Could the Axis have won?

[Sarmatian]

Agreed. But perhaps if the capture of Moscow does force the Soviets to capitulate (not likely, but possible), then oil could be sent from the Caucasus if the Trans-Siberian Railway can be improved enough to allow it. Also, the oil production facilities in the Sakhalin Islands becomes available to the Japanese to the tune of 580 million barrels/yr.

That's hindsight 20/20. IF the Japanese could correctly assess how quickly would Wehrmacht reach Moscow, IF Wehrmacht actually takes Moscow (it's a huge city, reaching it is not the same as taking it), IF it leads to Soviet capitulation (very unlikely)... A lot of if's, and it means taking on the army that kicked their butts twice recently. Even if all goes according to plan and then some, it's the Germans who get all the spoils and it leaves Japan dependent on German goodwill, which is contrary to the whole reason Japan went to war in the first place. Sure, Germany is friendly now, but US was friendly a few decades ago. On the other side, there are very rich and poorly defended areas ripe for the taking right that moment.

They could...as long as they stayed out of prime tank country like that found around Khalkin Gol, and operated in the heavily wooded areas (negating Soviet armored formations) around Kharbarovsk and Chingchangkou where their superiority in small unit tactics give them the advantage.

Debatable. I don't rate Japanese WW2 army that highly, but even if true, they would basically be conquering empty territory. Few population centres, few industry, and unlike modern Russia, Soviet Union at the time didn't exploit much of Siberian mineral wealth. Sure, it would have been a blow, but how severe.

I don't believe Vladivostok is simply symbolic and the discussion of LL is better kept to another topic

Yes, but if you argue capture of Vladivostok would have been severe for the Soviets due to loss of a major port for LL aid, the importance of LL overall becomes a valid point of discussion.

[ReluctantSamurai]

That's hindsight 20/20

I don't see how it is. The Germans did nothing but run all over the Soviets during the summer and fall of 1941, what would give the Japanese any indication that the Germans could be stopped?

A lot of if's, and it means taking on the army that kicked their butts twice recently.

Well, we are talking a bunch of what if's here, no?

Despite the setback at Khalkin Gol, there were a lot of supporters in the Japanese AGS that still wanted to wage war with the SU. What is also skimmed over in talking about the several border skirmishes before Khalkin Gol and Khalkin Gol itself is that the Japanese inflicted far more casualties than they took. At KG the Soviets took close to 30,000 casualties as opposed to 20,000 for the Japanese.

which is contrary to the whole reason Japan went to war in the first place.

My point, exactly. If the Germans (specifically I.G. Farben) help the Japanese with syn-fuel technology which, in the long run, will make Japan far more self sufficient with fuel production, it might have been enough to convince the Japanese general Staff to consider a northern move.

On the other side, there are very rich and poorly defended areas ripe for the taking right that moment.

Specifically, the DEI. If energy needs can be met in other ways, perhaps war with the US and the UK might be put off.

and unlike modern Russia, Soviet Union at the time didn't exploit much of Siberian mineral wealth

But they had developed the Sakhalin oil fields enough to yield substantial crude.

Debatable. I don't rate Japanese WW2 army that highly

As a whole, I would agree, but the one area that they excelled in was small unit tactics and this was one of the reasons they could inflict heavy casualties on the Soviets despite their lack of armor and mobile artillery.

Yes, but if you argue capture of Vladivostok would have been severe for the Soviets due to loss of a major port for LL aid, the importance of LL overall becomes a valid point of discussion.

Then discuss what you feel is pertinent. I just want to stay away from a detailed discussion of LL in this thread. We've all been there, seen it, done it, so-to-speak

[Brenus]

“The Soviet tank forces in the Far East were mainly BT-5's and BT-7's. All available T34's were facing the Germans. And even during the Khalkin Gol conflict, Soviet tank losses were very high due to "banzai" tactics that took advantage of the BT's penchant to catch fire.” True, but the Japanese still lost the battle. The Russian improved their side, the Japanese not. The Russian did learned their lessons front 1941, Finish War and reacted in producing new tactics. The inferior (compared with Russian) American Tanks (Grant) were more than match for the Japanese Tanks.
Then, if we speak of a Japanese attack, as shown in Malaysia, their logistic was too weak. You might leave on the country in Monsoon Countries, Siberia would be more difficult. Then, what would be the profits, gains, in Japanese terms? As mentioned, Siberia wasn’t really exploited at the time (except Gulags). The Sun Empire needed immediate profit, things to loot and with immediate effect…
And it would have distract forces from where they were needed..

