Could the Axis have won?

[Brenus]

“Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.” Agree. The German did find enough support to be able to raise SS Divisions, and Vlasov Army. But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).
Careful about figures: nobody knows how many died of famine. What we do know is the Ukrainian population in 1926 is around 30 million, so 20 million victims just few years before, are a little bit too much. These figures are made up by people who want to equal Nazism and Communism, forgetting that during the great Famine in Ireland or India, like during the Famine in Ukraine, both UK and USSR exported food.

[Sarmatian]

But it was, very much so. A few lines from a novel by Vassily Grossman called Forever Flowing. He lived in a small village in the Ukraine during the forced farm collectivization of the late 20's and the great famine of 1933 when Stalin demanded even more grain shipments from the Ukraine leaving the local peasants to starve (nearly 20 million died):

"Then I came to understand the main thing for the Soviet power is the Plan. Fulfill the Plan...Fathers and mothers tried to save their children, to save a little bread, and they were told: You hate our socialist country, you want to ruin the Plan, you are parasites, kulaks, fiends, reptiles...But these are words, and that was life, suffering, hunger. When they took the grain, they told kolkhoz members they would be fed out of the reserve fund. They lied. They would not give grain to the hungry."

Novels don't prove general sentiment, just the sentiment of the author.

20 million is a hugely inflated figure, as Brenus, said. The real number is much, much smaller. It would mean that more than 2/3 of Ukranians died and at the time, Ukranians actually had a growth in population.

Do you feel that the American public would have stood for the long casualty lists of Tarawa, the Solomons, Peleliu, etc. without the cry of "Remember Pearl Harbor" ringing in their ears?

In WW1 Americans lost about 300,000 in one year and cca. a million in 4 years in WW2. War would not have been the same had the Japanese attacked DEI or the Phillipines. American fleet would have had ample opportunity to attack Japanese troops in transit, reinforce local garrisons and in general harass them at every turn. Having lost the element of surprise, Japanese fleet would have at the mercy of the American fleet. After an attack on a protectorate and a few ships sunk, filled with brave American sailors who were just trying to protect defenseless allies against relentless Japanese expansionism and unimaginable cruelty, American president could make a speech about never giving up until the world is once again safe for democracy, for the sake of American allies and brave, freckled-face boys who died protecting that ideal.

Also, WW2 was an opportunity for America to assert its position as the world's premier power and cement it. I'm not saying they were asking for it or even hoping for it, but once it was there, it was hard to pass up. I'm pretty certain that in the end any additional Japanese expansion would have brought America into the war and that war would have ended with Japanese either abandoning their empire in a peace treaty or total defeat of Japan. Maybe it would have lasted longer, maybe shorter, maybe American High Command would be more careful with casualties, but it would have had happened.

If Japan attacks the Philippines only, or as in some what if's bandied about, bypass it without attacking and go straight to the DEI, the USN is relatively powerless (except for the subs based in Manila) to do much of anything about it for a very long time. What does the US do in either of those cases? Execute Plan Orange? Not likely.....

Plan Orange was more of a guideline than a concrete plan to be executed the moment the war starts. Americans had the luxury of time, they didn't have to go straight for the jugular. Their ability to harass the merchant fleet and troop transport would have created unsolvable problems for Japanese. They were aware of that, and that's why they sought decisive battle to begin with.

“Stalin and his cronies were very much hated by the Ukrainians, and the Germans would have found a lot of support had they not treated the populace as bad or worse.” Agree. The German did find enough support to be able to raise SS Divisions, and Vlasov Army. But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).
.

Vlassov was Russian, not Ukranian, iirc. and his "army" was mainly composed of Russians, and existed only on paper. In the end, the only population of Ukraine they managed to win over somewhat was Catholic population, proving that it had much less to do with Stalin and his rule than with old issues.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Novels don't prove general sentiment, just the sentiment of the author.

The man was there when it happened. His feelings reflected those of the general populace, if you care to look into it more closely.

20 million is a hugely inflated figure, as Brenus, said. The real number is much, much smaller. It would mean that more than 2/3 of Ukranians died and at the time, Ukranians actually had a growth in population.

