Quote Originally Posted by Gilrandir View Post
I don't completely agree. In 1941 Soviet prisoners of war numbered hundred of thousands which can't be explained by poor command only. We won't speculate on the reluctance of many people to fight for the country whose internal policy was suppressive. But poor weaponry is one more factor to be considered as responsible for the situation at the fronts. The best Soviet tanks T-34 weren't numerous, same true about the planes, most infantry were armed with Mosin rifles surviving from WWI and earlier, why, the Soviet army even had cavalry troops. The Phyrric losses Germans started to have at the and of autumn of 1941, but even so Germans were capable of a major offensive in 1942 which was checked at Stalingrad, again in late autumn. Thus it took the USSR about two years to furnish the troops with adequate arms which yielded results at Kursk and later. In 1941 the fruits of industrialization were deplorable.
Russian small arms were adequate in all categories (the moisin was no worse than the Gewehrs used by the Germans. Russian SMGs and LMGs, and crew MGs were of comparable performance -- though doctrinally the Germans deployed them more frequently and more organically at the section/platoon level). Russian tanks in 1941, aside from the fairly new/rare t-34 and KV series, were inferior to those fielded by the Axis, but only marginally (The BT-7 and T-28 and T-26 tanks were not notably outgunned by the PZ IIs. early Pz IIIs, and Czech tanks that formed the bulk of the Heer and SS tank forces, though German repair and recovery doctrine was better). Russian mortars were as good or more so than their German counterparts. Artillery was about on par.

Training and doctrine lagged significantly more. Also, as noted by others, the Soviet command structure had been gutted and the absence of Tsuchevsky alone kept the Russians in the infantry/cavalry tank doctrine far too long. That was still influencing things n 1941, even though the purge was years past. The only really outdated equipment class was air forces, wherein the Russians did NOT have enough of their modern designs in the field putting them at a qualitative disadvantage as well as doctrinal disadvantage.

The Sovs also had way too much of their armor and air forces forward deployed for a proper defense in depth (some argue that a Soviet 1942 attack was being prepared and caught too much too far forward). Stalin and the high command were strategically surprised by the assault -- Stalin had been lulled. It was the blitzkrieg's ability to punch holes in the Soviet formations and attack logistic and command nodes that left the relatively inflexible Soviet military of 1941 in such a bad way. Many of them fought bravely, sometimes even launching charges with fixed bayonets and no bullets because supplies had been cut off so thoroughly.