IMMIGRATION thread

[Montmorency]

No. Syncretism and multiculturalism are distinct. Multiculturalism persists far beyond the former. Insofar as even the hard rights of the world (outside of the massively multi-cultural SE Asia and sub-Saharan Africa) still shy away from "blood" or racial nationalism, linguistic nationalism is the global norm. And that's all that America has really accomplished. Without the English language and the long arm of the federal government and the "events" it organizes and participates in, America is still very much a nationally-fragmented structure.

What do you mean?

Humans interact, don't they? The only way to separate cultures is main violence, and absent that there is multiculturalism, with all its tensions.

[Fragony]

Provoke?
The intention is not to provoke, merely to illustrate reality.

But of course

[Legs]

Grow up.

My good fellow, if you take the Brexit topic can you describe your attitude there to people who were simply telling lies?
Would you be addressing what had been claimed in the discussion or just calling names?

[Fragony]

boots- I mean legs found another nazi, take a few cocktails now that you are in argentina

[Legs]

boots- I mean legs found another nazi, take a few cocktails now that you are in argentina

In addition to being a racist are you just the local forum troll?
It certainly seems that way.

[Viking]

The only way to separate cultures is main violence, and absent that there is multiculturalism, with all its tensions.

Not really, self-segregation is a strong force. Even within cultures, it could seem:

It’s a chicken and egg scenario – do people end up agreeing with their neighbours because they move, or because they’re influenced by where they’re living in the first place?

To find out, Motyl sifted through data from over a million US residents who had taken the implicit association test, an online survey which attempts to uncover those thoughts which are outside your conscious awareness, such as racial prejudice.

He was only interested in three things: where respondents currently lived, where they had lived the longest and their political ideology. Next he compared how the latter differed from the dominant views in these areas.

As it turns out, ideological misfits are significantly more likely to move – roughly eight out of 10, compared to five out of 10 conformists. Further, among those who leave, their new postcode is much more likely to be a stronghold for their own views.

http://www.bbc.com/future/story/2016...ying-democracy

[Fragony]

In addition to being a racist are you just the local forum troll?
It certainly seems that way.

I only troll you. You are also the only one who calls me a racist because uhhhhhhhhh well because

[Montmorency]

Exactly - think of it as an emulsion. The various substances will clump together by their own properties - but they will still be swimming against each other, being all suspended in the same solution.

What would contradict my point is if the people moving were all moving to isolated, self-sustaining communes or becoming hermits. But no, they generally move around more explicitly for work or retirement, both of which require significant interaction with multiple demographics. Now retirement (note not simply assisted care, just retirement, typically into municipalities with majority-elderly populations) is a more interesting case for us because it often results in "aged communities" of (for now mostly white) senior citizens congregating to live out their retirements. Perhaps there are social differences between communities developing around retirement and more mixed residential areas centered around commute to employment or otherwise entertainments and leisure activities.

Excerpts from the concluding chapter of Senior Power or Senior Peril: Aged Communities and American Society in the Twenty-First Century:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The aged context actually fosters a number of
unique political attitudes and behaviors, ensuring a distinct political
culture in locales with concentrations of older adults. This political
culture includes higher levels of political knowledge, less political efficacy,
more support for safety-net policies, and not exceptional levels
of turnout for elections among older-adult residents.

In this book, I have spent much time and effort on answering the
question of whether there are differences in political attitudes and
behaviors in aged communities that cannot be attributed simply to
the age or some other individual characteristic of residents but result
from the overwhelming presence of older-adult residents in the local
population. The answers to this question are quite consequential for
local and national politics as the Baby Boomers move into retirement
age, providing a picture of either pockets of senior activism and power
or retreatism and powerlessness all over the United States.

