The "Blind Brain Theory of Consciousness" and the Consequences of Eliminativism

[Ironside]

Well, sort of. If ttbs ttbs, then it must get some environmental information, or more precisely, metainformation. But it also should, upon processing this information, output information of its own into the larger brain.

What do you define as the larger brain? I'm agreeing that processed information gets reprocessed several times in the brain. For example, sight passes through several centers, with only that last ones sending information to the conciousness. That's why you have things as blind-sight.

I don't understand. That could very easily be explained as the larger brain performing the calculations and the ttbs catching wind of the result. Not agentive at all, unless you want it to be...

An agent is a specialised part of the brain that can send information to the conciousness.

Yet that's the thing - if ttbs is indeed distributed throughout the brain, and not confined to a single discrete structure, then your thesis for an executive role of consciousness makes little sense. Also, remember that metacognition is continuous with cognition, meaning that one does not wait for the other - it all flows together.

Then you only moved the executive role to the TTBS. Who in turn only acts on the information in the same moment the conciousness gets it. Something in the mind needs to choose the cause of action, from all the alternatives given by the different TTBS, agents, larger brain or whatever you call those subsystems. In particular if this action matters greatly.
I say that this central cohesion structure is the conciousness, while he says that this central cohesion structure is part of the TTBS, while the conciousness is kind of an illusion, pretending to be this central cohesion structure.

I do agree that the conciousness pretends to be more in control than what it is (we have many-semicouncious behaviors that we do, but will only conciously control if we focus on it). But what he calls a bug that exists for unknown reasons, I call a feature.

Nooo, he's saying nothing is in control. There is no such thing as control. But if you want to fall back on this intentional vocab to make things easier, then say that it's the brain at large that is in control, which is pretty much an ineluctable truism.

By control, I mean the sender of the excecutive order (for actions deemed to be needing some thought). I don't talk about a metaphysical soul beaming in actions into the mind. Free will exist or not depending on how you define it. Overwriting a human brain should be possible (and terrifying).

So do animals have this special brainy-brain thing or just people?

The whole thing seems overly complex in the way that only theory jumping way ahead of available information can be.

However, if indeed the information we get is strategically filtered by some kind of background program, it stands to reason that we have altered our environment to the point where that could be a serious flaw in civilization itself. So there's that at least. Most of that was way over my head...

If I've red him right, only people. Which I find ridiculous, since there's no place in the human brain that's essential for conciousness. Or at very least, multiple places can be the key piece.

He's at least treating modern conciousness as a uniqish thing, rather than an advanced version.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Given the developmental gradient of evolution, we can presume a gradual increase in capacity, with the selection of more comprehensive sourcing and greater processing power culminating in the consciousness we possess today.

There’s the issue of evolutionary youth, for one. Even if we were to date the beginning of modern consciousness as far back as, say, the development of hand-axes, that would only mean some 1.4 million years of evolutionary ‘tuning.’ By contrast, the brain’s ability to access and process external environmental information is the product of hundreds of millions of years of natural selection

And then there’s its relation to its object. Where the brain, thanks to locomotion, possesses a variable relationship to its external environment, allowing it to selectively access information, the RS is quite literally hardwired to the greater, nonconscious brain. Its information access is a function of its structural integration, and is therefore fixed to the degree that its structure is fixed. The RS must transform its structure, in other words, to attenuate its access.

These three constraints–evolutionary contingency, frame complexity, and access invariance–actually paint a quite troubling picture. They sketch the portrait of an RS that is developmentally gerrymandered, informatically overmatched, and structurally imprisoned–the portrait of a human brain that likely possesses only the merest glimpse of its inner workings. As preposterous as this might sound to some, it becomes more plausible the more cognitive psychology and neuroscience learns.

I mean sure, I suspect the reason why mental illness among humans are because of rapid evolution, so that robustness hasn't catched up yet. But I say that limitations of the conciousness is there from the start and intended.

[Husar]

How?

