Mostly Krivosheev and Glantz. You also have to account that in a lot of cases, especially 1941-1943, a lot of equipment was sent but not received (u-boats and other problems)
In 1941, Soviet Union produced 139,879 trucks. 8,600 were sent from the US, 1,506 arrived,
Total amount of tanks at the disposal of Red Army was cca 27,000. Sent from US 180, 35 arrived,
Planes - USSR produced about 15,000 of all types. Sent from USA 150, 29 arrived.
1942
USSR tank production 24,719, received through lend lease cca. 3,000
Planes - USSR 25,436 LL cca 2,500
Trucks - USSR 32,409, LL sent 72,000
Important note is where you'll often find Harrison wrong is that he takes into account what was sent and when was it sent. The problem is that not all of it made it on time or made it at all. For example, of about 6,000 planes sent in 1943 (SU produced about 34,000), only about 70% arrived in the year. 500 was lost and rest didn't arrive until following year, and often wasn't deployed until much later. Some of it wasn't deployed ever, simply because it was hugely inferior to Soviet equipment.
Allied equipment didn't have almost any impact in 1941 and 1942.
Parts of it were still classified, at until a few years ago when I last made serious effort of looking into it.You really think the bureaucrat types handling LL shipments wouldn't keep written reports on this?
Well, as it is an opinion about a complex topic, it's hard to back it up properly without a lengthy response which I'm not really in a mood to write. To put it simply, based on industrial capacity, manpower, resource production... Germany simply didn't have the capabilities to win against USSR in a total war. Especially not in way they fought it.Care to back that up with some substance other than opinion?
You still haven't put your figures into a broader context. You wanna push that LL was crucial for Soviet military victories? Fine. Compare what arrived (not what was sent) and when it arrived to the numbers available to the SU, how and when it was used and was it used at all. Just citing figures doesn't really mean anything on it's own.And so far, you haven't provided a single shred of evidence that it wasn't, other than your opinion and some vague, unreferenced, statistics.....
......like this:
Again.....source please
Harrison's numbers quoted above, come from a United States Department of Commerce report published in 1945 (United States Department of Commerce (1945) "United States trade with Russia during the war years" vol2, no41) citing the amounts of imports as recorded up to that time. Such reports are rarely, if ever, 'estimates'. The 133.4 million $ figure is correct unless you can find some other official report that states otherwise.
You do realize, don't you, that the Soviets actually levied import tariffs on incoming LL aid (not actual monetary amounts against the US but line items to be included in their yearly fiscal reports) to the tune of 78 billion rubles. Considering that total LL amounted to 63 billion rubles (converting the 11.93 billion number in US dollars into rubles), that adds more than double the value of all the LL delivered and makes it look like part of the Soviet NMP. Pretty neat trick (although I doubt that was the intention at the time) to downplay the actual % of LL as "only" 4%. Harrison took this into account when arriving at his 10% figure, which is probably closer to the truth......
It's a bit a like saying Company A had revenues of 2,000,000 in 2014. That's great, but what does it mean? Is it good, is it bad? What were its costs? How did it fare last year? How did the competition fare in those years? Did it make any significant investments and so on and so forth. On its own, it doesn't mean anything.
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