First, aged locales are probably places with increased opportunities
for political discussion. Measures were not ideal for measuring discussion
levels. However, we know that the increased opportunities are
present, given the testimony of the residents of The Villages and the
numbers of meeting places for seniors per capita that are available in
aged communities. We can also be quite confident that aged communities
are places with a high density of political resources and information,
owing to the higher rate of senior centers in such places. This
finding may indicate that further concentration of resources likely contribute
to the accessibility of aged cognitive content for residents of all
ages. Although the measures of engagement were not ideal for the
analysis, there is also evidence that political engagement is higher
among older adults in the aged locales.

older adults living among their peers have greater
levels of political knowledge than do seniors living elsewhere. The
association is particularly strong for knowledge related to senior issues
such as Social Security and prescription coverage. However, this relationship
is not apparent for the residents of very advanced age.

Chapter 5 provides evidence for a senior citizenry with cohesive
and supportive preferences for safety-net policies when they reside in
the aged communities. They are more supportive of policies that push
for a wider safety net than are their peers living in other places without
an aged context. These findings make sense, given their greater knowledge
of senior-related issues. In addition, the aged context appears to
have an impact on the attitudes toward safety-net policies of the
youngest residents in aged communities. They are also more supportive
of these policies than are their peers living elsewhere.

Although knowledgeable and unified on aged-relevant issues,
senior citizens living among their peers may not actually be very efficacious
or especially active. These relationships are explored in Chapters
6 and 7. The emergent older adults in the aged communities may be
less politically efficacious than seniors living elsewhere. The efficacy
attitudes of young adult residents are also related to the aged context,
as is the case with their attitudes toward safety-net policies. However,
the consequences may be quite negative, given the lower levels of political
efficacy for young people no matter where they live.
Living in an aged community also has some impact on the political
participation of its older residents, although there is a mixed bag of
evidence. Results for 2000 were consistent with the lower participation
expectations for aged community residents, but results for 2008 were
quite the opposite. Older adults may have the potential for exerting
exceptional participation and force but only in certain circumstances.
However, most of the time, aged places are not necessarily critical centers
of participation, as many people have supposed.

Chapter 2 discusses the two main types of
aged communities (active retired and small town) and the different
factors leading to their skewed population distributions. By accounting
for the size of the population, the median household income of each
community, and whether the local population is increasing or decreasing,
we gain confidence that results from the analyses are due to social
effects related to the aged population of the community rather than
differences in the populations that make up these two types of aged
locales. Past work on the aged context has paid little attention to the
differences between aging communities and aging individuals. The
scholarship of the politics of aging and especially journalism on
the subject too often assume that older adults belong to one massive
indistinct group.

different effects depending on whether an older adult is an
emergent older adult or an adult of very advanced age.

I also examine the youngest voters in society in a few chapters of
the book because this group is often still politically unsettled and only
beginning to establish political predispositions. Past contextual research
led to the hypothesis that the politics of minorities within the population
may be influenced by the politics of those with the greatest numbers.
For the current work, the overwhelming presence of older adults
in aged communities has made an impact on the younger generation
of residents living among them by influencing their attitudes toward
safety-net policies and their political efficacy attitudes—political characteristics
that may be influenced without much direct contact but by
simply living in a place with a certain aged cognitive content.

Many scholars have made
the logical leap, supposing that concentrations of socially interactive
older adults who are generally politically knowledgeable, efficacious,
tuned-in, and able should result in a politically exceptional and powerful
geriatric populace.
This work supports and adds to the less sensational but incredibly
important work that tells a different story. In the aged communities, we
find a distinctive mix of high political knowledge and low efficacy with
unimpressive turnout levels. It is possible that older adults have the
ability to remain engaged and current with political information but
lack the level of physical capability that might encourage increased
political activity in aged communities.
Physical challenges faced by older adults may very well contribute
to this disenchantment with politics, but it is also likely that aged communities
encourage a retreatist and politically pessimistic outlook
among many residents. In many of the communities, there are plenty
of leisure activities to take up energy that do not directly involve politics

So older residents of the aged communities are usually not forming
politically cohesive and powerful blocs of voters.