Perhaps so, but millions died. Care to provide some documentation for the part highlighted?

proving that it had much less to do with Stalin and his rule than with old issues

Proves nothing. Vlasov was a half-assed attempt to counter some of the idiotic policies of the Einsatz. If the Germans had at least given Ukrainians the opportunity to strike back at the Stalin regime (perhaps even using the revenge angle), they would have found widespread support for this, instead of providing Stalin with the means for turning things into The Great Patriotic War.

After an attack on a protectorate and a few ships sunk, filled with brave American sailors who were just trying to protect defenseless allies against relentless Japanese expansionism and unimaginable cruelty, American president could make a speech about never giving up until the world is once again safe for democracy, for the sake of American allies and brave, freckled-face boys who died protecting that ideal.

Not the same as revenge for what was viewed as a cowardly act of aggression on US soil. I don't see an attack on the DEI creating the same kind of fervor as the attack on PH. As for the highlighted part, a cursory examination of the state of affairs in the US at the time would show such a speech would fall on unsympathetic ears.

American fleet would have had ample opportunity to attack Japanese troops in transit, reinforce local garrisons and in general harass them at every turn. Having lost the element of surprise, Japanese fleet would have at the mercy of the American fleet.

If the USN battle fleet would've sortied to support either the Philippines or the DEI, they would have been sunk at sea and none of the BB's would have been recoverable like they were off the bottom of Pearl Harbor. The USN was quite far behind the IJN in fleet tactics, pilot training, and carrier aircraft. It took most of 1942 for US admirals to garner the experience on how to conduct modern carrier tactics, and for US pilots to figure out how to fight the Zero-sen.

Their ability to harass the merchant fleet and troop transport would have created unsolvable problems for Japanese.

Kinda hard to do when your fleet is resting on the bottom of the ocean

The Japanese actually did the US a favor by sinking its battleships as it forced the dependance on carriers which eventually led to a drastic change in USN carrier doctrine. Prior to PH, USN doctrine was to disperse the carriers into separate TF's (unlike the Japanese who were the first to form a true strike force utilizing multiple carriers in the same TF). After PH, a new breed of "aviation" admirals moved to the forefront, which eventually led to the formation of the "fast carrier" fleets like the 3rd/5th Fleet.

[Kralizec]

The only way to keep the US out of the war would have been to kill FDR.

He was a prime conspirator in US entry into WW I and he worked hard to get them into WW II.

The Germans refused to rise to the bait but he pushed the Japanese over the brink.

The Axis was still fighting an undeclared war the US. I don’t know how big a drain it was on them

Seemingly the only way to have kept the US out of the war was to have a different man in office.

Was that bolded part a typo?

If not: Huh?

About the WWII entry; it’s obvious that the Japanese and Germans did not appreciate the oil embargo and the lend-lease deliveries. I’m only aware of one other instance of economic sanctions being used as a casus belli, and ironicly it’s the first one known: Athens boycotting Megara, an ally of Sparta, into financial ruin. The arms delivery might have been an obvious bait for the Germans to declare war, but nevertheless they only did so after Japan attacked Pearl Harbour. An incredibly stupid decision from the Germans, I might add.

The sanctions against Japan were the proximate cause of war with both Japan and Germany. I know that FDR had significant opposition in Congress from isolationist politicians, but was there broad opposition against the sanctions?

[Franconicus]

But the fundamental stupidity of Nazism discouraged even the most anti-Semitic of them (not all of them).

Brenus, I agree that it was stupid. However, if you look at it with the insane mind of Hitler, there was no alternative. First reason was that Hitler believed that Germany lost the war because of the uprise of the people caused by hunger. He realy thought that the unbeatable German army would have won, if the people at home would have go on supporting the war. So he believed that having enough food was one of the most important preconditions to win the war. Therefore, it was most important for him to get a lot of food from Ukraine, accepting the death of millions there.
Second reason was that he obviously did not attack the SU to free Ukraine. He wanted the land for Germany, or better said for Germans. The population there had to disappear, with only few working slaves. So he used the opportunity of the war to get as many of the Ukrainians killed as possible.
So you are right, the Germans could have done much better, but it was not a realistic option for Hitler.

