I agree with virtually all of this. Grant was a better tactical commander than his critics credit him with, but it is his perseverance that was his biggest hallmark of success. He recognized that constant pressure on Lee would deny any reinforcements to the West and that the overall combination would be too much for the South. It was NOT an elegant strategy, but it was more or less guaranteed to succeed. If the Union could field 3-1 in overall numbers, then losing 1.6 to 1 would engender victory.

If the North had recognized early enough that it would come down to numbers, and not some single victory, then they could have used Scott's anaconda earlier and with fewer real casualties. Grant's version of attrition was less elegant, but even so, had you taken McClellan's army and given it to Grant 1 week after it landed on the Peninsula, the war would have ended in 1862 with far fewer overall casualties (though the Union dead on the Peninsula and around Richmond would have been many).