The results in this book present a case for the capability of older
adults and their potential to become a powerful force in local and
national politics when they are motivated by a threat to their livelihood.
Other work has shown this to be reality in many communities in
the right mix of circumstances. We see this happening frequently in a
pluralistic society in which many groups exhibit high levels of political
skills and resources.

So far the case makes it sound as though elderly communities become both insular (with respect to the mobility of elders themselves) and assimilating in key respects. These respects are not found to be based on individual or demographic differences, nor on the geographic context of the communities, but rather on the "aged context" (being around a bunch of retirees all the time) itself. It also appears that these places are not entirely self-selecting for culture (re: newcomers), but do indeed have assimilating effects on elderly/aged newcomers themselves, which may partly be a function of insularity. Also as quoted above, all these things stand in contrast to characteristics of the elderly distributed more evenly among the people.
However, it's also important to keep in mind that for now most such concentrations in America are overwhelmingly white, which must definitely affect our judgments on cultural assimilation.

In terms of our discussion, the relevance has to be somewhere in the principles. What I see is that homogeneity and insularity would not be enough to reduce multiculturalism, absent some convergent cultural impulse affecting all members/residents simultaneously. In other words, way of life. For instance then, one test would be to see what happens to multiculturalism if you pick out farmers from several dozen cultures around the world and, I don't know, colonize them in Siberia. The results of the book quoted may have us expect a significant degree of cultural convergence that would then exert on later arrivals. Such an effect might be related to the growth of American national culture in the early period, with the limitation of massive divergence in ways of life in that context.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Okay, Beskar, it is time. This thread and any thread on a related theme for a week or two would be my rec.

[Viking]

@Montmorency

I don't see how that relates to the original statement that multiculturalism is inevitable.

With globalisation likely to keep exerting its effects far into the distant future, to me it seems the opposite is 'inevitable': global cultural assimilation (homogenisation). A process that, thanks to media, does not really require the movement of people across borders.

[Montmorency]

Globalization introduces a wider flow to goods and people, but it absolutely does not mean that geographically-distant cultures will assimilate to each other. As per inevitability, neither will adjacent cultures by default. If you look at Western soft power, you will see that consumption of cultural products is not anywhere close to related to assimilation.

Unless you have a one-world government that continuously and uniformly redistributes populations around the world for the purposes of cohabitation and breeding...

But let's leave out this planet and activities thereon, and consider that other science fiction trope of interstellar colonization. Would cultures of planets assimilate? How? By my notion of "way of life"? In what sense that doesn't assume identical worlds or standards for settlement? Let's be honest, here or there or anywhere, even communication reliant upon teleportation technology would not suddenly replace the existing social logics.

[HopAlongBunny]

[Montmorency]

I don't like music. What does it mean-mean?

[Viking]

Globalization introduces a wider flow to goods and people, but it absolutely does not mean that geographically-distant cultures will assimilate to each other. As per inevitability, neither will adjacent cultures by default. If you look at Western soft power, you will see that consumption of cultural products is not anywhere close to related to assimilation.

Unless you have a one-world government that continuously and uniformly redistributes populations around the world for the purposes of cohabitation and breeding...

But let's leave out this planet and activities thereon, and consider that other science fiction trope of interstellar colonization. Would cultures of planets assimilate? How? By my notion of "way of life"? In what sense that doesn't assume identical worlds or standards for settlement? Let's be honest, here or there or anywhere, even communication reliant upon teleportation technology would not suddenly replace the existing social logics.

I think you are fundamentally wrong. Given how cultural changes spread within modern countries (think back the last several decades and centuries), I don't think face-to-face interactions have to be in every link of the chain.

Things like (for example) laws, news and impactful or popular pieces of fiction both plant seeds of and drive forward processes of change that in sum become significant.

