Fighting Power

[Strike For The South]

Facts and reason.

LOL, I just needed and excuse to post the picture

[CBR]

I did not expect anything else from a Texan

[ReluctantSamurai]

In the appendix to Hitler's Last Gamble, the authors state (Appendix H, p499):

The Germans are not and were not a "master race" as Hitler claimed. They simply organized themselves for war better than we did [my note: I would assume this is reference to battlefield organization, as the US and the Soviets were far better organized on a national scale] they made better use of their weapons; they were more professional than we were.

The German Army had adopted a military system that had been developed by the Prussians in 1807 after they had been overwhelmingly defeated by the French under Napoleon.

This military system, a cultural development and not inherent to the German people, built around the superb Prussian General Staff, produced leaders and soldiers who on average fought better than their enemies, including the United States.

They go on further to state [in reference to the Ardennes Camapign]:

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that American troops fought well in the Battle of the Bulge. Yet Patton was right. The Germans were better, at least during the first days of the battle and, on balance, in most instances for the entire campaign.

The average German soldier in the Ardennes campaign was not as well trained as the average American soldier. The fact that the Germans retained an average combat effectiveness superiority, even though at a lower margin than earlier in the war, was due to the continuing high standards of German professional leadership.

In reference to van Creveld's book Fighting Power, Dupuy himself had this to say:

My book, A Genius for War, was cited admirably by Israeli historian Martin van Creveld in his book, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance 1939-45. Van Creveld obviously leans heavily on my conclusions about the excellence of German combat performance in WW II. He then compares the American Army in WW II very unfavorably with the German Army. I strongly disagree with van Creveld in this respect. The specifics of most of his comparisons were simply very wrong. The Germans were very good; they were the best. But the Americans fought pretty well in WW II, also. We just weren't quite as good as the Germans.

Their final conclusion:

Why were the Germans better than we were? The answer is, in brief, the superior military system noted above. Man for man, the typical German soldier was not smarter, braver, stronger, or more highly motivated than was the American soldier. But their leaders were, for the most part, more professional.

Richard C. Anderson, one of the co-authors of Hitler's Last Gamble, is a regular poster at the Tanknet Forum. He might be willing to answer questions....depending on the mood he's in...

[PanzerJaeger]

The only doubt I have about this kind of study is how to separate the advantage of a defensive position and (perversely) a losing position. The Germans almost never were on the offensive against the Americans (Kasserine being an exception, but also one where the Americans were decidedly green.)

Dupuy's model was designed to factor out all observable variables in battle such as offense/defense, terrain, weapons, and so on, leaving only the human element - morale, training, leadership, etc.

Also, while the Germans were usually on the strategic defensive, that defense relied heavily on localized counterattacks as per German doctrine. Dupuy's study was based primarily on division level engagements. In Italy, for example, his numbers included 13 German attacks with an average Allied CEV of .58 compared to an overall average of .71 (over 1.00 being better than the German forces and less that 1.00 being worse).

[ReluctantSamurai]

For those who are interested, the TDI forums shed some light on the hows and whys of the QJM. I won't reference any particular topic as there are many...and you need to expand the topic list to include all topics because many are 5-6yrs old or more.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/cgi-bi...assCookie=true

[al Roumi]

I am 2/3 of the way through reading Anthony Beevor's book on D-Day/the Normandy campaign. From what he says, a fewer number of germans held back a larger number of Allied troops -and in ways that the allies would go on to learn (to their increased effectiveness). There are the differences in equipment, but strategically -the germans did not suffer from Monty, but did from Hitler; while the crucial factor was the overwhelming air superiority and ground support it provided to Allied troops (delaying and reducing german armour/columns before it even engaged allied troops).

[Brenus]

I have little remorse to speak about a book I didn’t read.
However, the Germans never succeed to held the lines. In 1941, first defeat in front of Moscow followed by few successes until Stalingrad. From mid-1942, the German Army doesn’t stop to retreat.
So, the result shows that the effectiveness of the German War Machine wasn’t that good.

Now to kill more enemies or to counter-offensives are not sign of more effectiveness. The Soviet had the same doctrine (as Germans and Russians were training together even before Hitler took power) had it lead them to disasters in the first months of the war. It was not until they learned to defend that they were successful.

In term of individual soldier, I have difficulty to imagine how to calculate his effectiveness as most of the results heavily depend on the tactic and strategy.
Without the Ardennes attack would the German Soldier so successful in front of his French/English counter-part? Without the element of surprise would Fort Eben-Emael fall so quick? With a proper English Commander, Crete would have been a disaster even if, in my opinion, the German Paratrooper were one of the best fighters of the time, but their parachutes were crap so their weapons had to be drop in containers…
How to you calculate their effectiveness?