The sanctions against Japan were the proximate cause of war with both Japan and Germany.

Kralizec, I agree that the sanctions should force Japan into war, as they did. But it was something else with Germany. Roosevelt did a lot of things to help GB and to provoke Germany: the lend & lease, the cash & carry, giving the Brits American destroyers, guiding convoys to the middle of the Atlantic, having long range air patrols over the Atlantic, occupying Island and Greenland and even attacking German submarines. Although the Germans were aware of all of this, they did not declare war. And Roosevelt could not. Why did the Germans declare war after Pearl Harbor. This does not make any sense to me.
The alliance between Japan and Germany had only one reason for Germany: Hitler believed, that the US would hesitate to step into the war against Germany, if they have to fear the war in the Pacific. Japan also hoped that the alliance with Germany would keep the USA out of the war. That is all. There was never a plan of a coordinated war. Japan did not attack Russia to help the Germans and Hitler did not even ask for it. Hitler was not informed about the plan to attack the US navy and there was no coordination with German subs or the Africa Corps. So the allaince was no reason for Hitler to declare war against the USA.
In my eyes, Pearl Harbor was the last chance for Hitler to avoid desaster. It was clear that the Us and Britain would declare war against Japan and that the Americans would urge their government to strike back as soon and as hard as possible. Would FDR have been able to declare war against Germany? I do not know.

[ReluctantSamurai]

Hitler did not even ask for it.

Actually, he did...several times.

So you are right, the Germans could have done much better, but it was not a realistic option for Hitler.

Of course, in reality, we all know utilizing human resources from the Ukraine was not an option considered by Hitler. But we are talking what if's here, and all of this discussion is just whimsical musings

The alliance between Japan and Germany had only one reason for Germany: Hitler believed, that the US would hesitate to step into the war against Germany, if they have to fear the war in the Pacific. Japan also hoped that the alliance with Germany would keep the USA out of the war.

This is also an accurate view. But in musing whether the Axis coalition could have done better, one area that could have made a large difference, IMO, is better co-operation between Japan and Germany...starting with better communications. The German pact with the SU in 1939 was both a surprise and a bitter pill for Japan to swallow. When Germany attacked in June of 1941, this was also a complete surprise to Japan and did nothing to further relations between the two powers. Japan's non-aggression pact with the SU was the flip-side of dampening relations with Germany.

Germany would have had to give Japan something substantial in return for a commitment for Japan to attack the Soviets in the Far East. My view on what that was has already been stated.

Would FDR have been able to declare war against Germany?

The Germans were always considered to be the larger threat, but America was not very prepared as of yet to go to war, and so was content, for the moment to supply money and materials to GB. Pearl Harbor changed all that.......

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Given the sum of their actions and policies, I am exceedingly glad the Axis were beaten. When Mussolini's Italy was the "progressive" choice, the list of choices more or less sucked. As it was, we allied with Soviet Russia -- FDR luke-warm at best, WC holding his nose -- to defeat them.

That said, there were any number of points that the Axis mis-played that could have generated a victory -- provided that victory was realized no later than January of 1943.

1. Germany could have opted out of any surface unit larger than a DD and turned the steel/yard space and the like over to U-boats. They began the war with 57 U-boats and never had more than 40 at sea prior to 1942, with the U-boat fleet not breaking the 100-at-sea mark (the Mark Raeder himself said would be required for six months to stangle England's economy) until July of 1942! The pocket battleship program, the excellent battlecruisers, even the battleships -- no matter how threatening -- were simply misplaced resources. Source: http://www.uboatarchive.net/U-boatPolicy.htm

2. Germany could have realized exactly what it had with its panzerkorps. Throughout the first half of the war, German high commanders slowed down the armored spear-heads for fear of them being cut off and defeated in detail -- despite the fact that it was the shock they were generating that protected them best. Runstedt slowed the advance near Dunkirk, allowing the withdrawal of thousands of troops who could have been netted. Again, in 1941, Hitler halted Guderian and the other spear head commanders of Army Group center and turned them South to secure the Ukraine, halting the advance on Moscow for over a month. Had they struck forward, Moscow would have fallen and taken a huge chunk of the Soviet infrastructure with it. Stalin may well have been forced to sue for peace on unfavorable terms. Source: Stolfi's Hitler's Panzers East: World War II Reinterpreted

