Already taken, I'm afraid. Not a fan of the warlords' kleptocracy, but Afghanistan's feature looks even bleaker now. I don't think the internationally recognized government has any hope of keeping Kabul, to be honest. Morale is around zero and the soldiers simply surrender or just desert. The Taliban will probably face regional uprisings, but only after their opponent has collapsed. Only a major foreign intervention can save it, but so far the priority seems to be just the evacuation. ANA desintegrated super quickly and in stark contrast to the Democratic Republic, which actually survived the USSR and crushed the Mujaheddin in Jalalabad.
Wasn't happy to see you were right that Kandahar had already fallen. The major military presence in Kandahar has always been down at KAF (Kandahar Airfield) where 205th Corps is based and seems to still be there though the are cutoff from Kabul so unless they go to Pakistan they're completely isolated.
The senior ANA officers that I worked with were all with the pro soviet Afghan Army so at the top in terms of experience there's no excuse for the failures. After the Soviet Union collapsed though the funds for the army dried up and the logistical links for keeping all the soviet equipment in working order also fell apart.
Before the pull out it's not like foreign forces were even securing much of the country, NATO was pretty much just relegated to a few bases with very few countries actually doing combat roles so it's not like the Afghan military hadn't been in the driver seat yet.
I suppose the difference between the Taliban and the ANA (in paper capabilities) is not even as large as that between the Iraqi Army and early IS in that regard.
Its not just a morale issue, its also corruption and incompetence.
Absolutely, I recall seeing my S3 Operations Officer counterpart at the Battalion(Kandak) level out in the marketplace selling the firewood that Kabul had sent to keep troops warm in the winter. The police Kandaks I worked with kept all the medical and fuel supplies at the HQ forcing the outposts to need to trade or sell their ammo to the locals just to get the gasoline to run the generator to pump drinking water out of the ground. The corruption and incompetence was mind boggling when I was there (I left in Dec 2013) but at the base level the Soldiers that had been in for a few years seemed fairly commited to actually fighting. The desertions were definitely common but mostly among the new recruits or anyone that got in trouble (in an illiterate military discipline is done through beatings and corvee).
Looks like we will get the 21st century version of the Fall of Saigon. Just terrible. I gotta say that the Biden admin really screwed the pooch on this one. The US withdrawal was far too quick, and the ceasefire from last year allowed the Taliban to gain strength before their impending final victory.
I agree whole heartedly, a more managed approach where at the very least we could provide the air power that we never really helped the Afghan Air Force buildup.
The current Afghan Government has been in power for twice as long as the Taliban ever were, it's a whole generation of people that have grown up under it and to see it all fall apart so quickly is surreal.
"Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
-Abraham Lincoln
Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.
The immorality and irresponsibility of the American strategy of withdrawal isn't in the precise timetable or in airstrikes or whatever (let's be frank, a hundred tons or two of aerial munitions can't affect the Taliban's operational progress anymore). It's in the failure to extract asylum seekers aggressively, beforehand.
Bring Afghans stateside by the tens of thousands and sort them out here, with full financial support, as we should have been doing since February (practically speaking). We owe even more as a responsible party, but it's never too late to step up.
Spmetla, I think after all the military misadventures of the United States aimed at statebuilding, in all parts of the world, we can conclusively affirm that military occupations can't reasonably create stable conditions from underlying instability. If anything, it only aggravates the situation, doesn't it? Soldiers can't build governments, and governments can't administer jurisdictions that are gripped by insurgency. If America can't prop up even Cuba or Haiti, maybe it should realize that it spends money only to create more problems in these circumstances. (Which isn't to say that there's nothing America could or should do, but American hard power has a terribly-ignoble record... Stick to core competencies.)
The immorality and irresponsibility of the American strategy of withdrawal isn't in the precise timetable or in airstrikes or whatever (let's be frank, a hundred tons or two of aerial munitions can't affect the Taliban's operational progress anymore). It's in the failure to extract asylum seekers aggressively, beforehand.
The failure to stand by those that worked hand in hand and shared danger like the many interpreters is truly embarrassing and deeply shameful to the US. Extracting all asylum seekers however would be overboard, we'd be pretty much having to transplant entire cities to the US.
conclusively affirm that military occupations can't reasonably create stable conditions from underlying instability. If anything, it only aggravates the situation, doesn't it?
They can but it's a matter of what risk to the soldiers are acceptable and how many are available, to actually do a military occupation of Afghanistan would have taken hundreds of thousands which was never an option. Instead we had enough soldiers to secure big bases and cities but not the countryside where most Afghans live meaning we could do 'raids' against the Taliban but at the end of the day we'd always give up whatever village or district the operation was in.
