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Thread: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

  1. #121
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    /////////////FIRST PART PROBABLY BELONGS IN GREAT POWER CONTENTION THREAD/////////////////////
    Bottom line: Is it very easy or very difficult to deter China on Taiwan, and if it's very difficult would adopting the most aggressive posture not ironically encourage China to be both more willing and more able to impose its will (this is known as "tragic drama")

    If it's very easy, just make the commitment, station a fleet or two, and call it a day - no discussion needed.
    I'd say it's difficult to deter China on Taiwan. As for making a commitment, that's part of the tragedy of the current situation with Taiwan and the flaw in the one-China policy. One-China policy was banked on the idea that opening up China would liberalize them and then allow for a peaceful rise and reunification, that was sorta working up until the early 2000s.
    China has now reversed their path of liberalization and gone back toward the path of repression, this has pushed Taiwan's youth from wanting reunification, especially in light of the crack downs in Hongkong, social credit scores, etc...
    With this, the US has now become coupled with China economically, it could break this relationship but that would be difficult and costly to the US and all the other major economies that have moved their industrial base and supply chains to China.

    The logic of an aggressive posture is that by being willing to risk war and the economic fallout in the near future, that risk is actually higher for China as they depend on sealanes for most of their trade, part of why they're investing in the new belt/road initative. A war would be economically costly to the whole world but would absolutely ruin China if it happened in present day.
    This is also tied with the fact that Xi Jinping has been the most powerful Chinese leader in 30 years and seems determined to be cemented in its memory on the same level as Mao Zedong. That type of meglamania can be unpredictable like we saw in the last four years of Trump. Granted Xi is actually smart man and calculating unlike Trump but that doesn't exclude him from wanting to accomplish the goal of reunification by force if needed.
    Just remember that the US position and that of its allies in the region is reactionary to China's new aggressive posture. They seek to change the status quo, forcibly if needed and are actively contending with the US at all levels short of conflict at the moment. Combine this with the ultra-nationalism and you get an opponent that won't negotiate on this issue leaving them with only one recourse if they want to force the issue.

    Deterring from what and in what capacity needs to be delineated. We already have a NATO commitment to mutual defense, which is the most important step.
    Mutual defense is only valuable if the members are capable and willing to defend each other. If some 'little green men' tried to overthrow Latvia's government in a Crimea type scenario are the NATO allies in the region capable of assisting? are they even willing? Trump question whether we should go to war to help Estonia was a huge hit to the idea of mutal defense.
    I personally think the major litmus test for NATO will be some crazy thing cooked up by Turkey over some Greek islands, Cyprus, Syria, or Armenia. Do we mutually defend one NATO ally against another. If one NATO ally starts a war that then draws in Russia in a limited way does that trigger article five? The Armenia-Azerbaijan war last year is fortunate in it's not expanding beyond those two countries.

    I don't see why the UK and France and Germany need to be militarizing for offensive operations into Eastern Europe. Today we know that Russia's strategic position in its near-abroad is weak, and not getting any stronger, as the (to some surprising) failure to check Ukrainian post-Russian ambitions demonstrated. Putin has a hard time trudging through his priorities for even Belarus. A massive armament campaign for NATO to achieve the capability to credibly strike against a hypothetical Russian occupation of Ukraine or Estonia would be socially corrosive and horrendously costly both before and during (any) deployment, in the latter case in terms of lives and materiel. It would also, naturally, incentivize further hostility from the Russian regime (if you think Europe can recommit to an arms race, Putin certainly can too - to hell with the domestic economy - in order to negate European augmentation).
    Who's talking about offensive operations? No sane person wants to start shit with Russia much less go on an offensive against them. It doesn't need to be a massive armament campaign, no one is advocating for a quarter million US troops back in Germany and its allies having dozens of armored divisions standing by.
    As for Putin being able to afford an arms race, I don't think he can. There's a reason why India has more modern T-90 tanks than Russia, Russia can't afford them. Russia is so cash strapped they still sell the Chinese jet-engines and air defense systems fully knowing that they will eventually be reverse engineered and that the Chinese will overtake Russia in most of its overseas arms sales.
    Russia is currently a threat that needs to be contained, it may not be a long term threat as who knows what it will be once Putin leaves. He certainly doesn't share the lime light, that tends to leave the successors to popular dictators vulnerable to infighting and domestic power plays.
    Europe needs to be capable to play the long game against Putin and deter more action on his part in the bordering states. The long-term should be to try and do what failed in the 90s and finally bring Russia home into Europe (not the EU or NATO). China is not a good partner for Russia and never has been, it's been a good source of cash at the expense of Russia losing it's military edge and secrets but China's ambitions in the far east and central asia will lead to their becoming enemies again at some point.
    https://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...ina-and-russia

    Getting NATO allies to at least get their readiness levels up so they could commit the few forces they have to a crisis if needed would be the most useful. No point in an air force if lack of spare parts means they can't be used when needed.
    https://www.dw.com/en/german-militar...ion/a-42603112

    Core European sealanes, borders, and airspace are secure from foreign powers as far as I know (not that there's a contender other than Russia here). If you mean that the EU needs more ships to shoot at Ivory Coast pirates or Mediterranean migrants, I don't see why. It might be more helpful to get a handle on what role Turkey is going to play in the region.
    As most of European/EU issues center around trade then Naval power is actually one of the best investments they can make. You may scoff at piracy but it is a problem that naval patrols have helped to mitigate. The core causes of piracy exist but short of nation building Somalia, Yemen and plenty of other countries the easier and more cost effective solution is sealane protection. Warships are expensive but if you're going to build ships then ideally they're capable of more than just deterring pirates, probably best to have the capability to lauch and support SOF too, or perhaps fly the flag where free navigation is threatened (South China Seas). Strategic lift capability and reach is extremely useful by air and sea and has uses for humanitarian aid as well moving troops ,there's a lot more to defense spending than tanks and troops though those are necessary too. Building NATO logistical and cyber-warfare capabilities that were independent of the US would be hugely useful and have uses beyond conventional warfare too.
    As you mention migrants though the EU seriously needs a lot more investment in FRONTEX. Belarus, Russia, Turkey, and Morocco all use migrants as a weapon, opening and closing the flow over the border as needed to punish the border nations of Europe and create European domestic infighting. It's like a modern day reverse Barbary-pirates scenario, give these concessions or we let thousands more over the border to become your problem. Just look at Lithuania bearing the brunt from Belarus in response to their raising diplomatic status of Taiwan's office.
    European sealanes and interests go a bit farther than just Europe's periphery though, the blockage of the Suez was hugely costly to European trade. The arctic is melting and Canada, Norway and Denmark/Greenland aren't exactly poised to stop Russian resource exploration when that eventually happens. Ice breakers and artic capable coast guard and aerial patrols will be a necessity as the Northwest passage becomes more common for Europe-East Asian trade (shorter and therefore cheaper for Northern/Western Europe).

