Countries greatest military mess-ups

[Kocmoc]

Cannae was indeed a roman disaster, if you look at all the historic battles, this battle was surely the one with most casuals. If im not mistaken died there over 70000 romans and around 5000 Carthaginians.

There are some different thoughts about how the battles was fought, the majority claims today, that the drop back in the center of Hannibal's center was intended from start.
His cav got in from the back after some skirmishes vs. the roman cav. Thats it.
The romans was so pressed into each other, that they wasnt able to move hands or swords. It was a 6 hour lasting massacre, it wasnt jsut a loss, this was a splatter killing monster massacre!

Well, hannibal won some battles, but lost the war. Still, this battle was one of the biggest mess-ups in roman history.

[CBR]

Cannae was indeed a roman disaster

Yes but does not mean the Romans made serious mistakes. If Veho Nex had called the thread "greatest military disasters" or "losses" then yes Cannae should be there for the Ancient times.

Battle of the Crater can be considered messed up because Meade changed the forces meant to lead the attack. Instead of the black division that had been instructed to go around the crater, an untrained division was to lead instead. On top of that the attack got delayed because of lack of footbridges and general confusion.

[Brenus]

“Well, France's behaviour in 1939 and 1940 obviously should be at the top of the list. The country had the means and the manpower to defeat Germany.” I wouldn’t put this as a blunder.
In 1939, the French Army wasn’t up the level.
In 1940, the Air Force just started to receive the modern Dewoitine 520 and other Lioré et Olivier 451 (too late for this one) Morane 406 and Block 152.
The French Generals were out manoeuvred so it can’t be counted as their blunder (except for ignoring the Aerial Recon Pictures showing the concentration of German Tanks in the other side of the Ardennes).
They couldn’t excepted the fall so quick of the Belgium fortress of Eben Emael…

Now, a real French Blunder is Indochina.
The Battle of the border:
That Khe, Dong Khe, Lang Son, Cao Bang. RC4.
These towns and road were the keys point for the control of the Chinese/Vietnameese Borders and became vital for the Vietminh after the fall of Chiang Kai Shek China to the Communist..
The French decided to evacuate Lang Son (after the defeat of the “fortress of That Khe”) withdrawing with all the material, in daylight, and with all the families and refugees fleeing the Vietminh. In the meantime, a column will go to meet them by the road, the Route Colonial no 4. It was a complete disaster, and then, in panic, the same officers decide to evacuate Lang Son, without any noise this time (so no destruction), leaving for the Vietminh enough material to equip 3 Divisions.
My father arriving 2 days after the evacuation and one day before the Vietminh (who was wondering where the French were and feared a trap) was still under the shock when telling me this… All supplies left intact to the enemy…

And of course Dien Bien Phu: by which aberration the French Generals (against the recommendation of the French Government) believed that the Vietminh (on foot) will not be able to move but the French Air Supply will succeed during the rain season is still a question for me.

[Brennus]

Jutland.

Now in terms of total losses suffered by both sides and the strategic implications Jutland wouldn't initially appear to be a muckup. However considering the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Royal Navy coupled with the tactical situation available to Jellico when the High Seas fleet withdrew from combat the battle, in my opnion in a major military muck up. It wouldn't have been so bad had the Germans been opposing another of the Allies (both France and Russia prided themselves more on their land forces) but for the maritime based British Empire the failure to crush the German High Seas fleet in a single engagement was disasterous for moral and the reputation of the Royal Navy in general. I would further like to add that for the British the battle was a muck up as the British continued to adhere to the principles which it credited it's victories against Napoleon for, namely maintaining pristine ships and firing more shots per minute than the enemy. Neither of these principles were of much use at Jutland where accuracy of shots and communication between ships were of more use. The fact that the Royal Navy continued to rely on signallers rather (like my great grandfather on HMS Royal Oak) than morse code was detrimental to their performance.

Jutland-Not the biggest muck up, but certainly alot of room for improvement.

[Peasant Phill]

They couldn't excepted the fall so quick of the Belgium fortress of Eben Emael...

Yeah that always made me chuckle. One of the reasons, this fort fell as fast as it did was because the German gliders could land on the roof. The trees and bushes on the roof of the fort, which would have prevented the gliders to land there, were cut down so that the soldiers stationed at the fort would have a place to play football.