That's why relying on Afghan police, military and 'local police'/militias was the approach that was tried.
I'll agree though that an outside military with no linguistic or cultural understanding absolutely aggravates the situation. That's why I think this should have remained a special operations war. Once big army got involved establishing massive FOBs with thousands of troops and then trying to enforce NATO standards of security around the FOBs and all the roads linking the FOBs it absolutely aggravated the situation.
Soldiers can't build governments, and governments can't administer jurisdictions that are gripped by insurgency.
At no point did NATO Soldiers govern Afghanistan. The second half is correct, it's the catch-22 of counter insurgency. Instability and insurgency stops commerce and day to day life which fuels resentment. To paraphrase Mao, an insurgent is like a fish and the population is like the sea, how does a fisherman eliminate all of one type of fish in the sea?
maybe it should realize that it spends money only to create more problems in these circumstances
Looking at the last 20 years in Afghanistan (and Iraq) there really wasn't any long term plan and that in itself is major problem of the US and the Western World in general, we aren't planning beyond 2-10 year timelines effectively.
After 9/11 launching some cruise missiles at Al Queda bases in Afghanistan wasn't going to be acceptable to US domestic opinion. I think even in alternate universe with Al Gore in charge the US would have go to war with Al Queda and the Taliban. The US was running on the 'high' of being the sole superpower, Russia was in a laughable state, China was hardly more than a regional threat, the US got to be the 'good guy' in Desert Storm and Yugoslavia. There's no way that the 9/11 attacks would not create a demand for a military response.
In hindsight perhaps the war should have been essentially a 'great raid' in invade to oust Al Queda, team up with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban and then leave completely. The whole nation building part was started with as you demonstrated no real track record for it though instead of looking to Cuba and Haiti (why Cuba though?) I'd look to Somalia. US/UN failure there was the earliest indicator that western militaries and governments don't have the expertise and patience to fix a failed state.
The terrible example of Libya is probably what would have served US interests best in Afghanistan. Military action to get rid of what we consider bad or at least placate domestic opinion, then fund a rump government and hope it can secure its country. If it can't it's really no issue so long as the problem doesn't spill over the borders (the collapse of Mali under Tuareg invasion and then the use of Libya by people smugglers to Europe).
The response to ISIS is a good example of what should probably have been done in Afghanistan, SOF elements working with local militias/militaries to fight the 'bad guys'. The Taliban were initially kicked out using the above method, sadly staying and trying to help is what hurt the most. A SOF fight which fights the 'bad guys' but doesn't really aggravate the local population can work and keeps the US from getting into nation building.
American hard power has a terribly-ignoble record... Stick to core competencies.)
Well intentioned hard power with ignoble record whenever it is we throw in the towel, yes. The military is retooling for the peer to peer threats that are China and Russia and eager to forget all about counter insurgency again. SOF and the SFABs will be the tools of choice instead of military occupation to create stability.
US soft power however is at least being used intentially again, hated how Trump loved the idea of hard power yet decried wars and undermined all the government elements that are used for soft power.
Last edited by spmetla; 08-14-2021 at 04:24.
"Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
-Abraham Lincoln
Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.
Accepting he risk of being accused of using a retrospectroscope, what the USA should have done can be seen in what they did to get Bin Laden - a surgical strike by highly trained experts after some proper CIA work. Yes, highly illegal. But that has never been a concern, has it? What would it achieve? Sod all - but this was always about settling scores rather than any, y'know, use
Whilst NATO etc could tie up their forces in training the locals to kill the locals there is a finite amount of forces and many more local areas that need attention - be that North Africa, the Middle East, Ukraine (from a Eurocentric view point); Central America and the ASEAN from a more America-centric view; the countries surrounding Afghanistan can provide easily adequate assistance if they choose - and given that this is Pakistan, China, Iran and the other -stans well, they range from not friendly to openly hostile so having to deal with this mess if anything a benefit. If the UN wants to drop off some blue hats to get shot at well good on them.
Last edited by rory_20_uk; 08-15-2021 at 12:07.
An enemy that wishes to die for their country is the best sort to face - you both have the same aim in mind. Science flies you to the moon, religion flies you into buildings.
"If you can't trust the local kleptocrat whom you installed by force and prop up with billions of annual dollars, who can you trust?" Lemur
If you're not a liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 35, you have no brain.
