Could the Axis have won?

[ReluctantSamurai]

Stalin's regime wasn't that much hated.

But it was, very much so. A few lines from a novel by Vassily Grossman called Forever Flowing. He lived in a small village in the Ukraine during the forced farm collectivization of the late 20's and the great famine of 1933 when Stalin demanded even more grain shipments from the Ukraine leaving the local peasants to starve (nearly 20 million died):

"Then I came to understand the main thing for the Soviet power is the Plan. Fulfill the Plan...Fathers and mothers tried to save their children, to save a little bread, and they were told: You hate our socialist country, you want to ruin the Plan, you are parasites, kulaks, fiends, reptiles...But these are words, and that was life, suffering, hunger. When they took the grain, they told kolkhoz members they would be fed out of the reserve fund. They lied. They would not give grain to the hungry."

Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.

I believe their strategy was the best possible one considering the circumstances.

Do you feel that the American public would have stood for the long casualty lists of Tarawa, the Solomons, Peleliu, etc. without the cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor" ringing in their ears?

What does Plan Orange have to do with it?

If Japan attacks the Philippines only, or as in some what if's bandied about, bypass it without attacking and go straight to the DEI, the USN is relatively powerless (except for the subs based in Manila) to do much of anything about it for a very long time. What does the US do in either of those cases? Execute Plan Orange? Not likely.....

[Brenus]

“Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.” Agree. The German did find enough support to be able to raise SS Divisions, and Vlasov Army. But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).
Careful about figures: nobody knows how many died of famine. What we do know is the Ukrainian population in 1926 is around 30 million, so 20 million victims just few years before, are a little bit too much. These figures are made up by people who want to equal Nazism and Communism, forgetting that during the great Famine in Ireland or India, like during the Famine in Ukraine, both UK and USSR exported food.

[Sarmatian]

But it was, very much so. A few lines from a novel by Vassily Grossman called Forever Flowing. He lived in a small village in the Ukraine during the forced farm collectivization of the late 20's and the great famine of 1933 when Stalin demanded even more grain shipments from the Ukraine leaving the local peasants to starve (nearly 20 million died):

"Then I came to understand the main thing for the Soviet power is the Plan. Fulfill the Plan...Fathers and mothers tried to save their children, to save a little bread, and they were told: You hate our socialist country, you want to ruin the Plan, you are parasites, kulaks, fiends, reptiles...But these are words, and that was life, suffering, hunger. When they took the grain, they told kolkhoz members they would be fed out of the reserve fund. They lied. They would not give grain to the hungry."

Novels don't prove general sentiment, just the sentiment of the author.

20 million is a hugely inflated figure, as Brenus, said. The real number is much, much smaller. It would mean that more than 2/3 of Ukranians died and at the time, Ukranians actually had a growth in population.

Do you feel that the American public would have stood for the long casualty lists of Tarawa, the Solomons, Peleliu, etc. without the cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor" ringing in their ears?

In WW1 Americans lost about 300,000 in one year and cca. a million in 4 years in WW2. War would not have been the same had the Japanese attacked DEI or the Phillipines. American fleet would have had ample opportunity to attack Japanese troops in transit, reinforce local garrisons and in general harass them at every turn. Having lost the element of surprise, Japanese fleet would have at the mercy of the American fleet. After an attack on a protectorate and a few ships sunk, filled with brave American sailors who were just trying to protect defenseless allies against relentless Japanese expansionism and unimaginable cruelty, American president could make a speech about never giving up until the world is once again safe for democracy, for the sake of American allies and brave, freckled-face boys who died protecting that ideal.

Also, WW2 was an opportunity for America to assert its position as the world's premier power and cement it. I'm not saying they were asking for it or even hoping for it, but once it was there, it was hard to pass up. I'm pretty certain that in the end any additional Japanese expansion would have brought America into the war and that war would have ended with Japanese either abandoning their empire in a peace treaty or total defeat of Japan. Maybe it would have lasted longer, maybe shorter, maybe American High Command would be more careful with casualties, but it would have had happened.

If Japan attacks the Philippines only, or as in some what if's bandied about, bypass it without attacking and go straight to the DEI, the USN is relatively powerless (except for the subs based in Manila) to do much of anything about it for a very long time. What does the US do in either of those cases? Execute Plan Orange? Not likely.....

Plan Orange was more of a guideline than a concrete plan to be executed the moment the war starts. Americans had the luxury of time, they didn't have to go straight for the jugular. Their ability to harass the merchant fleet and troop transport would have created unsolvable problems for Japanese. They were aware of that, and that's why they sought decisive battle to begin with.

“Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.” Agree. The German did find enough support to be able to raise SS Divisions, and Vlasov Army. But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).
.