3. Hitler failed to bring Franco into the war. The loss of Gibraltar would have crippled British offensive efforts in the Mediterranean, allowing Axis forces to concentrate in defense of a Frontal assault in the West as well as, potentially, pushing Turkey into the Axis camp and opening up the Caucasus from both sides.

4. Hitler could have had someone slip a blood-pressure increaser into one of FDR's martinis in 1940. President Garner would not have authored Lend Lease, would not have given destroyers to GB, and would certainly not have actively aided the RN in the North Atlantic without benefit of Congressional approval. In short, no FDR and England would largely have been stuck soloing against Germany while an isolationist USA either focused solely on Japan or even stayed home depending on Japanese actions. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Nance_Garner

5. Japan could have struck, in 1941, against Dutch possessions in the Pacific as a follow on to their efforts against French possessions. Though strategically they felt that they had to secure the Phillipines to do this (which required them to throw the "brush back" pitch against the USN at Pearl), it is possible that politically, they would have been in a position to force the USA to declare war against Japan to protect the Dutch (hated by the locals and not having received a lot of good press in the USA). The USA, particularly if #4 above occurred, would have been hard-pressed to get the votes for war from a largely isolationist public, especially Dutch "press" for the treatement of their Indonesian subjects wasn't exactly pristine. Absent the USA or a direct attack on Singapore, they might have forced the British to accept a fait accompli without war and thereby netted the oil etc. required for continued expansion in China.

Lots of other tactical things might be added, but these are some that might have made a strategic difference.

[Sarmatian]

Perhaps so, but millions died. Care to provide some documentation for the part highlighted?

No documentation per se, (there probably is somewhere but this is my research/conclusion based on censuses and population growth estimates), it is more of a common sense based on demographics of Imperial Russia and USSR. This is a post I made about it in a different thread some time ago.

According to 1897 census in the Russian Empire there were 22,380,551 Ukrainians in Russian Empire. Now, it would be better if we had some later census to take a look at as it would allow us to estimate more accurately the number of Ukrainians in 1932-1933, but census scheduled for 1915 never happened because of the first world war. Never fear though, as we can compare how much population increased in other European countries during the same period and make a pretty accurate estimation. So, let's see.

(in millions)
France:
1900 - 38.9
1930 - 41.6

Spain:
1900 - 18.5
1930 - 23.3

Portugal:
1900 - 5.4
1930 - 6.8

Germany:
1900 - 56.4
1930 - 65.1

Italy:
1900 - 32.4
1930 - 40.9

We see that population increase was mostly between 10% and 20% (closer to 10% for countries involved in WW1), and we know that in 1900 there were app. 22 million Ukrainians. If we apply the trend we've seen in other European countries there couldn't have been more than 25-26 millions of Ukrainians in 1930. But just for the fun of it, let's assume than in the case of Ukraine population increase was 50%. That would place the total number of Ukrainians in 1930 at slightly above 30 millions. Now, 5.5 millions of these 30 lived in Poland in the interwar period, because they were in the territories Russian Empire lost and they were out of Stalin's reach and not affected by Holodomor. That leaves 25-27 millions Ukrainians in the USSR in 1930's. So if your number is correct, it means that during that one year of Holodomor, more than 80% of all Ukrainians in USSR died, leaving only 5 millions. And then again those 5 + 5.5 from Poland became 50-60 millions today, which means that in roughly 70 years, Ukrainian population increased 500% or 600%.

That's assuming there was a 50% increase in population between 1900 and 1930. If we assume that increase in population was like in all other European countries, we can only conclude that more Ukrainians died than ever lived in the Soviet Union and to get to the number of Ukrainians today, there would have to be an increase 1000% to 1200% (from those 5.5 millions left in Poland).