Most of the things that have an impact on culture intranationally also exist internationally. Just like you have intranational laws, you have international laws. News often go global, as do music, movies and TV series. This means that a lot of the factors that influence how people view the world are partially synchronised globally.

The concepts of who are in- and out-group are naturally also directly impacted by such things. Whereas centuries ago a big natural disaster would go unnoticed by many or most people, this is now typically an international news item that encourages sympathy from a global audience, regardless of cultural background. Political news can also go global and arguments for and against something can also relatively easily be synchronised globally, which over time leads to similar debates with similar arguments in dissimilar cultures.

To me, it is inconceivable that globalisation in its current format does not lead to long term global cultural synchronisation, convergence and assimilation; particularly when you factor in that people also physically move across borders (and interbreed), and not just ideas and media.

[Montmorency]

Given how cultural changes spread within modern countries (think back the last several decades and centuries), I don't think face-to-face interactions have to be in every link of the chain.

?? I don't understand.

Anyway, with face-to-face interactions you can have intercultural, and subsequent intra-cultural resulting, which is just as significant one way or another.

Most of the things that have an impact on culture intranationally also exist internationally. Just like you have intranational laws, you have international laws. News often go global, as do music, movies and TV series. This means that a lot of the factors that influence how people view the world are partially synchronised globally.

I think you have it the other way around. International laws and disseminated products do not mutually assimilate consumers, but are themselves assimilated to the unique contexts and standards of a given culture.

Whereas centuries ago a big natural disaster would go unnoticed by many or most people

This is really due to both new concepts and broadcast technology. It allows compartmentalization when exposed, so that a concrete event is not just 'bad times', and individuals who would never become aware of this event stand to at least hear about it.

which over time leads to similar debates with similar arguments in dissimilar cultures.

Really? See above. And if anything like that is visible, it will be due more to the traditional modes of intellectual elites going abroad to study and fomenting new arguments and ideologies once they return. In the terms you specifically denote, I do not think you can even hope to point out a corroborating trend.

To me, it is inconceivable that globalisation in its current format does not lead to long term global cultural synchronisation, convergence and assimilation; particularly when you factor in that people also physically move across borders (and interbreed), and not just ideas and media.

I think that's a serious mistake, unless it comes to the point that all regions become lightly-urbanized or more, English farmers settle in the new Afghan countryside and intermarry with New Guineans, etc.

[Viking]

?? I don't understand.

How do you suppose cultural attitudes change? If at some point many or most people in a country believed in witches; and then, at some point, most do not - how did that come about? Was there an unbroken chain from one end of the country the other consisting of people telling people their acquaintances "I doubt witches exist"? I presume not, and that once the state stopped prosecuting people for witchcraft, people's beliefs started to follow suit (or because of some other centralised process, like a religious decree).

I think you have it the other way around. International laws and disseminated products do not mutually assimilate consumers, but are themselves assimilated to the unique contexts and standards of a given culture.

Not sure what you are saying here, but the idea is not that any culture or viewpoint dominates any other, but that factors that drive cultural change become the same in many different cultures.

This is really due to both new concepts and broadcast technology.

Naturally. Technological development is one of the most important contributors to stronger globalisation.

Really? See above. And if anything like that is visible, it will be due more to the traditional modes of intellectual elites going abroad to study and fomenting new arguments and ideologies once they return. In the terms you specifically denote, I do not think you can even hope to point out a corroborating trend.

If we were in the 1800s, maybe I'd agree. Today, many 'regular' people become activists and are often part of international organisations. Intellectuals aren't really necessary today for this kind of spread of ideas because more ordinary people take part in it, too.

Finding trends is inherently difficult for a topic like this. Just selecting time scales is tricky, and of course depends on the theory being tested.

I think that's a serious mistake, unless it comes to the point that all regions become lightly-urbanized or more, English farmers settle in the new Afghan countryside and intermarry with New Guineans, etc.

