Results 1 to 25 of 25

Thread: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

  1. #1

    Default Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Here is the situation. After nearly three months of bitter stalemate in Normandy, the Americans finally break out in the south towards Brittany in Operation Cobra. Instead of allowing his generals to withdraw to a more defensible position as they urged, Hitler instead ordered a disastrous counterattack codenamed Operation Lüttich, which only served to drive the last and best German divisions deeper into Allied hands.

    The German forces were enveloped and destroyed around the town of Falaise, a critical blow that concluded the Normandy campaign decisively for the Allies.

    Quote Originally Posted by wiki
    The battle of the Falaise Pocket marked the closing phase of the Battle of Normandy with a decisive German defeat.[2] Hitler's personal involvement had been damaging from the first, with his insistence on hopelessly optimistic counter-offensives, his micro-management of his generals, and his refusal to countenance a withdrawal when his armies were threatened with annihilation.
    However, significant numbers of Germans (up to 50,000) were able to escape the pocket without their heavy equipment, who later made life difficult for the Allies on the German border.

    The Allies being the Allies, politics entered the equation and even a great victory was accompanied by acrimony and recrimination.

    Here's where it gets fun, though. I have always read that the Americans blamed the British, and the British blamed the Canadians.

    Quote Originally Posted by wiki
    Disappointed that a significant portion of Seventh Army had eluded them, many in the Allied higher echelons—particularly among the Americans—were bitterly critical of what they perceived as Montgomery's lack of urgency in closing the pocket.[13] Writing shortly after the war, Ralph Ingersoll, a prominent peacetime journalist who served as a planner on Eisenhower's staff, expressed the prevailing American view at the time:

    The international army boundary arbitrarily divided the British and American battlefields just beyond Argentan, on the Falaise side of it. Patton's troops, who thought they had the mission of closing the gap, took Argentan in their stride and crossed the international boundary without stopping. Montgomery, who was still nominally in charge of all ground forces, now chose to exercise his authority and ordered Patton back to his side of the international boundary line. … For ten days, however, the beaten but still coherently organized German Army retreated through the Falaise gap.[83]
    Some historians agree that the gap could have been closed earlier; Wilmot notes that despite having British divisions in reserve Montgomery did not reinforce Simonds, and neither was the Canadian drive on Trun and Chambois as "vigorous and venturesome" as the situation demanded.[13] Hastings writes that Montgomery, having witnessed what he characterises as a poor Canadian performance during Totalize, should have brought up veteran British divisions to take the lead.[48] However, while acknowledging that Montgomery and Crerar might have done more to impart momentum to the British and Canadians, these and others such as D'Este and Blumenson dismiss as "absurd over-simplification" Patton's post-battle claim that the Americans could have prevented the German escape had Bradley not ordered him to stop at Argentan.[84]

    Wilmot states that "contrary to contemporary reports, the Americans did not capture Argentan until 20 August, the day after the link up at Chambois".[85] The American unit that closed the gap between Argentan and Chambois, the 90th Division, was according to Hastings one of the least effective of any Allied army in Normandy. He speculates that the real reason Bradley halted Patton was not fears over accidental clashes with the British but an appreciation that with powerful German formations still effective at that stage of the battle, the Americans lacked the means to defend an early blocking position and would have suffered an "embarrassing and gratuitous setback" at the hands of the retreating Fallschirmjäger and 2nd and 12th SS Panzer Divisions.[84]
    However, in another thread, one of our intrepid Polish posters claimed the following.

    Quote Originally Posted by Krook
    I have just read some memories of polish officers from 1st. polish armoured division.
    They wrote that french division did not execute order of assault into Falaise pot (and close it from south). They expected too big loses when facing German 1st line divisions.
    If its truth we can blame Frenchmen for running 40.000 experienced Germans troops from pot. Similar to liberation of Rome into 1944.
    I would like to see this fleshed out a bit more, preferably with sources, as I have never heard of the French divisions being blamed for not closing the pocket sooner.
    Last edited by PanzerJaeger; 01-22-2011 at 03:41.

  2. #2
    Old Town Road Senior Member Strike For The South's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jul 2005
    Location
    Between Louis' sheets
    Posts
    10,369

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    There, but for the grace of God, goes John Bradford

    My aim, then, was to whip the rebels, to humble their pride, to follow them to their inmost recesses, and make them fear and dread us. Fear is the beginning of wisdom.

    I am tired and sick of war. Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, for vengeance, for desolation.

  3. #3
    Senior Member Senior Member Brenus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2005
    Location
    Wokingham
    Posts
    3,523

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Interesting, but I saw no French Cowardice in it.
    I would be surprised to find it, as the French were under Patton, that, even if the French General Leclerc would have, this general would have tolerate this kind of behaviour.

    Krook, please can you provide info, for both cases you mentioned.
    For Rome, I much as I know, the French were ready to enter in Rome and was stop to leave this Honour to General Clarke.
    As you probably know, it was the French Troops of the General Juin that succeeded the breakthrough.
    Thanks to them, the Poles were finally able to take Monte Casino. I know, I know, it is cheap…
    Last edited by Brenus; 01-21-2011 at 20:00. Reason: sp
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltaire.

    "I've been in few famous last stands, lad, and they're butcher shops. That's what Blouse's leading you into, mark my words. What'll you lot do then? We've had a few scuffles, but that's not war. Think you'll be man enough to stand, when the metal meets the meat?"
    "You did, sarge", said Polly." You said you were in few last stands."
    "Yeah, lad. But I was holding the metal"
    Sergeant Major Jackrum 10th Light Foot Infantery Regiment "Inns-and-Out"

  4. #4
    Horse Archer Senior Member Sarmatian's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jan 2006
    Location
    Novi Sad, Serbia
    Posts
    4,315

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Quote Originally Posted by PanzerJaeger View Post
    I would like to see this fleshed out a bit more, preferably with sources, as I have never heard of the French divisions being blamed for not closing the pocket sooner.
    Are you seriously expecting sources from Krook?

  5. #5
    TexMec Senior Member Louis VI the Fat's Avatar
    Join Date
    Apr 2004
    Location
    Saint Antoine
    Posts
    9,935

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Please let's not make this personal.



    If I understand the theory correctly, the exhausted Poles tried to keep the Germans from breaking out of the pocket. The Poles lacked ammunition, support troops, supplies. This gave the Germans the oppportunity to break out past the Polish position.

    Apparantly, there were French troops who did not provide support because they feared high casualties.



    'If it werent for the cowardice of others who refused crucial support, we could've stopped the Germans'. Which, I suppose, in more nationalist circles counts as the overarching narrative of the entire Polish WWII military history.
    Anything unrelated to elephants is irrelephant
    Texan by birth, woodpecker by the grace of God
    I would be the voice of your conscience if you had one - Brenus
    Bt why woulf we uy lsn'y Staraft - Fragony
    Not everything
    blue and underlined is a link


  6. #6

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Quote Originally Posted by Sarmatian View Post
    Are you seriously expecting sources from Krook?
    He seemed to be referencing a specific memoir. I would really like to get my hands on a translated copy, as everything I've read about the French during Overlord has them both eager to engage and performing quite well - but I haven't read much. There was also a lot of misplaced triumphalism among the lesser Allies after Normandy, so it would be interesting to hear from a primary source, considering the crucial part the Poles played in the operation.

