Fighting Power by Martin van Creveld is a book I read a year ago. It works on the assumption that the average German soldier, or at least small unit, had more "fighting power" than its American equivalent. After establishing this assumption, it attempts to explain why this was so. All I really remember is that the Germans seemed to have had a superior replacements system and devoted more attention to the psychological well-being of the individual soldier. Well, before the hit the fan, at least.

At some point in the book I started taking notes on flash cards. I stopped after realizing that I was covering at best 10 pages an hour. So read them, I guess. Also, note that I'm not editing these in any way.

They are below (and possibly out of order):

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Card 1
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  • Truppenfuhrung - war is art, unpredictable; only success matters (decisive action)
  • US - scientific management? Similar to ^ though
  • Germany - operations; America - logistics + organization
  • German - mission oriented; objective/purpose is framework and methods are individual
  • US - managerial; tries to lay out methods and predict situations; little on individual, initiative, surprise, or maneuver
  • Feldheer & Ersatzheer
  • Feldheer military operations, Home Command logistics + admin
  • Ersatz in charge of Interior (Heimat) with Home Command - Gen. Fromm
  • Stauffenberg - Fromm's Chief of Staff, July 20 plot, Fromm + Stauffenberg executed
  • Field and replacement armies - counterpart "twin" units (Feldheer, Ersatzheer)
  • Standardized fundamental units formed into unique and independent task forces
  • Kampfgruppen - common by end of war


Card 2
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  • Corps - 1.5% HQ staff in 65000 men
  • Army of 2-300K - ~1% staff HQ
  • German unit in combat commanded by General Staff in Operations
  • US - Division has Chief of Staff who manages 4 equal Assistant CoS's of Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Training, and Logistics; all participate in combat (less specialized staff)
  • 1945 - 10.6K Division 4% staff HQ, 7% for Armored
  • US Divisions have up to twice as many officers
  • American Corps - 1/3 officers in staff, D staff was officers (CO), but in German counterpart was ~1/7
  • German 1939 ID - 91% in combat 10% in services units (56% infantry), 9% services; 1939 AD - 86% in combat units (26% armor, 27% inf), 14% in services <--- 350 tanks
  • 1944-5 PzGren Div - 14446 men, 89% in combat units
  • Been seeing "Beamter" for a while - "official clerks"? Very few in #
  • Officers in equal proportion to NCO, enlisted, in combat

Card 3
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  • Commander + staff, map department, dispatch, MP, signal, three subunits, special troops and support troops (administrative, supply, sanitary) in a unit
  • German units formed from distinct German identities (Prussian, Bavarian, etc.)
  • To keep social homogeneity, made new divisions instead of keeping old up to strength; beneficial?
  • US - War Department, General Staff commanded all land and sea forces
  • Army Ground Forces - training
  • Army Service Forces - replacements
  • Similar to German model, but German troops used special troops outside of their intended roles more; summer '44 idel para army in England
  • German units known after commander, but not American units
  • In WW1, US had similar German system - troops from same region
  • US Army 91 (89 combat) divisions in WW2, so couldn't be rotated but always up to strength


Card 4
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  • US 1945 ID <---- 14037 men - 89% in combat units (66% infantry), 11% service; AD 84% in combat units (28% inf, 20% armor) - 10670 men
  • Officers distributed equally between combat, service
  • In US forces, AT artillery <- dist. among other arms
  • Because US dislike using specialized forces outside role, engineers "auxiliary"
  • * Special Divisional Slices Table and other Table
  • US - end of 1944, 5.7 million army personnel, average divisional slice 64000?
  • Many replacements - actual strength (on.) ~13400
  • 20.8% army's strength in its divisions - 40-50% of usual German (see previous tables); however, US Army more centralized, so many nondivisional units under direct army and corps command, so Jan 1945 div slice - 57% combat troops, but 38% with 21000 replacements in training + "overheads in troops bosis" added
  • Between 1942-45 combat units less poportionally; many fit men given Zone of Interior jobs


Card 5
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  • Germany - decentralized personnel administration; handled mostly by regimental commanders
  • Mutual trust between soldier & immediate superiors?
  • At beginning of war, Central Personnel Office did not keep detailed manpower statistics; but no changes made, opposition by officers
  • Avoid increase in burden on troops
  • Need for replacements determined by relative importance + authorized strength and losses reported every 10 days
  • * Constant stressing by author that German army was opposite of blind obedience, bureaucratic stereotype
  • Sophisticated coordination of wounded
  • US Personnel Admin - centralized, mechanized, mathematical models
  • Importance of quantification + statistics
  • Constant search for additional organization
  • Worked poorly? - 1942 officer shortage, 1943 massive surplus
  • Extremely complicated Officer Evaluation Report with point system; 20 grades of officer quality
  • German officer aassessment (Beurteilung) every 2 years, simplified in Nov. 1942, asked for officer's subjective opinion of subordinates, no Y/N


Card 6
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  • Men over 35 in German combat units in frontline constantly being replaced by younger men
  • 17.9 mil "passed" through Wehrmacht + Waffen SS 9/39 - 4/45
  • By end of war more manpower in LW + KM & esp. SS at expense of Heer
  • Heer prestige went down - by Dec 41 had no exclusive CiC
  • Manpower peaks - Army in 1943/6.55 mil (Ersatz usually ~1/2); Airforce in 43-44/1.7 mil; Navy in 1945 44/810000 (30000 in 39); SS in 45/830000 (35000 in 39); Total 43-44/between 9.4-9.5 mil
  • Army classification + assignment of enlisted men based on physical exam by physician, put into 6 classes (i.e. fit for garrison, unfit for defense)
  • Max 80 people per physician daily
  • During examination Musterung preliminary exam review (Musterung) commander conversed with recruit to get mental condition, find defects
  • Decision of fitness made on spot, told to subject
  • Next stage of enrollment (Aushebung) - short phys exam, assignment based on phys condition, education, profession, paramilitary training & <-- preference

Card 7
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  • Final dist. section unclear, but involved unit commander
  • Simple decentralized personal system reliant on subjective opinions
  • Military psychologists - massive training effort
  • Psych lab <--(1926-42) only processed .5 mil 33-39, employed 200 psychologists in 39.
  • Closed in 42 because Keitel's son did not qualify to be officer
  • Mostly processed specialists (i.e. pilots, radio operators)
  • Moral attitudes, character traits (courage, loyalty, etc.) <-- personality > technical/mechanical aptitude
  • Psychological assessment must be a "work of art"
    Point
    4 brave men Ardant du Pique Picq Etudes de Combat
    Very Strong interpersonal relationships in units, common backgrounds
    Improvised units had low morale and broke quickly





I have no idea what I was on about with some of these. I guess I'm just not a good note-taker. Anyway, comments on these data/arguments? Oh, and these notes cover at best a quarter of the book, so read this ( http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com.../chapter4.aspx) review for a better idea of the book's premises and conclusions.

I anticipate the Frenchman.

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I'm not here to argue anything. I'm just one of the tourists.