Do you want Germany to raise military expenses?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I would take you to mean the capacity for significant and sustained force projection.
The U.S.A. is perhaps not the only NATO power with this interest, but with European defence in mind, it has the longest and likely most complex chain to manage.
I would assume the rest simply think they will cobble together whatever is needed (if it is ever needed).
If we view NATO's mission as world police, not European defence, then this becomes more important; who, besides the US takes this view?

Not quite as "world police," hopper.


But, the scope of NATO's original mission has changed, though the mission remains.

When NATO was founded, and up through the early 1980s, ALL of the logistics for the primary NATO mission involved getting US, UK and other NATO forces in place near the Rhine so as to counterattack, stop, and then roll back Soviet forces who'd been bled by US and mostly German troopers on their way to and through the Fulda gap. The only strategic logistic/mobility component of that was the cross-Atlantic element and the USN and RN had that pretty well covered.

With the draw down following 1989-1991, NATO cashed in on the absence of a USSR by reducing military expenditures, especially on those components that serve force projection (a function that has become almost a USA only affair at present).


With a somewhat resurgent Russia now serving again as a strategic opponent (though admittedly less combative and aggressive than the Soviets by far), and with the growth in NATO membership to include former Warsaw Pact states, the "line of defense" for the basic NATO mission is further East by a goodly bit. Moreover, while the Cold War featured little likelihood of the Russians pushing through Turkey or into the Southern Balkans, the chaotic nature of the Middle East at present, and of the Middle East/Central Asian region in general, makes some form of threat to Turkey and/or Greece more likely than before, not less. Again, the need to support deployments in service of NATO's primary mission at a greater distance than envisaged in 1960 is increased.

Enhancing NATO's ability for such a force projection would make sense. Cobbling Heavy airlift and sealift together is NOT all that easy. I suspect the Germans have the tech and the resources base to ramp up this skill set faster than the other NATO members, as well as the economy best able to absorb that expense.


This all references the NATO primary mission. If we view NATO as having a role in North Africa or the Levant as a form of "extended defense" zone for protecting its membership, than force projection becomes even more important. Moreover, the ability to project force should enhance whatever deterrent value is to be had.

[Kagemusha]

Not quite as "world police," hopper.


But, the scope of NATO's original mission has changed, though the mission remains.

When NATO was founded, and up through the early 1980s, ALL of the logistics for the primary NATO mission involved getting US, UK and other NATO forces in place near the Rhine so as to counterattack, stop, and then roll back Soviet forces who'd been bled by US and mostly German troopers on their way to and through the Fulda gap. The only strategic logistic/mobility component of that was the cross-Atlantic element and the USN and RN had that pretty well covered.

With the draw down following 1989-1991, NATO cashed in on the absence of a USSR by reducing military expenditures, especially on those components that serve force projection (a function that has become almost a USA only affair at present).


With a somewhat resurgent Russia now serving again as a strategic opponent (though admittedly less combative and aggressive than the Soviets by far), and with the growth in NATO membership to include former Warsaw Pact states, the "line of defense" for the basic NATO mission is further East by a goodly bit. Moreover, while the Cold War featured little likelihood of the Russians pushing through Turkey or into the Southern Balkans, the chaotic nature of the Middle East at present, and of the Middle East/Central Asian region in general, makes some form of threat to Turkey and/or Greece more likely than before, not less. Again, the need to support deployments in service of NATO's primary mission at a greater distance than envisaged in 1960 is increased.

Enhancing NATO's ability for such a force projection would make sense. Cobbling Heavy airlift and sealift together is NOT all that easy. I suspect the Germans have the tech and the resources base to ramp up this skill set faster than the other NATO members, as well as the economy best able to absorb that expense.


This all references the NATO primary mission. If we view NATO as having a role in North Africa or the Levant as a form of "extended defense" zone for protecting its membership, than force projection becomes even more important. Moreover, the ability to project force should enhance whatever deterrent value is to be had.

0,8% of GDP increase to German defense budget would mean 32 Bn $. About two times the defense budget of Israel, or three times Poland´s defense budget.