Could Germany have won WWII?

[PanzerJaeger]

The best Germany could ever hope for by Kursk, was a stalemate. I would like to see some sort of plan that even remotely gives them a chance to win, by that time......

As I previously stated, both the Russian and German armies were exhausted by '43. The Russians had more men in uniform, but the military's ability to recover from the kinds of massive losses experienced in the previous two fighting seasons had largely reached its limit. (This can be seen in the difficultly Russia had replenishing its losses after Kursk as compared to the quick rebound between '41-'42, which contributed to their inability to fully exploit the counteroffensives conducted after the battle and the relatively static nature of the Eastern Front until Bagration.) I believe a large scale envelopment (or several smaller scale ones) could have destroyed not only the offensive capabilities of the Red Army but also Stalin's will to continue the fight. In contrast to the myth, the man certainly did not have a "steel" constitution, and it is conceivable that, facing a major reversal, he would have sued for peace.

The Germans mustered a very powerful force for Kursk, one capable of taking the fight back to the gates of Moscow under the unrestrained leadership of Manstein and Model and with a bit of luck. It was unfortunate, or I suppose fortunate, that it was thrown against a brick wall specifically crafted to destroy it. As I stated, the Germans demonstrated the ability to outmaneuver and defeat much larger Soviet formations late into the war (Kharkov) and even well after Kursk (Iasi Offensive). Neither Model nor Manstein wanted any part of the highly predictable, frontal attack that Hitler approved for Kursk, preferring to allow the Soviets to attack first and defeat them through maneuver and envelopment, which would have played to the German forces' strengths. Given the Soviet's propensity for over extension of their forces, a "backhand" operation could have achieved the kind of envelopment necessary to remove entire Soviet armies from the game.

Essentially, the situation at the front was far more tenuous than is often implied through the numbers, which do not take into account combat effectiveness. I certainly do not think it would have been likely, but it is possible that the Germans could have delivered a powerful enough blow to reverse the fundamental calculus dictating the course of events on the Eastern Front. They had the forces and leadership in place to do so.

A rather harsh and decidedly untrue statement. The Eastern Front, while it certainly attracted a much higher total number of German units, doesn't automatically qualify that theatre of operations as having the 'vast majority' of first-line units.

Allied performance speaks for itself - while consistently overmanned and oversupplied, they also consistently underperformed as compared to their Russian and German counterparts. They lacked a sense of strategic and/or tactical urgency, consistently failing to take advantage of their material superiority or their enemy’s weakness.

Take the Battle of the Bulge for example. The Allies were at the height of the operational capabilities in manpower, material, and experience while the Germans’ capabilities had been eroded to a great degree; many of the units taking part – once arguably the best in the world – were shadows of their former selves, brought up to full strength with Volkssturm and other conscript units. And yet, when the German assault exhausted the resources necessary to keep moving forward, the infighting and confusion/lack of situational awareness that characterized Allied operations throughout the war prevented a decisive response and the vast majority of German forces were simply allowed to withdraw back to their starting lines (and give the Seventh Army quite the mauling in the process). Allowing such a large, weak, and exposed enemy salient to simply evaporate at its own pace without even an attempt at envelopment would have been unthinkable on the Eastern Front, where commanders on both sides would have recognized the need to act without haste to take advantage of the situation.

And speaking of The Bulge, I have a few issues with your characterization:

One could also point to the Ardennes Offensive in Dec 1944-Jan 1945 as another battle fought largely without air support for the Allies, yet resulted in another major defeat for the Germans despite the element of nearly complete surprise and the presence of two elite Panzer Armies in the 5th and 6th, along with a who-is-who list of German generals. Bastogne grabs all of the highlights and glory, but the defense of St. Vith was just as crucial to stopping the German advance and was a brilliant piece of tactics by Brigadier General Robert W. Hasbrouck who fought with a patchwork of units from several different US divisions against major elements of 6th Panzer Army.

a) Not to discount the efforts of the Allied soldiers – they fought hard and did delay the German timetable to some extent – but the offensive ground to a halt due to fuel and ammunition shortages and an inability for supply lines to keep up with the spearheads, as the German commanders predicted.

b) “Largely without air support” is incorrect. The offensive began on December 16 and the battle lasted until January 25; by December 23 Allied air power was again fully operational. So the Allies operated without air support for roughly one week out of a six week engagement, a period in which they were shattered and thrown back in disarray.

c) Calling any German unit that participated in the Bulge “elite” is a bit of a stretch. There were some elite banners carried into battle, but those units truly were shells of their former selves at that point. While the Germans were quite resourceful in quickly building surprisingly competent divisions from scratch through the clever distribution of battle hardened veterans in key positions, an ever increasing number of corners had to be cut by that stage of the war to meet the offensive's start date. I can detail the lack of training, use of Volks personnel to augment depleted units, deficit of fuel and supplies, etc. if you like. Such conditions were present throughout the German force, even in 1SS, Hitler’s namesake unit.