  7. #7
    Senior Member Senior Member Brenus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2005
    Location
    Wokingham
    Posts
    3,523

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    He seemed to be referencing a specific memoir.” Yeeahhh. It will be all theses memoirs when all Eastern European fleeing their countries were coming wit a new proof that Stalin was prepared to invade Germany…
    Probably following the New Europe and Old Europe debate, some Polish Officers decide to follow and to give to their potential Public what they wanted to read.

    As far as I know, the Polish were under English Command, the French under US command. How a Polish officer would have know what would happened in front of the French 2nd Armoured Division, I don’t know.

    From memorial-montormel.org:
    On the left flank of the 5th US armoured division, Leclerc’s division liberated Alençon on August 12th, then Ecouché the next day. Soon, it encountered AT ambushes positioned by 9. PzD freshly recalled from Nimes. After violent fighting in the Ecouves forest, French successfully overcame enemy resistance and could advance north, on Argentan. However, their units dispersed on the small roads leading to the town, creating inextricable traffic jams with 5th US armoured division. Reconnaissance units of the French division entered Alençon in the night of August 13th, but they were promptly driven back by German forces, firmly holding the town.
    The allied High Command wished to have the 2nd Free French armoured division to take part in the closing of the Falaise pocket, by reaching the Poles coming from north. Hence, 2nd Free French armoured division advanced northeast, on Oméel. August 19th, it directed some patrols of task force “Massu” on the southern slopes of hill 262, but failed to operate the junction with the polish armoured division
    .”

    In dday-overlord.com:
    On August 11, 1944, the 15th corps of the 3rd U.S. Army progressed toward Argentan. Hard fighting took place around the town of Alençon, besieged in the evening by the 2nd French Armoured division of General Leclerc. French soldiers entered the town but it has taken a few hours to clean the entire city from German snipers. 25 km have been covered since August On August 12, south-west of Falaise, the 15th corps of the 3rd U.S. Army progressed to the North despite numerous skirmishes with the SS Panzer divisions.
    The 2nd French Armoured division then controlled the town of Alençon, were difficult fighting took place since the eve in the streets. The French went back en route and soon entered Ecouché on the road to Argentan. The 15th American corps managed to reach in the evening the region near Argentan: the 1st and 3rd American armies have pushed the German forces of fifty kilometres in a week.
    For Germans, the situation in Normandy was catastrophic. Dozens of divisions are encircled by the Allies. The Americans attacked south of the pocket in three major areas. To the west, the 19th corps of the 1st Army attacked four German divisions including an armoured one. On his right flank, the 7th corps of the 1st Army, the 2nd French Armoured division and the 15th American corps progressed to achieve the trap
    .”
    So I am please to inform krook he will have to come up with more secret revelations…
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltaire.

    "I've been in few famous last stands, lad, and they're butcher shops. That's what Blouse's leading you into, mark my words. What'll you lot do then? We've had a few scuffles, but that's not war. Think you'll be man enough to stand, when the metal meets the meat?"
    "You did, sarge", said Polly." You said you were in few last stands."
    "Yeah, lad. But I was holding the metal"
    Sergeant Major Jackrum 10th Light Foot Infantery Regiment "Inns-and-Out"

  8. #8
    TexMec Senior Member Louis VI the Fat's Avatar
    Join Date
    Apr 2004
    Location
    Saint Antoine
    Posts
    9,935

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    I must say that very little of my nationalist instinct is at all moved by obscure stories of what which division may or may not have done during which ancient war.


    Anything unrelated to elephants is irrelephant
    Texan by birth, woodpecker by the grace of God
    I would be the voice of your conscience if you had one - Brenus
    Bt why woulf we uy lsn'y Staraft - Fragony
    Not everything
    blue and underlined is a link


  9. #9
    Member Member KrooK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Kraj skrzydlatych jeźdźców
    Posts
    1,083

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    My source is polish book called "Polish 1st armoured division at Normandy" by Jacek Kutzner and Juliusz S. Tym (title translated by me). Book is in polish but its full of quotations from other sources, mostly articles made by participants of the battle. I need some time to find that remark so give me some time. I'm not as addicted person like some of you.
    Anyway book might be very interesting for you PanzerJaeger. There is many remarks about German tanks - including Tiger II.

    I compared Falaise to Rome because results of these battles are similar. After Monte Cassino most of German units into Italy could have been trapped and destroyed. However Americans prefer capturing Rome. This let Germans withdraw and made new defense line. At Falaise allies might have destroy much more German units, including at least one SS Coprs. Of course Hitler lost many soldiers (12th SS Division after Normandy was estimated on less than 10% of its normal status).
    However as someone mentioned here biggest problem with German tank divisions were not tanks but experienced crews.
    John Thomas Gross - liar who want put on Poles responsibility for impassivity of American Jews during holocaust

  10. #10
    Member Member KrooK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Kraj skrzydlatych jeźdźców
    Posts
    1,083

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Ok I found - book has very good index of military units mentioned there.
    Its into chapter VI "Closing Trun pot". Page 411. I will try to translate. Sorry for language.

    "18th August 1944 acting as a part of american Vth Corp, french 2nd armoured division [french name of that unit here, lead by general Jacques Philippe Lecrerc, was given order of capturing TRUN. Due to indolence with executing this order division in the night from 18-19th august was given order of capturing areas OMMEEL and MONT ORMEL on the east and north from CHAMBOIS. According to relation of the one of the commanders of tactic groups from french 2nd armoured division, colonel Paul de Lanlade, this order was executed with indolence. For its commander [2nd division - added by KrooK] most important was reduction to situation when 2nd division could enter the Paris before other allies units. Thats why units from division avoided taking part into actions whom could cause significant losses."

    Source mentioned into this text: P. de Langlade, "En suivant Leclers (Koufra, Tunise, Alencon, Paris, Strasbourg, Berchtesgaden)", Paris 1965, p. 125 and next. Bigger comment into W. Rostafiński "Zajęcie i obrona Chambois i Mont Ormel w planach Sprzymierzonych w sierpniu 1944" into "Przegląd Kawalerii i Broni Pancernej", London 1991, nr 137, p. 50 - 57.

    Hmm Brenus - looks like I gave my source. Sorry for mistake into post about that Manor Assault. I wrote there that source is from polish officers memories. Looks like it was definitely french officer.
    If french officer, participant of that battle, wrote something like this....
    For me case is finished.

