The criteria themselves (3% deficit and 60% government debt) are somewhat arbitrary, and usually exceeded anyway in a period of recession when governments resort to deficit spending (what's wrong with anticyclical spending anyway?)
These criteria have however, never been intended as an instant justification for sanctions but as a prerequisite, as evidenced by the fact that the council can, but doesn't have to impose sanctions in the case of a breech. Wich brings me to the second point...
Germany and France getting away with their budgetary vices is a symptom of the toothlessness of the pact, not the cause of it. Even if they had behaved themselves on those occasions it's extremely questionable wether anybody else would have been punished for infractions. It was decided in the early days that the ability to impose sanctions should lie with the council (i.e. the national leaders and potential culprits) instead of a supranational body like the European Commission, or some other EU institution. The reason? The fear of losing sovereignty, or the appearance of giving away sovereignty in front of voters.
I stand corrected, in regards to Ireland. What I said still stands for Greece, Italy and some others though.
I still haven't seen anybody put forward a coherent argument why overarching taxes are necessary for a monetary union.
I don't have much agains the system you describe if it's meant for emergencies or unusual situations. As a general procedure, it smells of moral hazard.
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