An inside stimulus to make the right decisions (e.g. by giving all information an extra-pass or two through specialized regions of the brain).

Well, if they subserve different functions, then they should be distinguished.

What function does the TTBS/conscious serve if the brain at large is purely a predctable input/output machine that takes input and produces an entirely predictable output?

That's been the predominant mode of thought, you must admit. Though most people would simply couch it in such terms as "I cause X", which amounts to the same thing.

Saying that is only wrong if every single atom-collision in the universe could have been predicted from the point of the big bang. Any kind of randomness or unpredictable results would allow things within the system to affect the system.

And yet by definition this can never be tested - so why assume it? In fact, if something happens it happens - period. To suggest otherwise is merely feel-good palaver.

But this feel-good palaver just happened if what you say is true, and there'd be no reason for you to get worked up over it although you getting worked up would also be something that just happened.

Well, the latter has empirical grounding and fits well into the larger context of natural science, and the former is a fumbling folk-psychology approximation of a result. We can't prove that massy bodies don't just happen to "choose" to exert gravitational force, but why would we take that stance when it makes no sense in the wider metaphysical grounding of natural science?

Well, you keep arguing from the POV that this theory is true, and somehow serves as a basis for human thought. The basis for my thought is my own experience however, and that tells me I can decide and that this is not an illusion. Your theory can't prove that my experience is wrong beyond some coincidences, so why would I accept it? As for the wider natural science, that still hasn't entirely figured out how exactly the neural network in our body operates. The only thing this theory does is focus entirely on the outside influences and assume an unknown black box is not an unknown black box and works in entirely predictable patterns. Which is not proven and goes against our experiences and observations.

Some problems:

1. (Assuming choice and paths) If the paths are stimulated, then how could "choice" between them be free?
2. (Assuming choice and paths) If the paths are constrained by cognitive availability, then how could "choice" between them be free?
3. How could multiple paths be modeled? It seems to be much simpler, namely an input aggregate of stimuli that linearly and straightforwardly produce ineluctable output based on their physical properties. On what grounds would that conception be challenged?

1. I said it's not entirely free, it is always an influenced choice but we call it free choice because it's not predetermined either.
2. Because cognitive availability, whatever that means, does not yield predetermined results.
3. Neural networks do not process data in a linear way despite their physical properties. It is not something I entirely understand either but people who know these things better kept telling me you cannot predict the result of a neural network when you give it a new set of stimuli.

What does that mean? It's a linear process, and could easily be predetermined. Moreover, you still don't realize that even in a stochastic universe the mechanism would remain identical. Freedom is not a roll of the dice; if you can live with such a "freedom", then I leave you to your muddled wishful thinking beside the dude who insists that he is rich despite having no money to his name.

A roll of a dice is more linear than the processes in the brain. As for leaving me somewhere, if that is what your defeatist brain decides in the face of my arguments, then so be it, nothing our consciences could do...

You still don't understand the theory. Let's make some things clear:

Larger brain - processes environments
TTBS (Track the Brain Systems) - processes the larger brain
Consciousness - a side effect of the limitations of TTBS

And it's not at all clear that many or any other organisms have TTBS to any extent. Again - consciousness is not a discrete thing.

First off, blame my brain, not me, because if "I did not cause X" then I cannot be responsible for not understanding Y and your tone is neither appreciated nor warranted or helpful.
Secondly, I do get that, but consciousness is an effect caused in a discrete thing, namely the TTBS, and as such it is an integral part of the TTBS or is there a TTBS without a consciousness? What tells us that it is a side effect and not a wanted main effect? What is a TTBS good for without a consciousness? Why track something that produces predictable results?

See above. Alright, even if we replace your usage of "consciousness" with "TTBS", we face these problems:

1. Organisms that seemingly lack TTBS sleep too.
2. It is unclear what sleep is for, across lifeforms.
3. TTBS is active during human sleep, but in different ways than during waking moments.

So, the fact that humans behave a certain way when awake and another way while "asleep" doesn't actually say much of anything about consciousness per se.