[Brenus]

“ Rundstedt slowed the advance near Dunkirk, allowing the withdrawal of thousands of troops who could have been netted.” He did it for good reasons: Hitler and Von Rundstedt remembered the lesson from 1914, when the German being too advanced in France were badly defeated by a French counter-offensive. At the time of Dunkirk, the French were still holding at Lille, and had won a tactical battle of Gembloux few days before, giving the blitzkrieg myth a blow that the German final victory will delete from minds. Several French counter offensives (as in Arras) were potentially dangerous and were successfully contained thanks to the decisive action of the Luftwaffe.
However, nothing could tell Hitler and his generals than France had no reserves (and she had), and couldn’t or wouldn’t have the possibility to attack on the exposed flank of the Panzer Divisions.
Even Rommel had his nose made red when he confronted the French tanks, and was saved by the Stukas. If the French would have been able to secure the sky (and it was still a possibility on Dunkirk) and had the potential to counter attack (and they had),, the first task was to secure the flank at Lille (May 25 – May 31): According to Churchill: These Frenchmen, under the gallant leadership of general Molinié, had for four critical days contained no less than seven German divisions which otherwise could have joined in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter. This was a splendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunate comrades of the BEF" (Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. II. Their Finest Hour, Cassel & Co., 1949, p. 86.
The German General was sacked by Hitler for he gave to the French Garrison the Honours of War, which lost him one day and slow down the assault on Dunkirk. So Hitler wanted to go fast, but he wanted as well to be safe.

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer), reason why Guderian’s aim was not to fight the French, but to forbid them of possibilities to fight. If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

[Beskar]

If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

Now that would have been an interesting scenario. "What would the world be like if the French won?"

Would the Allies then declare war on the USSR to liberate Poland after the defeat of Germany and Italy?

[ReluctantSamurai]

No documentation per se, (there probably is somewhere but this is my research/conclusion based on censuses and population growth estimates), it is more of a common sense based on demographics of Imperial Russia and USSR. This is a post I made about it in a different thread some time ago

Thanks for making the effort. However, I'm not sure one can use simple extrapolation using data covering other countries. I'm not a statistician, so my opinion may be incorrect. But....the point I was trying to make concerning the Ukraine and its view towards the ruling Communist Party remains. Ukrainians harbored a deep resentment towards the Bolsheviks both for the forced collectivization of farms, the withholding of food during the Great Famine, and for religious persecution. Without knowing the true nature of Nazism, I believe they would have given a great deal of support to the Germans if it hadn't been for the Einsatzgruppen.

I think SF makes some excellent points, especially concerning the use of U-boats, and a better effort to bring Franco into the war on the side of the Axis.

I also feel that too much is being made of the halting of Guderian before Dunkirk. That it was a mistake is obvious (to me, at least), but the Axis still had chances to win the war despite this.

[PanzerJaeger]

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer),

Hello Brenus. These figures are completely inaccurate. Also, Stonne showed the weakness of the French Army more than its strength. I believe you are confusing German admiration for the individual fighting spirit of the French during that battle with a more generalized respect for the French Army, when in fact the Germans were shocked at the incompetence of the French forces beyond the small unit level.

[Sarmatian]

Thanks for making the effort. However, I'm not sure one can use simple extrapolation using data covering other countries. I'm not a statistician, so my opinion may be incorrect. But....the point I was trying to make concerning the Ukraine and its view towards the ruling Communist Party remains. Ukrainians harbored a deep resentment towards the Bolsheviks both for the forced collectivization of farms, the withholding of food during the Great Famine, and for religious persecution. Without knowing the true nature of Nazism, I believe they would have given a great deal of support to the Germans if it hadn't been for the Einsatzgruppen.

Of course, the lack of data about the population of Ukraine, the effect of famine etc... only gives us the option of an educated guess at best. But, in the lack of concrete information, those "educated guesses" are based on demographics in 99% of the cases. Keep in mind that Russia also suffered additional losses after the WW1 due to Civil War, war against various expeditionary armies and and war with Poland between 1918-1930. I would sincerely be surprised if the effect of famine was more than a million or two deaths in entire Soviet Union and not more than a few hundred thousands in Ukraine specifically. Of course, there is a large margin of error, but figures of 20 millions, even 10 and 5, are simply not possible.