It's not a big blunder but an amusing detail non the less.

[KrooK]

Cannae was great mistake from Roman side. Before battle Hannibal destroyed 2 consular armies (Trebba and T. Lake). Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights. They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation. No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

[CBR]

Romans knew that he is dangerous and like untypical fights.

Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

They had only one way of fighting - brutal attack directly in the middle of enemy formation.

Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

No matter that elite of enemy forces was on flanks.

Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

[OvidiusNasso]

Yes, they could see what had happened at Trebbia and corrected it: not being tricked into attacking, and they picked a battlefield where no ambushes were possible.

Yes that was the primary way of fighting for the Romans, and even when things were falling apart at Trebbia the center had cut through Hannibal's infantry. For Cannae they more than doubled the size of the army.

Yes so the Romans had an even larger army, including more cavalry than at Trebbia, and picked a spot with a narrow frontage with a river on their right wing and hills on the left. They also seemed to have been defensive with the cavalry to ensure that it would not be easily defeated and the two consuls each picked a wing to ensure the best control and encouragement.

So unless we should fault the Romans for not being psychic I still can't see their big mistake. Unless it is merely in hindsight knowing they lost and therefore should not have fought the battle at all.

Didn't the Romans make their units much bulkier and closer together than ever before instead of making a longer line?

[Decker]

I interpreted the battle as the middle of Hannibal's line giving away making a sort of "V" in the Roman formation giving the impression that they had made their army bulkier as you say.

[CBR]

Yes the Romans increased the depth of their maniples. We are unfortunately not told specifically by how much. Polybius says it was several times deeper than its front. He also say the legions had been boosted in size to 5000 infantry, so the maniples of Hastati and Principes could have been perhaps 160 men each and in standard formation 8 ranks and 20 men wide. If they went to 16 ranks and just 10 wide, and with the depth per man described as 6-7 feet, then it would been something like 30 feet wide and 100+ feet deep. I think that would fit the "several times deeper than its front" bit.

Why would the Romans do such a thing? Well, a standard Consular army consisted of two Legions and two allied Alae of more or less similar size. If it was needed then two consuls could combine their army. At Cannae each of the consuls had a double consular army and Polybius writes the Romans never had recruited 8 legions before.

So the Romans did not have the experience in handling a army that was four times the width of what they normally operated with, and still twice the width of what only occurred rarely (happened at Trebbia though). Such an army would have had a width of perhaps 3.5 Km just for the infantry, it would have taken twice as long to deploy and it might even have been difficult to find a spot big enough to deploy and fight.

Doubling the ranks of each maniple is a simply thing do and would IMO have made the army manageable within the level of experience the Romans had for that time. But I don't think it was a cause to the Roman defeat though.

[PanzerJaeger]

The French Generals were out manoeuvred so it can’t be counted as their blunder (except for ignoring the Aerial Recon Pictures showing the concentration of German Tanks in the other side of the Ardennes).

[ReluctantSamurai]

@ PJ

[Do doan]

“[B]Well,
And of course Dien Bien Phu: by which aberration the French Generals (against the recommendation of the French Government) believed that the Vietminh (on foot) will not be able to move but the French Air Supply will succeed during the rain season is still a question for me.

To understand , one must look at the whole picture of the French political and military situation inIndochina in 1954 . With Mao's victory and the arrival of Chin com on Sino Vietnamese borders in 1949 , the strategic situation in Tonkin ( north Vietnam) have become desperate in 1954 after many years of fighting . So General Navarre , Frenh commander-in -chief at France's behest and with US coordination concocted a plan which has 2 aspects :
1°) militarily to shorten French lines of supply
2°)politically try to salvage French positions in Indochina to preserve its interests in Laos , Cambodia and mostly in central (Annam) and southern Vietnam ( Cochinchina )
Cochinchina was relatively safe in French hands . The Vietminh had solid positions in Annam .
The Dien bien phu ploy meant to attract Giap main divisions in Annam and to lure them to move to DBP . French main thrust was the Atlante operation in Annam where they would wipe out Vietminh infrastructure and military forces and consolidate French rule in Annam
The DBP garrison was meant as a bait ; hopefully with some luck it would inflict sever casualties on Vietminh forces to impair their fighting capabilities ; if it were to fail as expected, the garrisoned troops would be mauled and that would fulfill one hidden purpose : France was expecting defeat and intended to transfer the burden to the USA ;French expeditionary force would have to retreat , the French government and general staff were afraid that the French forces which consist mainly of foreign legionaires ( ie merrcenaries ) and gung ho paratroopers would mutiny when confronted with a shameful retreat .
The Navarre plan was much coherent in its many aspects , it stood on paper a good chance of success.And it did succeed despite the DBP defeat and Atlante failure . The Geneva agreements validated the plan: thanks to Russian and Chinese help in pressuring the Vietminh , the agreements allowed French and US a political victory despite the military defeats . Vietnam was divided in two , the Vietminh were forced to evacuate their forces from Annam . French forces regrouped in what would become South Vietnam , theirs not to continue the fighting according to plan Navarre ; that would be devolved to US forces that would do the containment strategy on new and sounder political and military basis . Under the bait of elections to unify Vietnam , France and USA got from the Geneva accord a cease fire which gave them 2 year respite from Vietminh .Despite their victory , the Vietnamese were the big losers in Geneva .