The best argument against democracy is a five minute talk with the average voter. Winston Churchill
Some analysts in the USA thought Kabul could hold for 3 months. Is this another case of analysts creating work that the masters want?
American, French, Israeli, German, British troops to name a few could hold it for that time if not longer. There are armies around the world whose soldiers have fought against all the odds to the last man but there was never a chance this was going to happen - the Taliban have advanced at the speed the Afghan soldiers can run and the HumVees drive the advance has been as speedy as - ISIS did in Iraq.
Either Biden was lied to by his advisors when he said the Afghanistan could continue without the USA and allies or else he lied. Neither is particularly encouraging.
An enemy that wishes to die for their country is the best sort to face - you both have the same aim in mind. Science flies you to the moon, religion flies you into buildings.
"If you can't trust the local kleptocrat whom you installed by force and prop up with billions of annual dollars, who can you trust?" Lemur
If you're not a liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 35, you have no brain.
The best argument against democracy is a five minute talk with the average voter. Winston Churchill
Some analysts in the USA thought Kabul could hold for 3 months. Is this another case of analysts creating work that the masters want?
American, French, Israeli, German, British troops to name a few could hold it for that time if not longer. There are armies around the world whose soldiers have fought against all the odds to the last man but there was never a chance this was going to happen - the Taliban have advanced at the speed the Afghan soldiers can run and the HumVees drive the advance has been as speedy as - ISIS did in Iraq.
Either Biden was lied to by his advisors when he said the Afghanistan could continue without the USA and allies or else he lied. Neither is particularly encouraging.
Or he was making the best of what he'd been left with. The US obliged to withdraw, and observers both domestically and in Afghanistan holding him to his predecessor's promise.
This is not a "collapse," it is a popular uprising against us led by an opponent with none of our resources.
Preface: What I say about the proper scope and speed of evacuation and refugee programs for Afghanistan must be put in context of the fact that we probably couldn't physically extract such a number of persons without the managed consent of the Taliban, or the participation of Pakistani assets. You know, since there evidently wouldn't be anyone fighting behind the asylees' backs to secure their extraction, no matter the head start. Maybe it's still possible to have the Taliban peacefully expatriate those they want to be rid of and we need to take anyway - or maybe that's what we're currently working on; I dunno.
Originally Posted by spmetla
The failure to stand by those that worked hand in hand and shared danger like the many interpreters is truly embarrassing and deeply shameful to the US. Extracting all asylum seekers however would be overboard, we'd be pretty much having to transplant entire cities to the US.
Most Afghan refugees don't have a strong preference for America as a destination - and regardless I would say we should take a million of them if need be. So at the very least we should have made preparations to support thousands of them in Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and anywhere else, in abeyance. For the trillions we've spent on Afghanistan what's another ten billion on hundreds of thousands of lives and livelihoods? Of those who are interested in asylum in the US, every one of them deserves to have a safe space while they await a rapid and limited processing, which safe space could most directly manifest as a sojourn on American soil until the decision. The Biden administration is doing something like this to a very limited extent by allowing claims to be processed outside Afghanistan, IIRC, but physically transporting asylees to safety in the first case sounds best to me. Would it have sped the collapse of the central Afghan government in a rapid brain-and-heart drain? Yes, but at the rate we've observed the true collapse, it's hard to argue for big distinctions. The situation now will be even more destructive and disruptive beyond Afghan borders, unfinished as it is. Like I said, we should have been working furiously on the human aspect of withdrawal for years since, but even Biden had a little time to maneuver here as long as he was willing to commit the necessary resources and diplomacy, and tell the American media and Republicans to get bent.
After 9/11 launching some cruise missiles at Al Queda bases in Afghanistan wasn't going to be acceptable to US domestic opinion. I think even in alternate universe with Al Gore in charge the US would have go to war with Al Queda and the Taliban.
If we do alternate worlds, why not one where Gore reads the reports and averts 9/11, or where we negotiate with the Taliban to get results, or where we leave after a year, having accomplished the counterterrorist mission (whether or not bin Laden himself is neutralized)? A President can get away with a lot with 80% approval ratings. AS WE KNOW LOL
The US was running on the 'high' of being the sole superpower, Russia was in a laughable state, China was hardly more than a regional threat, the US got to be the 'good guy' in Desert Storm and Yugoslavia. There's no way that the 9/11 attacks would not create a demand for a military response.
Righteous anger is one thing, mindless bloodthirstiness with world-devastating results is a shameful other. It will never cease to horrify me how we had the whole neighborhood's sympathy over a baseball through the kitchen window and rode it to firebomb the nearby trailer park and threaten everyone else over it.