“The USA was looking for a cause”: Yes, the President did. But, without Germany declaring war, nothing he could have done. Roosevelt turned back the request for help for French Paul Reynaud in 1940, as he had no choice…

[ReluctantSamurai]

The inferior (compared with Russian) American Tanks (Grant) were more than match for the Japanese Tanks

Considering where the Japanese had been fighting since 1931 (China), and where warfare with the United States would probably take place (all the various island chains strung across the Pacific), Japan had no need for a main battle tank that was the mainstay of European-based warfare. With a limited industrial base, the Japanese decided to focus on the two areas that could make the most difference in the areas they expected to fight: aircraft and naval ships.

The Sun Empire needed immediate profit, things to loot and with immediate effect…
And it would have distract forces from where they were needed

After the US embargo in July of 1941, they needed oil.

To get back to the original OP...the Axis might have succeeded within a very narrow window of opportunity. The end of 1941 or by spring 1942 at the very latest. After that, their possibilities of success fall rapidly. The reason for this, IMO, is the industrial power of the three major Allied nations...the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. Combined, their industrial output simply dwarfs the Axis powers by a huge margin. Any protracted conflict will allow more and more of that industrial power to be brought to bear, which is just what actually occurred.

Germany and her immediate allies (Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland) had the better chance. Japan was doomed the instant they attacked Pearl Harbor. There are tons of specific examples of how Germany could have done this or that differently and thus effected a better outcome, but IMHO, one of the biggest mistakes was alienating the population of the Ukraine during the summer and fall of 1941. Here they had a ready-made base of people that would gladly take up arms to throw off the hated regime of Stalin, and this would have instantly solved the problem of replacements for the front lines, as well as greatly lessened the occurrence of partisan activity on their longest supply line (that of AG South). The Trans-Caucasus District were not very friendly towards the communists either, and it's not inconceivable that they might have turned on the communists, as well. This would not bode very well for Stalin, and might have tipped the balance far enough to allow a German victory.

Japan's only chance, and an extremely slim one at that, was to attack only the Philippines and the DEI and stay away from anything "mainland" USA. The virtual firestorm created by attacking Hawaii galvanized the US public in a way that they might not have been had holdings thousands of miles away been the only targets.

Plan Orange and all of its rainbow configurations were simply pipe dreams on the part of the US military. At the time PH was attacked, the USN had exactly 11 fleet oilers in the Pacific, of which only 6 were capable of at-sea refueling. Their capacity was barely adequate to keep the main battle fleet at sea for a month, let alone for an extended campaign all the way to Manila. After repeated heavy losses, the US might have settled for peace....and I repeat, might. The whole venture would be a long shot for the Japanese, but certainly better than the way it actually played out. And to head off the "hind-sighter" argument, there were many in the Japanese High Command (including Adm. Yamamoto) who felt that attacking the US at that time was a very bad idea, so this whole train of thinking had already been done by high-ranking Japanese naval officers.

[Sarmatian]

Considering where the Japanese had been fighting since 1931 (China), and where warfare with the United States would probably take place (all the various island chains strung across the Pacific), Japan had no need for a main battle tank that was the mainstay of European-based warfare. With a limited industrial base, the Japanese decided to focus on the two areas that could make the most difference in the areas they expected to fight: aircraft and naval ships.

That is true, but the lack armour would have been a major issue in a protracted war with the Soviet Union.

After the US embargo in July of 1941, they needed oil.

Yes, it was their most pressing concern after the embargo, but it wasn't the only one. They were dependent on other stuff, too.

To get back to the original OP...the Axis might have succeeded within a very narrow window of opportunity. The end of 1941 or by spring 1942 at the very latest. After that, their possibilities of success fall rapidly. The reason for this, IMO, is the industrial power of the three major Allied nations...the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. Combined, their industrial output simply dwarfs the Axis powers by a huge margin. Any protracted conflict will allow more and more of that industrial power to be brought to bear, which is just what actually occurred.

I agree. If an Axis victory was possible at all, it could have happened in 1942 at the latest.