[Kagemusha]

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

[Alexander the Pretty Good]

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kar%C3%A1nsebes

Holy cow.

[Marshall Louis-Nicolas Davout]

The Greatest Military Messups would be

Napoleon's campaigns of Egypt and Russia. Very bad campaigns, great battles nonetheless, but it proved nothing. Egypt was a major blow, and Russia was only a reminder, Thats in my opinion of course

[Lazy O]

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

Ouch...

[LeftEyeNine]

This one definetely belongs here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Karánsebes

Wow. I never knew that one. Ottomans counted 10.000 dead, eh ? Wow.

[Nowake]

It reads very plausible, but only one account? A pity we will never know for certain.

Aside from that, my own contribution to the thread: Battle of Acheloos.
Unfortunately, the Wiki entry reads as if it was heavily edited by Bulgarian "patriots", I'm sure you know the kind. I read a lot more scholarly accounts here, but I don't have the books on hand at the moment. Still, losses were disastrous and the battle was a genuine turning point.


EDIT: Oh and, welcome to the .Org mister Do doan, enjoy your stay!

[OvidiusNasso]

Do civil wars count? if so

1. Communists deciding to fight Republicans and Socialists during the Spanish Civil War (Does it count as surrender to Franco to kill each other when his men are right there?0

2. Russian Civil War, Denikin failing to realize the enemy of my enemy is my friend untill it was too late for Petliura to be of much assistance to him

3. American Civil War, well I don't know where to start.......

People make very bad decisions in civil wars.

[Brandy Blue]

The Battle of New Orleans was quite small and not important to anyone except us Americans.

However ... if the plan is to use infantry to attack earthworks protected by a canal and artillery, and you know you will need fascines to cross the canal and scaling ladders to mount the earthworks, wouldn't you call it a blunder to forget to bring the fascines and scaling ladders along?

[Decker]

Battle of the Crater can be considered messed up because Meade changed the forces meant to lead the attack. Instead of the black division that had been instructed to go around the crater, an untrained division was to lead instead. On top of that the attack got delayed because of lack of footbridges and general confusion.

It was a racial decision from what I understand (not sure how much of an exaggeration this is) but my understanding is that the black division had trained for some time to attack around the crater. Some white general (forget his name) didn't want the blacks to get the "glory" and the rest is as they say history. Also, even though the Confederates by this time were alerted to the attack (how could they not be), would it have been prudent to send the black soldiers around crater as prescribed? (I also thought they were just thrown into the crater along with the division that replaced them.

[CBR]

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

[Decker]

Meade did use two reasons: 1) that the black division had no experience and 2) in case of a defeat it would look bad, as it would seem like the Union just sent in black soldiers to spare white lives. The second reason seems to have been the important one as he apparently did not think the operation had much chance of success.

He told Burnside (the guy who had planned it all) about the change only 15 hours before so it left Burnside with little time to plan. One could fault Burnside for not having a backup plan but the problem was that his other three divisions were considered to be burned out. With no other proper options and his black troops having spent nearly three weeks training for it, and being very enthusiastic, maybe one can't blame him too much.

Some of the black regiments did manage to bypass the crater, but all surprise had been lost by then. The three white divisions had been sent in first and the black division was sent in about 2 1/2 hours after the first wave.

Thanks for the clarification on that.