But about TTBS, and there is not TTBS that is fully operational without consciousness.

Then you only moved the executive role to the TTBS. Who in turn only acts on the information in the same moment the conciousness gets it. Something in the mind needs to choose the cause of action, from all the alternatives given by the different TTBS, agents, larger brain or whatever you call those subsystems. In particular if this action matters greatly.
I say that this central cohesion structure is the conciousness, while he says that this central cohesion structure is part of the TTBS, while the conciousness is kind of an illusion, pretending to be this central cohesion structure.

I do agree that the conciousness pretends to be more in control than what it is (we have many-semicouncious behaviors that we do, but will only conciously control if we focus on it). But what he calls a bug that exists for unknown reasons, I call a feature.

I agree, the theory calls the consciousness a side effect while I think it's a feature.

[Montmorency]

by saying this, you yourself seem to assume that people who believe that (free will) are capable of doing otherwise (based on assesment of evidence and after the right assesment, they will change their minds). And i feel an implied, they who dont believe that (free will) are believing it because it is true, and not because it happens to be what happened in their brain when they were presented with a certain stimilus (or a sequence of stimuli).

Um, no. I'm doing this because I'm doing this - as always.

As always happens with people who try to disprove free will and rational agency, they start to mix things up, in trying to disprove they often are making assumptions that still imply agency and more often that not, their notion of agency is still heavily cartesian and their notion of free will is either vague or archaic.

I'm not trying to disprove anything. I'm saying that free will is a inherently incoherent concept. Saying I'm making any assumptions that entail free will here (and it's not like you go to point any out in more than the vaguest terms) is like saying ignosticism actually proves the existence of God, and just demonstrates the lack of sensible rebuttals from intentionalists. And even if I were to say, "Hell yeah I'm just messing with y'all I believe in free will" would, as it turns out, contribute absolutely nothing toward supporting the veridicality of free will. I mean, come on. Come up with some more inspiring arguments.

I'll get to the others, but for now recommend they (such as GC) read this.

[The Stranger]

Um, no. I'm doing this because I'm doing this - as always.



I'm not trying to disprove anything. I'm saying that free will is a inherently incoherent concept. Saying I'm making any assumptions that entail free will here (and it's not like you go to point any out in more than the vaguest terms) is like saying ignosticism actually proves the existence of God, and just demonstrates the lack of sensible rebuttals from intentionalists. And even if I were to say, "Hell yeah I'm just messing with y'all I believe in free will" would, as it turns out, contribute absolutely nothing toward supporting the veridicality of free will. I mean, come on. Come up with some more inspiring arguments.

I'll get to the others, but for now recommend they (such as GC) read this.

and im saying your "argument or whatever it is" is also incoherent and above all pointless.

[Montmorency]

and im saying your "argument or whatever it is" is also incoherent and above all pointless.

Which argument? The consciousness theory or the free will critique? How is it incoherent?

I agree that's it's pointless though - your point being?

What do you define as the larger brain?

Those parts of the brain that are involved in processing sensory information, i.e. external environments (with the rest of the body counting as external in at least some sense).

Then you only moved the executive role to the TTBS.

No, I haven't. The point is that there is no central executive, per se.

Who in turn only acts on the information in the same moment the conciousness gets it. Something in the mind needs to choose the cause of action, from all the alternatives given by the different TTBS, agents, larger brain or whatever you call those subsystems. In particular if this action matters greatly.

The same moment? Why? And why does there need to be a "choice", whatever that is? There are no alternatives, only straightforward processes culminating in a single ineluctable result.

but will only conciously control if we focus on it

That's not 'you choosing to focus on it', that's conscious awareness receiving information that something else is being focused on, and TTBS qua consciousness then outputs information to the rest of the brain along the lines of TTBS being the origin of this process, and the cycle goes on...

He's at least treating modern conciousness as a uniqish thing, rather than an advanced version.