[ReluctantSamurai]

I would sincerely be surprised if the effect of famine was more than a million or two deaths in entire Soviet Union and not more than a few hundred thousands in Ukraine specifically. Of course, there is a large margin of error, but figures of 20 millions, even 10 and 5, are simply not possible.

20 million is far too high, yes....a few hundred thousand far too low. Frank Lorimier in his book The Population of the Soviet Union, places the number of peasant deaths (non-specific as to geographic locations) at four million (and calls that a conservative estimate). He also lists the Kazakh population as 4 million in the 1926 census and 3 million in the 1939 census (1.5 million short of what it should have been).

Noone will probably ever know the true number of deaths. But its' the intent of the Stalin regime to extract its' grain quotas regardless of the consequences to the peasant farmers that's the issue, IMHO. If you look at a map of the former Soviet Union today, it seems to me that even after several generations, the peoples of the Ukraine, and the Trans-Caucasus District have long memories

[Brenus]

“These figures are completely inaccurate” Could be, I took them on Wikypedia, and was too lazy to check them… Same for the German Historian Karl-Heinz Frieser in “Blitzkrieg-Legende: der Westfeldzug 1940”, saying that a German officer compared this battle with Casino or even Verdun. It was Xmas and didn’t make my homework on this.
But other sources give same figures.
However, the French mistakes were obvious, but it illustrates what I was saying; without the total incompetence of the French Command during the initial offensive, the outcome of the battle could have been different. So, Hitler was right to stop the offensive to Dunkirk, clearing Lille first and then finishing off The UK and French armies. Then the French defensive tactic (Artillery, Infantry and Tanks) was vindicated as the Panzer couldn’t break it. You will notice that was the same employed by the Russian in Kursk.

The funny thing is that the same reproaching Hitler his caution at Dunkirk are the same reproaching him his reckless attitude in Russia!

“the Germans were shocked at the incompetence of the French forces beyond the small unit level.” The French Generals incompetence can’t be denied. But they did, blaming the individual soldier for it. And it worked; proof is when you read the comment on the French Military Aptitude. They succeed to convince even the French that they didn’t fight. I was, until I went for more details…

[ReluctantSamurai]

However, the French mistakes were obvious, but it illustrates what I was saying; without the total incompetence of the French Command during the initial offensive, the outcome of the battle could have been different

French generals, with a few exceptions, were certainly timid. But...in all fairness, noone (except perhaps the Japanese) had experienced massed armored attacks on the scale with which the Germans had unleashed. The confusion and dislocation caused by fast-moving armor can certainly lead to indecision (especially when you attempt to set up a new HQ location only to find the Germans already there), and the lack of adequate recon more often than not had the French desperately trying to find out where the German armor was....

So, Hitler was right to stop the offensive to Dunkirk, clearing Lille first and then finishing off The UK and French armies.

Neither Guderian nor Manstein agreed with the decision, though Manstein more than Guderian offers suggestions on what should have been done. Neither had the "big picture" however.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

“ Rundstedt slowed the advance near Dunkirk, allowing the withdrawal of thousands of troops who could have been netted.” He did it for good reasons: Hitler and Von Rundstedt remembered the lesson from 1914, when the German being too advanced in France were badly defeated by a French counter-offensive. At the time of Dunkirk, the French were still holding at Lille, and had won a tactical battle of Gembloux few days before, giving the blitzkrieg myth a blow that the German final victory will delete from minds. Several French counter offensives (as in Arras) were potentially dangerous and were successfully contained thanks to the decisive action of the Luftwaffe.
However, nothing could tell Hitler and his generals than France had no reserves (and she had), and couldn’t or wouldn’t have the possibility to attack on the exposed flank of the Panzer Divisions.
Even Rommel had his nose made red when he confronted the French tanks, and was saved by the Stukas. If the French would have been able to secure the sky (and it was still a possibility on Dunkirk) and had the potential to counter attack (and they had),, the first task was to secure the flank at Lille (May 25 – May 31): According to Churchill: These Frenchmen, under the gallant leadership of general Molinié, had for four critical days contained no less than seven German divisions which otherwise could have joined in the assaults on the Dunkirk perimeter. This was a splendid contribution to the escape of their more fortunate comrades of the BEF" (Winston Churchill, The Second World War. vol. II. Their Finest Hour, Cassel & Co., 1949, p. 86.
The German General was sacked by Hitler for he gave to the French Garrison the Honours of War, which lost him one day and slow down the assault on Dunkirk. So Hitler wanted to go fast, but he wanted as well to be safe.

