Future of the European Union

[Fragony]

Freeriding what? Whom did the US actually defend us from since NATO was established?
And who asked the US to spend 4% of GDP? Why don't they just spend 2% and why did Trump increase the military budget if he thinks he's spending too much money on it? And why was the 2% goal only loosely set in the 90s?

On that note, why does the US demand us to see THAT goal as binding, but would never sign a climate contract with binding goals?
How about we accept that binding goal if the US accepts a binding goal that we like, such as a certain CO2 reduction (that we would also agree to of course)?

I mean, if we just accept some US wish and get none of our wishes granted, surely that would be a bad deal for us...Germany First!

We should be able to defend ourself. For a country like the Netherlans meeting the NATO-standard on spending doesn't make much sense, it's a small country with a huge economy, but in general NATO-partners could, and should, do better

[Pannonian]

People like myself that complain do so because we anglophiles tend to see the hollowing out of the Royal Navy as a sad reflection of the UKs diminishing role in the world. For the purely NATO standpoint, the UK and France have long been the only NATO allies with navies capable of any force projection or long term sustainment at sea, having the UK give up that capability or let it erode means that for any NATO naval operation (like off the Somali coast) will take more US logistical support.

Though it sounds stupid, you need armies to keep a peace or to back up your positions. They don't need to be large, but they should at least be functional. The swiss haven't had to use their army in a long time but it's existence and it's being formidable enough kept it out of WWI and WWII. The Germans copying the the US model of logistics (based off the Walmart model) was supposed to save money which it does at the cost of equipment readiness. Not being allowed to stockpile parts means that maintenance shops have to wait for the ordering system to work back to depots and forward again meaning more downtime for even simple repairs.

In the longer term viewpoint, if Russia ever succeeds in the dissolution of NATO and the watering down of any collective EU defense then it's quite likely that they'd use outright force again to enforce political/economic disputes with their neighbors. As any student of history knows, building up an army does not happen quickly and any credible European military response to Russian aggression can't wait for the threat to become so real that public support demands it.
If the above seems unrealistic just think back how different to world was 30 years ago or 20 years ago. Things have gotten more peaceful for Europe but that is not irreversible. Remember, the strong tend to despise 'weakness' not respect it. Thankfully France has 'the bomb' so there is some independent deterrent (assuming the US abandons Europe again) within the EU following the departure of the UK.

With the advent of Brexit, the UK's 2% may support a rather smaller military than previously. Efficiencies could have been sought with the UK and France specialising in different areas and forming a larger coherent joint force, but of course the UK has been busy burning bridges since June 2016.

[Furunculus]

He threatened to just disregard it if the nations in trouble don't meet his standards in terms of military expenditure and potentially other things. So far he hasn't done anything, but he certainly didn't invoke trust by bringing up the possibility that he would ignore the invasion of a member state if he felt it wasn't "worthy" in his eyes.

He did no more to damage nato than euro nations failing to do their bit for collective defense.

[rory_20_uk]

With the advent of Brexit, the UK's 2% may support a rather smaller military than previously. Efficiencies could have been sought with the UK and France specialising in different areas and forming a larger coherent joint force, but of course the UK has been busy burning bridges since June 2016.

This could work in that the UK could have a force that is useful for what an island nation needs - a Navy and perhaps some Marines and all but disband the army completely and if France or others want to have a large army then we could work together. Perhaps then we might even manage to have planes for the lovely aircraft carriers and enough ships to form the accompanying fleet to use them for anything that is remotely dangerous.

And the greatest bonus is then the almost complete inability to get sucked into protracted military engagements in far flung places beyond some shoreline battery fire and perhaps establishing a beachhead.