Bakker actually mentions that it's perfectly possible for us to evolve more consciousness or less of it over time (assuming we don't directly intervene to speed things up). Therefore, he supposes, it is likely that our hominid ancestors had some sort of very murky "consciousness", and that it's possible that other animals have a murkier one still ATM. I'm not sure if its in the OP essay or some other writing, but he does acknowledge this. Though I don't suppose something like, say, a dog has many or maybe even any systems for TTBS. But that's an empirical matter, so we can leave it at this.

An inside stimulus to make the right decisions (e.g. by giving all information an extra-pass or two through specialized regions of the brain).

So what? And what is a "right decision"? Don't go all Sasaki on me...

What function does the TTBS/conscious serve if the brain at large is purely a predctable input/output machine that takes input and produces an entirely predictable output?

See Bakker on "problem-ecologies". TTBS allows for more advanced planning and behaviors. Metaphysically speaking, that's neither here nor there with respect to how events proceed from one another. It doesn't have bearing, either direction.

Any kind of randomness or unpredictable results

I've already pointed out that freedom is not compatible with either a stochastic or random universe. Or are you saying that a fully random event could be free? It's just not coherent. Freedom seems like something that precedes everything, and nothing precedes everything.

But this feel-good palaver just happened if what you say is true, and there'd be no reason for you to get worked up over it although you getting worked up would also be something that just happened.

A better thing to point out would be that I posted this thread in the first place, or even better, that I post things at all, ever.

The way I see it, I might have entered a coma-like/vegetative state and might right now be embodying nihilism as a barely-living husk hooked up to life support - but I'm not. I'm just a typical human, as it turns out.

The basis for my thought is my own experience however, and that tells me I can decide and that this is not an illusion.

Your theory can't prove that my experience is wrong beyond some coincidences, so why would I accept it?

This theory provides a natural-science way to explain why you think that, and why it's wrong. Our experience and intuition told us that the Sun orbited the Earth - and this was obvious, until new science arose to discredit the notion. We can't prove that the Earth orbits the Sun; we can only predict it, and observe it. We can't prove that there is gravitational force; we can only predict it and observe it in action. Hell, we can't prove that there's such a thing as causality - that's merely convention, just like "free will". We can't prove there's such a thing as us - maybe we should be reverse-solipsists?

(What you point out here actually has wider relevance to nihilist theory and what I call "supervenient revenge", but I guess I won't ever discuss that unless I actually get to the point of seriously publishing my original theories. )

1. I said it's not entirely free, it is always an influenced choice but we call it free choice because it's not predetermined either.

If it's influenced, it cannot be free. Forget about predetermination; if freedom exists it will exists regardless of whether that is or isn't the case.

Because cognitive availability, whatever that means, does not yield predetermined results.

You just dodged the question. Again, forget about predetermination. It's irrelevant.

3. Neural networks do not process data in a linear way despite their physical properties. It is not something I entirely understand either but people who know these things better kept telling me you cannot predict the result of a neural network when you give it a new set of stimuli.

Well of course you can't - just like you can't predict how the asteroid that's hitting some living world billions of lightyears away will affect the ecosystem of that world: lack of information, and enormous complexity.

Once we arrive at the ability to map the brain, we will, so to speak, know it inside and out.

Neural networks are indeed linear in their processing, as we can tell by mapping the nervous systems and determining the actions of simpler organisms such as Aplysia slugs. Even CPUs are linear in their processing, ultimately.

A roll of a dice is more linear than the processes in the brain.

Not a worthy response, as "roll of the dice" is clearly metaphorical -since you aren't responding to the technical term "stochastic" - and the processes are indeed linear anyway, as are all processes, unless you would like to present a rigorous new conception of time, or point me to one, that illustrates what you seem to be saying.

First off, blame my brain, not me, because if "I did not cause X" then I cannot be responsible for not understanding Y and your tone is neither appreciated nor warranted or helpful.

Well, that's difficult - do you even have a brain? After all, what are "you"?