In hindsight perhaps the war should have been essentially a 'great raid' in invade to oust Al Queda, team up with the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban and then leave completely. The whole nation building part was started with as you demonstrated no real track record for it though instead of looking to Cuba and Haiti (why Cuba though?) I'd look to Somalia. US/UN failure there was the earliest indicator that western militaries and governments don't have the expertise and patience to fix a failed state.
That example, along with Haiti, wasn't illustrating the aspect of military intervention against an enemy, but that of using military assets or aid to prop up the government we preferred. The US desperately needs to learn that being surrounded by richer, stronger, peer countries is better for its long-term interests than trying to exert violent imperial control with minimal intellectual and non-military social investment - even when those countries don't all share the American government's views on something. Democracy nationally and internationally have shared fates. Suicidal hypocrisy is one of the worst things about this country. Actually, correction: more like a murder-suicide pact. Lots of murder.
The terrible example of Libya is probably what would have served US interests best in Afghanistan. Military action to get rid of what we consider bad or at least placate domestic opinion, then fund a rump government and hope it can secure its country. If it can't it's really no issue so long as the problem doesn't spill over the borders (the collapse of Mali under Tuareg invasion and then the use of Libya by people smugglers to Europe).
The response to ISIS is a good example of what should probably have been done in Afghanistan, SOF elements working with local militias/militaries to fight the 'bad guys'. The Taliban were initially kicked out using the above method, sadly staying and trying to help is what hurt the most. A SOF fight which fights the 'bad guys' but doesn't really aggravate the local population can work and keeps the US from getting into nation building.
Without expanding the scope of the conversation too much, rebuilding Libya, linked to the Mediterranean as it was, should have been vastly easier than Afghanistan, so long as one wasn't excessively bothered about the condition of the far interior. But we didnt try, to the point that thousands of migrants could bite Europe in the ass as a political problem. Imagine the EU and US spending $2 trillion on the Libyan economy itself: Misrata could look like Monte Carlo. The problem is that we're terrible at long-term commitment as groups and individuals and will happily suffer (or allow others to suffer) over long periods to avoid disrupting a terrible status quo.
At no point did NATO Soldiers govern Afghanistan.
Exactly. They couldn't have. What government Afghanistan did have, we dissolved by force, with little to replace it.
It's worth pointing out that the one real case (AFAIK) of successful reconstruction under military governance or guardianship, US-occupied Germany and Japan, featured at bottom a security environment where all sources of instability exclusive of the occupation itself had been stamped out already. When you look at Haiti under Clinton through Obama, for example, it's not exactly a warzone but a society so impoverished and insecure, with few national constituencies and bases of power, that a foreign military presence can at best kick the can down the road. I can't find the article now, but it was pointed out that Haiti was only worse off on numerous indicators following US and UN missions there, and that this shows the general concept true of external armed forces being unconducive to lasting stabilization. Foreign soldiers can freeze a collapse or a conflict in the short term, perhaps, but they contribute nothing to actually developing the economy or the civil society by their mere presence. You need much more for that... Meanwhile, and this is the critical part, when you have those foreign soldiers propping up some weak and unpopular government, it actually weakens its ability to build legitimacy and exert its sovereignty over the jurisdiction, sort of like how free clothing and foodstuffs in earlier phases of international assistance to struggling African countries happened to impair the health of domestic textiles and agricultural industries - because they were being crowded out.
On the Right, between 1980-2016 especially, we often heard warnings that government investment would crowd out the private sector in a vicious cycle of economic stagnation (military Keynesianism exempted), but this theory may have always held more true on the level of interactions between states and societies.
The principle arguably even applies to the ANA, who I hear were used as auxiliaries to the US mission to the end, equipped to fight a conventional and technological war without the experience or technology to do it alone. Meaning in practice the ANA was never put in a position to fight its real-world enemies unassisted.
Thus I repeat: Soldiers can't build governments, not by nor with gunpoint. Or in another phrasing, 'Infantry take and hold ground, not develop it.'
I want the US to involve itself in nationbuilding at home and abroad. The military just doesn't have much role in that. Something along the lines of this old talk (some of which hasn't aged well), which to simplify recommends something like a Department of War and a Department of Everything Else (Nationbuilding, or Peace according to Marianne Williamson). Battle space vs. transition space vs. peace space in his words: "You can't ask the same 19-year old to do it day in and day out."