    At Falaise polish division could not do more than it does. Destroyed at least 52 tanks, 2 tank destroyers, 14 armoured cars, 38 armoured transporters, 79 cannons, 207 other vehicles and 152 horse vehicles was big deal. Add here about 429 POWs taken during Totalize operation and about 5113 POWs taken during Tractable (Poles took so many prisoners that there were not enough guards and prisoners were given neighbour allies units). Loses of German army were really significant. But could have been much bigger. But (as we see higher) french division did not close pot.
    John Thomas Gross - liar who want put on Poles responsibility for impassivity of American Jews during holocaust

  11. #11
    Senior Member Senior Member Brenus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2005
    Location
    Wokingham
    Posts
    3,523

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    No. The French Division didn’t close the gap, but nor the Canadian, the English, the Poles or the American.
    But none of them is accused to have done this for cowardice like in the book of Polish Officers. No document, no evidence of any cowardice, so I am afraid you still have the burden of the proof to give.
    Case is not close.

    Your source mixed-up thinks. In fact of sources from the American sides tend to prove that the French were at least keen in liberating their country and were quite aggressive.
    In 1944, the French of the 2 D.B had a long combat history, with a lot of veteran in its rank (some from the Spanish Civil War).
    The 2nd Armoured Division was leading the 3rd US Army. I am not a big admirer of Gal Patton, but I doubt he would have let a French Unit (or any unit) to get away with “indolence” or “cowardice”.

    From flamesofwar.com
    When the roads were finally sorted, the Allied High Command decided to use the 2ème Division Blindée as a battering ram to try to close the Falaise Pocket. They were to meet the southward advancing Polish Armoured Division to close the gap. The division advanced northwest and made for their objective; the town of Oméel. The fighting was again desperate and although lead elements of the Spahis made the South Eastern slopes of Hill 262, the rest of the division could not reach the Poles and the Pocket remained open.”

    From wordlingo.com
    The Division landed at Utah Beach in Normandy on 1 August 1944, about two months after the D-Day landings, and served under General Patton's Third Army. The division played a critical role in Operation Cobra, the Allied breakout from Normandy, when it served as a link between American and Canadian armies and made rapid progress against German forces. They all but destroyed the 9th Panzer Division and defeated several other German units. During the Battle for Normandy, the 2nd Division lost 133 men killed, 648 wounded, and 85 missing. Division material losses included 76 armoured vehicles, 7 cannons, 27 halftracks, and 133 other vehicles. In the same period, the 2nd Division inflicted losses on the Germans of 4,500 killed and 8,800 taken prisoner, while the Germans' material losses in combat against the 2nd Division during the same period were 117 tanks, 79 cannons, and 750 wheeled vehicles.”

    Now, all the sources I read mentioned the French took heavy loses… So perhaps it was not as the Polish Officers insinuated that the French were afraid to take heavy loses but had heavy loses.
    And I found no record of a report from Langlade about an alleged “indolence” of his forces. And due to the date of publication, I seriously doubt he did write this.
    And by the way, it is not because a document is written by a French, even a veteran, that I accepted blindly.
    Veteran can lie as well, for various reasons, or make mistake...
    Last edited by Brenus; 01-23-2011 at 09:12. Reason: sp
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltaire.

    "I've been in few famous last stands, lad, and they're butcher shops. That's what Blouse's leading you into, mark my words. What'll you lot do then? We've had a few scuffles, but that's not war. Think you'll be man enough to stand, when the metal meets the meat?"
    "You did, sarge", said Polly." You said you were in few last stands."
    "Yeah, lad. But I was holding the metal"
    Sergeant Major Jackrum 10th Light Foot Infantery Regiment "Inns-and-Out"

  12. #12
    Member Member KrooK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Kraj skrzydlatych jeźdźców
    Posts
    1,083

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Brenus I have stupid question.
    Have you even read my 2nd post? I wrote about mine mistake. Statement about avoiding of fight was given by FRENCH not polish OFFICER. I wrote my source. Its polish book quoting french book. So sorry but if your officer, participant of that battle, tell that they disobeyed order - I trust him.

    I have shown French sources. Evidence has been given. I prooved my point of view. Now you are saying "sorry but I found into .net that its not truth". You are not showing links, only site names. Maybe give something better.

    As for now - you prooved that your division was good into catching running Germans. When Germans were ready to fight, you did not attack them.
    John Thomas Gross - liar who want put on Poles responsibility for impassivity of American Jews during holocaust

  13. #13
    Senior Member Senior Member Brenus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2005
    Location
    Wokingham
    Posts
    3,523

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    So sorry but if your officer, participant of that battle, tell that they disobeyed order - I trust him.
    I have shown French sources. Evidence has been given. I prooved my point of view. Now you are saying "sorry but I found into .net that its not truth". You are not showing links, only site names. Maybe give something better.
    As for now - you prooved that your division was good into catching running Germans. When Germans were ready to fight, you did not attack them


    Krook, you proved nothing.

    Your sources gave one French Officer who said the French were “indolent”. That is still to be proved. However, even if it was true, that doesn’t mean coward or they disobeyed order.
    The French troops, known as the Spanish as they were veteran of the Spanish Civil War, reached the foot of the hills and were not able to reach the Polish positions. These are the facts.
    I gave you the opportunity to rectify your officers mistake and you come up with non-sense a little bit insulting for the French soldiers who were fighting the Nazi from 1939 and never stopped.
    I could answer in the same way saying that the Polish nicely installed in a defensive position at the top of a hill were not willing to go down to close the gap. That would be as much a twisted picture as the one you gave.

    And, one again, I found no track of what he wrote and the book being written in 1958, I doubt I will.
    There is no one shred of evidence of what your two Polish Officers said that a French Officer wrote is true.
    Now, if you come with an official document of the 3rd US Army under the command of the Gal. Patton I will start to give attention.

    And once again, the French were not the only one trying to close the gap, and no one can pretend that the Germans would let this happened.

    So, you proved nothing, once again.
    About links, you just type www. Then the address, you should get the document.

    And I will give you a trick I learnt in University. When somebody writes or says something, always question the motives. Most officers are keen to blame somebody else for failures, from politicians to theirs troops, every body except themselves…
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltaire.

    "I've been in few famous last stands, lad, and they're butcher shops. That's what Blouse's leading you into, mark my words. What'll you lot do then? We've had a few scuffles, but that's not war. Think you'll be man enough to stand, when the metal meets the meat?"
    "You did, sarge", said Polly." You said you were in few last stands."
    "Yeah, lad. But I was holding the metal"
    Sergeant Major Jackrum 10th Light Foot Infantery Regiment "Inns-and-Out"

  14. #14
    Member Member KrooK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Kraj skrzydlatych jeźdźców
    Posts
    1,083

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    OMG please read - read - read. Then tell. It does not hurt. Maybe you have problems with eyes or something. I wrote about polish officers and later wrote that they did not made statement mentioned. It was my mistake - I mixed Langlade statement with some polish officers memories. But I wrote about this 2 times (this is 3rd). So I beg you - read then write.

