Inferiority of middle eastern militaries in the ancient world?

[Sarmatian]

A ground force of hundreds of thousands and a navy of hundreds of ships isn't a trivial amount.

Hundreds of thousands is an exaggeration, the real number was much smaller. At Thermopylae, even though Greeks sources mention such numbers as million or two millions of Persian, in reality the number was certainly less than one hundred thousands and that's including entire Persian expedition, not just fighters, but cooks, dancers, concubines, eunuchs, musicians etc...

[Montmorency]

Huh, that contradicts most estimates I've seen.

I'm assuming something in the range of 150000-300000, which is where most fall.

[Sarmatian]

Huh, that contradicts most estimates I've seen.

I'm assuming something in the range of 150000-300000, which is where most fall.

There are some estimates that say Persian army was 300,000 strong, indeed, but it is really an unlikely number, especially since most modern estimates of the battle of Gaugamela say Persian army was 100,000 strong. It is doubtful that Persian would muster 3 times that force for a punitive expedition at the very end of the empire.

[Montmorency]

Others' words serve best:

If it is true that the Persian army consisted of something between 50,000 and 100,000 fighting men, it follows not only that the Greeks were a nation of liars or dreamers, but also that the actions of the Greeks and of the Persians were totally irrational. One must wonder why the Persians should have sent by land an army that could have been easily transported on ships; why should the fleet have followed the army along the coast step by step for five months, suffering great losses because of storms; why should the Greeks have avoided any major military engagement on land for almost two years; why should the Athenians have abandoned their city to the Persians, allowing them to destroy it and massacre the poorer citizens who did not have the means to seek refuge abroad; why should the coalized Greeks have decided that the only possible strategy consisted of abandoning the country to the enemy, while trying to defend the line of the Isthmus of Corinth.

...

Very few scholars deny that the Persian fleet disposed of at least 600 triremes plus other warships and transports. Since a trireme could remain fit for action with 100 soldiers on board and could transport up to 300 passengers, a fleet of 600 triremes could have easily carried 60,000 soldiers with their supplies directly from Asia Minor to Attika. This is what was done in the case of the Persian landing at Marathon ten years earlier. In 480 B.C. the construction of two bridges across the sea at the Hellespont would have been a pointless gesture if the Persian army had been a force of 100,000 men or less.

...

According to Herodotos, the King had concluded that it was necessary for the national survival of Persia to destroy the power of Athens and Sparta; the course of history, as yet unknown in Herodotos' time, proved that the King was right. According to Herodotos, the King knew quite well that he was engaging in a risky enterprise, but decided that the gamble was reasonable if there was a chance whatsoever of success (VII 10, 50). King Xerxes was a rational ruler who decided that all the resources of his empire had to be engaged in a calculated risk, since the very existence of that empire was at stake. The King had in mind not only the support given by the Greek mainland to the revolt of his Greek subjects of Asia Minor and the humiliation suffered by the Persian army at Marathon in 490 B.C., but probably most of all the support given by the Greeks to the revolt of Egypt, a key province of the imperial system. Preparations for the Greek campaign were initiated immediately after the end of the campaign for the pacification of Egypt (VII 8). At that moment the King would have said, "All we possess will pass to the Greeks or all they possess will pass to us" (VII 12). It is currently assumed that Herodotos was totally ignorant of what is called philosophy of history, whereas here he predicted correctly history's future course. The Kings of Persia as well as the Greeks foresaw what finally took place about a century and a half later: if the Persian universal empire could not subdue the Greeks of the mainland, a Greek universal empire would replace it.]

Though I'm not sure about that last bit...

Also note Lazenby, keeping in mind the above on naval considerations:

But does it follow that sea power was the
decisive factor in the war? Modern scholars often appear to think so: the
Persian army, we are told, depended on sea-borne supplies, despite the
fact that there is no evidence for this view, and that if the Persian navy
was anything like as large as Herodotos (cf. 7.89 ff.; 184. 1-2) and the
contemporary playwright, Aischylos, believed (cf. The Persians, 341-3),
it would have been manned by well over a quarter of a million men and
have needed every ounce of supplies it could carry or convoy for its own
purposes. It is also not explained how the Persian army could have
marched from Therma to Thermopylai, in 480, apparently without experiencing
any commissariat problems,despite its being out of contact with
the fleet for nearly three weeks ; or, for that matter, how, after the fleet's
defeat at Salamis and its consequent withdrawal to Asia Minor, a substantial
proportion of the army could have remained in Greece for nearly a year without starving

The only evidence for Persian
supply-ships is Herod [otos] 7.25.2 and 191.1, but the first passage refers simply to
the carrying of supplies to food-dumps in Thrace, and although in the second the
supply-ships are certainly accompanying the fleet, they are surely there to supply
the fleet itself.

[Sarmatian]

Others' words serve best:



Though I'm not sure about that last bit...

Also note Lazenby, keeping in mind the above on naval considerations:

Unfortunately, that is wishful thinking. When the first sentence starts with "if it isn't true, than Greeks are liars" you can easily deduce it's not serious scholarly work.

Greeks aren't liars, it's just that at that time, size of the armies were estimated with the naked eye, there usually weren't any written documents. Compared to the Middle East, Greece was sparsely populated. Population of Athens at its peak was around 300,000 people, including women, children and about a 100,000 slaves. Sparta's male population was around 15,000. Seeing an invading army of around 75,000 was a huge shock.

[Catiline]

Unfortunately, that is wishful thinking. When the first sentence starts with "if it isn't true, than Greeks are liars" you can easily deduce it's not serious scholarly work.

Greeks aren't liars, it's just that at that time, size of the armies were estimated with the naked eye, there usually weren't any written documents. Compared to the Middle East, Greece was sparsely populated. Population of Athens at its peak was around 300,000 people, including women, children and about a 100,000 slaves. Sparta's male population was around 15,000. Seeing an invading army of around 75,000 was a huge shock.

And not for nothing was Herodotus known as the father of lies...

[Lazy O]

The amount of persians given above is absolutely ridiculous. Do you even know how many Baivarabama were active at a given time? And no more were raised except in times of crisis (Alexander)

@Sarmatian; Greeks arent liars? Oh, that must be a genetic error that sets them apart from every other people on earth...

[|Sith|DarthRoach]

Sparta's male population was around 15,000.

Someone is ignoring the 150 thousand helots....