Multiculturalism is dead

[The Stranger]

Because killing innocent children for fun is wrong, by the definition of "wrong". The analogy I would make is to say that there are facts about what color the sky is, because the sky is blue, by definition. There are not facts about how happy the sky is by contrast, because of what it is that the word "sky" refers to.

actually i disagree, for a few reasons. let me first start with the obvious and then work my way to the less obvious reason, which i also find hard to explain in english so i hope that you can forgive me if i make some mistakes or become incoherent.

1. it doesnt follow from the definition of the sky that it is blue. however there are facts about the color of the sky because it is a fact that the sky has a color. However in order to determine what color the sky has we have to go outside and determine the color. Therefore "the sky is blue" is a synthetic a fortiori statement. Unlike the statement that "all bachelors are unmarried" which is a analytic a priori statement because it adds no new information and we do not need experience to tell us that "all bachelors are in fact unmarried". These first type of facts are empirical facts, they are facts about the world and can be determined to be true or not only for so far they appear in the world. If there was no sky in the world, then it could not have a color, and it couldnt be blue. The second type of facts are a different type of facts, because even if the world would have no bachelors it would still be true that all bachelors are unmarried.

2. It doesnt follow from the definition of wrong that "killing innocent children for fun" is wrong. It follows from the definition of wrong that when you believe something to be wrong that you disagree with it. It follows from the definition of square that all sides are equal, and its interior angles are all right angles (90°). From this it follows that the opposite sides are also parallel. But nothing about the definition of square says that the square has to be blue. Yet it is a fact that there are squares which are blue, it is not a fact that all squares are blue. It follows from the definition of innocent that one who is innocent has done nothing evil/morally wrong, but if doesnt follow from the definition of innocent that it is wrong to kill someone who is innocent.

3. while it is a fact that there are people who believe that it is wrong to kill innocent children for fun, it doesnt follow from that that it is a fact that killing innocent children for fun is wrong.

analogy

it is a fact that people disagree about their morals, but it doesnt follow from that fact that it is also a (empirical, not to be mistaken with moral) fact that there are no (moral) facts in morals

analogy

you can not derive a moral rule from a empiral fact.

–adjective
1.
not in accordance with what is morally right or good: a wrong deed. (in this case something is "wrong" if it is not in accordance with one's morals, nothing about it states what these morals must be)
2.
deviating from truth or fact; erroneous: a wrong answer. (and again it doesnt say anything about "killing for fun is wrong".)

however i think what we need to establish first is this, in the case that there would be moral facts, what kind of facts would they be? most people would say that they are metaphysical facts, but perhaps you are a moral realist and you would say that they are empirical facts and they can be determined by experiment.

if you believe morals to be metaphysical you cant use the scientific method in order to determine whether one moral statement is wrong and the other is not. if you believe morals to be empirical than you can, but that gives rise to a whole different set of problems such as, how to we recognise moral facts etc etc

[Sasaki Kojiro]

I think you are right that I was misusing the phrase "...by definition". What I was trying to get at was this--when we first had the urge to call things wrong or immoral (and when we have it today) we have in mind something in the real world. If we were to win a race and the prize was given to someone else, we would call it unfair, and that's where the word comes from. That makes the meaning of "unfair" pretty solid. The person giving the prize would clearly by factually incorrect if they said "it may be "fair to you" that the fastest runner gets the 1st place prize, but according to me it is fair to give it to my son".

So what I was suggesting then was that "killing innocent children for fun" is a paradigm case of something that is wrong. Similar to how being burnt by fire is a paradigm case of something that is painful. That since our conception of pain and fairness and wrongness are built off of such cases, they have to be discussed in that framework. To do otherwise is use the same words but act like they refer to something different, which is why I said that about definition. And I think this shows that moral claims are things that can be true or false. What you are talking about is a different problem. For example, astrological claims are things that can be true or false, but they fail at being factual. So it becomes the much tougher question of when we are justified in believing something.

I don't think anyone would argue that we aren't justified in believing something is painful (even though some people may be tougher or less sensitive than others). But I think that is because it is not at all a confusing topic. Whereas morality is something that people can become confused about, and thus there is widespread disagreement. But I generally agree with the SEP's summary:

Some moral realists argue that the disagreements, widespread as they are, do not go very deep—that to a significant degree moral disagreements play out against the background of shared fundamental principles with the differences of opinion regularly being traceable to disagreements about the nonmoral facts that matter in light of the moral principles. On their view, the explanation of moral disagreements will be of a piece with whatever turns out to be a good explanation of the various nonmoral disagreements people find themselves in.

