The Irish boom saw a vast property bubble puffed up by appallingly managed banks with the complicity of idle regulators and political cronies. House prices between 1994 and 2006 rose by around 520%. The relationships between developers, their financiers and the officials who authorised the building spree were usually cosy, often corrupt. Towards the end of the growth years, the country's financial sector descended into full-blown mania. Banks doled out credit indiscriminately and borrowed on international capital markets on a scale that far exceeded the nation's economic output. When the bubble burst, the government stepped in to rescue the banks, but their debts were ultimately bigger than the state's capacity to raise revenue. Ireland started sliding towards insolvency. Hence, the bailout.
Not all of the boom was bogus. The initial expansion was driven by growth in exports. A young, well-educated, cheap labour force attracted investment. So did an aggressively competitive 12.5% corporate tax rate. Ireland positioned itself as a lean, buccaneering start-up economy, challenging Europe's unwieldy giants. Membership of the single currency gave seamless access to export and capital markets.
But there was a shift at the start of the 21st century. As success fed into higher disposable incomes and demand for houses, the returns on property investment soared. The government, in turn, became dependent on tax revenues – and in some cases bribes – from the building trade. Politicians kept consumer demand buoyant with generous public spending, while rewarding developer friends with public works contracts. Ireland's narrow elite ran the economy like a casino and awarded itself free chips. No one, save a few lonely economists, had much incentive to call time on the party. By 2007, around one in five Irish jobs depended in some way on the property market.
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