Inevitably, one reverts back to the great Bernard Lewis, whose work explained how Islam impeded the development of a civic society in Arabian societies, and aided despotism:
The received wisdom of the “Orientalist” school is that the lack of civil society in the Arab world is due to the absence, or at best the irremediable weakness, of civil society’s basic elements. For the prevailing trend in that school, Islam has been the primary reason for this because of what is considered to be its “despotic” nature, best illustrated by Islam not knowing any separation of the spiritual and the temporal and by its only acknowledging divine sovereignty, which is believed to inhibit the emergence of any autonomous public sphere. Furthermore, Islam impeded the formation of a civil society that could have resisted despotism for, in the words of Bernard Lewis:
Islamic law knows no corporate legal persons; Islamic history shows no councils or communes, no synods or parliaments, nor any other kind of elective or representative assembly. It is interesting that the jurists never accepted the principle of majority decision. There was no point, since the need for a procedure of corporate collective decision never arose. In heaven there was one God, and one alone; on earth there was no court but a single judge, no state but a single ruler.11
The fact that mainstream Sunni political thought in classical Islam upheld the doctrine that when the unity of the community (umma) was in danger, and in the potential face of anarchy, submission ought to be given to the ruler even if an evil-doer, led another leading author of the Orientalist school, Elie Kedourie, to assert that in Islam:
There can be no question of checks and balances, of division of power, of popular sovereignty, of elections of representative assemblies. … There could be no question of representative bodies being set up to carry on a dialogue between ruler and subject; neither could there be institutions of local self-government in town or countryside; nor could craft or professional associations flourish unhindered, since they would always be suspected of limiting the sway of the government over its subjects.12

http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/...ions/salam.pdf
Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
But Lewis is an orientalist, or so say his critics, who note the Arab world has seen an emergence of a civil society in recent decades. The following was written in 2002, and it is my distinct impression civil society has gained much ground since then (but also lost some):

Two turning point events in the contemporary history of the Middle East would, however, allow civil societies to re-emerge and regain strength, for they compelled most Arab states to consider change and start opening up their regimes—although not to the degree often publicized. The first of these events was the impact on the radical governments of the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel. Not only were their “nationalist” strategies now questioned, their failure to deliver on their promises of development and social justice were attacked as well. The second event was the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, which threatened the oil monarchies in their legitimacy while it also exposed for all to see the adventurism and oppressive nature of the Iraqi regime.

Several other factors have led to the revitalization of civil society in the Arab world during the past three decades. The most important among them are the following:

. Massive urbanization leading both to growth in the socio-economic needs of the population and to the weakening of primordial ties. What is important to note here is that this phenomenon is continuing at a time when many Arab states are no longer capable of providing such services as housing, better quality health, and education, let alone job opportunities.

. The increasing number of university graduates,
especially those holding European and American degrees, along with the general expansion of education. The subsequent rise of the levels of expectation and ambition of the young is motivating them to organize in order to better articulate their demands. This also explains the developing attention to issues of human rights and women among Arab youth.

. The recent trend of international development agencies (such as the World Bank, UNDP, and others), the European Union, and numbers of bilateral donors to extend grants and loans no longer to national governments only, but directly to “vulnerable” social groups (e.g., women, disabled, youth), to associations carrying out projects related to “human” or “sustainable” development, such as environment protection and rural development, and to local governments (e.g., regional councils, municipalities). As a matter of fact, the role of NGOs in development has become a key feature of the “neo-liberal” approach to socio-economic problems based on private sector initiatives, especially with an increasing trend towards privatization throughout the Arab world.

The political liberalization that took place during the past two decades, even though it was initiated from above and often pursuant to the advice given to Arab rulers by their Western allies. When most Arab leaders promote reforms, it is not because they have come to accept the possibility of having to relinquish power one day, but rather because “they seek to keep it,” as Richard Norton so pertinently puts it. However, whatever the limitations of such reforms so far, they did open up certain outlets for the free expression of ideas, and permitted a large number of interest groups to form NGOs and of social groups to start organizing, be it in the form of clubs, syndicates or associations.

The rapidity with which new technologies such as the internet and satellite television are gaining ground in the Arab world is circumventing state control over information and further exposing the people of the region to foreign experiments of change and dissent, whether successful or not. This is also contributing to their higher levels of consciousness and to greater aspirations.