    Do you mean cruise missiles? My knowledge of the relevant systems is limited, but I recall that a modern navy will have strong countermeasures against any such systems, as best demonstrated by the Coalition naval forces during the Gulf War. Wouldn't the best practicable option be quantity rather than superior technical sophistication? Dozens to hundreds of missiles against landing craft close to shore (with the caveat that the entire Chinese sealift would never all be exposed at a single moment) seems like the only option.
    It's a fair bit more complicated than that, the weapons and defenses have moved a long way from the Gulf War. If we're relying on line of sight weapons against landing craft then the invasion is already a success. In short though, Taiwan needs what you've mentioned before, good area-denial capability and we should help build it. Taiwan doesn't have much strategic depth so relying on defense to fend off the PLA in the face of drone swarms, ballistic missiles, electronic and cyber warfare can only do so much. Given the geographic, qualitative, and numerical advantage of China that's only a method to buy time. The deterrence is in the capability to come to the aid of Taiwan if needed, this deterrence must not be vulnerable to a Chinese first strike either (a modern day Pearl Harbor in another form) which is why the US has been moving Marines out of Okinawa and to Guam and hopefully now to Australia too. With the Philippines not being available the US has lost a lot of strategic depth too and is relying on only a few major bases to cover and project power into a very large area.

    That latter outcome is too high a risk for the CCP, as it would lose enormous quantities of domestic legitimacy, international standing, economic stability, military readiness, and so on, all for the sake of empty posturing; Taiwan would be further out of reach than ever. Since the CCP has demonstrated its rationality many times, assuming it retains that rationality we keep returning to the principle that any overt measure to reduce Taiwan's independence has to be projected to be rapid and decisive from the Chinese point of view.
    China's record for rationality has been slipping a lot as of late, they take much more risk for much less gain than the previous three generations have. When you keep telling your population that 'our time is now and the US must step back and allow us to take our rightful place' they eventually expect their leaders to act on it. A generation raised on propaganda eventually results in people ruling that believe that same propaganda.

    //////////////////HERE STARTS ISIS/TALIBAN GWOT TALK////////////////////////////

    The degradation of the state system in the Middle East has set up some social and humanitarian consequences that will reach throughout the century, which go without elaboration, and has in fact altered strategic relationships: see the drift of Turkey and Pakistan, the comparative loss of Influence of Saudi Arabia, Arab-Israeli rapprochement, the permanentish alienation of Iran from the West, Russian reentry to the region, indeed the continuing (I would say accelerated) spread and escalation of terrorism to full-blown internal conflict around the Islamic world...

    Back to the issue of deterrence, the War on Terror made China and Russia intrinsically much less friendly to the American order ("And when the band plays "Hail to the chief", Ooh, they point the cannon at you"). This is almost as profound as it gets in the contemporary period. Whaddaya want for to call it world change, the collapse of the EU and a return to armed territorial conflict between Continental states, the reemergence of a true Caliphate, the final disappearance of American primacy - uh?
    GWOT didn't degrade the state system in the middle east, it's always been teetering. The only stable governments in the region over the last 50 years has been Israel and Saudi Arabia, each with significant issues too.
    Turkey has been adrift for a long time, it's issues with Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, the Kurds have ensured that it would never be a real European nation. Erdogan's actions and spur toward dictatorship haven't been because of GWOT.
    Pakistan is in the same boat as Turkey, were they ever really a US ally? Only when it looked like India would go from non-allied to Soviet bloc and as a base to funnel weapons to the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan but that didn't happen and India opened up so no need for Pakistan and it's perpetually causing problems for every one of its neighbors.

    True on the effect of making China and Russia less friendly. I'd say that NATO actions against Serbia and the dangling of NATO membership to Ukraine and Georgia together with our cozying up with Azerbaijan are what really turned Russia against the US. GWOT just provided opportunity while the US was tied down in quagmires.
    Of course China would oppose US actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan is right next door and if the history of the US establishing permanent bases succeeded there then there'd be a threat to China's strategic depth. The Bush 'axis of evil' and policy of regime change in Iraq is what really pushed China into firm opposition.
    World changing events tend to affect the whole world. GWOT was significant for the middle east and parts of Africa. It's affects on most of Africa, Asia, the Americas, and most of Europe (apart from the troop contributing nations) weren't all that significant. The collapse of the Warsaw pact and then Soviet Union had an immediate far reaching effects. The Suez Crisis essentially ending France/UK great power status and leading to France's divorce from NATO and the expedited policies of France and the UK to decolonize changed the makeup of the world leading to huge social, economic, and political upheavals in all former colonies over the next 30 years. So yeah, your later examples are far closer to the mark though you took them to a another extreme degree.

    The deciding factor is that our decisions on the basic form of the Afghan government we would recognize - a unitary, centralized republic - restricted plausible forms for the Afghan milsec establishment to what we would recognize as a conventional, centralized, milsec establishment. But the point that the Taliban had no need for air support is a suggestive one; could different governmental and social forms for our endorsement have produced more resilient native anti-Taliban operations under a less complex and costly organization? And I don't mean fomenting a permanent war of all militias and ethnicities against all. But that requires creativity, cultural sensitivity and responsiveness to local conditions, and a willingness to supercede path dependence that the US - more fairly states in general - has shown little aptitude for.
    Well, yes, different government, military, and social forms could have worked. The idea that we could ever impose the needed ideal state even given the creativity and sensitivity we lack is just not gonna happen and never was. There's no such thing as a perfect government, all governance is a compromise of some sort. The GIROA experimient was apprantly too centralized, perhaps more power in the districts and provinces would have been more successful.
    I get what you're saying about about air support not being necessary but that's always been an issue in all counter-insurgencies. The insurgent can hide in the population, doesn't wear a uniform so is able to only strike when he's got the advantage and so on. Separation the insurgent from the populace is the way to win; we evidently failed to do that from some combination of fear or at the minimum neutrality toward the insurgent or support for the insurgent. The areas that support the Taliban support what the Taliban stand for, a modern representative liberal for the region nation state of any form was not going to get their short term support. Giving them a status like the northwest frontier tribal region (Pakistan) might have been a solution but that's too large an area of Afghanistan to break up, it'd be essentially balkanizing the country. The failure of GIROA to win over the population doesn't necessarily mean the population supports the Taliban either, they just don't care enough to oppose the Taliban or risk their life for GIROA.
    Air support is only useful if it's supporting troops on the ground, seeing as the ANA didn't even bother fighting the Taliban once we left it makes no difference if they had one plane or a million. If the ANA had fought the Taliban then air support would have given an edge in firepower and mobility as it has for the past seven years in which the ANA did most of the fighting and dying and NATO mostly just advised from the sidelines.

    The GIROA was a flawed beast but it had far more of the elements you advocate for than the Taliban government did in the past and looks to have in the future. The Taliban are primarily Sunni zealots and Pashto tribesman, they don't have a history have much cultural sensitivity towards the Hazarras (they're Shia too), Tajiks, Iranians, or Uzbeks.