Perhaps you are in fact a whole brain? Then you don't have a brain, technically speaking.
Perhaps you are only the TTBS circuits within a larger brain? Then that's reminiscent of the parable of the feet, stomach, and hands (or whatever) arguing over who of them is most useful to the body.
Perhaps you are your TTBS qua closed system, i.e. a consciousness? Then that's still complicated, since this theory isn't a comprehensive unified theory of consciousness, right? Too many questions remain.
Perhaps you are merely what a body says and does, i.e. entirely performative? Then I guess you don't have a brain or a body, and are just caused by a brain and a body. You would be more the words you type than a body or a brain.
Perhaps you are nothing at all? There are no subjects in this view, so the ongoing usage of personal names and pronouns is just verbal behavior between organisms, conditioned by operant contingencies that promote cooperativity and keep a constant reference framework.

I'm not sure this theory makes this particular issue clearer, though the author has his opinions. I'd rather not try to address it in this thread or we'll be here forever, constantly bringing in farflung sources to bolster some, as TS would say, futile case. Let's just default to you and I being whole brains, in which case you certainly have a heluva-lot of responsibility, as I pointed out in the Political Beliefs thread.

and as such it is an integral part of the TTBS or is there a TTBS without a consciousness?

See, the consciousness is a byproduct of the limited nature of the TTBS. If we had a "perfect" TTBS, then there would be zero consciousness, just a brain tracking causes causing causes within itself. To have our consciousness, we need a TTBS that is just crappy enough, you see?

What tells us that it is a side effect and not a wanted main effect?

Because the primary characteristics of consciousness can be predicted and recreated if we see that there is such a thing as TTBS (i.e. metacognition) and that it operates under conditions of informatic asymmetry with respect to the rest of the brain.

Otherwise, there is no evidence for consciousness as a "main effect" besides our intuitions, and the theory explains those as well. And theories are generally judged by their ability to make correct predictions and explain observables...

What is a TTBS good for without a consciousness? Why track something that produces predictable results?

TTBS just tracks the brain...

Consciousness is good for nothing per se, it's a side effect.

Why track something that produces predictable results? Oh, well, economics and weather, those are predictable results, nothing to track there, just grasp the answers immediately somehow. Just because a complex system is predictable in theory doesn't mean predictions can be made about it with zero resources. Again, we are not God.

[Papewaio]

"Given the developmental gradient of evolution, we can presume a gradual increase in capacity, with the selection of more comprehensive sourcing and greater processing power culminating in the consciousness we possess today."

Incorrect definitions in this paragraph. I'm sure if actual biologists, neuroscientists and computer scientists picked apart this they would find a few more gems.

Evolution isn't a gradient nor necessarily gradual nor forwards for that matter. It is survival of the fittest.

So one cannot presume a gradual increase in capacity and we have our Neanderthals to show another branch with a larger brain capacity that did not survive.

He then assumes that it is the greater capacity that has resulted in our consciousness we have today. Unfortunately given his incorrect definition of how evolution works and his assumption of our own growing capacity one cannot also assume that his idea is correct. It might be, but not based on the ideas touted in that paragraph.

It doesn't get any better latter as he assumes that software is 1:1 bound to hardware

"And then there’s its relation to its object. Where the brain, thanks to locomotion, possesses a variable relationship to its external environment, allowing it to selectively access information, the RS is quite literally hardwired to the greater, nonconscious brain. Its information access is a function of its structural integration, and is therefore fixed to the degree that its structure is fixed. The RS must transform its structure, in other words, to attenuate its access."

Let's answer this from a computer point of view. There are plenty of computers in the world that can run multiple OS and they can all have different hardware yet we can use the same applications on them to make sense of the world.

Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) and its ilk essentially separate hardware from software. So yes there will be a minimum requirement to run a game for instance but some games also have a maximum hardware restriction is Fallout can't handle too many hardware cores and needs to run in an emulator restricting core access on my PC or it will be over loaded.

So to say the RS is fixed to its brain structure is false. For instance an app can run on an iPhone or an Android or that you can run a Commodore 64 within a phone.