What is one large obstacle facing English farmers who want to settle in the Afghan countryside? Security. In 200 years from now on, Afghanistan could have turned into one of the safer countries on Earth for all we know. At that point, an English farmer might well settle on the Afghani countryside with their New Guinean partner. I don't see why not. Already today people from very different cultures separated by continents marry and settle on the countryside here or there (though typically in the home country of either). What is needed for your scenario is first and foremost that the security situation in Afghanistan improves by a certain amount.

I am not sure what you mean by 'lightly-urbanized'; Internet-access and the dissemination of knowledge is nowadays less dependent on urbanity than ever before. In fact; where I come from, access to high-speed Internet via optical fibre is often better on the countryside than in cities due to issues with distributing the physical fibre in densely populated areas and (perhaps) the fact that DSL performs much better over shorter distances than longer ones.

[Montmorency]

How do you suppose cultural attitudes change? If at some point many or most people in a country believed in witches; and then, at some point, most do not - how did that come about? Was there an unbroken chain from one end of the country the other consisting of people telling people their acquaintances "I doubt witches exist"? I presume not, and that once the state stopped prosecuting people for witchcraft, people's beliefs started to follow suit (or because of some other centralised process, like a religious decree).

Kind of a strawman. In the first place, people had many varying beliefs about witches, and these circulated in a stable fashion. Other changes in society, least of all lack of prosecution, led to de-emphasis and finally abrogation or neutralization of beliefs in witchcraft.

Not sure what you are saying here, but the idea is not that any culture or viewpoint dominates any other, but that factors that drive cultural change become the same in many different cultures.

Yes, I said that's wrong, and moreover any factors that drive cultural change in similar ways across cultures do not develop as such but simply exist as a fact of the nature of culture.

Today, many 'regular' people become activists and are often part of international organisations.

"Local" people assimilate international ideas to local contexts. Internationally-minded intellectuals are the ones who spread, among each other, the discourses with which we're more familiar. This mistake you make is one of the factors that led many to misinterpret the events of the "Arab Spring". A selection bias.

What is one large obstacle facing English farmers who want to settle in the Afghan countryside? Security.

That obstacle is beside the point. Security is not an obstacle to their settlement in the United States, yet that hasn't been a trend for a 150 years, a time when the United States was much less safe.

What is needed for your scenario is first and foremost

As I said, I believe the first and foremost necessity would be top-down allocation to drive the movement and interaction of people in such a way.

I am not sure what you mean by 'lightly-urbanized'

More specifically to the Afghan context, I see their geography and demographic distribution as entailing much of the countryside become dotted with interconnected small towns around a handful of major urban centers. In Scandinavia, it's simply a matter of fact that the south and coasts carry most of the population, so infrastructure through mountains and tundra is more relevant to the transportation of goods than directly connecting and servicing residents. This doesn't have bearing to the larger topic.

[Viking]

Kind of a strawman. In the first place, people had many varying beliefs about witches, and these circulated in a stable fashion. Other changes in society, least of all lack of prosecution, led to de-emphasis and finally abrogation or neutralization of beliefs in witchcraft.

Not so much a straw man as an explanation aimed at your "??", accompanied by a question for which model(s) you are using for cultural evolution.

So, would you maintain that the decline in the belief in witches and supernatural creatures was by and large not driven by any centralised process - i.e. not driven by science or formal education? What exactly caused the decline?

Yes, I said that's wrong, and moreover any factors that drive cultural change in similar ways across cultures do not develop as such but simply exist as a fact of the nature of culture.

I am not sure what you are saying here, so I'll bring up a specific, theoretical example:

Person in a culture with little focus on animal welfare happens upon the web page for an organisation for homeless dogs in a culture with much focus on animal welfare. Person empathises with the organisation due to (I presume) an innate function of humans to empathise with other beings, such as dogs (and ugly ones). Person then creates a local version or branch of this organisation and gets media attention. Through this and similar organisations (that eventually start to pop up), the attitudes regarding animal welfare in person's culture starts to approach the attitudes in the other culture (as it may become considered generally more advanced and/or authoritative in person's culture for this particular topic).