Well intentioned hard power with ignoble record whenever it is we throw in the towel, yes. The military is retooling for the peer to peer threats that are China and Russia and eager to forget all about counter insurgency again. SOF and the SFABs will be the tools of choice instead of military occupation to create stability.
US soft power however is at least being used intentially again, hated how Trump loved the idea of hard power yet decried wars and undermined all the government elements that are used for soft power.
From what little I know of US diplomacy with the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, it was progressing well on core objectives of mitigating the Taliban's endorsement of international terrorism, until Bush and the New American Century neocons decided to take their American-boot-up-the-ass show on the road. Soft power is just everything besides hard power, itself almost exclusively military force, despite frequent framing that treats soft power as but the domain of the The Simpsons and Will Smith and Elton John. What was preventing us from taking Iran as a partner in 2001? There's a lot of ruin in a nation, and the US retains - despite everything - a fair amount of power to constrain the export, diffusion, and re-import of corruption, state failure, and economic exploitation. In 2001 meanwhile the US was unmatched in relative power anywhere and anytime. How many licks does it take to get to the ruin of a nation?
The US security establishment has never understood that friendly-but-transactional relations with democratic peer nations, and even illiberal troublemakers, is worth uncountably more than a constellation of temporarily-leashed autocratic commodity/poverty farms. It's part of what's been undermining us domestically and abroad since the end of the Victorian era. Without indulging in what-ifs, it's plain to see that on the day of the 9/11 attacks, we had ample opportunity and approbation to treat the matter as an international criminal conspiracy and to work to bring the whole Middle East into a healthier state of being. The 2000 election and the entire response to 9/11 are some of the very greatest blunders, hinges, in all of history, and many people won't survive them ongoing. That's worth a lot of disappointment.
A decent starting point would be to faithfully orient national strategy around the literal text of the Weinberger Doctrine.
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress. The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.
Last edited by Montmorency; 08-16-2021 at 07:29.
Vitiate Man.
History repeats the old conceits
The glib replies, the same defeats
From what little I know of US diplomacy with the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, it was progressing well on core objectives of mitigating the Taliban's endorsement of international terrorism, until Bush and the New American Century neocons decided to take their American-boot-up-the-ass show on the road.
The major lynch-pin for the invasion of Afghanistan was that the Taliban refused to evict Al Queda and Bin Laden based on the Pashtun Wali concept of protecting their 'guests' no matter who comes knocking on the door. The operations in the Tora Bora Mtns almost got Bin Laden but he escaped over into Pakistan and for whatever reason the Bush Admin didn't put the pressure needed on Pakistan to pursue him. In hindsight we gave them an ultimatum much like Austro-Hungary did to to Serbia before WWI.
Soft power is just everything besides hard power, itself almost exclusively military force, despite frequent framing that treats soft power as but the domain of the The Simpsons and Will Smith and Elton John.
I understand what soft power is, in the government the major elements of power that can be exerted are DIME or diplomatic, information, military, and economic. I highly highly doubt soft power would have coughed up Bin Laden, unfortunately some criminal elements can only be eliminated with a combination of soft and hard power though the ramped up drone strikes etc.. done from Bush/Obama/Trump onward have certainly go overboard on the hard power part primarily because there are so many ungoverned regions in which these groups base themselves.
What was preventing us from taking Iran as a partner in 2001? There's a lot of ruin in a nation, and the US retains - despite everything - a fair amount of power to constrain the export, diffusion, and re-import of corruption, state failure, and economic exploitation. In 2001 meanwhile the US was unmatched in relative power anywhere and anytime. How many licks does it take to get to the ruin of a nation?
Nothing was preventing us from partnering Iran in 2001 besides the Bush administrations pig headedness. After the example of the gulf war a a decade earlier and toppling the Taliban in Iran's backdoor the Iranians very rightly feared they were next. If I recall correctly from what I read in the "Persian Puzzle" ten years ago the Iranians pretty much offered us everything we'd been asking for to reestablish relations and deescalate tensions between us and they were completed rebuffed by Bush Jr and Co which then proceeded to invade Iraq.
The year 2001 certainly was filled with potential and it's hard to believe twenty years later how those key decisions made have led us to the unfortunate position now.
The United States should not commit forces to combat unless the vital national interests of the United States or its allies are involved.
U.S. troops should only be committed wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. Otherwise, troops should not be committed.
U.S. combat troops should be committed only with clearly defined political and military objectives and with the capacity to accomplish those objectives.
The relationship between the objectives and the size and composition of the forces committed should be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
U.S. troops should not be committed to battle without a "reasonable assurance" of the support of U.S. public opinion and Congress.
