What economic approach would actually work?

[Agent Miles]

And industrialized France didn't survive. Surviving can be explained by more than the type of economy.

France used its industry to build the obsolete Maginot Line. Their economy was wasted producing something that was useless.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

France used its industry to build the obsolete Maginot Line. Their economy was wasted producing something that was useless.

It was expensive, and arguably other military preparation might have been better, but the Maginot line did, as intended, channel German effort Northward forcing them to face the low countries first and allow time for allied armies to position themselves to advantage.

The French screwed the pooch on their evaluation of the Ardennes, but the Maginot fulfilled its strategic purpose.

[Gilrandir]

France used its industry to build the obsolete Maginot Line. Their economy was wasted producing something that was useless.

So the USSR in 1941 used its industry satisfactorily producing top notch military equipment and creating effective defense infrastructure? Why then did the Soviet troops roll back for a copule of years?

[Pannonian]

So the USSR in 1941 used its industry satisfactorily producing top notch military equipment and creating effective defense infrastructure? Why then did the Soviet troops roll back for a copule of years?

Problems at the top. The Soviet military were effective even in the early years at mauling the German military. Unfortunately issues with command and strategy meant they lost strategically even whilst inflicting Pyrrhic losses on the Germans. Once these were ironed out, the Soviets, with similar levels of losses as earlier (barring the kessels), consistently made strategic gains whilst avoiding irretrievable strategic disasters.

[Gilrandir]

Problems at the top. The Soviet military were effective even in the early years at mauling the German military. Unfortunately issues with command and strategy meant they lost strategically even whilst inflicting Pyrrhic losses on the Germans. Once these were ironed out, the Soviets, with similar levels of losses as earlier (barring the kessels), consistently made strategic gains whilst avoiding irretrievable strategic disasters.

I don't completely agree. In 1941 Soviet prisoners of war numbered hundred of thousands which can't be explained by poor command only. We won't speculate on the reluctance of many people to fight for the country whose internal policy was suppressive. But poor weaponry is one more factor to be considered as responsible for the situation at the fronts. The best Soviet tanks T-34 weren't numerous, same true about the planes, most infantry were armed with Mosin rifles surviving from WWI and earlier, why, the Soviet army even had cavalry troops. The Phyrric losses Germans started to have at the and of autumn of 1941, but even so Germans were capable of a major offensive in 1942 which was checked at Stalingrad, again in late autumn. Thus it took the USSR about two years to furnish the troops with adequate arms which yielded results at Kursk and later. In 1941 the fruits of industrialization were deplorable.

[Strike For The South]

You are worried about systems when you should be worried about issues.

[Husar]

You are worried about systems when you should be worried about issues.

Don't systems cause issues and aren't issues fixed by changing the system?

[Seamus Fermanagh]

I don't completely agree. In 1941 Soviet prisoners of war numbered hundred of thousands which can't be explained by poor command only. We won't speculate on the reluctance of many people to fight for the country whose internal policy was suppressive. But poor weaponry is one more factor to be considered as responsible for the situation at the fronts. The best Soviet tanks T-34 weren't numerous, same true about the planes, most infantry were armed with Mosin rifles surviving from WWI and earlier, why, the Soviet army even had cavalry troops. The Phyrric losses Germans started to have at the and of autumn of 1941, but even so Germans were capable of a major offensive in 1942 which was checked at Stalingrad, again in late autumn. Thus it took the USSR about two years to furnish the troops with adequate arms which yielded results at Kursk and later. In 1941 the fruits of industrialization were deplorable.

Russian small arms were adequate in all categories (the moisin was no worse than the Gewehrs used by the Germans. Russian SMGs and LMGs, and crew MGs were of comparable performance -- though doctrinally the Germans deployed them more frequently and more organically at the section/platoon level). Russian tanks in 1941, aside from the fairly new/rare t-34 and KV series, were inferior to those fielded by the Axis, but only marginally (The BT-7 and T-28 and T-26 tanks were not notably outgunned by the PZ IIs. early Pz IIIs, and Czech tanks that formed the bulk of the Heer and SS tank forces, though German repair and recovery doctrine was better). Russian mortars were as good or more so than their German counterparts. Artillery was about on par.

Training and doctrine lagged significantly more. Also, as noted by others, the Soviet command structure had been gutted and the absence of Tsuchevsky alone kept the Russians in the infantry/cavalry tank doctrine far too long. That was still influencing things n 1941, even though the purge was years past. The only really outdated equipment class was air forces, wherein the Russians did NOT have enough of their modern designs in the field putting them at a qualitative disadvantage as well as doctrinal disadvantage.

The Sovs also had way too much of their armor and air forces forward deployed for a proper defense in depth (some argue that a Soviet 1942 attack was being prepared and caught too much too far forward). Stalin and the high command were strategically surprised by the assault -- Stalin had been lulled. It was the blitzkrieg's ability to punch holes in the Soviet formations and attack logistic and command nodes that left the relatively inflexible Soviet military of 1941 in such a bad way. Many of them fought bravely, sometimes even launching charges with fixed bayonets and no bullets because supplies had been cut off so thoroughly.

[Greyblades]

Design wise Russian equipment was indeed up to par and even good, in some cases captured russian weaponry was employed by german units, the problem was that for a while the methods of production in the soviet union was hit and miss meaning they were prone to defects.

Of course the main factor of german sucess was stalins inability to see germany coming meaning the majority of russia's professional soldiers were caught literally half a world away from the front in 1941.

[Gilrandir]

Of course the main factor of german sucess was stalins inability to see germany coming meaning the majority of russia's professional soldiers were caught literally half a world away from the front in 1941.

I would say reluctance to believe.

[spmetla]

Design wise Russian equipment was indeed up to par and even good, in some cases captured russian weaponry was employed by german units, the problem was that for a while the methods of production in the soviet union was hit and miss meaning they were prone to defects.

Of course the main factor of german sucess was stalins inability to see germany coming meaning the majority of russia's professional soldiers were caught literally half a world away from the front in 1941.

The unpreparedness only really affects the first few weeks. After the initial victories the Soviets were able to attempt proper defense against the Germans but met with failure. The Germans had just had 2 years of practical experience which they applied ruthlessly. Morale was high, low level initiative was high, and the tactics and forces available were right for the initial attacks.
The eventual Soviet victory wasn't so much anything to do with their economic system or industrialization but in that they simply learned how to fight modern war. Defense in depth, deception operations, the massive use of simple but extremely effective anti-tank mines and anti-tank guns as well as the proper use of armor in achieving and exploiting breakthroughs. All the while they wore down the German armies which became poorer and poorer in quality and quantity throughout the war despite the influx of 'Wunderwaffen'

[CrossLOPER]

Design wise Russian equipment was indeed up to par and even good

It was better in every conceivable way, but useless in the hands of officers with single digit IQs.