The 19 True Things Generals Can't Say About Afghanistan

[gaelic cowboy]

The battle at Tora Bora took place in December of 2001, iirc. The invasion of Iraq commenced in March of 2003.

Irrelevant you asked if lack of resources hampered the effort obviously they have on occasion.

[PanzerJaeger]

Irrelevant you asked if lack of resources hampered the effort obviously they have on occasion.

Umm, not irrelevant as the discussion was about resources diverted to Iraq and whether they could have made a difference in Afghanistan...

[gaelic cowboy]

Umm, not irrelevant as the discussion was about resources diverted to Iraq and whether they could have made a difference in Afghanistan...

So when there was no Iraq they had problems with resources, but when Iraq was on the problems went away

[PanzerJaeger]

So when there was no Iraq they had problems with resources, but when Iraq was on the problems went away

Your position seems to have shifted a bit. I thought your argument was:

[...]Bin Laden and the Taliban were let escape from Tora Bora due to basically lack of resources.

If you had a caught them then you could have declared victory and drew down your forces at a time when the Afghan insurgency had not ramped up yet.

Which may or may not be true (I'm taking your word on the SOCOM General's testimony about a lack of resources as the only such incident I am aware of was a Delta Force commander, 'Fury', who did interviews on Tora Bora but said nothing about a lack of resources*), but, as I pointed out, had absolutely nothing to do with the Iraqi adventure.

Now that position seems to have transformed into 'because there were resource problems at the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001, there must have been resource problems when the Iraq war commenced several years later'.

Such a position is rife with logical inconsistencies, one of the largest being that you are mixing macro-level strategic resource commitment over a broad period of time to tactical resource commitment during a specific engagement. The resource problems that may or may not have existed at a specific date, at a specific time, at a specific location, and in a specific battle do not say much one way or the other regarding the overall resource situation of the broader war effort, to say nothing of long term development aid. For example, at Khe Sanh in Vietnam the US forces faced severe resource shortages for a period of time during the battle, but that was not indicative of the greater US resource situation in South Vietnam.

And more importantly, in the case of Tora Bora, there were at least 800 Army Rangers in the area that could have been committed to the battle but were not, which indicates that the resource deficiency in the battle was more a function of leadership than a systemic under-deployment. Tommy Franks' decision not to use them has been heavily criticized for years now.

* IIrc, 'Fury' indicated that Bin Laden's escape was due mainly to an over reliance on Afghan native fighters with questionable loyalties and commitment to the fight, the assumption that Pakistan would seal its border, and the failure to utilize air dropped mine fields to contain him. The former highlights another issue with your analysis. In 2001, the US was using a very different strategy than is currently being used - one that emphasized a small footprint, special forces, and a reliance on Afghan fighters. If I were to bet, I would say that your SOCOM general came to the same conclusion that most other military types have over the years - that a stronger presence in the beginning, and especially around Tora Bora, would have yielded better results. The lack of resources he cites is completely different than the lack of resources being discussed earlier in the thread, in that the former was a tactical decision in which resources were available and not used and the latter was a strategic decision to shift limited resources from one front to another.

[gaelic cowboy]

Your position seems to have shifted a bit. I thought your argument was:



Which may or may not be true (I'm taking your word on the SOCOM General's testimony about a lack of resources as the only such incident I am aware of was a Delta Force commander, 'Fury', who did interviews on Tora Bora but said nothing about a lack of resources*), but, as I pointed out, had absolutely nothing to do with the Iraqi adventure.

Now that position seems to have transformed into 'because there were resource problems at the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001, there must have been resource problems when the Iraq war commenced several years later'.

Such a position is rife with logical inconsistencies, one of the largest being that you are mixing macro-level strategic resource commitment over a broad period of time to tactical resource commitment during a specific engagement. The resource problems that may or may not have existed at a specific date, at a specific time, at a specific location, and in a specific battle do not say much one way or the other regarding the overall resource situation of the broader war effort, to say nothing of long term development aid. For example, at Khe Sanh in Vietnam the US forces faced severe resource shortages for a period of time during the battle, but that was not indicative of the greater US resource situation in South Vietnam.

And more importantly, in the case of Tora Bora, there were at least 800 Army Rangers in the area that could have been committed to the battle but were not, which indicates that the resource deficiency in the battle was more a function of leadership than a systemic under-deployment. Tommy Franks' decision not to use them has been heavily criticized for years now.