[Montmorency]

More tooth, less tail: Getting beyond NATO’s 2 percent rule

The question of obsolescence seems to have been settled. But the debate on burden-sharing continues unabated. In his roundabout way, President Trump has done a notable job of raising the issue of the adequacy of European NATO’s defense spending. Criticism has focused almost entirely on the level of investment by member countries—whether they are meeting the 2 percent commitment—with far less attention paid to their actual ability to defend themselves and their allies. All things considered, the 2 percent rule is a poor way to measure burden-sharing. It came about in part as a convenience, as this was the level of NATO Europe’s spending in 2002, when the target was first agreed upon. It is one of the few things that NATO reports externally. It is useful, if a little crude, but it has a few methodological flaws and takes us only so far. Even the wider concept of burden-sharing, the desire for members to “pay their fair share,” is inherently flawed, since it focuses on inputs rather than outputs.

To keep metrics simple, the public focus should be on inputs (spending) and outputs (capabilities measured in deployable, ready, sustainable forces). Productivity metrics—the efficiency and effectiveness with which inputs are converted to outputs—should be provided for the benefit of member nations. Burden-sharing can then appropriately focus not simply on what countries spend, but on the forces they provide to ensure the security of Europe and the North Atlantic, as the treaty originally intended.

1.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

[MY OPINION] The burden on European countries of holding membership in NATO, allowing American basing, and the indispensability to NATO/America of the same, is not accounted for in allegations of "unequal burden-sharing".

Finally, some argue that the United States’ status as a global power means that its defense spending is not directly comparable to that of other NATO members. Of nearly 200,000 US forces deployed overseas, just over 99,000 of them are deployed in Europe, suggesting that roughly half of US deployed forces (and by extension roughly half its spending) are dedicated to non-European missions.15 By that measure, the US contribution to NATO would not seem nearly so disproportionate.

2.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

The 2 percent figure dates to the 2002 Prague summit, when it was established as a non-binding target; it was reiterated in Riga in 2006. At the NATO 2014 summit in Wales, all states not meeting the target pledged to do so within the next decade (and states above 2 percent agreed to maintain that level). In the three years since the Wales summit, spending has started to move in the right direction, increasing by 1.8 percent in 2015, 3.3 percent in 2016, and a projected 4.3 percent this year.

To get to 2 percent, spending will need to increase by another $107 billion annually ($28 billion in Germany, $17 billion in Italy, $15 billion in Spain, $12 billion in Canada, $5 billion in France, and smaller sums elsewhere).

NATO members have committed to spending 20 percent of their annual defense expenditure on equipment

3.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

At the Riga summit in 2006, it introduced a target that NATO land forces be at least 40 percent deployable and 8 percent deployable on a sustained basis (raised to 50 percent and 10 percent in 2008).

The latest official figures from the EDA show that only 29 percent of EDA member forces are deployable, and less than 6 percent of them on a sustainable basis,19 with unofficial figures suggesting that fewer than 3 percent of European troops are deployable due to a lack of interoperability and equipment shortages.20

4.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

There is no shared understanding of what makes up defense spending. In its definition of “military expenditure,” NATO includes defense ministry budgets, expenditure for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and research and development costs. Significantly, it also includes pensions. For many states, military pensions represent a substantial proportion of their defense budget (in 2016, 33 percent of Belgium’s defense budget was spent on pensions, as was 24 percent of France’s and 17 percent of Germany’s). The trouble is that while pensions contribute to the 2 percent target, they do not contribute to a state’s fighting power.

5.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

For all of those problems, the 2 percent metric retains its appeal. It is simple, straightforward, and (relatively) easy to measure. Jan Techau, director of Carnegie Europe, argues that the 2 percent target is “flawed but indispensable” as a measure of “who is and who is not politically committed to NATO’s core task: Europe’s security.”

“Spending at 2 percent says very little about a country’s actual military capabilities; its readiness, deployability, and sustainability levels; and the quality of the force that it can field. It also is mum about a country’s willingness to deploy forces and take risks once those forces are deployed. It does not assess whether a country spends its limited resources wisely.”22

6.

The 1949 Strategic Concept called for this level of rigor: “A successful defense of the North Atlantic Treaty nations through maximum efficiency of their armed forces, with the minimum necessary expenditures of manpower, money and materials, is the goal of defense planning.”

ATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has recently suggested that member states publish plans detailing three elements: cash, capabilities, and commitments.

I propose a framework to meet the needs that NATO and others have identified.

A. Spend enough. NATO must measure and report total defense spending. A "real" percentage threshold - no pensions, no military aid, no intelligence spending...

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

This prompted the UK, in 2015, to add some £2.2 billion to its reported NATO figure by adding civilian and military pensions, contributions to UN peacekeeping missions, and a large portion of the Ministry of Defence’s income from other countries’ defense ministries to its reported figure.27 Although these inclusions were seen as legitimate, it seems likely that they do not contribute to the UK’s fighting power and should be removed from the NATO definition for all nations.

B. Spend it on the right things. NATO should measure and report what the money is spent on. The right mix of spending on personnel, operational costs, equipment, and R&D.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

“European defense spending has been consumed disproportionately by personnel and operational costs.”28 In fact, more than 50 percent of European spending goes to salaries and pensions. Roughly speaking, an optimal mix is no more than 40 percent on personnel and a quarter on major equipment. Yet NATO Europe forces spend only 15.2 percent of their budgets on equipment, versus a much healthier 25 percent in the United States (and 24.5 percent in France and 22.6 percent in the UK).29

The net result is that the US spends fully $127,000 on each soldier’s equipment, while NATO European members spend only one-fifth that amount, $25,200 per soldier

NATO should be measuring spending at a more granular level: military pay, civilian pay, major equipment acquisition, research and development, operations and maintenance, and infrastructure.

C. Spend it well. NATO should measure efficiency and effectiveness in each of these three categories: Personnel, Equipment, Operations & Maintenance.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Many forces waste precious resources, maintaining Cold War bureaucracies rather than prioritizing frontline forces. The people and infrastructure supporting the fighting force (the tail) has failed to shrink as fast as the fighting force itself (the tooth), resulting in an ever-deteriorating tooth-to-tail ratio (Exhibit 3). The force is at the same time too large, with too many non-deployable forces, and too small, with too few deployable fighting forces.

Compounding the problem of too few euros going to equipment, the purchasing power of European governments is dissipated by an inefficient industry structure. Alexander Mattelaer at the Institute for European Studies argues: “The present degree of fragmentation in the European defense markets and organizational structures virtually guarantees a poor return on investment.”30 McKinsey’s analysis shows 178 different weapon systems in service in Europe, versus 30 in the US.

Many forces have failed to spend enough to maintain what equipment they do have, and their overall maintenance productivity is low. In 2014, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen revealed major deficiencies in the operational capability of important German weapons systems. For example, only 42 of 109 Eurofighters, 38 of 89 Tornado fighters, and 4 of 22 Sea Lynx helicopters were ready for service, mostly due to a lack of spare parts.

Experience suggests that overall maintenance productivity is low.

D. Measure the outputs. NATO should measure capabilities and continue to measure the readiness, deployability, and sustainability of forces (and its will to use them).

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

During the Cold War, each NATO member had a commitment to a “self-defense plan” that specified a required force structure, a certain readiness level, and a deployability level for their forces. [...] Two critical and necessary steps to reform the notion of burden-sharing would be for NATO to craft an integrated defense plan, and for nations to commit to making force structure contributions to that plan, which they agree to fund.

[NATO] should take the next step and ask nations to publish the figures [on deployability of forces].

Finally, it would be useful to measure actual contributions to NATO missions as a measure of commitment to the alliance. Which nations are punching above their weight? Purely investment-related metrics have been a notoriously poor guide to predicting actual contributions to NATO missions. Denmark and a few other nations do not meet the 2 percent target, but when it comes to capabilities and contributions, they manage to outperform most other allies.

7. The US is not immune.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

...more than 20 percent of the DoD’s nearly $600 billion annual budget was dedicated to six back-office business processes (facilities management, HR, finance, logistics, acquisitions, and health management).

...the DoD has significant opportunity to improve its own tooth-to-tail ratio, focusing on achieving productivity gains in the back-office core business processes and support functions, and reinvesting the savings to fund mission needs.