    There's currently a moment of opportunity for the Taliban to be the government that you advocate but I'm positive that they will not do that. They are a hardline extremist organization. Twenty years of fighting and a 'god given victory' will not temper that too much. The formal world organizations will likely keep the bank accounts closed as the Taliban won't make the concessions to human rights needed to allow 'the west' to morally deal with them as an equal nation. The Taliban will then just like you allude to go the path of pariah state like Iran. Those organizations could just open up and deal with the Taliban but then they'd be possibly bankrolling Taliban oppression too. Is legitimizing and funding their oppressors helping Afghans? Is it to be another permanent UN aid mission?

    You've said enough that we should try and act on behalf of what's best for the Afghan people. I still think in the long run that would have been supporting the flawed state that was GIROA. Hindsight being what it is we clearly needed to somehow fight corruption as our primary effort. What will Taliban governance bring Afghanistan though? Half of the Afghan people (the women) have just lost most of their access to human rights. All Afghans have just lost access to a modern legal system, corrupt and slow yes, but at least not resulting in public stoning to death. Yes, there's no fighting as the war is done, only time will tell if the peace ends up more repressive and deadly than the war (now that the Taliban can focus on ruling rather than just killing other Afghans) or if the Afghans prefer today's Taliban security or yesterday's liberties.
    Last edited by spmetla; 09-19-2021 at 09:19.

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    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  2. #122
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Afghanistan: Executions will return, says senior Taliban official
    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58675153
    The Taliban's notorious former head of religious police has said extreme punishments such as executions and amputations will resume in Afghanistan.

    Mullah Nooruddin Turabi, now in charge of prisons, told AP News amputations were "necessary for security".

    He said these punishments may not be meted out in public, as they were under previous Taliban rule in the 1990s.

    But he dismissed outrage over their past public executions: "No-one will tell us what our laws should be."

    Since taking power in Afghanistan on 15 August the Taliban have been promising a milder form of rule than in their previous tenure.

    But there have already been several reports of human rights abuses carried out across the country.
    On Thursday, Human Rights Watch warned that the Taliban in Herat were "searching out high-profile women, denying women freedom of movement outside their homes [and] imposing compulsory dress codes".

    And in August, Amnesty International said that Taliban fighters were behind the massacre of nine members of the persecuted Hazara minority.

    Amnesty's Secretary-General Agnès Callamard said at the time that the "cold-blooded brutality" of the killings was "a reminder of the Taliban's past record, and a horrifying indicator of what Taliban rule may bring".
    Days before the Taliban took control of Kabul, a Taliban judge in Balkh, Haji Badruddin, told the BBC's Secunder Kermani that he supported the group's harsh and literal interpretation of Islamic religious law.

    "In our Sharia it's clear, for those who have sex and are unmarried, whether it's a girl or a boy, the punishment is 100 lashes in public," Badruddin said. "But for anyone who's married, they have to be stoned to death... For those who steal: if it's proved, then his hand should be cut off."

    These hardline views are in tune with some ultra-conservative Afghans.

    However, the group are now balancing this desire to appeal to their conservative base with a need to form connections with the international community - and since coming into power, the Taliban have tried to present a more restrained image of themselves.
    Turabi, notorious for his harsh punishments for people caught listening to non-religious music or trimming their beards in the 1990s, told AP that although harsh forms of punishment would continue, the group would now allow televisions, mobile phones, photos and videos.

    Turabi - who is on a UN sanctions list for his past actions - said the Taliban's cabinet ministers were now discussing whether or not punishments should be public, and that they would "develop a policy".

    Back in the 1990s, executions were held in public in Kabul's sports stadium, or on the vast grounds of the Eid Gah mosque.

    At the time Turabi was justice minister and head of the Ministry of Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice - the Taliban's religious police.

    "Everyone criticised us for the punishments in the stadium, but we have never said anything about their laws and punishments," he said in the latest interview.

    Earlier this week, the Taliban also requested to speak at the UN General Assembly, which is being held in New York City.

    German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas said that while it was important to communicate with the Taliban, "the UN General Assembly is not the appropriate venue for that".

    The US, which sits on the credentialing committee, also said it would not make a decision before the end of the summit next week.
    Not surprised though still sad to see and predictable with the Taliban in charge. Made even worse that your 'trial' is essentially a religious hearing.

    To protect Afghan girls, UN panel urges conditions on aid
    https://apnews.com/article/united-na...ae7aa6e62deb08
    DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) — Aid to Afghanistan should be made conditional to ensure the protection of women’s rights and access to education under the rule of the Taliban government, a panel of high-level speakers said at the United Nations on Friday.

    Since taking control of the country last month when the U.S.-backed government collapsed, the Taliban have allowed younger girls and boys back to school. But in grades six to 12, they have allowed only boys back to school along with their male teachers.

    The United Nations says 4.2 million children are not enrolled in school in Afghanistan, and 60% of them girls.

    The Taliban have also said female university students will face restrictions, such as a compulsory dress code, and will not be allowed in the same classrooms as their male counterparts. Additionally, the subjects being taught will be reviewed, the new government said.

    U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed said that “by and large, we’re very concerned” about measures restricting girls’ access to education since the Taliban took control of the country following the U.S. withdrawal and collapse of the Afghan government in August.

    “I think the international community here, first and foremost, has to draw on the expertise, on the leadership of Afghan women... to stop the reversal, to remain in school,” she said in the U.N. panel that focused on ways to support girls’ education in Afghanistan. The virtual discussion took place on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, where the Taliban have requested to speak as representatives of Afghanistan.

    Mohammed said aid to Afghanistan can “absolutely” be made conditional on education for girls and women. She said the United Nations and the international community can help ensure Afghanistan’s economy does not collapse and that educators and health care workers continue to be paid.
    ..............
    I'm glad they're setting conditions though given the recent Taliban statements they seem to have little to no inclination to moderate their behavior. Essentially an attitude of 'help us we need the aid but don't criticize our internal matters.'

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
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    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  3. #123

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Since taking control of the country last month when the U.S.-backed government collapsed, the Taliban have allowed younger girls and boys back to school. But in grades six to 12, they have allowed only boys back to school along with their male teachers.
    The Taliban have also said female university students will face restrictions, such as a compulsory dress code, and will not be allowed in the same classrooms as their male counterparts. Additionally, the subjects being taught will be reviewed, the new government said.
    There's some work required to make these statements consistent with one another. At face value, women will be barred from secondary education but permitted in tertiary education, which implies that women will de facto be barred from tertiary education as the supply of currently-enrolled or eligible secondary-educated girls dwindles. Obviously there's little meaning to nominally permitting women to attend college if all the women in traditional college age at some time are barely literate or numerate.

    So if the quoted statements are valid, either the Taliban are phasing out women in university, or they're actually phasing in girls in high school (after a pause).

    Unless I'm missing something, such as geographic variation in policy or conflicts or differences in authority in the sources of each of the statements.
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  4. #124
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    We'll need to wait and see what the Taliban actually do versus what they promise and see if it applies to just Kabul or the whole country too. Their current spokesman has said that they haven't let girls back into school yet in some ages because they need to figure out how to make it safe for girls. This is of course a bit bizarro land as the reason it was so unsafe in the past twenty years has been because of Taliban supporters attacking and kidnapping girls going to schools or destroying the schools outright.