The commitment of U.S. troops should be considered only as a last resort.
I agree with most of the ideas of the Weinberger Doctrine but unfortunately it comes from an era with slightly clearer lines than now, there's a lot of what ifs and gray area that it doesn't address.
To start, I don't think anyone ever commits US troops without the intent of winning, but ignorance, overconfidence and so on make initial assessments with the 'fog of war' difficult. I would agree on the well defined military objectives that are tied to a political objective. That's generally what's been undertaken, the problem is the short sighted look beyond the military solution. In Iraq, the military pretty much did what it was asked, defeat Saddam Hussein's army, there wasn't a plan to occupy the country and provide security for ten years. The military plan seemed to assume that there'd be some sort of peace deal and then they go home, the Bush Admin forgot to consider that when engaging in regime change there's no one left with the legitimacy to make peace with.
The reassessment of the size forces is certainly one of the most scrutinized things that actually does happen which is what led to the deluge of hiring military contractors so that basic things like base security can be accomplished without having ot bring in a few hundred more troops that add to the much scrutinized troop numbers.
The last two are a bit difficult for the gray area aspect, special operations, drone strikes, cyber warfare etc... are largely done without vetting public opinion and with only a few key members of congress/senate notified. Sending regular formations of Soldiers somewhere certainly gets public debate.
The other problematic aspects are we have a lot of treaty allies now and as the US is the keep over the current world order versus the 'revisionist' powers of Russia and China this involves a lot of support for countries that aren't clear allies but have some tacit US agreements to maintain their territorial sovereignty (for example Ukraine, Taiwan). The willingness to use force is sadly as important as the ability to use it which is why the pendalum swing from pacifism/appeasement to militarism/hegemony are so dangerous to ourselves and the world. Putin may be an SOB but at least his allies know where he stands, same with the PRC when it comes to their interests.
Sending the navy to deter pirate attacks or escort vessels in a dangerous area can lead to conflict, routine air patrols and training can lead to incidents like the Hainan island crash.
The 2000 election and the entire response to 9/11 are some of the very greatest blunders, hinges, in all of history, and many people won't survive them ongoing. That's worth a lot of disappointment.
Couldn't agree more, as a patriotic guy seeing a generation of our effort, revenue, and standing wasted is incredibly disappointing.
To get back on topic though, talking with friends and chatting on facebook and other social media today, there's certainly a lot of soul searching going on today by Afghan veterans. I am and remain ashamed of our hurried and unplanned departure, while every administration has led up to this point I still lay may blame for the immediate debacle on the Trump for dealing with the Taliban that undermined the little legitimacy left for the actual Afghan government and then with Biden for doing this stupid hurried pullout. Call it ripping the bandaid off, sure, but it didn't have to be with leaving bases in the middle of the night without letting the ANA know, without a plan to help the translators that worked with us, without a pledge of support to the Afghan government and people.
I truly feel terrible for the Afghans that wanted a modern life that are now stuck there, I can only hope that I'm as wrong about the Taliban's intentions on ruling as I was about the ANA willingness to fight. Having my dad talk to me about where he was when Saigon fell and then see that imagine of a CH-47 evacuating the US Embassy in Kabul to match the parallel perfectly. To think this year started out with an attempted coup by the sitting president and then has led to this by my preferred "America is Back" candidate is depressing.
"Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
-Abraham Lincoln
Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.
Biden speech on Afghanistan today. Over-the-horizon counterterrorism. The Afghan government and military are contemptible and unsalvageable. Don't involve American troops in this business. New information: Ghani government asked Biden admin to slow down evacuation to avoid precipitating panic.
Tragic 2005 story on a National Guardsman pointlessly killed in Iraq due to a lack of training and equipment. Captures the essence of the whole broader conflict.
More stories on how the ANA was totally overmatched, undertrained for their independent mission, undersupplied (by massive corruption and bad logistics), in pay arrears forever, and basically bribed by the Taliban Mongol-style into surrender. This is, by the way, another component of incredible mission failure by the US, since propping up the ANA was exactly the domain of the American military and state department to a T. ANA failure is a systemic failure by the American military and government, not a political failure. But it makes more sense if you interpret the continued intervention as being more about lining the pockets of military-industrial corporations, security contractors, and other interested actors on the take, rather than achieving a concrete military or strategic outcome. The common Afghan soldier, especially the serious ones, has been betrayed many times over. But we're disturbingly good at facilitating the betrayal of allied fighters once we have no use for them... https://observers.france24.com/en/20...diers-army-eat https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...or-the-taliban https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...lapse-taliban/ https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghani...an-11628958253 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/13/w...-collapse.html
This story reviews the point directly, reiterating the old leaked internal documents from State and Defense - that the US military was never honestly preparing the ANA for anything useful, knew about it, and lied about it, because the security establishment believes that any level of deceit towards the American public and political class is justified in the pursuit of it's harebrained internal consensuses. Every discrete actor or group here, at every level of American government and society from President to the voting public, messed up continuously. This is what people talk about when they say it feels shameful to be an American. How is one to be proud of 'with great power comes great failure, better luck next time'?