Vlassov was Russian, not Ukranian, iirc. and his "army" was mainly composed of Russians, and existed only on paper. In the end, the only population of Ukraine they managed to win over somewhat was Catholic population, proving that it had much less to do with Stalin and his rule than with old issues.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Novels don't prove general sentiment, just the sentiment of the author.

The man was there when it happened. His feelings reflected those of the general populace, if you care to look into it more closely.

20 million is a hugely inflated figure, as Brenus, said. The real number is much, much smaller. It would mean that more than 2/3 of Ukranians died and at the time, Ukranians actually had a growth in population.

Perhaps so, but millions died. Care to provide some documentation for the part highlighted?

proving that it had much less to do with Stalin and his rule than with old issues

Proves nothing. Vlasov was a half-assed attempt to counter some of the idiotic policies of the Einsatz. If the Germans had at least given Ukrainians the opportunity to strike back at the Stalin regime (perhaps even using the revenge angle), they would have found widespread support for this, instead of providing Stalin with the means for turning things into The Great Patriotic War.

After an attack on a protectorate and a few ships sunk, filled with brave American sailors who were just trying to protect defenseless allies against relentless Japanese expansionism and unimaginable cruelty, American president could make a speech about never giving up until the world is once again safe for democracy, for the sake of American allies and brave, freckled-face boys who died protecting that ideal.

Not the same as revenge for what was viewed as a cowardly act of aggression on US soil. I don't see an attack on the DEI creating the same kind of fervor as the attack on PH. As for the highlighted part, a cursory examination of the state of affairs in the US at the time would show such a speech would fall on unsympathetic ears.

American fleet would have had ample opportunity to attack Japanese troops in transit, reinforce local garrisons and in general harass them at every turn. Having lost the element of surprise, Japanese fleet would have at the mercy of the American fleet.

If the USN battle fleet would've sortied to support either the Philippines or the DEI, they would have been sunk at sea and none of the BB's would have been recoverable like they were off the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The USN was quite far behind the IJN in fleet tactics, pilot training, and carrier aircraft. It took most of 1942 for US admirals to garner the experience on how to conduct modern carrier tactics, and for US pilots to figure out how to fight the Zero-sen.

Their ability to harass the merchant fleet and troop transport would have created unsolvable problems for Japanese.

Kinda hard to do when your fleet is resting on the bottom of the ocean

The Japanese actually did the US a favor by sinking its battleships as it forced the dependance on carriers which eventually led to a drastic change in USN carrier doctrine. Prior to PH, USN doctrine was to disperse the carriers into separate TF's (unlike the Japanese who were the first to form a true strike force utilizing multiple carriers in the same TF). After PH, a new breed of "aviation" admirals moved to the forefront, which eventually led to the formation of the "fast carrier" fleets like the 3rd/5th Fleet.

[Sarmatian]

Perhaps so, but millions died. Care to provide some documentation for the part highlighted?

No documentation per se, (there probably is somewhere but this is my research/conclusion based on censuses and population growth estimates), it is more of a common sense based on demographics of Imperial Russia and USSR. This is a post I made about it in a different thread some time ago.

According to 1897 census in the Russian Empire there were 22,380,551 Ukrainians in Russian Empire. Now, it would be better if we had some later census to take a look at as it would allow us to estimate more accurately the number of Ukrainians in 1932-1933, but census scheduled for 1915 never happened because of the first world war. Never fear though, as we can compare how much population increased in other European countries during the same period and make a pretty accurate estimation. So, let's see.

(in millions)
France:
1900 - 38.9
1930 - 41.6

Spain:
1900 - 18.5
1930 - 23.3

Portugal:
1900 - 5.4
1930 - 6.8

Germany:
1900 - 56.4
1930 - 65.1

Italy:
1900 - 32.4
1930 - 40.9

We see that population increase was mostly between 10% and 20% (closer to 10% for countries involved in WW1), and we know that in 1900 there were app. 22 million Ukrainians. If we apply the trend we've seen in other European countries there couldn't have been more than 25-26 millions of Ukrainians in 1930. But just for the fun of it, let's assume than in the case of Ukraine population increase was 50%. That would place the total number of Ukrainians in 1930 at slightly above 30 millions. Now, 5.5 millions of these 30 lived in Poland in the interwar period, because they were in the territories Russian Empire lost and they were out of Stalin's reach and not affected by Holodomor. That leaves 25-27 millions Ukrainians in the USSR in 1930's. So if your number is correct, it means that during that one year of Holodomor, more than 80% of all Ukrainians in USSR died, leaving only 5 millions. And then again those 5 + 5.5 from Poland became 50-60 millions today, which means that in roughly 70 years, Ukrainian population increased 500% or 600%.