    I did not mention 1939. I wrote that 2nd division had such a good kill ratio because Frenchmen were catching running Germans into 1944 IN NORMANDY.
    Looks like1939 is your weak point. But if you mention 1939. I think theory that French soldiers were not fighting nazis into 1939 can be prooved too. France was in war with Germany since 1939 but French soldiers did not fight. They did many things but did not fight. Even into 1940 most of them did not fight. Taking part into war - yes definitely. But not fight. However this it other story.

    And do you know why polish unit did not capture 2nd hill 262. There are 2 main reasons: next to 1st hill 262 was a road. Polish tanks found so many targets there that could not find time to charge another hill - too many targets including Panthers from rear. Actually it was good tactic - they kill so many people and destroyed so many equipment that road was completely closed. After war it looked like a battle of bzura into 1939. With sides turned. 2nd reason was that polish tank brigade spent whole day looking for target. Why? Because local guide (imagine it was Frenchman) guided then directly on SS positions and then disappeared. It finished into destruction of 2nd SS division HQ but took a whole day to find hill 262.

    Later it appeared that decision was well. Polish division hardly hold its positions. If they divide units on 2 hills, they would be destroyed. Remember that Poles were being attacked by 3 or 4 SS tank divisions with support from other units. With much better tanks and cannons. And they were attacking from 3 sides, having no ammo, with thousands of POWs in the middle of them.

    Anyway I wrote my statements. They are based on French sources. I underlined that they are relations and I can't be sure about their truth. Here you are attacking me without any reliable sources (net is not reliable for me, especially Wikipedia). Soon you will start talking that into 1939 French army captured half of Germany.
    John Thomas Gross - liar who want put on Poles responsibility for impassivity of American Jews during holocaust

  15. #15
    Senior Member Senior Member Brenus's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2005
    Location
    Wokingham
    Posts
    3,523

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    OMG please read - read - read.”:
    I did. And you wrote that in a book written by Polish Officers stating a French Officer is telling the French refused to attack the Germans.
    I want a proof of this, not from a book even written by a French Officer, even if he wrote this, which I doubt.
    I found no track of this statement, nowhere… And knowing how the French are keen to destroy all heroism when it is some body else, it would have created a HUGE polemic in France as the 2nd DB and its commander are legends.

    We had 3 steps in the writing the History of the WW2:
    First, all the French were resistance and courageous.
    Second all the French were collaborators.
    Third, it is more complex than this.

    The book would have been written in the first phase, so I don’t believe it was written.

    Then THERE ARE NO ARMY DOCUMENTS RELATED OF A UNIT REFUSAL TO OBBEY ORDERS IN THE PATTON ARMY. Is it clear?

    If you want to speak of 1940, just go for battle of Gembloux. It will give you some information
    Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities. Voltaire.

    "I've been in few famous last stands, lad, and they're butcher shops. That's what Blouse's leading you into, mark my words. What'll you lot do then? We've had a few scuffles, but that's not war. Think you'll be man enough to stand, when the metal meets the meat?"
    "You did, sarge", said Polly." You said you were in few last stands."
    "Yeah, lad. But I was holding the metal"
    Sergeant Major Jackrum 10th Light Foot Infantery Regiment "Inns-and-Out"

  16. #16
    Member Member KrooK's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Kraj skrzydlatych jeźdźców
    Posts
    1,083

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    OK now I see you misunderstood me. I will post PM with explanation in few days. I'm very busy at work and explanation should be very clear - otherwise you might not understand it correctly. And would be nice if you send me information about that battle on PM.
    John Thomas Gross - liar who want put on Poles responsibility for impassivity of American Jews during holocaust

  17. #17

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    I didn't hear anything about this alleged episode. I wouldn't put the blame on French units.

    It was rather Canadian 4th Armoured Division that messed up:

    August 19th, the 4th Canadian armoured detached a column made up of South Alberta Regiment and Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders under the command of major D.V. Currie, in direction of Saint Lambert sur Dives. During three days, this group would repel the massive attacks of the Germans seeking to leave the pocket, and will take hundreds of prisoners. During Currie’s struggle for Saint Lambert, main Canadian forces were driving towards Polish positions on hill 262, but were stopped on hill 240 by negligible German opposition. It failed to deliver its attack before the morning of August 21st, which obliged the Poles to fight isolated, and made it possible for thousands of Germans to escape from the Falaise pocket. This controversial performance resulted in Kitching, commander of the Canadian division, being dismissed from his command.
    And here is an article about Polish involvement in the battle:

    ==============================================

    Prelude:

    In the final stages of the Normandy Campaign the bulk of two German armies had become surrounded by the Allies near the town of Falaise, and the Mont Ormel ridge, with its commanding view of the area, sat astride the Germans' only escape route. Polish forces seized the ridge's northern height on 19 August and, despite being isolated and coming under sustained attack, held it until noon on 21 August, contributing greatly to the decisive Allied victory that followed.

    The American success of Operation Cobra provided the Allies with an opportunity to cut off and destroy most of the German forces west of the River Seine. American, British and Canadian armies converged on the area around Falaise, trapping the German Seventh Army and elements of the Fifth Panzer Army. On 20 August Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model ordered a withdrawal, but by this time the Allies were already across his path; during the night of 19 August, two battlegroups of Stanisław Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division had established themselves in the mouth of the Falaise pocket on the northernmost of the Mont Ormel ridge's two peaks.

    His forces encircled, on 20 August Model organised attacks on the ridge from both within and outside the pocket, and the Germans managed to isolate the position and force open an escape route. Lacking the fighting power to close the corridor, the Poles nevertheless directed constant and accurate artillery fire on German units leaving the sector, causing heavy casualties. Exasperated, the Germans launched fierce attacks throughout 20 August, inflicting severe losses on Hill 262's entrenched defenders. Exhausted and dangerously low on ammunition, the Poles managed to retain their foothold on the ridge. The following day, less intense attacks continued until midday, when the last German effort to overrun the position was defeated at close quarters. The Poles were relieved by the Canadian Grenadier Guards shortly after noon; their dogged stand had ensured the Falaise pocket's closure and the collapse of the German position in Normandy.

    The Canadians reorganised and on 14 August launched Operation Tractable. Three days later Falaise fell. The Allied noose was closing around von Kluge's force and it fell to the Poles to draw it tight. In a meeting with his divisional commanders on 19 August, Simonds emphasised the importance of quickly closing the Falaise Pocket to General Stanisław Maczek. Assigned responsibility for the Moissy–Chambois–Coudehard area, Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division had split into three battlegroups each composed of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion and been sweeping the countryside north of Chambois. However, facing stiff German resistance and with Loszutski's battlegroup having "gone astray" and needing to be rescued, the division had not yet taken Chambois, Coudehard, or the Mont Ormel ridge. Following his meeting with Simonds, Maczek was determined to get his men onto their objectives as soon as possible. The 10th Dragoons (10th Polish Motorised infantry Battalion) and 10th Polish Mounted Rifle Regiment (the division's armoured reconnaissance regiment) drove hard on Chambois, the capture of which would effect a link-up with the United States 90th Infantry Division who were simultaneously attacking the town from the south. Having taken Trun and Champeaux, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division reinforced the Poles, and by the evening of 19 August the town was in Allied hands.

