Fighting Power

[PanzerJaeger]

The only doubt I have about this kind of study is how to separate the advantage of a defensive position and (perversely) a losing position. The Germans almost never were on the offensive against the Americans (Kasserine being an exception, but also one where the Americans were decidedly green.)

Dupuy's model was designed to factor out all observable variables in battle such as offense/defense, terrain, weapons, and so on, leaving only the human element - morale, training, leadership, etc.

Also, while the Germans were usually on the strategic defensive, that defense relied heavily on localized counterattacks as per German doctrine. Dupuy's study was based primarily on division level engagements. In Italy, for example, his numbers included 13 German attacks with an average Allied CEV of .58 compared to an overall average of .71 (over 1.00 being better than the German forces and less that 1.00 being worse).

[ReluctantSamurai]

For those who are interested, the TDI forums shed some light on the hows and whys of the QJM. I won't reference any particular topic as there are many...and you need to expand the topic list to include all topics because many are 5-6yrs old or more.

http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/cgi-bi...assCookie=true

[al Roumi]

I am 2/3 of the way through reading Anthony Beevor's book on D-Day/the Normandy campaign. From what he says, a fewer number of germans held back a larger number of Allied troops -and in ways that the allies would go on to learn (to their increased effectiveness). There are the differences in equipment, but strategically -the germans did not suffer from Monty, but did from Hitler; while the crucial factor was the overwhelming air superiority and ground support it provided to Allied troops (delaying and reducing german armour/columns before it even engaged allied troops).

[Brenus]

I have little remorse to speak about a book I didn’t read.
However, the Germans never succeed to held the lines. In 1941, first defeat in front of Moscow followed by few successes until Stalingrad. From mid-1942, the German Army doesn’t stop to retreat.
So, the result shows that the effectiveness of the German War Machine wasn’t that good.

Now to kill more enemies or to counter-offensives are not sign of more effectiveness. The Soviet had the same doctrine (as Germans and Russians were training together even before Hitler took power) had it lead them to disasters in the first months of the war. It was not until they learned to defend that they were successful.

In term of individual soldier, I have difficulty to imagine how to calculate his effectiveness as most of the results heavily depend on the tactic and strategy.
Without the Ardennes attack would the German Soldier so successful in front of his French/English counter-part? Without the element of surprise would Fort Eben-Emael fall so quick? With a proper English Commander, Crete would have been a disaster even if, in my opinion, the German Paratrooper were one of the best fighters of the time, but their parachutes were crap so their weapons had to be drop in containers…
How to you calculate their effectiveness?

[ReluctantSamurai]

How to you calculate their effectiveness?

I would suggest:

1. Read one or more of Dupuy's books

2. Use the link I provided above and visit the TDI forums

[CBR]

Just because The Germans and Russians trained a bit with tanks and aircraft a decade before the war does not mean the Russians had same doctrine nor same level of training.

So, the result shows that the effectiveness of the German War Machine wasn’t that good.

Overall result is not important. It is about how well the units fought and casualties produced and suffered compared to the odds. And odds is a combo of numbers, terrain, fortification, surprise, weather, weapons etc.