    As for the problem above that you mentioned, well for the girls currently allowed in school it's of course the pre-pubescent girls. Even in Taliban areas little girls and boys were able to play together. Once they get near puberty though the Sharia law comes down and they separate girls from boys in everything. Most of Afghan schools having been mixed genders the last twenty years means that trying to have separate education for girls and boys means they'll need to build all new schools, something I doubt the Taliban will spend a lot of time or resources on.
    As for the universities that are currently allowing some limited women's education, that may be for international consumption, may be because there's more classrooms and teachers that can make it work. Who knows for sure, their spokesmen have said a great deal but only time will tell what they actually intend.

    There's also the issue of teachers, a lot of Afghan teachers were women so if they end not not being allowed to work and so on it creates the problem of who's to teach the adolescent girls.

    At the very least if there's access to internet throughout most of the country then there's an ability to access DL education if the girls family wants to. We'll see if the Taliban ends up implementing some sort of islamic firewall in the future

    Will the Taliban restrict internet access in Afghanistan?

    The Taliban have continued to insist that certain rights to free expression and women's rights will be respected.

    But local media has reported that in the southern city of Kandahar over the weekend, the Taliban banned music and women's voices from being played over the radio.

    Taneja believes that the internet will also soon be subject to similar bans that will start in the provinces before moving to Kabul.

    "Let's not forget," said Taneja. "This is the Taliban."
    https://www.dw.com/en/will-the-talib...tan/a-59029364
    Last edited by spmetla; 09-25-2021 at 19:44.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

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  5. #125
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    We'll need to wait and see what the Taliban actually do versus what they promise and see if it applies to just Kabul or the whole country too. Their current spokesman has said that they haven't let girls back into school yet in some ages because they need to figure out how to make it safe for girls. This is of course a bit bizarro land as the reason it was so unsafe in the past twenty years has been because of Taliban supporters attacking and kidnapping girls going to schools or destroying the schools outright.

    As for the problem above that you mentioned, well for the girls currently allowed in school it's of course the pre-pubescent girls. Even in Taliban areas little girls and boys were able to play together. Once they get near puberty though the Sharia law comes down and they separate girls from boys in everything. Most of Afghan schools having been mixed genders the last twenty years means that trying to have separate education for girls and boys means they'll need to build all new schools, something I doubt the Taliban will spend a lot of time or resources on.
    As for the universities that are currently allowing some limited women's education, that may be for international consumption, may be because there's more classrooms and teachers that can make it work. Who knows for sure, their spokesmen have said a great deal but only time will tell what they actually intend.

    There's also the issue of teachers, a lot of Afghan teachers were women so if they end not not being allowed to work and so on it creates the problem of who's to teach the adolescent girls.

    At the very least if there's access to internet throughout most of the country then there's an ability to access DL education if the girls family wants to. We'll see if the Taliban ends up implementing some sort of islamic firewall in the future

    Will the Taliban restrict internet access in Afghanistan?


    https://www.dw.com/en/will-the-talib...tan/a-59029364
    They promised last time to allow women back in public institutions like education when security allowed, postponing such a decision indefinitely. It's the same thing again.

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  6. #126
    Darkside Medic Senior Member rory_20_uk's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by Pannonian View Post
    They promised last time to allow women back in public institutions like education when security allowed, postponing such a decision indefinitely. It's the same thing again.
    Yup, so it is. And it was wishful thinking that the Victor would change depending on the demands of the looser.

    And are they the worst in the world? Saudi Arabia? I don't hear many complaints about their approach.

    I hope that the countries surrounding it manage a better job than NATO et al did.

    An enemy that wishes to die for their country is the best sort to face - you both have the same aim in mind.
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  7. #127
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    "The victors do what they will, the conquered suffer what they must."

    We, especially in the West, like to pretend that this hasn't always been the case.
    "The only way that has ever been discovered to have a lot of people cooperate together voluntarily is through the free market. And that's why it's so essential to preserving individual freedom.” -- Milton Friedman

    "The urge to save humanity is almost always a false front for the urge to rule." -- H. L. Mencken

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  8. #128
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Iran and Taliban forces clash in border area
    https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/...n-border-areas
    Tehran, Iran – Clashes erupted between Iranian soldiers and Taliban forces near the Afghanistan-Iran border, but appear to have led to no casualties and was later described as a “misunderstanding”.

    Multiple videos on Wednesday showed Taliban troops mobilising. Gunfire can be heard while one shows Iranian forces firing artillery shells in response to Taliban fire.
    The semi-official Iranian news agency Tasnim confirmed the battle in the village of Shaghalak in Hirmand county.

    Tasnim, which has links with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), said there are walled areas on Iranian soil near the border with Afghanistan in order to combat smuggling.

    Some Iranian farmers passed the walls but were still inside Iran’s border when Taliban forces opened fire, thinking its side had been violated, the report said.

    The fighting was over and Iranian authorities were discussing the situation with the Taliban, it added.

    Later on Wednesday, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said in a statement a “misunderstanding between border residents” had caused the fighting, without naming the Taliban.
    ‘Complete control’
    A video purportedly showed Taliban forces inside an Iranian garrison, with reports claiming several outposts were seized.

    Tasnim denied the seizure of any facilities, but said “some of the published footage was for the early moments of fighting, and border forces now have complete control over the country’s borders”.

    But a report by the semi-official Fars news website, which also has ties with the IRGC, made no mention of the Taliban, saying smugglers may be at fault. It said there were no casualties and the area is now calm.
    Mohammad Marashi, security deputy for Sistan and Baluchestan’s governor, told Iranian state television the clashes were not serious, incurred no harm on personnel or property, and had ended. He named Taliban forces as the instigators.

    Iran has not officially recognised the Taliban since the group quickly took control of neighbouring Afghanistan following the withdrawal of United States forces in August.

    Iranian officials have repeatedly said the recognition would hinge on the formation of an “inclusive” government in Afghanistan, but have called on the US to lift its sanctions on the Taliban to quell humanitarian concerns.

    In mid-November, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, Iran’s special representative on Afghanistan, led an Iranian delegation for an official visit to the country to hold talks. He met several Taliban officials to discuss the country’s economy, geopolitics of the region, and security concerns.

    In late October, Iran hosted a meeting of neighbours plus Russia in Tehran, however, Taliban officials were not invited.
    Not a good sign at all. The Taliban oppression of the Shia Hazarra minority is certainly a sticky issue as they've got close ties with Iran. I'm sure that this is just a misunderstanding of course as the article says as I can't see either party in position for open hostilities at least.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  9. #129

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Meanwhile, in Afghanistan...