[rory_20_uk]

Any system that has KPIs invariably leads to everyone aiming for the KPI and ignoring the "bigger picture" of what the overarching purpose is for - what exactly in Europe is the military there to do, where is it going to achieve this and who is doing what? Point D really summarises this well - when there was a real concern that things might be required for use there was an attempt to ensure it was fit for purpose. For the last 25 years it has become more politicised with decisions based on non-military realities (aircraft carriers without planes, anyone?) Perhaps even going to the better countries such as Denmark and seeing if there are any things that can be learned from their approach - perhaps it might boil down to a less corrupt procurement procedure.

[Pannonian]

Any system that has KPIs invariably leads to everyone aiming for the KPI and ignoring the "bigger picture" of what the overarching purpose is for - what exactly in Europe is the military there to do, where is it going to achieve this and who is doing what? Point D really summarises this well - when there was a real concern that things might be required for use there was an attempt to ensure it was fit for purpose. For the last 25 years it has become more politicised with decisions based on non-military realities (aircraft carriers without planes, anyone?) Perhaps even going to the better countries such as Denmark and seeing if there are any things that can be learned from their approach - perhaps it might boil down to a less corrupt procurement procedure.

The carriers weren't designed without planes in mind. They were designed with the F-35 in mind. The RN, trusting the US's estimates, scheduled the retirement of its Harriers to be replaced in short order by F-35s. The F-35 isn't ready because they've been delayed, but the carrier is because they've been less delayed. The USMC refused to put aside their still working Harriers until the F-35 was a working concern. So they still have planes for their carriers.

The lesson in this should be to assume that solutions aren't going to be perfect until they're shown to be so. Stick with the status quo until the changed situation has proven itself.

[spmetla]

The carriers weren't designed without planes in mind. They were designed with the F-35 in mind. The RN, trusting the US's estimates, scheduled the retirement of its Harriers to be replaced in short order by F-35s. The F-35 isn't ready because they've been delayed, but the carrier is because they've been less delayed. The USMC refused to put aside their still working Harriers until the F-35 was a working concern. So they still have planes for their carriers.

The lesson in this should be to assume that solutions aren't going to be perfect until they're shown to be so. Stick with the status quo until the changed situation has proven itself.

Well retiring any system based on a supposed future fielding date of new equipment is always problematic, the Space Shuttle is a good example of the American version. We've been hitching rides with the Russians for far too long and the political/beauracatic moving of the goal posts keeps delaying it's replacement just like with the F-35. I personally think the Royal Navy should have gone for catapult launched aircraft which would have allowed it to field interim aircraft (like the F/A18, Rafale, or Sea Gripen) until their desire replacement was ready or at the very least kept their Harrier fleet around (the Italians and Spanish still fly Harriers from their aircraft carriers as well as the USMC).

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/...am/1039835001/

what exactly in Europe is the military there to do, where is it going to achieve this and who is doing what?

That's certainly the first topic that needs to be taken up and one of the reasons an EU military is so unlikely. The French would certainly want the EU military to also work on the peripheries of Europe (the Med and Africa) while the Germans understandably don't want to leave the continent short of peacekeeping and limited support for NATO operations to fly the flag.
If either the French or Germans were to try and reorganize themselves for a credible challenge to Russia it would require a large investment into top tier military hardware, something both governments are unlikely to fund. Especially as the military is still culturally something to be despised (WW2, Algiera and Indochina).
Right now the European militaries/governments seem more geared toward just barely keeping their defense industry afloat in the pursuit of foreign military sales (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, India, Thailand, Brazil etc...).

At the very least more coastal patrol boats etc.. to help Frontex in it's overstrech in Greece, Italy and Spain would help curb the immigration issues that are being used to stoke far-right nationalism.

