Union Civil War Generals

[econ21]

I will give you McClellan is a strange case - appearing paralysed by a curious over-estimation of Confederate strength. I probably over-stated my case. Poor generalship does seem to have been a factor in the first half of the war in the East. But what I was getting at was that there were competent Union generals in the west and for the second half of the war in the East, but still winning the war was a slow process. It's hard not to see it in terms of attrition - of the superior resources of the North slowly wearing down the South.

edit: oh and technology had nothing to do with the length of the war or battles not being decisive enough. It was a simple matter of size of the country coupled with low population density and therefore difficult logistics and occasionally broken up terrain.

I mentioned the scale issue as my the first reason (aside from any Union incompetence) for the ACW being long, but still would make a case for technology being a second. The crucial Eastern front, where a quick Union victory was more of a possiblility, was a relatively small war zone. The distance from Washington DC to Richmond is only 88 miles. One factor that stopped even competent generals like Grant from quickly defeating the Confederacy was the difficulty in decisively winning an offensive battle in the face of entrenchments and firepower of near-WW1 lethality. You only need to look at the final fighting around Richmond to see evidence of that. ("Grant maneouvred his entrenchments around Richmond" is one memorable description from the later stages of the war.)

If technology meant wars could no longer be won by single battles then why where there so many long wars that involved several battles?

I confess I don't follow the logic here.

[Kagemusha]

Two rather good Union Corps commanders who spring to mind were Major Generals John F. Reynolds and Winfried Scott Hancock.

[CBR]

But what I was getting at was that there were competent Union generals in the west and for the second half of the war in the East, but still winning the war was a slow process. It's hard not to see it in terms of attrition - of the superior resources of the North slowly wearing down the South.

Yes it was a slow grind because there was no single objective that could decide the war (maybe Richmond). In the west logistically it had to be done step by step because of the big distances. The British had a similar problem 80+ years earlier and lost the AWI. The French had superior numbers in Spain yet Spain was not known for being a great campaigning country, so the fighting lasted years and they only tried once to get to Wellington's base which was uhm fortified.

One factor that stopped even competent generals like Grant from quickly defeating the Confederacy was the difficulty in decisively winning an offensive battle in the face of entrenchments and firepower of near-WW1 lethality.

Entrenchments made things rather difficult, just like entrenchments always had. Claiming near WW1 lethality is rather dubious though because weapons technology and tactics were closer to Napoleonic warfare than WW1.

Don't be tricked into thinking that 88 miles would be easy. Logistics were difficult in that area and broken up terrain made fighting difficult and confused at times. Lee could not even support his own army there, which led to his northern adventures. Yet the two times he did that it quickly escalated into a battle that made Lee retreat home (one could even say a rather decisive battle each time). Why such a difference compared to the grinding fight further south? Why did Sherman have to take a slow and methodical approach to reach Atlanta, yet when he went off for his march to the sea he marched faster and no rebel army seemed to have slowed him down one bit?

That Sherman lived off the land and Lee went north for his army to feed it should already provide a strong hint. The areas they entered were open, well populated and with lots of roads and supplies. It gave an army more options for maneuver and therefore armies had to fight or retreat quickly. That resembles a lot of European campaigns, even when European armies used similar or better weapons technology.

You only need to look at the final fighting around Richmond to see evidence of that. ("Grant maneouvred his entrenchments around Richmond" is one memorable description from the later stages of the war.)

Fortifications did not prevent Grant from pushing beyond Lee's line because Lee did not cover everything. So what stopped Grant from making a grand sweep into Lee's rear then? His need to protect his supply base and the difficulties of supplying any large force far away from his base. His only option was to take a gradual approach, building up supplies and use fortifications to free up units and extend the line step by step until Lee was overextended.

The supply situation, terrain and condition of roads played a bigger part in the last phase of the ACW than weapons.

I confess I don't follow the logic here

Sorry I should have quoted what I was responding to:

the world was moving away from wars that could be won by single decisive battles, into ones which inherently would last longer

There are very few wars that were decided by just one battle. Funnily enough in '66 and '70 armies with same or better weapons than in ACW decided the issue within a few weeks.