One of the things that is underlying my prediction for cultural convergence is the (presumed) fact that most humans - regardless of culture - run a similar operating system in their minds (which can support software requiring empathy, jealousy and so on), so to speak. So in this scenario, the original organisation was created because of the same empathy function that caused the new organisation to be founded in the other culture. The reason why the organisation did not already exist in the other culture could be more or less arbitrary (like the fact that any trend typically starts at one specific or a limited number of places), or that the original organisation was started in a wealthier country where people are more likely to feel that they have the time and resources needed to dedicate themselves to such a cause.

"Local" people assimilate international ideas to local contexts.

Exactly. The ideas are not supposed survive as identical copies in individual cultures, but to pull the cultures in question in a similar direction. The more factors you have pulling in a similar direction, the less difference there will be between cultures when it comes to the adaptation the original ('pure') ideas or new ideas will require; as the other parts of the cultures that required this adaption have also changed - in a similar direction.

That obstacle is beside the point. Security is not an obstacle to their settlement in the United States, yet that hasn't been a trend for a 150 years, a time when the United States was much less safe.

As I said, I believe the first and foremost necessity would be top-down allocation to drive the movement and interaction of people in such a way.

I thought of your comment as "why isn't this happening already" rather than "I think this needs to happen first", so never mind.

More specifically to the Afghan context, I see their geography and demographic distribution as entailing much of the countryside become dotted with interconnected small towns around a handful of major urban centers. In Scandinavia, it's simply a matter of fact that the south and coasts carry most of the population, so infrastructure through mountains and tundra is more relevant to the transportation of goods than directly connecting and servicing residents. This doesn't have bearing to the larger topic.

But why would this light urbanisation be necessary?

[Montmorency]

by any centralised process - i.e. not driven by science or formal education?

By definition these would not be centrally-derived effects unless it was inculcated dictat that "there are no such things as witches; you must not credit their existence". But largely it was other facts of the organization of society, especially changes in political structure and in urbanization, that caused de-emphasis in prevalence of the ideas. They just weren't as useful to apply to the world, and thus became used less often. Science and education were parallel, not driving, factors.

Person in a culture with little focus on animal welfare happens upon the web page for an organisation for homeless dogs in a culture with much focus on animal welfare. Person empathises with the organisation due to (I presume) an innate function of humans to empathise with other beings, such as dogs (and ugly ones). Person then creates a local version or branch of this organisation and gets media attention. Through this and similar organisations (that eventually start to pop up), the attitudes regarding animal welfare in person's culture starts to approach the attitudes in the other culture (as it may become considered generally more advanced and/or authoritative in person's culture for this particular topic).

Be careful, as now you are shifting the focus, and the question. For all intents and purposes, we could take these persons, one apathetic to animal welfare (as philosophy), and another being member of a animal-welfare organization, and have them be neighbors in adjacent apartment or other units. In other words, there is already a considerable cultural scaffold and milieu that abets interpretation in-fact and in content. To put it in the terms we were using earlier, of actual distant acculturation, then we see that it really does not work in this way across the world. Part of the reason is also that cultural elements do not stand alone, but interconnect and reinforce each other. For example, taking conspiracy theorists from the other thread, giving evidence against or wholesale alternatives to one belief or set of beliefs rarely works because beliefs will both require and compensate for each other, leading to conservation until there is some critical point from within the perspective of that system, and not from a perspective outside it.

This idea is a relevant one.

One of the things that is underlying my prediction for cultural convergence is the (presumed) fact that most humans - regardless of culture - run a similar operating system in their minds (which can support software requiring empathy, jealousy and so on), so to speak. So in this scenario, the original organisation was created because of the same empathy function that caused the new organisation to be founded in the other culture.