Also ones brain can possess a variable relationship with its environment regardless of locomotion or not. Just sit in a corner of a room and look. Now look for red objects, then blue then yellow. Your perception of the room has just changed sans locomotion. Yes you can selective filter information, you can for instance filter the universes mysteries from a wheelchair. Locomotion is a simple method of changing perspective and the most literal, it is neither the only one nor is it a factual statement rigorous enough to state that the RS app is fixed into its brain hardware.

[Montmorency]

Given the developmental gradient of evolution, we can presume a gradual increase in capacity, with the selection of more comprehensive sourcing and greater processing power culminating in the consciousness we possess today.

It seems clear to me that he's saying that the gradient of our evolution was pretty uniformly from less to more, in that we did not oscillate back and forth in 'degree of consciousness', which is a perfectly reasonable assumption. Why assume, for instance, that homo habilis had less consciousness than homo erectus? Also, this means that we assume the evolution of consciousness-producing systems to have been somewhat gradual over a few million or hundreds of thousands of years, rather than a saltational development specific to homo sapiens plus maybe some other later hominins.

It doesn't get any better latter as he assumes that software is 1:1 bound to hardware

You assume that "software" and "hardware" analogize well to brains.

So to say the RS is fixed to its brain structure is false. For instance an app can run on an iPhone or an Android or that you can run a Commodore 64 within a phone.

So you're saying that, because computers work one way, brains must work the same way? I can't accept that by any means. And to say that the RS is not fixed to brain structure is nonsense because the RS is just more brain structure - it just subserves a different sort of function.

Also ones brain can possess a variable relationship with its environment regardless of locomotion or not. Just sit in a corner of a room and look. Now look for red objects, then blue then yellow. Your perception of the room has just changed sans locomotion. Yes you can selective filter information, you can for instance filter the universes mysteries from a wheelchair. Locomotion is a simple method of changing perspective and the most literal, it is neither the only one nor is it a factual statement rigorous enough to state that the RS app is fixed into its brain hardware.

The idea is simple enough:

1. In one spatial position, the brain receives one set of sensory information - this is obviously an oversimplification, but an illustrative one.
2. If the body moves to another spatial position, the brain has access to a new set of sensory information.
3. The RS, being made up of some neurons, gets only information from other neurons with which it is synaptically integrated.
4. While it is a matter of future empirical inquiry the extent to which RS connections are stable - recalling that some connections can last for years, or even lifetimes, substantially unchanged - it is already pretty clear that the structure of such an RS would perforce circumscribe the variability and extent of its access to the larger brain, meaning practically, as Bakker says, that the RS only "gets what it gets".

RS app

If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail, and so on and so forth.

[Ironside]

Those parts of the brain that are involved in processing sensory information, i.e. external environments (with the rest of the body counting as external in at least some sense).

But then things get more complicated. For example, eyesight have 5 different centers iirc. Only the first one is directly dealing with sensory information, while the last ones are sending data that reaches the conciousness.

The same moment?

Yes. It's evident in sports or any meassurement of reaction times. Even something very simple, like running when the gun is shot, it won't happen until it reaches conciousness. The conciousness lag is the reason why we see them stand still for a moment before they react.

Reflex systems are faster. Pre-conciousness systems are faster (that's why people who sees the number 6 as yellow will find the black 6 as fast as a normal person sees a yelllow 6. The coloration occurs pre-conciously).
Outside reflex responses, things never happens faster than the time it takes for something to reach conciousness.

No, I haven't. The point is that there is no central executive, per se. Why? And why does there need to be a "choice", whatever that is? There are no alternatives, only straightforward processes culminating in a single ineluctable result.

You've never had conflict of intererest in your mind? TTBS A says we should do one thing, TTBS B says we should do another. TTBS omega decides that TTBS A is better for this moment. Now TTBS omega isn't a singular structure, but the combination of the TTBS:s interested in the matter.