Other moral realists, though, see the disagreements as sometimes fundamental. On their view, while moral disagreements might in some cases be traceable to disagreements about nonmoral matters of fact, this will not always be true. Still, they deny the anti-realist's contention that the disagreements that remain are well explained by noncognitivism or by an error theory Instead, they regularly offer some other explanation of the disagreements. They point out, for example, that many of the disagreements can be traced to the distorting effects of the emotions, attitudes, and interests that are inevitably bound up with moral issues. Or they argue that what appear to be disagreements are really cases in which the people are talking past each other, each making claims that might well be true once the claims are properly understood (Harman 1975, Wong 1984). And they often combine these explanatory strategies holding that the full range of moral disagreements are well explained by some balanced appeal to all of the considerations just mentioned, treating some disagreements as not fundamentally moral, others as a reflection of the distorting effects of emotion and interest, and still others as being due to insufficiently subtle understandings of what people are actually claiming. If some combination of these explanations works, then the moral realist is on firm ground in holding that the existence of moral disagreements, such as they are, is not an argument against moral realism. Of course, if no such explanation works, then an appeal either to noncognitivism or an error theory (i.e. to some form of anti-realism) may be the best alternative.

however i think what we need to establish first is this, in the case that there would be moral facts, what kind of facts would they be? most people would say that they are metaphysical facts, but perhaps you are a moral realist and you would say that they are empirical facts and they can be determined by experiment.

I'm afraid I can't answer this properly. It's a difficult question, compared to moral realism which can be arrived at merely by rejecting sophistry. I think W.D. Ross gave a good description of how we acquire moral knowledge:

That our responsibilities are self-evident does not entail that they are obvious to everyone who reflects on them. Ross maintains that a responsibility is self-evident ‘not in the sense that it is evident from the beginning of our lives, or as soon as we attend to the proposition for the first time, but in the sense that when we have reached sufficient mental maturity and have given sufficient attention to the proposition it is evident without any need of proof, or of evidence beyond itself. It is self-evident just as a mathematic axiom, or the validity of a form of inference, is evident’ (RG 29; also 12, 32). The analogy with mathematics is instructive, for we acquire our moral knowledge in the same way we acquire knowledge of mathematical axioms. We apprehend that 2+2 = 4 by apprehending that 2+2 matches makes 4 matches and that 2+2 balls makes 4 balls, and so on. We apprehend the algorithm in the particular cases after repeated exposure to particular instances of its application, by a process of intuitive induction (FE 170). We apprehend that it is prima facie right to keep promises by apprehending that it is prima facie right to fulfill this or that particular promise. ‘What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty’ (RG 33; also FE 170).

But in general it's a complicated subject that's a little beyond me. But I find the practical theory's like ross's and aristotle's virtue ethics far more sensible and genuine than many other attempts which are often biased, sophist, or attempt to be too systemized.

*************

On a personal aside from the argument, I doubt the sincerity of people who claim they don't think "killing innocent children for fun is wrong" is factual, and that we are justified in believing it.

[The Stranger]

it is indeed a difficult topic, and since i have serious trouble making correct and meaningfull phrases in english about it i think i will let it rest for now. perhaps ill try to write an essay about it :)

thank you for your response!

[Sasaki Kojiro]

I have trouble making the correct phrases in english too

[al Roumi]

Firstly, thanks for your patience Sasaki –I was away for a long weekend without the time to give this a proper answer/thought. I think it’s fair to point at a couple of assumptions in my argument, I’ll try to delve into them now.

I agree that a simple disagreement or difference of opinion doesn’t mean that both parties are right. However, I do think that when the valuation of what is right is subjective, that neither party can claim to be right over the other.

This is where my point regarding cultural values defining some aspects of morality comes in. I completely agree that morality is generated by experience and rationalising, but I do maintain that there is room for culture and ideology to play a part in these experience and rationality.

Abstaining from causing various forms of harm to “thy neighbour” seems to be a near universal moral, but when we look at things where the definition of harm varies –or where there are multiple and alternative “harms” consequent of the initial dilemma or circumstance, “moral” individuals will knowingly perpetuate systems and actions which cause harm for the greater good.

It is this kind of situation, of far greater complexity and consequence than “x harms y therefore x is wrong/bad/immoral”, that I have been referring to in our discussion.

To give you an example: As we might say the west values liberty and freedom of expression above all, some cultures value tradition and respectfulness above all. These are not equal or opposite sets of values, but they have some areas of mutual agreement, as well as contradiction. So, as the west claims it is vital that women are treated equally to men, other cultures might agree that women should be treated fairly, but without undermining their patriarchal social norms –hence not actually treating women equally to men. I know which view I agree with more, but I cannot say which view is, in an absolute sense, correct or wrong either.