The German High Command had a huge respect for the French Army, and it was deserved as shown by the Battle of Stonne (26,500 casualties for the Germans, 7,500 French and where the French tank B1 Bis shown itself as better than the Panzer), reason why Guderian’s aim was not to fight the French, but to forbid them of possibilities to fight. If the French would have counter attack earlier, the German might have been defeated according to post war writings from the German General Hermann Hoth.

Certainly some truth in that, and you may well be correct in the whole. In point of fact, the French fought hard. The Germans suffered nearly as many casualties as had the French during the first 3 weeks of fighting. However, the paralysis -- "shock" effect -- induced by the blitzkrieg had thrown the French out of whack far more than the mere level of casualties would indicate. Their heavier armor was a match -- or more -- for the best the Germans had in the field but their coordination wasn't up to the task. Moreover, far too many of their numerically larger force were in haphazardly equipped divisions. The best French divisions of the time were the equal of anybody, but were never deployed concentrated and never given adequate strategic leadership. The Germans consistently underestimated the "shock" effect of the blitzkrieg and halted early, fearing a counter-attack, when their opponent was seeing stars and unable to do more than swing blindly. I don't think the grand counter-punch you envision, Brenus, could have happened. Had it, you may well be right as to the result.

[Brenus]

“I don't think the grand counter-punch you envision, Brenus, could have happened.” I agree. But the question is “was Hitler right to be worried about the possibility of it”. My answer is yes. The French and British Defeat was not written in the sky. As we know, the decisive blow was not due to the best weaponry or training of the German, even not by the air superiority, but by an attack on the flank, the Ardennes, through an unexpected direction. This is hardly a new tactic…
“The best French divisions of the time were the equal of anybody, but were never deployed concentrated and never given adequate strategic leadership” They were deployed to face an expected attack on Belgium. The race to the sea by Guderian was to prevent them to withdraw from there. Most of the French and British Armoured Units were lost not by direct fighting but by lack of petrol, especially the French tanks using kerosene…
“However, the paralysis -- "shock" effect -- induced by the blitzkrieg had thrown the French out of whack far more than the mere level of casualties would indicate”. Yes. The Russian succeeded in recovering from this shock effect because they had space. The French hadn’t.

[Tsar Alexsandr]

At the start of the war, the balance of power was about equal. But then the Axis got a good head start. So, with that I believe they could have "won" but it would require that things play out differently. Towards the end of the war Allied power was far greater. The Axis was a rather small alliance. If the Axis could have kept the conflict, or conflicts smaller, it may have had more success. Then again, the European allies and the Japanese allies in the Axis had different goals. For the plan to have worked more co-operation would have been needed. Perhaps if Japan had not attacked the US the US would have sat the war out as a neutral. (But in keeping with tradition, a bad neutral who was aiding the Brits and undermining Germany.) The European Axis would have had to cede Asia to the Japanese element of this alliance. No China for you Germany.

Even with this different policy though, it's still most of the world vs. the Axis. And I do believe they could have "won," but it wouldn't have been easy. Plus there is the problem of identifying just what a victory would have been for the Axis. Europe for Germany and Italy? Sounds likely. But Japan would likely not abide their allies gains. And Russia would be unlikely to be conquered. So what would result, I believe, is a new situation in which the Reich, the Russians, and the Japanese would have ended up at odds with each other. And of course America would have been left alone, unless when Japan split away from the Axis it targeted the US. (But it could easily attack Russia instead, or make Russia an ally.) Of course Fascism and Communism are total opposites, except in the way they treat the masses. Really they are the same thing. A collectivist control scheme branded with a different name. So although they call themselves diehard enemies, they're not incompatible.