* IIrc, 'Fury' indicated that Bin Laden's escape was due mainly to an over reliance on Afghan native fighters with questionable loyalties and commitment to the fight, the assumption that Pakistan would seal its border, and the failure to utilize air dropped mine fields to contain him. The former highlights another issue with your analysis. In 2001, the US was using a very different strategy than is currently being used - one that emphasized a small footprint, special forces, and a reliance on Afghan fighters. If I were to bet, I would say that your SOCOM general came to the same conclusion that most other military types have over the years - that a stronger presence in the beginning, and especially around Tora Bora, would have yielded better results. The lack of resources he cites is completely different than the lack of resources being discussed earlier in the thread, in that the former was a tactical decision in which resources were available and not used and the latter was a strategic decision to shift limited resources from one front to another.

The White House had to be near dragged into going into Afghanistan such was the obsession with Iraq.

Do you seriously believe this did not have any effect in anyway in Afghanistan.

A country like Afghanistan always needed far more resources than it got, massive reliance on Pakistan and local elements has basically done in your efforts and all you can do now is choose your leaving.

[PanzerJaeger]

The White House had to be near dragged into going into Afghanistan such was the obsession with Iraq.

Do you seriously believe this did not have any effect in anyway in Afghanistan.

A country like Afghanistan always needed far more resources than it got, massive reliance on Pakistan and local elements has basically done in your efforts and all you can do now is choose your leaving.

Now it just seems like you're throwing out random assertions hoping something will stick.

In any event, I think you're dead wrong. The White House had to be 'dragged' into higher troop levels in Afghanistan because at some level the administration initially understood what happens to large occupying forces in Afghanistan. The problems in Afghanistan had much more to do with President Bush's unchecked idealism than anything to do with Iraq. Apart from Tora Bora, the initial campaign in the country was brilliantly executed, and the gains made against the Taliban could have been maintained if the US had operated in the same manner that everyone else does in Afghanistan - through money and proxy armies. But when freedom and democracy were promised, the associated mission creep necessitated an ever greater number of troops and resources which had an equal and opposite effect on the Coalition's effectiveness. There were plenty of warlords in Afghanistan more than willing to take American money and SOCOM's help in keeping the Taliban out of their fiefdoms, there were far fewer willing to subordinate themselves to a national government - especially one led by Hamid Karzai.

That's why I question the 'if we'd just poured more resources into Afghanistan earlier' line of thinking. Afghanistan will swallow all the resources we're willing to throw at it and still remain... well... Afghanistan. As long as Pakistan still exists as a nation state, there will always be a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan until an ISI approved government is in place in Kabul - it's just a matter of how that insurgency is managed and whether it can be convinced (through death from above or $$) to limit its ambitions. The focus should have never grown beyond securing Western security from international terrorism by denying Islamic terrorists safe haven in the country. If America had played smarter instead of harder, this could have been done for less than a billion dollars a year - especially with the progression of the drone programs.

We're destined for failure in the conflict not because of a lack of resources, but because we've committed so many that our effort is no longer sustainable. It was never our responsibility to ensure that little girls have access to school in Afghanistan, and it was equal parts stupid and idealistic to assume that we could fundamentally change a culture far older and far more resilient than our own through force of will alone. But that was America coming out of the 90's...

[gaelic cowboy]

Now were talking about different things PJ, my assertion is there was never enough resources either men, equipment, political will or even money in Afghanistan

Your trying to assert that increasing resources would have been no good, that you should follow established Afghan models.

Thats all fine and well except for the big Iraq war next door obviously was sucking all the best minds, money, equipment and men into it.

You cant run a proxy war if your main interest is an actual war somewhere else now can you, also come on now PJ asserting that at some level the admin blah blah etc etc.

Rumsfeld had to be sacked eventually he was that incompetent and the rest of the neo-cons were also massively out of touch with reality too all across the board.

We're destined for failure in the conflict not because of a lack of resources, but because we've committed so many that our effort is no longer sustainable. It was never our responsibility to ensure that little girls have access to school in Afghanistan, and it was equal parts stupid and idealistic to assume that we could fundamentally change a culture far older and far more resilient than our own through force of will alone. But that was America coming out of the 90's...

Thats been America always PJ nothing to do with the 90s