Germany and her immediate allies (Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland) had the better chance. Japan was doomed the instant they attacked Pearl Harbor. There are tons of specific examples of how Germany could have done this or that differently and thus effected a better outcome, but IMHO, one of the biggest mistakes was alienating the population of the Ukraine during the summer and fall of 1941. Here they had a ready-made base of people that would gladly take up arms to throw off the hated regime of Stalin, and this would have instantly solved the problem of replacements for the front lines, as well as greatly lessened the occurrence of partisan activity on their longest supply line (that of AG South). The Trans-Caucasus District were not very friendly towards the communists either, and it's not inconceivable that they might have turned on the communists, as well. This would not bode very well for Stalin, and might have tipped the balance far enough to allow a German victory.

Stalin's regime wasn't that much hated. Imperial Russia wasn't really a much better place to live. If Germany made it strictly a "regime change" war, than maybe they would have been able to recruit some of the population of SU, but I expect it would have been a very small part. It didn't happen in any war in modern times (post 19th century). Besides people's unwillingness to join the enemy, the conquering nations were naturally were reserved to arm a significant portion of enemy population. It usually ends up with a small minority assisting the invaders with intelligence and stuff like that.

Japan's only chance, and an extremely slim one at that, was to attack only the Philippines and the DEI and stay away from anything "mainland" USA. The virtual firestorm created by attacking Hawaii galvanized the US public in a way that they might not have been had holdings thousands of miles away been the only targets.

Japan's conquering spree in the Pacific and SE Asia would have definitely gotten America into the war, sooner or later. Japan couldn't win against a protracted war so they tried to re-enact the 1905 war against the Russians - seriously hurt the ability of the US to project power in the next few years, hoping it would bring them a favourable peace, but, even if they got the carriers, I don't think US would accept that. I believe their strategy was the best possible one considering the circumstances. Anything else and it would have been even worse.

Plan Orange and all of its rainbow configurations were simply pipe dreams on the part of the US military. At the time PH was attacked, the USN had exactly 11 fleet oilers in the Pacific, of which only 6 were capable of at-sea refueling. Their capacity was barely adequate to keep the main battle fleet at sea for a month, let alone for an extended campaign all the way to Manila. After repeated heavy losses, the US might have settled for peace....and I repeat, might. The whole venture would be a long shot for the Japanese, but certainly better than the way it actually played out. And to head off the "hind-sighter" argument, there were many in the Japanese High Command (including Adm. Yamamoto) who felt that attacking the US at that time was a very bad idea, so this whole train of thinking had already been done by high-ranking Japanese naval officers.

What does Plan Orange have to do with it? Japanese needed to defeat US Navy totally, and given just how US could outproduce Japan 20 times over, it was an unlikely possibility, and the final dead end was the fact that even if they managed it, they didn't have the capacity to seriously threaten mainland USA.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Stalin's regime wasn't that much hated.

But it was, very much so. A few lines from a novel by Vassily Grossman called Forever Flowing. He lived in a small village in the Ukraine during the forced farm collectivization of the late 20's and the great famine of 1933 when Stalin demanded even more grain shipments from the Ukraine leaving the local peasants to starve (nearly 20 million died):

"Then I came to understand the main thing for the Soviet power is the Plan. Fulfill the Plan...Fathers and mothers tried to save their children, to save a little bread, and they were told: You hate our socialist country, you want to ruin the Plan, you are parasites, kulaks, fiends, reptiles...But these are words, and that was life, suffering, hunger. When they took the grain, they told kolkhoz members they would be fed out of the reserve fund. They lied. They would not give grain to the hungry."

Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.

I believe their strategy was the best possible one considering the circumstances.

Do you feel that the American public would have stood for the long casualty lists of Tarawa, the Solomons, Peleliu, etc. without the cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor" ringing in their ears?

What does Plan Orange have to do with it?

If Japan attacks the Philippines only, or as in some what if's bandied about, bypass it without attacking and go straight to the DEI, the USN is relatively powerless (except for the subs based in Manila) to do much of anything about it for a very long time. What does the US do in either of those cases? Execute Plan Orange? Not likely.....

[Brenus]

“Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.” Agree. The German did find enough support to be able to raise SS Divisions, and Vlasov Army. But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).
Careful about figures: nobody knows how many died of famine. What we do know is the Ukrainian population in 1926 is around 30 million, so 20 million victims just few years before, are a little bit too much. These figures are made up by people who want to equal Nazism and Communism, forgetting that during the great Famine in Ireland or India, like during the Famine in Ukraine, both UK and USSR exported food.