    Although the arms of the encirclement were now in contact, the Allies were not yet astride Seventh Army's escape route in any great strength and their positions came under frenzied assault. During the day an armoured column from the 2nd Panzer Division had broken through the Canadians in St. Lambert, taking half the village and keeping a road open for six hours until it was closed again towards nightfall. Many Germans escaped along this route, and numerous small parties infiltrated through to the River Dives during the night.

    Initial drive for Falaise:

    Operation Tractable began at 12:00 on August 14 when 800 Lancaster and Halifax bombers struck German positions along the front. As with Totalize, many of the bombers mistakenly dropped short of their targets, causing 400 Polish and Canadian casualties. Covered by a smokescreen laid down by their artillery, two Canadian divisions moved forwards. Although their line of sight was reduced, German units still managed to inflict severe casualties on the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which included its Armoured Brigade commander Brigadier Leslie Booth as the division moved southward towards Falaise. Throughout the day, continual attacks by the 4th Canadian and Polish 1st Armoured Divisions managed to force a crossing of the Laison River. Limited access to the crossing points over the Dives River, allowed counterattacks by the German 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion. The town of Potigny fell to Polish forces in the late afternoon. By the end of the first day, elements of the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions had reached Point 159, directly north of Falaise, although they had been unable to break into the town. In order to bolster his offensive, Simonds ordered the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division to move towards the front, with the hope that this reinforcement would be sufficient to enable his divisions to capture the town.

    Although the first day's progress was slower than expected, Operation Tractable resumed on August 15; both armoured divisions pushed southeast towards Falaise. The 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, with the support of the 2nd Canadian (Armoured) Brigade continued their drive south towards the town. After harsh fighting, the 4th Armoured Division captured Soulangy but the gains made were minimal as strong German resistance prevented a breakthrough to Trun. On August 16, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division broke into Falaise, encountering minor opposition from Waffen SS units and scattered pockets of German infantry. Although it would take two more days to clear all resistance in the town, the first major objective of Operation Tractable had been achieved. Simonds began to reorganize the bulk of his armoured forces for a renewed push towards Trun to close the Falaise Pocket.

    Drives for Trun and Chambois:

    A Polish Bren Gun Carrier moving through Fontaine-les-Bassets, towards the final objective of Chambois. The drive for Trun by Polish and Canadian Armoured Divisions began on August 16, with preliminary attacks in preparation for an assault against Trun and Chambois. On August 17, both armoured divisions of the 1st Canadian Army advanced. By early afternoon, the Polish 1st Armoured Division had outflanked the 12th SS Panzer Division, enabling several Polish formations to both reach the 4th Armoured Division's objectives and significantly expand the bridgehead northwest of Trun. Stanisław Maczek, the Polish divisional commander, split his forces into three battlegroups each of an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion. One of these struck southwest, cutting off Trun and establishing itself on the high ground dominating the town and the Dives river valley, allowing for a powerful assault by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division on Trun. The town was liberated on the morning of August 18.

    As Canadian and Polish forces liberated Trun, Maczek's second armoured battlegroup manoeuvred southeast, capturing Champeaux and anchoring future attacks against Chambois across a six-mile front. At its closest, the front was four miles from forces of the US V Corps in the town. By the evening of August 18, all of Maczek's battlegroups had established themselves directly north of Chambois (one outside of the town, one near Vimoutiers and one at the foot of Hill 262). With reinforcements quickly arriving from the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, Maczek was in an ideal position to close the gap the following day. The presence of the Polish Armoured Division also alerted Field Marshal Model of the need to keep the pocket open.

    August 19 - Closing the Gap:

    Early on August 19, General Simonds met with his divisional commanders to finalize plans for closing the gap. The 4th Armoured Division would attack towards Chambois, on the western flank of two battlegroups of the Polish 1st Armoured Division. Two additional Polish battlegroups would strike eastward, securing Hill 262 to cover the eastern flanks of the assault. The 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions would continue their grinding offensives against the northern extremities of the Falaise Pocket, inflicting heavy casualties on the exhausted remains of the 12th SS Panzer Division. The assault began almost immediately after the meeting, with one battlegroup of the Polish 1st advancing towards Chambois and "Currie Task Force" of the 4th Armoured Division covering their advance. Simultaneously, two Polish battlegroups moved for Hill 262. Despite heavy German resistance, Battlegroup Zgorzelski was able to secure Point 137, directly west of Hill 262. By early afternoon, Battlegroup Stefanowicz had captured the hill, annihilating a German infantry company in the process.

    By late afternoon of August 19, Canadian and Polish forces had linked with the American 80th Division and 90th Division already stationed in the town. The Falaise Gap had been closed, trapping Model's forces. As the linkup occurred, Model's 2nd SS Panzer Corps had begun its counterattack against Polish forces on Hill 262, hoping to reopen the pocket. With American and Canadian forces facing German counterattacks in their sectors, the Polish forces would have to defend against two veteran Panzer divisions to keep the gap closed.

    Hill 262 (Mont Ormel):

    Northeast of Chambois, an elongated, wooded ridge runs roughly north–south above the village of Coudehard. The ridge's two highest peaks - Points 262 North (262N) and 262 South (262S) - lie either side of a pass within which the hamlet of Mont Ormel, from which the ridge takes its name, is situated. A road runs through the pass east from Chambois, heading for Vimoutiers and the River Seine. Historian Michael Reynolds describes Point 262N as offering "spectacular views over much of the Falaise Pocket". Viewing the feature on an Allied map, Maczek commented that it resembled a caveman's club with two bulbous heads; the Poles nicknamed it the Maczuga, Polish for "mace". The ridge, known to the Allies as Hill 262, formed a crucial blocking position for sealing the Falaise Pocket and preventing any outside attempts to relieve the German Seventh Army.

    19 August:

    Shortly after noon on 19 August, Lieutenant-Colonel Zgorzelski's battlegroup (the 1st Armoured Regiment, the 9th Infantry Battalion, and a company of anti-tank guns) made a thrust towards Coudehard and the Mont Ormel ridge. Two companies of the Polish Highland (Podhalian) Battalion led the assault up the north peak, followed by the squadrons of the 1st Armoured Regiment who picked their way up the ridge's only vehicular access—a narrow, winding track. The Poles reached the summit at approximately 12:40 and took captive a number of demoralised Germans before proceeding to shell a mixed column of tanks and other vehicles moving through the pass between the peaks along the Chambois–Vimoutiers road. The Germans, despite being "shocked" to discover that Point 262N was now in Polish hands, quickly responded with a bombardment from rocket-launchers and anti-tank guns. The Poles counterattacked and more Germans, including wounded, were taken prisoner. These were moved to a hunting lodge (the Zameczek) on the ridge's northern slope. Point 137, near Coudehard, fell just after 15:30, yielding further captives.