    In recent months, the Taliban’s efforts to crush the Islamic State in Afghanistan have grown increasingly brutal. Suspected members of the Islamic State have been hung in public or beheaded. The Taliban have increased the tempo of deadly night raids and deployed over 1,000 additional foot soldiers to carry out the fight in Nangahar province. These tactics are ruthless and — unfortunately for the Taliban — they’re not working. Following their capture of Kabul on Aug. 15 — after waging a nearly two-decade conflict with the Afghan government and its Western supporters — few could dispute the effectiveness of the Taliban’s approach to insurgency. But now, with foreign troops withdrawn, the group seems overwhelmed with the Herculean challenge of maintaining its own cohesion, forming a new government and framework of governing policies, stabilizing the country, and dealing with a collapsing economy and dwindling social services. Additionally, the Taliban are struggling to combat a growing insurgency from the Islamic State in Afghanistan (also known as Islamic State-Khorasan), as illustrated by at least 54 attacks conducted by the Islamic State between mid-September and late October. After enjoying success as insurgents, the Taliban are failing miserably as counter-insurgents, unable to fend off Islamic State attacks against population centers and their own personnel.
    As Barnett Rubin recently commented, “the alternative to the Taliban is not Karzai, Abdullah, Saleh, or Massoud. It is the Islamic State in Afghanistan.”
    [...]
    In every country or region where al-Qaeda and Islamic State branches are co-located, they are in conflict, and Afghanistan is no different. Even the youngest generation of Taliban fighters, many born after 9/11, revere Osama bin Laden and view al-Qaeda as having near-mythical status.
    Switching from insurgency to counter-insurgency is no easy task. There is an old adage that “insurgents win simply by not losing.” The inverse of this saying implies that counter-insurgents can only win by resolutely defeating an insurgency. But history suggests that brutal suppression is typically insufficient to do so, and a draconian approach defined by wanton and indiscriminate violence often backfires. Effective counter-insurgents need to carefully blend the use of targeted violence with efforts to promote political legitimacy, protect the population from harm, and provide tangible reasons for citizens to support the government. To date, the Taliban have failed at each of these aspects and, due to its inherent tendencies of violence, paranoia, and self-preservation, the group seems unlikely to be more successful at them for the foreseeable future.

    With regards to the use of violence, the Taliban have thus far mostly attempted to use brutality to destroy the Islamic State. Their actions have included night raids — an unpopular tactic that alienated Afghans when it was used by the United States — and extra-judicial killings of suspected Islamic State members. The Taliban have also engaged in indiscriminate targeting and harassment of Salafist communities, which Taliban fighters tend to equate with the Islamic State. While these actions have undoubtedly resulted in the deaths of many Islamic State members, they have thus far been insufficient to stop the Islamic State from continuing to conduct attacks against Taliban fighters and various “soft targets” such as Shiite mosques. The Taliban have, in recent weeks, shown some proclivity to engage in talks with Salafi clerics and local leaders in areas that they have assessed to be Islamic State strongholds. It remains to be seen, however, whether the Taliban will elevate such attempts at local diplomacy above what has thus far mostly been a focus on the use of ruthless suppression. Interviews with Taliban fighters in which they express a persistent desire to pursue martyrdom opportunities against the likes of the Islamic State suggest that violence will remain a central feature of the Taliban’s approach.
    [...]
    The Taliban cannot merely overrun by force or lay siege to Islamic State strongholds to defeat the group as it did with the National Resistance Front in Panjshir. After all, the United Nations assesses that the Islamic State is now active in every province in Afghanistan.
    The Taliban are also staring down fast-approaching humanitarian and economic crises in Afghanistan. Roughly 23 million people — approximately half of Afghanistan’s population — are at severe risk of starvation over the coming winter months, according to the U.N. World Food Programme. The country is also teetering on the brink of outright economic collapse. Without vast sums of international aid, the Taliban have no means of preventing these outcomes or of relieving what is likely to be the mass suffering of Afghanistan’s people — offering little to nothing to Afghans in the way of enticements to support their new government. The international community is aware of these conditions but is wary of providing aid that would inevitably help the Taliban consolidate political legitimacy without having to change their behavior in return.
    From a long assessment linked in the above, my takeaway is Stalinist Taliban leadership wagged by Freikorps rank and file. A complex and incoherent situation:

    The Taliban have, to date, claimed that certain policies or social restrictions are temporary, and are being enforced simply due to security concerns (or other exigent circumstances of the takeover). This claim has been met with serious skepticism in terms of restrictions on women. Afghan women recall that the Taliban of the 1990s introduced their emirate as an “interim” or “caretaker” government, which never evolved. Many have observed that the Taliban attempted to justify their earlier restrictions on women due to the security environment at the time, which—though the group claimed improved under its rule—were never eased or lifted.72 In the Taliban’s first three months back in power, the numerous restrictions on women’s place in the public sphere have been perhaps the most contentious reflection of the movement’s catering to the most socially conservative flank of its membership. In one instance, the ministry of education instituted a de facto ban on girls’ school attendance in grades 6-12. Spokesmen claimed this was only until courts and officials could determine a properly ‘Islamic’ modality of implementing girls’ education, but the Taliban’s prioritization of other issues could leave the ban in place indefinitely.73

    The issue was muddled when Taliban officials in four different provinces that have (as a generalization) a relatively more progressive history of girls’ education announced, in early October 2021, that girls had resumed their attendance, that the appropriately ‘Islamic’ measures were fully in place (some of which, such as requiring women teachers for every segregated girls’ classroom, are not only impractical given gender imbalances in the education sector, like most sectors in Afghanistan, but would ironically require years of a concerted push to encourage and recruit more women to attend school and graduate university in order for a new generation to fill the ranks of public school faculty).74 These announcements gave some hope that the Taliban might either allow gradual progress or at least permit regional variation in the enforcement of social codes, but they also raise the specter every Afghan government has historically struggled with: permitting greater degrees of regional autonomy can potentially weaken the center. The Taliban’s ideological affinity for centralized rule suggests that a series of variations in policy, which could grow into an assertion of authority from peripheral commanders (or the communities they represent), likely will not continue without being contested eventually.u

    At the same time, some of the Taliban’s recent social restrictions have revealed the same cynical sort of pragmatism as they displayed in years of shadow governance as an insurgency. For instance, women in public health have been consistently encouraged to continue working across the country, one of the few sectors in which the Taliban have done so.75 Functional health facilities in friendly territory were also a military imperative in order to treat wounded fighters; once established in Taliban-controlled communities, the movement insisted that female staff be present in order for any women of the community to receive treatment.

    This illustrates an obvious but potentially useful point for those international organizations and donors deliberating on how to best leverage the Taliban’s treatment of the Afghan population: the Taliban grow most pragmatic when the actor they are engaging with has something they badly need—and does not publicly pressure the group with any potential conditions.76 When they are unable to identify a critical benefit, or when the compromise necessary to obtain that benefit might offend and inflame the sensibilities of a large enough segment of their membership, threatening cohesion, they are prone to adopt a smokescreen narrative about themselves, posturing as defenders of all things truly ‘Islamic’ and Afghan. With domestic audiences, Taliban messaging often plays on the ambiguity of these dual pillars of values; when challenged about the ‘Islamic’-ness of a given policy or behavior they may claim that it is innately and traditionally Afghan, and when questioned about the Afghan-ness of it, they often default to uniquely exclusive interpretations of Islam.
    What's impressive is that even as resistance in the traditionally-fierce Panjshir Valley almost instantly collapsed after the fall of the government (yeah, all that noise in the media was mere hot air by a handful of grifters and zealots), the Islamic State just seems to get stronger (and not only in Afghanistan).