But this is precisely what creates such diversity in the first place. Even clonal organisms will diverge wildly when placed in different environments.

The reason why the organisation did not already exist in the other culture could be more or less arbitrary (like the fact that any trend typically starts at one specific or a limited number of places), or that the original organisation was started in a wealthier country where people are more likely to feel that they have the time and resources needed to dedicate themselves to such a cause.

No, not arbitrary! Geography and climate are precisely what will generate the bulk of difference between cultures - and that's before we begin to take exchange into account.

Exactly. The ideas are not supposed survive as identical copies in individual cultures, but to pull the cultures in question in a similar direction. The more factors you have pulling in a similar direction, the less difference there will be between cultures when it comes to the adaptation the original ('pure') ideas or new ideas will require; as the other parts of the cultures that required this adaption have also changed - in a similar direction.

Then you would need to introduce material factors, as simply pointing out exposure to culture will not entail (often the contrary) that there will be pull in a "similar direction".

But why would this light urbanisation be necessary?

Simply as a function of transport/communications infrastructure, and to permit more than haphazard growth of population or polity.

[Viking]

By definition these would not be centrally-derived effects unless it was inculcated dictat that "there are no such things as witches; you must not credit their existence". But largely it was other facts of the organization of society, especially changes in political structure and in urbanization, that caused de-emphasis in prevalence of the ideas. They just weren't as useful to apply to the world, and thus became used less often. Science and education were parallel, not driving, factors.

Science is typically produced at centres (cities, institutions) by a small amount of people (relative to the size of the population), hence centralised. I presume the changes in political structure referred to here were also dictated from central authorities.

Urbanisation does not explain how beliefs in supernatural creatures also disappeared from the countrysides. These trends ultimately manifested themselves both in rural and urban populations with little long-term difference. Yet the physical flow of people tended to be mostly in one direction: from countryside to city, no?

Be careful, as now you are shifting the focus, and the question. For all intents and purposes, we could take these persons, one apathetic to animal welfare (as philosophy), and another being member of a animal-welfare organization, and have them be neighbors in adjacent apartment or other units. In other words, there is already a considerable cultural scaffold and milieu that abets interpretation in-fact and in content. To put it in the terms we were using earlier, of actual distant acculturation, then we see that it really does not work in this way across the world. Part of the reason is also that cultural elements do not stand alone, but interconnect and reinforce each other. For example, taking conspiracy theorists from the other thread, giving evidence against or wholesale alternatives to one belief or set of beliefs rarely works because beliefs will both require and compensate for each other, leading to conservation until there is some critical point from within the perspective of that system, and not from a perspective outside it.

This idea is a relevant one.

Not sure what you are talking about here. The scenario like the one I created is precisely something I had in mind right from the start. In a typical modern culture (at the least), you can expect plurality of opinion, even polarisation. What I have in mind in this context, is that common opinions (polarised or not) about topics should become similar between cultures over time, as ideas flow back and forth. Initial local versions of an ideology or movement might be very different from the ones found in cultures that inspired their creations, however: more extreme in some respects, less extreme in others; maybe entirely lacking some parts.

Of course different elements of a culture can be heavily dependent on each other. In this context, having multiple factors simultaneously pushing for change is important - and, indeed, the right (relevant) factors all acting simultaneously. In the longer run, I would anticipate that this would happen at some point (simple probability; it may be necessary to assume that older cultural influences do not revert or drift too much in the meantime), where the elements that depend on each other are all pulled in the same direction simultaneously.

But this is precisely what creates such diversity in the first place. Even clonal organisms will diverge wildly when placed in different environments.

What globalisation is doing, is to make parts of the environment more similar for all cultures affected by it. The factors that drive cultures in similar directions are of course in sum supposed to make up an important part of this environment per definition (the environment being the collection of all things that influence culture).