What would actually make one wrong and the other right? A comparative Marxist/materialist view of a society's productivity? Surely one gauges or measures the worth of each position according to one’s personal scale/view. This subjective scale is, IMO, itself defined by what one values - hence westerners valuing outcomes according to the degree of liberty and equality and others according to the degree of tradition and respectfulness. This is circular reasoning, but I would venture that this circularity is actually why the talking past each other happens.

How can we objectively measure (the cornerstone of moral realism afaik from wikipedia) the outcomes when the criteria by which the outcomes are appreciated are subjective? Until one can transcend these cultural or personal values and propose a solution of objective, independent or mutually understandable worth, neither party will see eye to eye.

[gaelic cowboy]

I have trouble making the correct phrases in english too

Tommy Tiernan summed it up best here

"The English language is like a brick wall between me and you, and is my chisel" (insert common Irish swear word)

[Sasaki Kojiro]

As I said in my reply to stranger, it is hard to say what exactly the basis for morality is, and it is often difficult to argue for one moral position over the other. The good thing about multiculturalism is that it acknowledges this, and is thus an improvement over the idea it largely replaced. But it should only acknowledge that it is difficult. It is not that neither party can claim to be right, it is that they cannot merely claim to be right, they must try and show that they are right.

I don't think though, that valuation of what is right is subjective. It is not a matter of arbitrary taste. And I think if we look at the differences in rules, we will see that they are not based on differences in taste. It is wrong to not tip your bartender in America, but not wrong in England (as I understand it). But we would not conclude that whether one should tip is subjective. In America the hourly wage for a bartender is very low, and tips are supposed to make up the difference. In England that's not the case. On the surface it looks like a difference but underneath it's the same principle.

My values are things that can be distorted and wrong. This is something that has to be admitted. Someone who is extremely selfish values their own wallet over the person who's car the just hit before driving off. There's no subjectivity there--they are wrong. "Values" is a word that I think confuses. It kind of begs the question. My "values" are not necessarily to be "valued". They are not necessarily worth anything. If I am extremely selfish, they are bad values.

I would extend that to the culture that values having women be servile. If you look at all the things that go into backing up their moral beliefs, I think you would reject many of them. Selfishness on the part of the men, and fear on the part of the women, for example. How is it a matter of taste?

And even when I am earnest and well meaning in my moral beliefs, I can be wrong and would admit it if I could be shown how. I may believe that X results in Y when it does not. I may not have any personal experience with something, and therefore not add enough weigh to it in my evaluation. I may have an underlying bias due to the way the idea was first presented to me--perhaps it is something I was taught while young and never questioned.

I acknowledge that there is a certain amount of variation. I think how much we value security has a window of subjectivity, for example. There are genetic differences that have to do with that. But then I don't think the value of acknowledging and working with such legitimate subjective ranges is itself subjective.

Frankly I think that multiculturalism, in its combat with xenophobia, has taken to leaning on the "values are subjective" type of argument as a crutch. If you are arguing with a xenophobe it's natural to avoid exposing yourself by making difficult arguments about the basis of morality, and trying to figure out and judge what all the causes of disagreement are. It's difficult but it's better to do it, because we will get closer to the truth that way. If someone is arguing against Mexicans bringing their culture here, we should be able to do more than say that it is subjective whether their culture is bad. That grants equal legitimacy to the xenophobe. We should instead be able to argue that it is good.

[Beskar]

I don't think though, that valuation of what is right is subjective. It is not a matter of arbitrary taste. And I think if we look at the differences in rules, we will see that they are not based on differences in taste. It is wrong to not tip your bartender in America, but not wrong in England (as I understand it). But we would not conclude that whether one should tip is subjective. In America the hourly wage for a bartender is very low, and tips are supposed to make up the difference. In England that's not the case. On the surface it looks like a difference but underneath it's the same principle.

Everyone and everything wants a tip in America.

In England, everyone gets a good wage, and even then, we only tip 10% if the meal is good in a restaurant. That tip goes towards a bonus for all the staff, as the 'waiter/waitress' is only giving you a plate, it was the cook in the back which is doing the meal. You pay for what you ordered and you pay for everything, no hidden costs.

In America, random person opens door, then opens their hand. You are expected and pretty much "have" to tip or they go into an infernal rage. Even worse when they just take your money and they don't even give you your change, or even when you tip them, they cry about how you didn't tip them enough.

Then there is full of hidden costs. I remember using an American tour company for a holiday, they had so many hidden costs, it was unbelievable. It turns out they don't even pay the bus driver or the tour guide and you are expected to pay their entire wage in tips. What kind of barmy system is that? When I pay for something, I expect to have paid for it. I don't budget for random throwing money at my wallet at people. They got in a rage when they only got £200 in tips, £200 is a lot of money, and they were wanting like £500-700.

(Oh and that Tour Company wasn't cheap itself either. What on earth did they do with the money that we had to pay them? Line their back pockets with it?)