The forces facing the Axis were quite powerful, and the problems they'd have to surmount would have been very difficult, but they certainly could have worked better. After arguing that the Axis could win, I now feel stronger than ever that they really couldn't. Yes, they "could" win, but I don't think they had much of a chance. But they definitely had a chance. I think had they achieved their goals the world would have been much worse off.

[Brenus]

“Really they are the same thing. A collectivist control scheme branded with a different name. So although they call themselves diehard enemies, they're not incompatible.”
To tell is not enough. Please develop.
They have similarities, but no, there are not the same. By the way, where is collectivism in Nazi Germany?
Nazism is based on racism, not on political choices. They are enemies. One thinks there are races of Lords and Slaves, the other believes in equality. It is not because water and fire can destroy a lot that they are the same. Both are natural disaster, but there finishes the comparison.
To go with your way of thinking, Communism is the same than Christianism. They both slaughtered a lot of people for their own good, and to help them to understand the true and to build happiness…

[Tsar Alexsandr]

“Really they are the same thing. A collectivist control scheme branded with a different name. So although they call themselves diehard enemies, they're not incompatible.”
To tell is not enough. Please develop.
They have similarities, but no, there are not the same. By the way, where is collectivism in Nazi Germany?
Nazism is based on racism, not on political choices. They are enemies. One thinks there are races of Lords and Slaves, the other believes in equality. It is not because water and fire can destroy a lot that they are the same. Both are natural disaster, but there finishes the comparison.
To go with your way of thinking, Communism is the same than Christianism. They both slaughtered a lot of people for their own good, and to help them to understand the true and to build happiness…

Well the basics of a collectivist system is the belief in the good of the many outweighing the good of the individual. And therein lies the purported goals of Nazism and Communism. The Nazis did try to appeal to the working class. A blue-collar sort of regime. For the third Reich, the good of the many, Germans, did outweigh the good of the Germans who opposed the regime, the disabled, and all the convenient minorities who were used as a scapegoat.

The Communists always appealed to the working class. It was "The People's Revolution." Just like how China is the People's republic. Once again, majority rules. But of course, this majority is represented by a very small elite minority. Just like the Nazis, only the Nazis could have even fewer truly powerful individuals.

Nazism and Communism are variants of Collectivism. But not Collectivism perfectly.

[Brenus]

“Nazism and Communism are variants of Collectivism. But not Collectivism perfectly.” A very big over-simplification.
Nazism believed in the Fuhrerprincip: That is far away from the Soviet Principe.
Nazism never collectivised industries. In fact, one of the problems of the Germans was the inability of the government to centralise and planned the productions, for tanks and planes, or even small weapons. In fact, one of the characteristics of Nazism is anarchy at all levels…

The fact to appeal to the working class is a characteristic of all modern regimes since the powder very democratised death on battle fields: Uncle Sam Needs You or whatever pamphlets you wish to choose for the call to arms.

I know it is fashion now to equal Nazism and Communism in order to make Nazism more acceptable. However, the doctrine are opposite, the base of beliefs is opposite and even the implementation was opposite.

[Ironside]

Well the basics of a collectivist system is the belief in the good of the many outweighing the good of the individual. And therein lies the purported goals of Nazism and Communism. The Nazis did try to appeal to the working class. A blue-collar sort of regime. For the third Reich, the good of the many, Germans, did outweigh the good of the Germans who opposed the regime, the disabled, and all the convenient minorities who were used as a scapegoat.

The Communists always appealed to the working class. It was "The People's Revolution." Just like how China is the People's republic. Once again, majority rules. But of course, this majority is represented by a very small elite minority. Just like the Nazis, only the Nazis could have even fewer truly powerful individuals.

Nazism and Communism are variants of Collectivism. But not Collectivism perfectly.

And a libertarian socialist, lassez-faire capitalist and “statist individualist” (apt description of the nordic model) are really the same thing and compatible with eachother, correct? They are all focusing on induvidual liberty after all.