The choise, so to speak, hasn't to do unpredictabillity. It has to with the hundreds of choises each input and previous information gives us. And since we can have multiple sources of input at the same time... A computer doesn't have the option of "1+1= oh that music is great, let's dance". To culminate in a single ineluctable result, the combined might of all TTBS needs to be processed. The conciousness is the combined might of all TTBS.

That's not 'you choosing to focus on it', that's conscious awareness receiving information that something else is being focused on, and TTBS qua consciousness then outputs information to the rest of the brain along the lines of TTBS being the origin of this process, and the cycle goes on...

I was more thinking that those actions are ran by a single agent or TTBS, but can be changed or ran by the whole TTBS structure, if the TTBS culminate in a single ineluctable result.

Bakker actually mentions that it's perfectly possible for us to evolve more consciousness or less of it over time (assuming we don't directly intervene to speed things up). Therefore, he supposes, it is likely that our hominid ancestors had some sort of very murky "consciousness", and that it's possible that other animals have a murkier one still ATM. I'm not sure if its in the OP essay or some other writing, but he does acknowledge this. Though I don't suppose something like, say, a dog has many or maybe even any systems for TTBS. But that's an empirical matter, so we can leave it at this.

An animal certainly has something. They do have the same TTBS on sight as us for example. Or are we up to TTBS on the TTBS yet? It may not reach more than a child when peaking, but a child is certainly concious.

[Montmorency]

But then things get more complicated. For example, eyesight have 5 different centers iirc. Only the first one is directly dealing with sensory information, while the last ones are sending data that reaches the conciousness.

My impression is that all of these centers deal with the sensory data directly, but the last one(s) - the primary visual cortices - then send information to the cognitive-processing centers, at least some of which will be distinct from TTBS (though perhaps there's a higher concentration of TTBS in the frontal lobe relative to other parts of the brain, but that's a research question and I can't address it).

Yes. It's evident in sports or any meassurement of reaction times. Even something very simple, like running when the gun is shot, it won't happen until it reaches conciousness. The conciousness lag is the reason why we see them stand still for a moment before they react.

Reflex systems are faster. Pre-conciousness systems are faster (that's why people who sees the number 6 as yellow will find the black 6 as fast as a normal person sees a yelllow 6. The coloration occurs pre-conciously).
Outside reflex responses, things never happens faster than the time it takes for something to reach conciousness.

You've made a mistake. There is no difference between consciousness-systems and reflex-systems such as you lay out. In your example, what we see is the difference between cerebral processing and spinal-cord processing. Of course the latter is faster than the former: that's the utility of it. The former is slower because it will by definition be slower, consciousness or no consciousness - there's more distance to travel, more stages to pass through. This is no surprise, and has nothing to do with consciousness or TTBS.

You've never had conflict of intererest in your mind?

We simply cannot use our own metacognitive intuitions in investigating metacognition; it's like using a suspect as a witness at his own trial.

TTBS A says we should do one thing, TTBS B says we should do another.

[...]

To culminate in a single ineluctable result, the combined might of all TTBS needs to be processed. The conciousness is the combined might of all TTBS.

To be clear: it is not self-evident that the TTBS is primarily, or even substantially, involved in so-called executive function. Don't conflate TTBS with some ultimate 'sorter and decision-maker'. And there is no need to say that the TTB systems act as an aggregate - they could well be functionally independent, each processing their own inputs and dumping their own outputs into the rest of the brain.

I was more thinking that those actions are ran by a single agent or TTBS, but can be changed or ran by the whole TTBS structure, if the TTBS culminate in a single ineluctable result.

Single ineluctable result formula: Stimulus-set X over time-period Y mediated through brain cells of a given structure and composition A can and will produce only one result (e.g. a particular motor response). Now, if you keep X and Y constant and repeat them, you will get various results, but in each case there will be "one ineluctable result". There, the difference is that the configuration of neurons, synapses, chemicals, and so on has changed from A to A', or A'', or A''', or whatever.

They do have the same TTBS on sight as us for example.

Hmm... I would need to hear more detail.