That's assuming there was a 50% increase in population between 1900 and 1930. If we assume that increase in population was like in all other European countries, we can only conclude that more Ukrainians died than ever lived in the Soviet Union and to get to the number of Ukrainians today, there would have to be an increase 1000% to 1200% (from those 5.5 millions left in Poland).

[Brenus]

“ Rundstedt slowed the advance near Dunkirk, allowing the withdrawal of thousands of troops who could have been netted.” He did it for good reasons: Hitler and Von Rundstedt remembered the lesson from 1914, when the German being too advanced in France were badly defeated by a French counter-offensive. At the time of Dunkirk, the French were still holding at Lille, and had won a tactical battle of Gembloux few days before, giving the blitzkrieg myth a blow that the German final victory will delete from minds. Several French counter offensives (as in Arras) were potentially dangerous and were successfully contained thanks to the decisive action of the Luftwaffe.
However, nothing could tell Hitler and his generals than France had no reserves (and she had), and couldn’t or wouldn’t have the possibility to attack on the exposed flank of the Panzer Divisions.
Even Rommel had his nose made red when he confronted the French tanks, and was saved by the Stukas. If the French would have been able to secure the sky (and it was still a possibility on Dunkirk) and had the potential to counter attack (and they had),, the first task was to secure the flank at Lille (May 25 – May 31): According to Churchill: These Frenchmen, under the gallant leadership of general Molinié, had for four critical days contained no less than seven German divisions which otherwise could have joined in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter. This was a splendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunate comrades of the BEF" (Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. II. Their Finest Hour, Cassel & Co., 1949, p. 86.
The German General was sacked by Hitler for he gave to the French Garrison the Honours of War, which lost him one day and slow down the assault on Dunkirk. So Hitler wanted to go fast, but he wanted as well to be safe.

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer), reason why Guderian’s aim was not to fight the French, but to forbid them of possibilities to fight. If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

[Beskar]

If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

Now that would have been an interesting scenario. "What would the world be like if the French won?"

Would the Allies then declare war on the USSR to liberate Poland after the defeat of Germany and Italy?

[PanzerJaeger]

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer),

Hello Brenus. These figures are completely inaccurate. Also, Stonne showed the weakness of the French Army more than its strength. I believe you are confusing German admiration for the individual fighting spirit of the French during that battle with a more generalized respect for the French Army, when in fact the Germans were shocked at the incompetence of the French forces beyond the small unit level.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

“ Rundstedt slowed the advance near Dunkirk, allowing the withdrawal of thousands of troops who could have been netted.” He did it for good reasons: Hitler and Von Rundstedt remembered the lesson from 1914, when the German being too advanced in France were badly defeated by a French counter-offensive. At the time of Dunkirk, the French were still holding at Lille, and had won a tactical battle of Gembloux few days before, giving the blitzkrieg myth a blow that the German final victory will delete from minds. Several French counter offensives (as in Arras) were potentially dangerous and were successfully contained thanks to the decisive action of the Luftwaffe.
However, nothing could tell Hitler and his generals than France had no reserves (and she had), and couldn’t or wouldn’t have the possibility to attack on the exposed flank of the Panzer Divisions.
Even Rommel had his nose made red when he confronted the French tanks, and was saved by the Stukas. If the French would have been able to secure the sky (and it was still a possibility on Dunkirk) and had the potential to counter attack (and they had),, the first task was to secure the flank at Lille (May 25 – May 31): According to Churchill: These Frenchmen, under the gallant leadership of general Molinié, had for four critical days contained no less than seven German divisions which otherwise could have joined in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter. This was a splendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunate comrades of the BEF" (Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. II. Their Finest Hour, Cassel & Co., 1949, p. 86.
The German General was sacked by Hitler for he gave to the French Garrison the Honours of War, which lost him one day and slow down the assault on Dunkirk. So Hitler wanted to go fast, but he wanted as well to be safe.

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer), reason why Guderian’s aim was not to fight the French, but to forbid them of possibilities to fight. If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

Certainly some truth in that, and you may well be correct in the whole. In point of fact, the French fought hard. The Germans suffered nearly as many casualties as had the French during the first 3 weeks of fighting. However, the paralysis -- "shock" effect -- induced by the blitzkrieg had thrown the French out of whack far more than the mere level of casualties would indicate. Their heavier armor was a match -- or more -- for the best the Germans had in the field but their coordination wasn't up to the task. Moreover, far too many of their numerically larger force were in haphazardly equipped divisions. The best French divisions of the time were the equal of anybody, but were never deployed concentrated and never given adequate strategic leadership. The Germans consistently underestimated the "shock" effect of the blitzkrieg and halted early, fearing a counter-attack, when their opponent was seeing stars and unable to do more than swing blindly. I don't think the grand counter-punch you envision, Brenus, could have happened. Had it, you may well be right as to the result.