    At around 17:00 Lieutenant-Colonel Koszutski's battlegroup, consisting of the 2nd Armoured Regiment and the 8th Infantry Battalion, arrived at the ridge, followed by the rest of the Polish Highland Battalion and elements of the 9th Infantry Battalion at 19:30. The remainder of the 9th Infantry Battalion and the anti-tank company had remained around Boisjos 2 kilometres (1.2 mi) north of Coudehard, but the bulk of two battlegroups—some 80 tanks, 20 anti-tank guns, and around 1,500 infantrymen was now concentrated on and around Point 262N. However, the Poles did not occupy Point 262S. Although Lieutenant-Colonel Zdzisław Szydlowski, commanding the 9th Infantry Battalion, was given orders to take the southern peak, with darkness falling and thick smoke from the burning German column obscuring the battlefield, this was deemed too hazardous to attempt before next light. The Poles spent the night fortifying Point 262N and entrenching the southern, southwestern, and northeastern approaches to their positions.
    Polish operations 19 August:



    20 August:

    Of the approximately 20 German infantry and armoured divisions trapped in the Falaise pocket, around 12 were still operating with a degree of combat-effectiveness. As these formations retreated eastwards, they fought desperately to keep the jaws of the encirclement—formed by the Canadians in Trun and St. Lambert, and the Poles and Americans in Chambois—from closing. German movement out of the pocket throughout the night of 19 August cut off the Polish battlegroups on the Mont Ormel ridge. On discovering this, Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksander Stefanowicz, in command of the Polish 1st Armoured Regiment, conferred with Koszutski. Lacking sufficient means to either seal the pocket or fight their way clear, the two decided that their forces' only chance of survival lay in holding fast until relieved. Although the Polish soldiers on Point 262N could hear movement from the valley below, other than some mortar rounds that landed among the positions of the 8th Infantry Battalion the night passed uneventfully. Without possession of Point 262S the Poles were unable to interfere with the large numbers of German troops slipping past the southern slopes of the ridge. The uneven, wooded terrain, interspersed with thick hedgerows, made control of the ground to the west and southwest difficult by day, and impossible by night. As it grew light on 20 August Szydlowski prepared to fulfil his orders of the previous night and organised two companies of his 9th Infantry Battalion, supported by the 1st Armoured Regiment, for an attack across the road towards Point 262S. However, hampered by the wreckage littering the pass the attack soon bogged down in the face of fierce German resistance.

    While Currie's force stalled German forces outside of St. Lambert, two battlegroups of Maczek's Polish 1st Armoured Division were engaged in a protracted battle with two well-trained SS Panzer divisions. Throughout the night of the 19th, Polish forces had entrenched themselves along the south, southwest and northeastern lines of approach to Hill 262. Directly southwest of Mont Ormel, German units moved along what would later become known as "The Corridor of Death", as the Polish inflicted heavy casualties on German forces moving towards Mont Ormel with a well-coordinated artillery barrage.

    From the northeast, the 2nd SS Panzer Division planned an assault in force against the four infantry battalions and two armoured regiments of the Polish 1st Armoured Division dug in on Hill 262. The 9th SS Panzer Division would attack from the north, while simultaneously preventing Canadian units from reinforcing the Polish armoured division. Having managed to break out of the Falaise Pocket, the 12th SS, 10th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions would then attack Hill 262 from the southwest. If this major obstacle could be cleared, German units could initiate a full withdrawal from the Falaise Pocket.

    The first attack against Polish positions was by the "Der Führer" Regiment of the 2nd SS Panzer Division. Although the Podhale Rifles battalion was able to repel the attack, it expended a substantial amount of its ammunition in doing so. The second attack was devastating to the dwindling armoured forces of the Polish battlegroups. A single German tank, positioned on Point 239 (northeast of Mont Ormel), was able to destroy five Sherman tanks within two minutes. At this time, the 3rd Parachute Division, along with an armoured regiment of the 1st SS Panzer Division, attacked Mont Ormel from inside the Falaise Pocket. This attack was repulsed by Polish artillery, which "massacred" German infantry and armour closing in on their positions.

    Around midday the Germans opened up an artillery and mortar barrage that caused casualties among the ridge's defenders, and would last for the entire afternoon. As the assault from the southwest ran out of steam, the 2nd SS Panzer Division resumed its attack on the northeast of the ridge. Since Polish units were now concentrated on the southern edges of the position, the 2nd SS Panzer Division was able to force a path through to the 3rd Parachute Division by noon, opening a corridor out of the pocket. At about the same time, Kampfgruppe Weidinger seized an important road junction northeast of Coudehard. By mid afternoon, several units of the 10th SS, 12th SS, and 116th Panzer Divisions managed to clear a corridor past Point 262N, and upwards 10,000 German troops had escaped out of the pocket. Despite being overwhelmed by strong counterattacks, Polish forces continued to hold the high ground on Mont Ormel, which they referred to as "The Mace" (Maczuga), exacting a deadly toll on passing German forces through the use of well-coordinated artillery fire.

    Irritated by the presence of these units, which were exacting a heavy toll on his men, Colonel General Paul Hausser — commanding the Seventh Army — ordered the positions to be "eliminated". At 15:00, substantial forces, including remnants of the 352nd Infantry Division and several battle groups from the 2nd SS Panzer Division, inflicted heavy casualties on the 8th and 9th Infantry Battalions. By 17:00 the attack was at its height and the Poles were contending with German tanks and infantry inside their perimeter. Grenadiers of the 2nd SS Panzer Division very nearly reached the summit of the mace before they were repulsed by the well dug in Polish defenders. The integrity of the position was not restored until 19:00, by which time the Poles had expended almost all their ammunition, leaving themselves in a precarious situation. At about this time a 20-minute ceasefire was arranged to allow the Germans to evacuate a large medical convoy, after which fighting resumed with redoubled intensity.

    Earlier in the day, Simonds had ordered his troops to "make every effort" to reach the forces on Hill 262. At a "sacrificial" cost, the surviving remnants of the 9th SS Panzer and 3rd Parachute Divisions had succeeded in preventing the Canadians from intervening. Dangerously low on supplies and unable to evacuate their prisoners or the wounded of both sides—many of whom had received further injuries from the unremitting hail of mortar bombs—by the evening the Poles had hoped to see the Canadian 4th Armoured Division coming to their rescue. However, it became clear that no Allied relief force would reach the ridge that day. Lacking the means to interfere, the exhausted Poles were forced to watch as the remnants of the XLVII Panzer Corps left the pocket. Fighting died down as night fell and was sporadic throughout the hours of darkness; after the brutality of the day's combat, both sides avoided contact. However, frequent Polish artillery strikes continued to harass German forces retreating from the sector and bombard every German unit that entered the evacuation corridor.
    20 August - German counterattacks and breakthrough attempts repelled by Poles:



    20 August - St. Lambert-sur-Dives and Hill 117:

    On the morning of August 20, at the same time when two German formations, the 2nd and 9th SS-Panzer Divisions, attacked Polish positions on Hill 262, the 16th Infantry and 12th SS Panzer divisions attacked American and Canadian forces from within the pocket, opening small channels through Allied positions. By mid-morning, 2,000 survivors of the German 2nd Fallschirmjäger Korps had managed to breach Canadian positions along the Dives River, as well as at Point 117. At approximately noon, several units of the 10th SS, 12th SS and 116th Panzer Divisions managed to break through these weakened positions.