In the summer of 2011, Army Lt. Gen. William Caldwell IV made a round of public appearances to boast that he had finally solved a problem that had kept U.S. troops bogged down in Afghanistan for a decade. Under his watch, he asserted, U.S. military advisers and trainers had transformed the ragtag Afghan army and police into a professional fighting force that could defend the country and keep the Taliban at bay... In fact, according to documents obtained for the forthcoming Washington Post book“The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War,” U.S. military officials privately harbored fundamental doubts for the duration of the war that the Afghan security forces could ever become competent or shed their dependency on U.S. money and firepower. “Thinking we could build the military that fast and that well was insane,” an unnamed former U.S. official told government interviewers in 2016.
Senior U.S. officials said the Pentagon fell victim to the conceit that it could build from scratch an enormous Afghan army and police force with 350,000 personnel that was modeled on the centralized command structures and complex bureaucracy of the Defense Department. Though it was obvious from the beginning that the Afghans were struggling to make the U.S.-designed system work, the Pentagon kept throwing money at the problem and assigning new generals to find a solution.
Twitter thread pointing out that Trump's Winter 2020 deal ending sanctions, limiting air strikes (?), exchanging 5000 Taliban prisoners for 1000, had the immediate effect of permanently undermining ANA readiness and set the stage for the mass distributed surrender of ANA forces this summer (it wasn't just hashed out in a few weeks, it was a long time down the pike).
Reminder of Coalition war crimes in Afghanistan, including calculated mass execution of civilians and their posthumous addition to official "kill lists" (Joint Priority Effects List).
Originally Posted by spmetla
The major lynch-pin for the invasion of Afghanistan was that the Taliban refused to evict Al Queda and Bin Laden based on the Pashtun Wali concept of protecting their 'guests' no matter who comes knocking on the door. The operations in the Tora Bora Mtns almost got Bin Laden but he escaped over into Pakistan and for whatever reason the Bush Admin didn't put the pressure needed on Pakistan to pursue him. In hindsight we gave them an ultimatum much like Austro-Hungary did to to Serbia before WWI.
I wasn't around to follow the events in realtime, so my awareness is limited to items such as this.
President George Bush rejected as "non-negotiable" an offer by the Taliban to discuss turning over Osama bin Laden if the United States ended the bombing in Afghanistan.
Returning to the White House after a weekend at Camp David, the president said the bombing would not stop, unless the ruling Taliban "turn [bin Laden] over, turn his cohorts over, turn any hostages they hold over." He added, "There's no need to discuss innocence or guilt. We know he's guilty". In Jalalabad, deputy prime minister Haji Abdul Kabir - the third most powerful figure in the ruling Taliban regime - told reporters that the Taliban would require evidence that Bin Laden was behind the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, but added: "we would be ready to hand him over to a third country".
Speaking of which, fill me in: did George Bush ever specify that neutralizing bin Laden was a primary goal of the "War on Terror," or was it all just a pretext for launching the crusade against the Axis of Evil, with Afghanistan being a mere roadstop on the way to manufacturing consent for the conquest of Iraq that Bush and co had explicitly campaigned on since before the election?
The President wanted a plan that featured the rapid use of military force and the insertion of troops on the ground as soon as possible. It should be noted here that some Defense officials believed that the terrorists likely had the help of a state sponsor and that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was the most likely suspect.9
The issue of simultaneously attacking Iraq was brought up at Camp David by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, but the suggestion had little support among the National Security Council (NSC) principals and was sidelined by the President. The timing was not fortuitous. However, on September 26, President Bush asked Rumsfeld in private to “look at the shape of our plans on Iraq” and asked for “creative” options.10 In any event, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) planning for a potential war in Iraq would begin in earnest in November 2001 before the conclusion of the initial fighting in Afghanistan.11
In terms of Value Over Replacement, it's plainly been historicist bias not to rank Bush and Trump as among the three worst presidents in our history. These contemporary bottom threes are mostly defensible, but seeing Bush moved out of the bottom 10 is an outrageous revision.