Geography and climate are precisely what will generate the bulk of difference between cultures [...]

Do you have sources that back you this up? I mean, the food eaten and which clothes worn when should be expected to differ from place to place, but cultures that already exist do span across significantly different geographies and climates.

Then you would need to introduce material factors, as simply pointing out exposure to culture will not entail (often the contrary) that there will be pull in a "similar direction".

I am primarily not thinking of just exposure to other cultures. The factors in question are supposed to penetrate into and/or stay embedded in the culture (at least for some time). So, if an ideology spreads to a new culture, I model its members as a group that can be almost entirely independent of people in other cultures over shorter time scales; but because most of the ideology remains very similar across cultures, the contribution to the local public debate from followers of the ideology will also be very similar across cultures.

Simply as a function of transport/communications infrastructure, and to permit more than haphazard growth of population or polity.

Afraid I still fail to see the necessity.

[AE Bravo]

http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berli....co/EbOuBkQZYz

Her dad tried to attack the rapist but the police shot him. To flee terror and getting raped and losing her father in Germany from some migrant. Tragic.

I hope he gets his shit kicked in in jail.

[Fragony]

You couldn't make it up, 'refugees' from Marocco get almost 2000 euro pocket money and a free ticket for the plane once they are naturally denied asylum-status, do that twice a year and you make twice the anual salary you do there. Except for the occupied area (western sahara) nobody likes to mentions because uhmmmmmm, well free palestine now schnapps!!! Marocco is a relatively free and safe country why not send them back immediatly, with only what they came with.

[Husar]

You couldn't make it up, 'refugees' from Marocco get almost 2000 euro pocket money and a free ticket for the plane once they are naturally denied asylum-status, do that twice a year and you make twice the anual salary you do there. Except for the occupied area (western sahara) nobody likes to mentions because uhmmmmmm, well free palestine now schnapps!!! Marocco is a relatively free and safe country why not send them back immediatly, with only what they came with.

Maybe the development aid we send there is reduced accordingly?

[Fragony]

Maybe the development aid we send there is reduced accordingly?

That could be an option I guess but as always harms the wrong ones, development aid isn't aid anyway it's extemely cynical. Nah,send them back.

[Fragony]

lol that aren't children http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016...n-within-days/ UK what are you doing to yourself

[Beskar]

Children are classified as under the age of 18. So a 17 year old would technically be a child.

[Fragony]

Children are classified as under the age of 18. So a 17 year old would technically be a child.

Sure but they are much older, anyone can see that. Turkish maffia is making millions forging pasports

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Sure but they are much older, anyone can see that. Turkish maffia is making millions forging pasports

Not exactly unusual when refugees are massed together. Market economics in action.

[Fragony]

Very big lol, this 16 year old must have gone througn a lot http://www.geenstijl.nl/mt/archieven....html#comments

Nobody who thinks hmmmmmmm no he's not really sixteen.

obviously 12, maybe younger.

manmanman

[ghostofxmaspast]

Sure but they are much older, anyone can see that. Turkish maffia is making millions forging pasports

Forged passports aren't needed. In fact they're better off with no passport or ID at all if they make it to UK.

And still the question which no politician wants to answer: If they want asylum and are fleeing oppression or persecution, then what is wrong with all of the several EU countries (including France) they had to go through in order to get to the UK?

There is a big difference between people genuinely fleeing for their lives and economic migrants. I know which type are in Calais. Most people know which type they are and what they are, but it's not politically correct to state that.

The UK government will allow these "unaccompanied children" for political reasons and nothing more, not out of kindness and not because they truly believe they are who they say they are. They may well be criminals, but that's someone else's problem.

Never thought I'd agree with fragony, but it's a farce and has nothing whatsoever to do with the welfare of migrants. It will simply cause even more people - in particular unaccompanied minors - to make more perilous journeys. Win, win for the people smugglers.