[CBR]

When did Sherman condone rape and executing blacks? Executing civilians because of resistance was a common thing for that era so can't fault any general for that. Burning down stuff as economic warfare is hardly a new thing either. A few "harsh" quotes from Sherman still does not make him equal to German war criminals from another era who had different international laws.

[Fisherking]

When did Sherman condone rape and executing blacks? Executing civilians because of resistance was a common thing for that era so can't fault any general for that. Burning down stuff as economic warfare is hardly a new thing either. A few "harsh" quotes from Sherman still does not make him equal to German war criminals from another era who had different international laws.

No!

It is quite well established, if not well publicized.

It is like asking me to prove Einstein was Jewish or the Pope Catholic


I will give you one essay and you can research the truth of the argument for your self.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo140.html

[ELITEofWARMANGINGERYBREADMEN88]

No!

It is quite well established, if not well publicized.

It is like asking me to prove Einstein was Jewish or the Pope Catholic


I will give you one essay and you can research the truth of the argument for your self.

http://www.lewrockwell.com/dilorenzo/dilorenzo140.html

So I take it you hate Sherman then?

[Fisherking]

So I take it you hate Sherman then?

I don’t hate Sherman but it is safe to say I don’t admire him either.

you can't change the past but some things need a little more light shined on them to get a clearer view.

[CBR]

I don’t hate Sherman but it is safe to say I don’t admire him either.

you can't change the past but some things need a little more light shined on them to get a clearer view.

And I think it is is important to see things in the proper light instead of judging people by modern standards. Sherman did not release Einsatzgruppen on peaceful southerners. Nor did Sherman create horrors like seen in Spain in the Napoleonic era. Nor were they treated like the Boors. In that sense Sherman does not appear like a monster and he certainly did not exist in some vacuum with the atrocities seen in some of the border states.

[econ21]

Entrenchments made things rather difficult, just like entrenchments always had. Claiming near WW1 lethality is rather dubious though because weapons technology and tactics were closer to Napoleonic warfare than WW1.

Well, things were in transition. At the start, the weapons and tactics were essentially Napoleonic. But by the end, with repeater rifles making an appearance, ever more lethal artillery and battlefield entrenchments being routine, the era of close formations deploying in the open, shock combat and cavalry charges was coming to an end.

Yet the two times he did that it quickly escalated into a battle that made Lee retreat home (one could even say a rather decisive battle each time).

Antietam and Gettysburg? They did play a key strategic role but my point about the difficulty of decisive offensive battles was about the challenge of attacking in the face of the firepower available, which both battles amply demonstrate.

Funnily enough in '66 and '70 armies with same or better weapons than in ACW decided the issue within a few weeks.

That's a good point. I guess WW1 could also have been decided quite quickly, had the French and British been a bit weaker in 1914 and the Germans a bit stronger. Indeed, you make a lot of good points about the terrain and logistics in the ACW. But I think the technology probably played a role - perhaps in combination with the scale. In WW1, it was when you had such mass mobilisation, you could have entrenchments stretched across the battlefield that an attritional stalemate was produced (at least until tactics and technology were developed to break it). I think you saw something similar in the ACW in the east.

[CBR]

Antietam and Gettysburg? They did play a key strategic role but my point about the difficulty of decisive offensive battles was about the challenge of attacking in the face of the firepower available, which both battles amply demonstrate.

McClellan is entirely to blame for not getting a better result at Antietam. He had Lee cornered yet did not use his whole army. Gettysburg was a meeting engagement where Lee (who was outnumbered) sent his units in without knowing how strong the enemy really was. If one does not have numbers, surprise or good position (room for flanking) then it would be difficult to win any battle when attacking. It is easy enough to find similar battles in earlier eras, just ask Marlborough, Frederick the Great or Napoleon and they rarely had to deal with such terrain and roads.

In WW1, it was when you had such mass mobilisation, you could have entrenchments stretched across the battlefield that an attritional stalemate was produced (at least until tactics and technology were developed to break it). I think you saw something similar in the ACW in the east.

Yeah I would just say that while tech and numbers was the key reason in WW1 then in the ACW the reasons were IMO mainly terrain and logistics. The slow grinding approaches we do see simply had to happen under very specific circumstances. If the approach to Atlanta or the Wilderness had been like the southern fields of Pennsylvania or perhaps Shenandoah I would think things would have been different.