    By mid afternoon, reinforcements from an armoured battlegroup under Major David Vivian Currie managed to reach St. Lambert-sur-Dives, denying two German armies evacuation of the pocket. Over the next 36 hours, the battlegroup repulsed almost continual attacks by German forces, destroying 7 German tanks, 12 88 mm antitank guns and 40 vehicles. In the brutal fighting around Lambert-sur-Dives, Currie's battlegroup was able to inflict nearly 2,000 casualties on attacking German forces, including 300 killed and 1,100 captured. By the evening of August 20, the Germans had exhausted their attack against St. Lambert-sur-Dives; the surviving members of the 84th Korps, commanded by General Elfeld, surrendered to Canadian and American forces near Chambois. For his actions at St. Lambert-sur-Dives, Major Currie was awarded the Victoria Cross, the only Canadian so honoured for service in the Normandy Campaign.

    21 August:

    After the brutality of the combat that had occurred during the day, night was welcomed by both German and Polish forces surrounding Mont Ormel. Fighting was sporadic, as both sides avoided contact with one another. Frequent Polish artillery barrages interrupted German attempts to retreat from the sector.

    In the morning, despite poor flying weather, an effort was made to air-drop ammunition to Stefanowicz's men. Learning that the Canadians had resumed their push to reach the ridge and were making for Point 239, at 07:00 a platoon of the 1st Armoured Regiment's 3rd Squadron reconnoitred the German positions below the Zameczek.

    Further German attacks were launched during the morning, both from inside the pocket along the Chambois–Vimoutiers road, and from the east. Raids from the direction of Coudehard managed to penetrate the Polish defences on Mont Ormel on and take captives. As the remaining Polish forces repelled the assault, their tanks were forced to use the last of their ammunition. The final German effort was launched at around 11:00 by SS remnants who had infiltrated through the wooded hills to the rear of the 1st Armoured Regiment's dressing station. This "suicidal" assault was defeated at point-blank range by the 9th Infantry Battalion, with the 1st Armoured's tanks using their anti-aircraft machine guns in support. The machine guns' tracer set fire to the grass amongst the German troops, killing wounded men on the slope. As the final infantry assaults melted away, the German artillery and mortar fire targeting the hill finally subsided as well. There would be no further attacks; the two battlegroups of the Polish 1st Armoured Division had survived the onslaught, despite being surrounded by German forces for three days. At 12:00 a Polish forward patrol encountered the Canadian vanguard around 3 kilometres (1.9 mi) north of Point 262N, near Point 239. The Canadian Grenadier Guards reached the ridge just over an hour later, having fought for more than five hours and accounted for two Panthers, a Panzer IV, and two self-propelled guns along their route. By 14:00, with the arrival of the first supply convoy, the position was relieved.

    The Falaise pocket was finally considered closed by evening of 21 August. Tanks of the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had linked up with the Polish forces in Coudehard, and the Canadian 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions had fully secured St. Lambert and the northern passage to Chambois.

    Aftermath:

    Both Reynolds and McGilvray place the Polish losses on the Hill 262 at 351 killed and wounded and 11 tanks lost. McGilvray estimates the German losses in their assaults on the ridge as around 500 dead with a further 1,000 taken prisoner and many hundreds wounded, most of these from the 12th SS Panzer Division. He also records "scores" of Tiger, Panther and Panzer IV tanks destroyed, as well as a significant quantity of artillery pieces. Within an hour, The Canadian Grenadier Guards managed to link up with what remained of Stefanowicz's men. By late afternoon the remainder of the 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions had begun their retreat to the Seine River. The Falaise Gap had been permanently closed, with a large number of German forces still trapped in the pocket.

    According to military historian Gregor Dallas: "The Poles had closed the Falaise Pocket. The Poles had opened the gate to Paris." Simonds stated that he had "never seen such wholesale havoc in his life", and Canadian engineers erected a sign on Mont Ormel's summit reading simply "A Polish Battlefield".

    In 1965 on the battle's 20th anniversary, a monument to the Polish, Canadian, American and French units that took part in the battle was erected on Hill 262. Marking the occasion, former President Dwight D. Eisenhower commented that "no other battlefield presented such a horrible sight of death, hell, and total destruction." The Mémorial de Coudehard–Montormel museum was constructed on the same site on the battle's 50th anniversary in 1994.

    Due to the rapidity of successive offensives during early August, exact Canadian casualties for Operation Tractable are unknown. However, figures for the combined losses during Totalize and Tractable are put at 5,500 Canadian casualties.

    Exact German casualty figures during Operation Tractable are also uncertain. Although semi-reliable figures can be found for total casualties within the Falaise Pocket, no statistics are available for how many of these were taken as a result of Canadian operations during Tractable. In the aftermath of the Falaise Pocket, the German 7th Army was effectively annihilated, losing anywhere from 50,000–200,000 men in the pocket, as well as over 200 tanks, 1,000 guns, and 5,000 other vehicles. In the fighting around Hill 262 alone, German casualties totaled 2,000 killed, 5,000 taken prisoner, in addition to 55 tanks, 44 guns and 152 armoured vehicles.

    By contrast, Polish casualty figures for Operation Tractable (until 22 August) are known. The Poles reported a total of 1,441 casualties during the operation. Of these, 325 were killed (including 21 officers), 1,002 were wounded (35 officers), and 114 missing. This includes 263 men lost before the Chambois and Ormel actions on August 14–18. Of the Polish losses, 50 were killed (and many dozens wounded) by American bombs during the second American bombing on 14 August.
    Polish operations on 21 August:

    Last edited by Domen; 05-09-2011 at 20:46.

  18. #18

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    ah,anti french propaganda,idotis

  19. #19
    Semi-Corruptible Member White_eyes:D's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Roaming the Great plains...
    Posts
    4,244

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Canada lost over 1/4th of it's forces on D-day and yet somehow, they were supposed to stop them all from escaping?
    They made just as much progress as any other force on D-day...
    The subsequent push inland towards Carpiquet and the Caen-Bayeux railway line achieved mixed results. The sheer volume of men and vehicles on the beaches created lengthy delays between the landing of the 9th Brigade and the beginning of substantive attacks to the south. The 7th Brigade encountered heavy initial opposition, before pushing south and making contact with the 50th Infantry Division at Creully. The 8th Brigade encountered heavy resistance from a battalion of the 716th at Tailleville, while the 9th Brigade deployed towards Carpiquet early in the evening. Resistance in St. Aubin prevented the Royal Marines from establishing contact with the British 3rd Division on Sword Beach. When all operations on the Anglo-Canadian front were ordered to halt at 21:00, only one unit had reached its D-Day objective. Despite this, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division had succeeded in pushing farther inland than any other landing force on D-Day.
    Last edited by White_eyes:D; 05-28-2011 at 02:42.