    Hey, pragmatic considerations cooled the fervor of the ayatollahs' revolution during the war with Iraq. The sticking point is the Taliban's own cohesion (the ayatollahs had a civilizational buff in that). No country has yet recognized the Emirate, right? What a struggle.
    Vitiate Man.

    History repeats the old conceits
    The glib replies, the same defeats


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  10. #130
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Posting this in here as the civilian deaths investigated are mostly Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and don't think this merits its own thread.

    U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures
    An Independent Assessment

    The Report:
    https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ran...D_RRA418-1.pdf
    The base site:
    https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_r...N000009Je6eQAC
    Key Findings
    Assessments reveal what happened
    • The military's data and records that support assessments of civilian harm can be incomplete.
    • Intelligence efforts focus on the enemy, limiting the resources available to understand the broader civilian picture.
    • The military's standard for finding a civilian casualty report to be credible is higher than advertised.
    • Combatant commands planning for high-intensity conflict against near-peer adversaries are unprepared to address civilian-harm issues.


    More-extensive investigations can reveal why
    • Investigations are the most comprehensive tool for documenting and fully understanding civilian-harm incidents.
    • Neither investigations nor credibility assessment reports enable learning within the force.
    • Investigations can carry the stigma of a disciplinary process.


    Responses to civilian-harm incidents can include the provision of ex gratia payments to the affected community and individuals
    • Such responses provide assistance to those affected by the tragedy of war, advance the U.S. mission on the ground, build rapport with local communities, and reinforce the U.S. relationship with the host-nation government.
    • DoD's responses to civilian harm have historically been inconsistent and confusing.
    • DoD's interim regulations are just part of what should be a more comprehensive response policy that addresses all civilian-harm response options.


    DoD is not adequately organized, structured, or resourced to sufficiently mitigate and respond to civilian-harm issues
    • There are not enough personnel dedicated to civilian-harm issues full-time, and those who are responsible for civilian-harm matters often receive minimal training on the duties that they are expected to perform.
    • DoD is not organized to monitor and analyze civilian casualty trends and patterns over time.


    Recommendations
    • Expand the kinds of information available for assessments to make them more robust.
    • Develop and deploy a tool or data environment to improve collection of, access to, and storage of operational data related to civilian harm.
    • Incorporate civilian harm into pre-operation intelligence estimates and post-operation assessments of the cumulative effect of targeting decisions.
    • Use a range of estimates of civilian casualties to improve the accuracy of assessments.
    • Establish guidance on the responsibilities of U.S. military forces in monitoring partners' conduct and offer assistance to partners in building their own assessment capabilities if needed.
    • Expand guidance on civilian-harm assessments across the full spectrum of armed conflict.
    • Implement a standardized civilian-harm operational reporting process intended to support learning.
    • In DoD guidance, avoid placing overly restrictive limits on why, where, and to whom the U.S. military distributes condolence payments.
    • In DoD's final policy on ex gratia payments, include additional transparency around how payment amounts are determined and how the payments are disbursed.
    • Provide guidance and training on all options available to commanders to respond to civilian harm.
    • Create dedicated, permanent positions for protection of civilians in each geographic combatant command and across DoD, and establish working groups of rotating personnel for additional support.
    • Create a center of excellence for civilian protection.
    • Maintain the capability to conduct periodic reviews to monitor civilian-harm trends over time and address emerging issues.
    • When civilian casualty cells are established at joint task forces, define processes for reverting responsibilities and data back to the command's headquarters.
    I've only skimmed through this so far as it was only published today, interesting and not surprising findings. Touches on the many things such as the DoD not really trying too hard to investigate, not disseminating results throughout the force to learn and change from investigations and so on.
    There're apparently CIVCAS cells in some Geographic Commands but staffed by junior or untrained people which is a clear demonstration that it's not given the importance should have. A lot of good recommendations but seeing as RAND is an independent research agency only time will tell what the DoD does to change.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  11. #131
    Darkside Medic Senior Member rory_20_uk's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Meanwhile, in Afghanistan...






    From a long assessment linked in the above, my takeaway is Stalinist Taliban leadership wagged by Freikorps rank and file. A complex and incoherent situation:



    What's impressive is that even as resistance in the traditionally-fierce Panjshir Valley almost instantly collapsed after the fall of the government (yeah, all that noise in the media was mere hot air by a handful of grifters and zealots), the Islamic State just seems to get stronger (and not only in Afghanistan).

    Hey, pragmatic considerations cooled the fervor of the ayatollahs' revolution during the war with Iraq. The sticking point is the Taliban's own cohesion (the ayatollahs had a civilizational buff in that). No country has yet recognized the Emirate, right? What a struggle.
    If the West doesn't get involved this could be a place where the radicalised go to kill each other.

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Posting this in here as the civilian deaths investigated are mostly Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria and don't think this merits its own thread.

    U.S. Department of Defense Civilian Casualty Policies and Procedures
    An Independent Assessment

    The Report:
    https://www.rand.org/content/dam/ran...D_RRA418-1.pdf
    The base site:
    https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_r...N000009Je6eQAC


    I've only skimmed through this so far as it was only published today, interesting and not surprising findings. Touches on the many things such as the DoD not really trying too hard to investigate, not disseminating results throughout the force to learn and change from investigations and so on.
    There're apparently CIVCAS cells in some Geographic Commands but staffed by junior or untrained people which is a clear demonstration that it's not given the importance should have. A lot of good recommendations but seeing as RAND is an independent research agency only time will tell what the DoD does to change.
    This could have been written after the Vietnam war.

    An enemy that wishes to die for their country is the best sort to face - you both have the same aim in mind.
    Science flies you to the moon, religion flies you into buildings.
    "If you can't trust the local kleptocrat whom you installed by force and prop up with billions of annual dollars, who can you trust?" Lemur
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  12. #132

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by rory_20_uk View Post
    If the West doesn't get involved this could be a place where the radicalised go to kill each other.
    We're still good with the refugees though, right?

    This could have been written after the Vietnam war.
    During Vietnam it was our formal policy to target civilians and civilian infrastructure; hence the half-million or more civilian dead at our hands alone. We've gotten somewhat better.
    Vitiate Man.

    History repeats the old conceits
    The glib replies, the same defeats


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  13. #133
    Darkside Medic Senior Member rory_20_uk's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    We're still good with the refugees though, right?



    During Vietnam it was our formal policy to target civilians and civilian infrastructure; hence the half-million or more civilian dead at our hands alone. We've gotten somewhat better.
    Fair point - the USA has stopped making war crimes policy. Progress!