I don't advocate that they pursue a re-militarization to be on par with say South Korea, the threat from Russia isn't that impending but it should certainly be more than it is now. The Polish, the Baltic States, and Romania are now the front line states in Europe and should be given the assurances they need from the major EU powers. The Baltic air policing and rotation of training forces is okay for getting greater inter-operability but not the same as having defense policy that actually supports functional militaries.

[rory_20_uk]

The carriers weren't designed without planes in mind. They were designed with the F-35 in mind. The RN, trusting the US's estimates, scheduled the retirement of its Harriers to be replaced in short order by F-35s. The F-35 isn't ready because they've been delayed, but the carrier is because they've been less delayed. The USMC refused to put aside their still working Harriers until the F-35 was a working concern. So they still have planes for their carriers.

The lesson in this should be to assume that solutions aren't going to be perfect until they're shown to be so. Stick with the status quo until the changed situation has proven itself.

I am aware they were designed to have planes. In fact during the building of the aircraft carriers they changed the planes they were to use twice I believe.

No solution is ever perfect - and no created product ever is so if one is awaiting perfection one will never have anything, and sticking to the status quo would have soldiers in red uniforms and bearskin hats.

If this is stating the UK needs to admit it is a Tier 2 country and refocus most spending on off the shelf solutions and not cutting edge "solutions" I would agree; that still does not address what exactly the carriers can be used for without sufficient ships to form proper carrier groups.

[Husar]

He did no more to damage nato than euro nations failing to do their bit for collective defense.

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

[spmetla]

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

Each time the Russians, Turks, or any other country violate EU or NATO airspace or maritime boundaries it could be considered a failure. It's not an overrun in a hot war but it is showing the weaknesses of the nations in questions. That doesn't mean that EU countries are about to be bombed in anyway but generally a nation that can't police its borders and stop foreign military incursions opens itself up to that possibility. That's why the airspace defense zones and island building in the South China Sea are such a big deal.

EU warns Turkey after it violates Greek airspace 141 times in one day
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enl...es-in-one-day/
Sweden confirms submarine violation
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rine-violation
Cyprus protests to the UN Turkish violations of air and maritime space
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/24/c...aritime-space/

[Husar]

Each time the Russians, Turks, or any other country violate EU or NATO airspace or maritime boundaries it could be considered a failure. It's not an overrun in a hot war but it is showing the weaknesses of the nations in questions. That doesn't mean that EU countries are about to be bombed in anyway but generally a nation that can't police its borders and stop foreign military incursions opens itself up to that possibility. That's why the airspace defense zones and island building in the South China Sea are such a big deal.

EU warns Turkey after it violates Greek airspace 141 times in one day
https://www.euractiv.com/section/enl...es-in-one-day/
Sweden confirms submarine violation
https://www.theguardian.com/world/20...rine-violation
Cyprus protests to the UN Turkish violations of air and maritime space
https://cyprus-mail.com/2018/02/24/c...aritime-space/

Isn't Turkey a NATO member just like Greece? We sell Turkey weapons, so if they're considered a threat to us, that's really kinda weird.

And regarding the defense failure definition, that's really quite funny:

Russian bombers penetrated U.S. airspace at least 16 times in past 10 days (from 2014)
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news...e-least-16-ti/

4% of GDP and still a complete failure?!

[spmetla]

Turkey is the ally we need but don't really want and their (government's) attitude toward NATO is similar. They are a potential future threat, if they continue down the political path they have been on they will likely be kicked out of or leave NATO and either join the Russian sphere or attempt to lead a new 'non-aligned' islamist movement in the middle east (Neo-Ottoman). As it is right now we can only hope that Erdogan's changes can be reversed in the future.
As you said, it is really weird but looking at the relations they have with Germany and the EU especially I'm sure you agree that weird is probably an understatement too.

4% of GDP and still a complete failure?!

Yup, a complete failure of course..... a lot of airspace to cover for the US with a shrinking Air Force (though far more expensive and less cost effective). That 4% is a target, a goal, not a magic number that equals military might or invulnerability.