  20. #20

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Quote Originally Posted by White_eyes:D View Post
    Canada lost over 1/4th of it's forces on D-dayand yet somehow, they were supposed to stop them all from escaping?
    Can you source this please? It doesn't correspond to the numbers I have read either for the losses directly on D-day or for the Normandy Campaign in general.

  21. #21
    Semi-Corruptible Member White_eyes:D's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Roaming the Great plains...
    Posts
    4,244

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Something I watched with a Canadian veteran, talking about the total loses for D-day and how it affected the Holland campaign(?). It was the last major campaign they would do.(didn't have many soldiers left after that one)

    Edit: I got this off Wiki...well need to due for now, until I find that video.
    On June 6, 1944, the 3rd Canadian Division landed on Juno Beach in the Battle of Normandy and sustained 50% casualties in their first hour of attack. By the end of D-Day, the Canadians had penetrated deeper into France than either the British or the American troops at their landing sites, overcoming stronger resistance than any of the other beachheads except Omaha Beach. In the first month of the Normandy campaign, Canadian, British and Polish troops were opposed by some of the strongest and best trained German troops in the theatre, including the 1st SS Division, the 12th SS Division and the Panzer-Lehr-Division. Several costly operations were mounted by the Canadians to fight a path to the pivotal city of Caen and then south towards Falaise, part of the Allied attempt to liberate Paris. Canadian troops played a heavy role in the liberation of Paris. Some feel[who?] that Canadian inexperience during the battle to close the Falaise Gap allowed German forces to escape destruction, but by the time the First Canadian Army linked up with U.S. forces, the destruction of the German Army in Normandy was nearly complete. Three Victoria Crosses were earned by Canadians in Northwest Europe; Major David Currie of the South Alberta Regiment won the Victoria Cross for his actions at Saint-Lambert-sur-Dive, Captain Frederick Tilston of the Essex Scottish and Sergeant Aubrey Cosens of the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada were rewarded for their service in the Rhineland fighting in 1945, the latter posthumously.
    Edit2: I recall he said, there reserves didn't take something into account....so most of the allies thought they had tons of reserves to soak up damage, when in reality they didn't.
    Last edited by White_eyes:D; 05-28-2011 at 06:40.

  22. #22
    Member Centurion1's Avatar
    Join Date
    Jun 2007
    Location
    Wherever my blade takes me or to school, it sorta depends
    Posts
    6,007

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    I think no one can argue the Canadians had a much more sizeable impact on Normandy than anybody, especially in America gives them credit for. I believe they had their own landing beach?

  23. #23
    Oni Member Samurai Waki's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2004
    Location
    Portland, Ore.
    Posts
    3,925
    Blog Entries
    1

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    Allied Commanders always seemed to put Canadian soldiers in horrible situations... Mountbatten was thoroughly hated in Canada for his poor handling of Canadian soldiers in the Dieppe Raids; Crocker was distrusted by his Canadian soldiers after repeatedly failing to take Caen, and heavy casualties at Charwood... and I find it surprising that the Canadians so willingly put their soldiers into the hands of British Commanders, they already had some very capable commanders of their own.

  24. #24
    Semi-Corruptible Member White_eyes:D's Avatar
    Join Date
    Nov 2007
    Location
    Roaming the Great plains...
    Posts
    4,244

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    It was politics and our PM at that time wasn't "general material". He once complimented Hitler, yet called Churchill "The most dangerous man I know". One example was that Churchill saw that Hong Kong was going to be taken by the Japanese and not even 10,000 crack British troops were going to hold it. He ordered them to pull out to defend the homeland, but here Mackenzie sent 2,000 raw recruits to help defend it (there was 1,000 or so British troops but it was mostly colonial defense troops).

    The result? Most of them were killed and taken prisoner. Some of them didn't even know where they were, or who they were fighting! Language barrier, no maps, total information blackout all helped with this. In the end it was a waste of 2,000 men for no reason other then politics.

    The best example in my mind of how the Canadian troops showed how far they were willing to go was the battle of the Scheldt.
    Quote Originally Posted by Wiki
    In early October, after Market Garden had failed with heavy losses, Allied forces led by the First Canadian Army set out to bring the Antwerp ports under control. But the well-established German defenders staged an effective delaying action. Complicated by the waterlogged terrain, the Battle of the Scheldt proved to be a challenging campaign in which the losses suffered by the Canadians exacerbated another conscription crisis.

    After five weeks of difficult fighting, the First Canadian Army, bolstered by attached troops from several other countries, was successful in clearing the Scheldt after numerous amphibious assaults, obstacle crossings, and costly assaults over open ground. Both land and water were mined, and the Germans defended their line of retreat with artillery and snipers.

    The Allies finally cleared the port areas on 8 November at a cost of 12,873 Allied casualties (killed, wounded, or missing), half of them Canadians.[3]
    A surviving veteran mentioned that his brigade had to go up a road with no artillery support, that's crazy.(They were wiped out)
    Last edited by White_eyes:D; 06-05-2011 at 21:57.

  25. #25
    Senior Member Senior Member ReluctantSamurai's Avatar
    Join Date
    Feb 2008
    Location
    USA
    Posts
    2,483

    Default Re: Alleged French Cowardice at Falaise

    A surviving veteran mentioned that his brigade had to go up a road with no artillery support, that's crazy.
    One of the results of Monty's poor assessment of Crerar as a field commander. Although Monty often overstated his opinions, he nevertheless made these comments about Crerar in a letter to CIGS in July 1944:

    [He] will be quite unfit for command of an army because he was very prosy and stodgy.
    Canadian forces under Montgomery did have the right to refer any matter concerning themselves to the Canadian government. Monty insisted that the only Canadian officer who could exercise this right was Lt.Gen Stuart, CS at Canadian Military HQ in London. Any other officer serving in the Canadian I Army who would have this power, Monty saw as undermining his authority of 21st AG.

    As to the Scheldt operation, the Canadian I Army was given an impossible task considering the wholly inadequate resources allocated to it. Monty's eye had been fixed to the east and the Ruhr, so the preponderance of supplies and support was given to British II Army in anticipation of executing Operation Veritable (the assault from R. Maas to the Rhine).

    This oversight, that of underestimating the importance of opening Antwerp as quickly as possible, was one of the few strategical mistakes made by Monty in the European campaign. Had the Canadian I Army been given proper support, Antwerp would have begun operation much sooner than it actually did, and would have greatly eased the Allied logistical problems of early 1945.

    The degree to which Monty distrusted the Canadians can be illustrated by his great reluctance to allocate Operation Veritable to the Canadian I Army even though his initial insistence that British II Army be tasked with executing the operation would've been an operational nightmare. When faced with the inevitable, Monty finally gave in and assigned the Canadian I Army the task, but he insisted it be reinforced with British troops.
    Last edited by ReluctantSamurai; 06-07-2011 at 22:42.
    High Plains Drifter

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •  
Single Sign On provided by vBSSO