    If you want the refugees fine - you've paid for them over the last 20 years after all...

    An enemy that wishes to die for their country is the best sort to face - you both have the same aim in mind.
    Science flies you to the moon, religion flies you into buildings.
    "If you can't trust the local kleptocrat whom you installed by force and prop up with billions of annual dollars, who can you trust?" Lemur
    If you're not a liberal when you're 25, you have no heart. If you're not a conservative by the time you're 35, you have no brain.
    The best argument against democracy is a five minute talk with the average voter. Winston Churchill

  14. #134

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by rory_20_uk View Post
    Fair point - the USA has stopped making war crimes policy. Progress!

    If you want the refugees fine - you've paid for them over the last 20 years after all...

    https://twitter.com/scotfoodjames/st...47865933889543
    Vitiate Man.

    History repeats the old conceits
    The glib replies, the same defeats


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  15. #135
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Have you seen his quote that I posted in the other thread? About a different subject, but amusing.

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  16. #136
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    TALIBAN STRUGGLES TO CONTAIN AFGHAN NATIONAL RESISTANCE FRONT
    https://www.understandingwar.org/bac...sistance-front
    By Peter Mills

    Co-produced by the Institute for the Study of War and the Critical Threats Project

    Key Takeaway: The Taliban government is struggling to defeat the National Resistance Front (NRF), a growing anti-Taliban insurgency in northeastern Afghanistan. Taliban leaders appointed a new slate of military commanders to lead anti-NRF operations, indicating dissatisfaction with the previous commanders? performance. Political and ethnic divisions are also likely undermining Taliban forces. Continued Taliban failures against the NRF could lead to the strengthening of the Haqqani Network within the Taliban?s military leadership.
    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

    The Taliban government appointed several successive commanders who have struggled to defeat the NRF in Panjshir and Baghlan provinces. Senior Taliban military leaders have launched repeated operations against the NRF but have achieved only intermittent short-term success and failed to decisively quash NRF activity. Taliban Minister of Defense Mohammad Yaqoub, his Chief of Army Staff Qari Fasihuddin, and his Deputy Defense Minister and senior Taliban military leader Fazl Mazloom have all previously led operations against the NRF. Fasihuddin originally led the operation to conquer the Panjshir Valley in September 2021. Although Fasihuddin?s initial operation saw rapid short-term success, the continued deployment of large numbers of Taliban forces was an early indicator of long-term problems. By February 2022, more than 10,000 Taliban troops were reportedly involved in the operation to suppress NRF insurgent activity in northeastern Afghanistan.[1] Fasihuddin and Mazloom jointly conducted counter-NRF operations in the Andarab Valley, Baghlan Province in April.[2] Mazloom later led a separate offensive against the NRF in northern Panjshir in mid-May.[3] Yaqoub also repeatedly visited the Panjshir Valley and commanded offensive operations against the NRF in February, May, and July 2022.[4] Local Taliban units retreated without orders in early July, allowing the NRF to capture territory in the east of neighboring Baghlan Province. Yaqoub took direct command of the counteroffensive to retake that territory later that month to prevent further disobedience among Taliban forces.[5]

    The Taliban government appointed another military commander to the counter-NRF fight in August 2022, indicating ongoing concern with the state of the campaign. Senior Taliban military commander and Deputy Minister of Defense Abdul Qayum Zakir took command of Taliban forces fighting the NRF in the Andarab and Panjshir Valleys on August 21.[6] Zakir previously served as head of the Taliban military commission from 2010-2014 and became Yaqoub?s deputy in 2020.[7] Zakir is likely bringing in hundreds of Taliban reinforcements from Helmand Province to fight the NRF. Zakir?s counteroffensive against the NRF in Panjshir has not seen notable success so far, though major flooding in the Panjshir Valley in August may be hindering his ability to move forces within the valley and conduct offensive operations against the NRF. Reports from mid-August indicate that the NRF is capturing outlying villages within Panjshir Province.[8]

    Local Taliban forces in Panjshir and Baghlan provinces are likely struggling to unite their efforts due to ethnic divisions within their forces. Taliban forces in Panjshir Province come from a variety of different backgrounds and include local Tajik Taliban units from Panjshir Province and neighboring Badakhshan Province as well as many Pashtun Taliban fighters from southern and eastern Afghanistan.[9] Local Tajik Taliban forces appear to be increasingly unwilling to fight the NRF, which would likely force the Taliban to draw increasing numbers of Pashtun Taliban forces from southern Afghanistan. A local Tajik Taliban commander defected from the Taliban and joined the NRF in May while Tajik Taliban units from Badakhshan reportedly refused to continue fighting the NRF in the Panjshir in July.[10] These events likely fed into pre-existing mistrust between Pashtun and Tajik Taliban units.[11] Taliban fighters have previously committed war crimes, including torture and extrajudicial killings, against the local, predominantly Tajik, population in the Panjshir Valley.[12] An influx of Pashtun Taliban fighters will likely exacerbate the pre-existing inter-ethnic tensions and worsen cooperation between Pashtun and Tajik Taliban fighters.

    Factional infighting within the Taliban is also likely affecting its campaign against the NRF and continued failure could empower Taliban commanders from the Haqqani Network. The Haqqani Network is a branch of the Taliban movement that has existed for decades as a sophisticated extremist organization that maintains ties to Al-Qaeda.[13] The leader of the Haqqani Network, Sirajuddin Haqqani, hosted former Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri at a house in Kabul until Zawahiri?s death in a US drone strike.[14] The Haqqani Network is known to exert extensive influence over southeastern Afghanistan, including Khost and Paktia, and often competes for influence and power with the Kandahar-based Taliban leadership. Taliban forces based in Panjshir are drawn from Kandahar, Helmand, and Haqqani-dominated provinces in southeastern Afghanistan.[15] Leader of the Haqqani Network Sirajuddin Haqqani and Minister of Defense Mohammad Yaqoub?who draws his support base from Kandahar?compete for influence within the Taliban movement.[16] The Taliban security chief for Panjshir declared his allegiance to Sirajuddin Haqqani in an online video and criticized Taliban forces under Yaqoub?s command.[17] Soon after, the Yaquob-aligned Taliban governor for Panjshir removed this security chief from command.[18] Taliban forces later arrested troops affiliated with the former security chief, indicating continuing tensions between the rival commanders.[19] If Taliban commanders affiliated with Yaqoub continue to fail to quash the NRF rebellion, the Taliban leadership could decide to shift responsibility to other factions within the Taliban, increasing their influence at the expense of Yaqoub.

