginians, under Hanno, were defeated. After that, it was a prolonged struggle of attrition over land and sea that pretty much was devoid of any foreign influence or interference.

Livy: "Laelius and Masinissa, who had followed up the defeated cavalry a considerable distance, now returned from the pursuit at the right moment and attacked the enemy in the rear. This at last decided the action."
As a result of the battle of Zama: "Hannibal... told the senate frankly that he had lost not a battle merely but the whole war, and that their only chance in safety lay in obtaining peace."

Soooooo... who's this Masinissa guy? Perhaps one of the preeminent examples of political success leading to battlefield success for the Romans? The political success coming first, of course. And let us not forget that some of Scipio's success in Spain during same war was due to wooing or threatening Iberian tribes to support Rome over Carthage. In the "purely military war" as if there were such a thing, Carthage lost Sicily, but threw the Romans back when they invaded Africa. In the war where the Romans thought about using politics and diplomacy, they destroyed Carthaginian resistance in Africa and completely dismantled Carthaginian hegemony. Zama was not an incredible tactical victory. The Romans did little different than they had in numerous previous battles - Scipio was a great general because he, like Hannibal, understood the essentially political role of generalship.

Military matters are simply a subset of politics, nothing more. And you're simply wrong about Carthage being more politically stable than Rome during the Punic Wars. It trusted its allies and subject peoples far less, to the point of reducing the permitted military defenses for many of them, to its later sorrow. Its internal factional politics interfered with its military efforts more often and in a more serious fashion than Rome's.

Also, it is quite bizarre that in your haste to insult Gracchus for not praising the legions for... however you wanted him to praise them, you completely change the subject by talking about Rome's role in shaping later history. Which was not the topic. You're attacking him for something he never said. Which is strange and rude at the same time.

[Gaius Sempronius Gracchus]

Thankyou MisterFred, this; "Military matters are simply a subset of politics, nothing more." pretty much sums up what I've been trying to say. Hannibal defeated the Roman military pretty comprehensively at Trebia and Carrhae, and it is almost certain that the internal politics of Carthage was what put paid to Hannibal then marching onto Rome - instead Hannibal was restricted to what became a pointless and protracted campaign through Italy which ended up strengthening the ties between Rome and her Italian allies. It was the relative political unity of Rome, and the factional politik within Carthage that undid Hannibal - not the 'military might' of Rome.

When Viriathus waged war with those barbaric Lusotanians, how did the mighty Roman military overcome them? With the military superiority one should expect, given your account of Roman success? No, by bribing his emmissaries to Rome, who killed him in his sleep. And something very similar is likely to have occured with Quintus Sertorius.

How did the might of Rome deal with Jugurtha? By defeating him comprehensively on the battlefield? No, by having him betrayed and handed to them as a prisoner by King Bocchus.

To the suggestion that "Son, if it wasn't for Rome there probably would be no such thing as a modern Europe. France, Spain, and Italy, are all products of the social, political, and cultural structures that the Romans established."...; ignoring the condescending opening, are you suggesting that Europe would have sunk into the ocean had Rome not kept it afloat? What do you mean by such hyperbole? And then, in order to argue the predominant importance of the military of Rome you espouse the "social, political and cultural structures" that Rome "established"?! I'm not sure I understand how the implementation of social, political and cultural structures undermines, in any way, my argument that it was the political acumen of Rome that was, ultimately, their greatest strength... (I would also add that the diocese of France were based upon, as you say, the provinces/civitas of Roman Gaul which were based upon..... the tribal affiliations of pre-Roman Gaul - in other words, that the social, political and cultural structures that Rome "established"' were, in fact, the use of pre-exisitng structures.

You seem, if I understand you correctly(Slicknica), to believe the (Roman propogandist) idea that Europe would have been a cultural backwater were it not for them.. but there were clearly political/cultural progressions going on within these areas while outside of Roman influence. But, you are right in one respect, Rome has had a profound effect on modern Europe. Who were the allies within the Barbarion factions that Rome relied upon? Well, those souls who would feed the slave trade that Roman patricians relied upon more and more ( and by which they devalued the rights of lesser Roman citizens), in other words those who would sell their own people for a tidy profit in their own 'pocket', or for a few amphora of wine. That's a good starting point for all social, political and cultural structures, I'm sure. So, likely the feudal system that predominated in Europe through the medieval period is a result of Rome's intervention. Hooray for slavery and serfdom. Also the most intolerant political/religious hegemony in history can be laid at their doorstep. Hooray for religious persecution and patrician mysogeny.

Ahem...., so, back to the original point of this thread. I'll thank you again for your surety as to the political/social set-up of pre-Roman Britain, and I hope you can forgive my rudeness in preferring to take note that some serious historians, who have spent a great deal of time and effort trying to understand what can be understood from this period, really don't know. All I was asking - in a nutshell - was, is it worthwhile /historical to even have a strong political entity within Britain during the period of the late Republic. Thanks to oudysseos I think that any faction would have to be linked to a Belgic faction...

[Gaius Sempronius Gracchus]

As a point of discussion; Alesia is, on the face of it, a simple military blunder by Vercingetorix. I see this military blunder as being precipitated by the political instability of the Gallic uprising that he lead. Vercingetorix, I would argue, based his decision to remain within Alesia on the basis of the political situation he faced.

In order to even begin the rebellion he had to face down factions of the nobility within his own tribe. When the Aedui joined the uprising they attempted to have the command of it transferred to them - away from Vercingetorix. We see his internal enemies raise their heads again following the siege of Avaricum. There he was accused of 'treason' for having left the army without a commander. He managed to overcome these accusations by rightly showing how the army were left in a position unfavourable to attack by their enemies (as Caesar attests).

So, here he is at Alesia. The best military decision that he could make would have been to have escaped with his cavalry in order to co-ordinate the relief of Alesia. That way Caesar would be turned from the besieger to the besieged - with little hope of relief himself. So, Vercingetorix made a simple tactical blunder? I think that he knew that leaving Alesia un-commanded would have been the end of him, so he was left to trust to the military co-ordination ofothers....not all of whom were (perhaps) quite as...... committed as he was to ridding Gaul of the Romans.

Had Vercingetorix had the political power to do so he would almost certainly have escaped Alesia. He could not because the Gauls were divided by internal politicking.

[President]

Soooooo... who's this Masinissa guy? Perhaps one of the preeminent examples of political success leading to battlefield success for the Romans? The political success coming first, of course.

I think Massinissa fought in 2nd Punic War...