[Furunculus]

Can you name these failures in defense? Did anyone get overrun and I missed it?

let me rephrase that so it is more easily understood:

whatever damage was done to public acceptance of collective defence by NATO (as a result of trumps comment re Art5), was minor in comparison to the damage done to public confidence that collective defence actually meant something (when most of nato europe has atrophied its military capability so badly).
to the point where you might question whether many nations within nato-euope would add any sustantial military capability to collective defence.

i'd go further, and argue that trump's reaction was a political response to this atrophy of nato-europe capability; "you obviously don't take it seriously, so why should we?"

A much better view of where we stand:

http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...ce-crisis.html

Notwithstanding the value of the report Monty listed above, in filling in the detail of what I link here.

[Furunculus]

On a different note:

Buckle up chaps, we might be in for a fun ride! :D roflmao - This is what happens when you try to treat politics as a safe space. It isn't, you either trust voters or you don't!

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-44275010

I understand El-Presidente had no problem with the platform, merely the person proposed for the job. Lol:
No mention of leaving the Euro, but plan to cut taxes and increase spending, blowing deficit out to 7.5% and add to the 125%/gdp debt pile. Draw your own conclusion!

What he's really saying: we had confidence we could make you think again from enacting the implications of your program, unless this chap is at the helm, in which case we're not sure of our ability to manipulate the public-policy platform of the incoming gov't. So you can't have him, we want a puppet instead.

[Montmorency]

let me rephrase that so it is more easily understood:

whatever damage was done to public acceptance of collective defence by NATO (as a result of trumps comment re Art5), was minor in comparison to the damage done to public confidence that collective defence actually meant something (when most of nato europe has atrophied its military capability so badly).
to the point where you might question whether many nations within nato-euope would add any sustantial military capability to collective defence.

i'd go further, and argue that trump's reaction was a political response to this atrophy of nato-europe capability; "you obviously don't take it seriously, so why should we?"

A much better view of where we stand:

http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...ce-crisis.html

Notwithstanding the value of the report Monty listed above, in filling in the detail of what I link here.

Declaring things nonsense pat? But I take issue with "Peace through legitimate strength", channeled through vigorous armed forces.

Russia and China are most successful through asymmetric warfare and aggressive diplomacy and mercantilism. No amount of defense spending alone is going to deter these actions, because Russia and China (mostly China) know we're not going to risk pre-emptive war over their incremental strategies. You need soft power to contain them; else they'll recruit enough auxiliaries to contain us.

There's a discussion for the precise sorts of hard power we most need to support the soft power, but revamping and accumulating conventional force is actually irrelevant in the long-term unless we can collectively sort out our vision for the world.

Let me emphasize: you're never going to have the opportunity to wield shiny toys, because the adversary won't let you choose those those terms of contest.

[spmetla]

Russia and China are most successful through asymmetric warfare and aggressive diplomacy and mercantilism. No amount of defense spending alone is going to deter these actions, because Russia and China (mostly China) know we're not going to risk pre-emptive war over their incremental strategies. You need soft power to contain them; else they'll recruit enough auxiliaries to contain us.

Their methods of warfare can be countered but don't think for a second that they don't have substantial conventional capabilities as well. The collective lesson of Desert Storm to Russia and China were the marked advantage that quality currently has over quantity and hence their upgrades from massive armor/mechanized formations of medium quality (Russia) and massive infantry formations (PRC) to much more independent and qualitative formations.

The asymmetric warfare aspect however isn't new, it's essentially the same "Revolutionary Warfare" that the French encountered in Indochina and Algeria, that the US fought in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the British in Malaya, Northern Ireland, and Iraq.

To counter what the Russians have done in Ukraine and what the Chinese are currently doing in the South China Sea would require the US to engage more in propping up regional militias like Vietnam is currently doing.
Vietnam's Fishing ‘Militia’ to Defend Maritime Claims Against China
https://www.voanews.com/a/vietnam-fo...a/4335312.html
To counter the constant cyber attacks should take a concerted and centralized US/NATO response to standardize and upgrade systems, as well as find a suitable countermeasure and response to ensure that such attacks can't go unanswered anymore.