    Taliban forces are increasingly using air assets to support their operations in the Andarab and Panjshir but this is unlikely to have a decisive strategic effect. The Taliban Air Force has been using Mi-17 transport helicopters to ferry troops and supplies around mountainous terrain within the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys.[20] The Taliban have also used Mi-24 attack helicopters on at least one occasion to carry out airstrikes on NRF positions in Eastern Baghlan Province.[21] The NRF shot down a Taliban-operated Mi-17 in mid-June 2022, despite lacking any man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).[22] The Taliban Air Force continued to use American-made helicopters, including at least four MD-500 light attack helicopters, during Zakir?s Augustoffensive into Khenj District, Panjshir Province.[23] Taliban Chief of Army Staff Fasihuddin stated recently that the Taliban Air Force has 60 working aircraft in service, an increase from the 40 claimed in January.[24] The Taliban government is clearly prioritizing the air force and will likely continue to keep some aircraft operational for the foreseeable future. Despite these additional aircraft, the Taliban Air Force is still less than half the size of the former Afghan Air Force.[25] The addition of a few more helicopters will help Taliban operations against the NRF on a tactical level but is unlikely to result in significant strategic effects due to the limited number of airframes and constraints surrounding securing additional spare parts to keep aircraft operable.

    NRF activity is expanding beyond the Andarab-Panjshir Valleys despite Taliban pressure. NRF attacks in Takhar Province have recently surged with increased attacks in Taloqan, Namakab, Rustaq, Kalafgan, and Fakhar districts.[26] NRF forces also reportedly clashed with Taliban forces in Kishm and Ragh districts in Badakhshan Province.[27] Several local Tajik Taliban commanders in Badakhshan have reportedly defected to the NRF over the past few months.[28] The loss of local commanders who are intimately familiar with the rough, mountainous terrain in northeastern Afghanistan will hinder the Taliban?s ability to govern and control these areas. The defection of Tajik Taliban commanders will also likely increase mistrust between Tajik and Pashtun Taliban forces, further hindering the Taliban?s ability to carry out operations against the NRF.

    It remains to be seen whether the NRF threat will unite Taliban factions or further divide them. A credible internal threat to the Taliban?s rule may help the movement overcome its internal divisions and remain cohesive. Alternatively, worsening Taliban divisions in response to the growing NRF insurgency would indicate that those divisions run deep. The longer the NRF is able to grow its insurgency, the greater the chance that it could eventually acquire support from another state. External support could enable the NRF to eventually become powerful enough to threaten Taliban control over parts of Afghanistan. If local Tajik Taliban fighters lose their willingness to fight the NRF, or defect outright to the NRF, then NRF capabilities will continue to grow at the expense of the Taliban?s ability to govern and control northeastern Afghanistan. In this scenario, the Taliban leadership may increasingly deploy southern Pashtun Taliban fighters to the Panjshir and Andarab, likely further exacerbating pre-existing ethnic tensions and possibly driving increased support for the NRF. Finally, the Taliban?s counter-NRF fight may have implications for national inter-Taliban power struggles. If Yaqoub?s commanders continue to fail to defeat the NRF, then Sirajuddin Haqqani may be able to argue for appointing his own commanders, increasing the Haqqani Network?s influence in northeastern Afghanistan.


    Guess the old struggle of the Northern Alliance days continues....

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

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  17. #137
    Darkside Medic Senior Member rory_20_uk's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    It's true now as it was probably true 500 years ago - the only thing that unites the locals is outsiders coming in.

    Britain went in and failed. Russia went in to support the Communist government and left. The USA and its motley crew of helpers also left.

    I think it's only fair that China gets a go.

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  18. #138

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    It took some effort, but Britain more or less succeeded. A bit like the Russian Federation in Chechnya. The Greeks succeeded, the Arabs succeeded, the Mongols and their cousins succeeded, the Iranians succeeded most of all... If the Taliban were in full control like in 2001, the Chinese might promptly attempt to buy their way in.

    The trouble today is that holding a multi-ethnic empire by violence alone is rather hard. Think of it as an unrest modifier.
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  19. #139
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Perhaps Balkanizing Afghanistan should have been done post 9/11. Pashtuns get their own area, Tajiks their own or maybe join Tajikstan, same with the Uzebks. Hazaris get their own nation too. Make it all a very loose confederation to safeguard some rules for trade, taxes, and borders with military/police forces mostly so they don't threaten each other too much.

    Really is such a shame for the country, had some of the most beautiful landscapes I've ever seen and some of the Afghans I worked with were really great people.

    Multi-ethnic is part of the problem but it being truly tribal is the other part, looking out for you tribal group first before nation, religion, etc... makes ruling really hard. That's why that book "the strongest tribe" though it was about Iraq also applies to an extent to Afghanistan. The Europeans understood this in the colonial area and would reward the friendly tribes and punish or split up the troublesome ones, something an occupying 'modern' power can't really understand or deal with.

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  20. #140
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    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Perhaps Balkanizing Afghanistan should have been done post 9/11. Pashtuns get their own area, Tajiks their own or maybe join Tajikstan, same with the Uzebks. Hazaris get their own nation too. Make it all a very loose confederation to safeguard some rules for trade, taxes, and borders with military/police forces mostly so they don't threaten each other too much.
    For whatever reason, the US has this bizarre habit of attempting to remake any society they enter into their own EXACT image, and then act confused when it doesn't work.
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  21. #141

    Default Re: ISIS and Afghan Taliban

    Multi-ethnic was a problem with respect to imperial methods of control. This -

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    "The Europeans understood this in the colonial area and would reward the friendly tribes and punish or split up the troublesome ones, something an occupying 'modern' power can't really understand or deal with."
    don't work anymore. One can blame what they please - increased mobility and communications, increasing complexity even in agrarian economies, the general intellectual development of societies during modernity - but divide and conquer no longer works, it just encourages chaos. In decentralized societies like Afghanistan there are more limited opportunities for foreign powers to even manipulate local politics, but for a more or less indigenous central government to be strong it must have effective policies and processes that actively contribute to the gestalt cohesion of the country in an era of fragmentation and immense dissociative forces. Inevitably this means broadening stakeholders and offering everyday value. GIROA and the Taliban are too inefficient and sectarian to meet those criteria. In other words I'm referring to what it takes to build a national state in an area that has been under some form of fully royalist or imperial governance for 98% of its history. The Taliban's form of domination could possibly achieve stable rule during a certain period of Afghanistan's history, but after 20 years of contact with the international community that era is clearly over. The US didn't have what it takes, and far from it is the case that the US just wasn't sufficiently brutal or Machiavellian.

    Hussein, Qaddafi, Assad - all these would have passed on or been overthrown without our assistance, over time, because of the underlying structural implications of the countries over which they ruled. To some extent they contributed to this fragmentation by concentrating authority in their own hands while playing that same game of demographic divide and conquer. Well... now everyone gets to live in violent, unstable societies where most are getting poorer and long-term prospects for prosperity are dim. Due to the fluidity of ethnic geography, the continuity of physical geography, and the reality of resource competition in regions that have struggled to generate necessities of food, water, and household energy, I do also doubt a sophisticated federated structure for Afghanistan or Iraq (or Syria, or Libya) could have been viable. Or it would have had to be so sophisticated as to eventually constitute, again, that pernicious attempt to control from afar.

    Here's what "we" should have done: not fuck around.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 09-11-2022 at 06:14.
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