But this is also tangential to what I was getting at, which is that
I understand what soft power is, in the government the major elements of power that can be exerted are DIME or diplomatic, information, military, and economic. I highly highly doubt soft power would have coughed up Bin Laden, unfortunately some criminal elements can only be eliminated with a combination of soft and hard power though the ramped up drone strikes etc.. done from Bush/Obama/Trump onward have certainly go overboard on the hard power part primarily because there are so many ungoverned regions in which these groups base themselves.
What I mean is, kinetic measures against OBL himself were always going to be more about revenge than degrading credible opposition capabilities (noting that a clean operation eliminating him with limited geopolitical collateral would have bothered very few people). Whereas preventing the use of Afghanistan as a staging and training ground for transnational networks into the future was, theoretically and intellectually, the highest objective behind the invasion. Before 2001 the human rights picture in Afghanistan or the Taliban's legitimacy was a niche activist interest. My point therefore is that following the attacks I suspect our subkinetic array of sticks and carrots was sufficient to bend the Taliban towards our purposes, cheaply if incrementally improving its security and human rights landscape.
Recalling the debates around Syria and Ukraine, I continue to lament that right-wing Trotskyism,
Spoiler Alert, click show to read:
he neoconservatives who went through the Trotskyist and socialist movements came to see foreign policy as a crusade, the goal of which was first global socialism, then social democracy, and finally democratic capitalism. They never saw foreign policy in terms of national interest or balance of power. Neoconser vatism was a kind of inverted Trotskyism, which sought to "export democracy," in Muravchik's words, in the same way that Trotsky originally envisaged exporting socialism. It saw its adversaries on the left as members or representatives of a public sector-based new class. The neoconservatives also got their conception of intellectual and political work from their socialist past. They did not draw the kind of rigid distinction between theory and practice that many academics and politicians do. Instead they saw theory as a form of political combat and politics as an endeavor that should be informed by theory. They saw themselves as a cadre in a cause rather than as strictly independent intellectuals. And they were willing to use theory as a partisan weapon.
like most things Right, seems to retain elite-tier clout no matter the results, yet imagining a hard-left American administration trying to pick up where the Soviets left off in a proper "liberatory" war of choice is farcical: The governing party would suffer a historic landslide defeat at the nearest opportunity like few moments in our history have seen - regardless of how well or poorly operationalized the adventure may have been.
I truly feel terrible for the Afghans that wanted a modern life that are now stuck there, I can only hope that I'm as wrong about the Taliban's intentions on ruling as I was about the ANA willingness to fight. Having my dad talk to me about where he was when Saigon fell and then see that imagine of a CH-47 evacuating the US Embassy in Kabul to match the parallel perfectly. To think this year started out with an attempted coup by the sitting president and then has led to this by my preferred "America is Back" candidate is depressing.
Biden's brand was optimism, decency, and good feelings, just like Obama's was unity and prosperity through cerebral dealmaking, and Trump's was getting the right sort of people back in power again. These brands reflect/arise from both their political fortunes and their underlying personalities. Biden was never going to go turbo-Carter and tell the sane part of the American - or Afghan - public to plan for the rest of their lives on the Rollercoaster to Hell. (Though his address linked at the top of the post is fairly sober and forthright.)
Tangential note: Even with half a million troops in Afghanistan on rotation, defeating the Taliban would arguably be out of reach without somehow leashing the Pakistani government. And even then, the Saudi and Iranian and Russian and Chinese governments...
And to think we had their diplomatic support/approval for many potential courses of action in late 2001... It serves one well to remember that the old adage isn't "Swing that big stick all about like you're cosplaying Leatherface."
Last edited by Montmorency; 08-17-2021 at 07:13.
Vitiate Man.
History repeats the old conceits
The glib replies, the same defeats
If you purchased $10,000 of stock evenly divided among America’s top five defense contractors on September 18, 2001 — the day President George W. Bush signed the Authorization for Use of Military Force in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks — and faithfully reinvested all dividends, it would now be worth $97,295. This is a far greater return than was available in the overall stock market over the same period. $10,000 invested in an S&P 500 index fund on September 18, 2001, would now be worth $61,613. That is, defense stocks outperformed the stock market overall by 58 percent during the Afghanistan War.
Last edited by ReluctantSamurai; 08-18-2021 at 01:13.
Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban
Originally Posted by Crandar
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