The biggest thing the US and NATO need to figure out is 'messaging' or "propaganda" in selling what we're doing. We have trouble even convincing our own populations to support even standard peace time operations such as the Baltic Air Patrols and the relevancy of NATO, how can we possibly convince our allies or local civilians in any conflict. While it's good to know that the US hasn't been good at propaganda since WW2 it certainly doesn't help us be "The Good Guys" that we want to be when the chief competitors are the ones succeeding at putting their messages and themes out.

There's a discussion for the precise sorts of hard power we most need to support the soft power, but revamping and accumulating conventional force is actually irrelevant in the long-term unless we can collectively sort out our vision for the world.

If nothing else it's a deterrent, Britain hasn't had to have another Falklands War since Argentina has seen that those islands will be contested. France's remaining colonial possessions and ties with it's close African allies have been maintained by a credible and timely use of force.
In Côte d'Ivoire, a Model of Successful Intervention
https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...ention/240164/
Operation Serval Another Beau Geste of France in Sub-Saharan Africa?
http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Porta...231_art014.pdf

The above cases are of course not at all directed toward a peer competitor such as Russia or China but given their gradual escalation in getting their way on the world stage over the last 15 years I personally believe it's building toward a short sharp conflict over something like Taiwan, North Korea, or the Ukraine in which they will try to give us a bloody nose and then open talks. Given the current apathy/dislike in the US and Western Europe toward Russia, the PRC, and most importantly the roles of the US and NATO in the world it'd be easy to see the PRC or Russians make such a calculated gamble that would be short of an all out war but at the same time demonstrate that the US is no longer a Superpower capable of contesting a Regional Power and thereby undermine any remaining confidence in our resolve to support friends and allies (think Suez in 1956 or South Vietnam in 1975).
With cold war tensions gone and mutual annihilation off the table (in the public's mind) the threat of a limited war with a Regional Power is actually more likely than before.

Let me emphasize: you're never going to have the opportunity to wield shiny toys, because the adversary won't let you choose those those terms of contest.

The adversaries have those same 'shiny toys' and if they gain a qualitative edge of significance they will likely demonstrate it. Until then they'll use Revolutionary Warfare with "polite people" in crimea and patriotic fishermen in the South China Sea and off the Senkaku Islands to ensure that if/when we need to defend ourselves it will initially be portrayed as us attacking civilians without cause.

[Furunculus]

Declaring things nonsense pat?

i don't understand? :)

[Montmorency]

The above cases are of course not at all directed toward a peer competitor such as Russia or China but given their gradual escalation in getting their way on the world stage over the last 15 years I personally believe it's building toward a short sharp conflict over something like Taiwan, North Korea, or the Ukraine in which they will try to give us a bloody nose and then open talks. Given the current apathy/dislike in the US and Western Europe toward Russia, the PRC, and most importantly the roles of the US and NATO in the world it'd be easy to see the PRC or Russians make such a calculated gamble that would be short of an all out war but at the same time demonstrate that the US is no longer a Superpower capable of contesting a Regional Power and thereby undermine any remaining confidence in our resolve to support friends and allies (think Suez in 1956 or South Vietnam in 1975).
With cold war tensions gone and mutual annihilation off the table (in the public's mind) the threat of a limited war with a Regional Power is actually more likely than before.

I agree well with this.

The adversaries have those same 'shiny toys' and if they gain a qualitative edge of significance they will likely demonstrate it. Until then they'll use Revolutionary Warfare with "polite people" in crimea and patriotic fishermen in the South China Sea and off the Senkaku Islands to ensure that if/when we need to defend ourselves it will initially be portrayed as us attacking civilians without cause.

Whatever the potential capabilities of Russian or Chinese conventional force in the future, their use will remain a high-risk, high-cost proposition that detracts from their other vectors (diplomacy, economics, asymmetric war). If they can get their way in a situation by other means - which they almost certainly can - then they will shun direct confrontation. The one countervailing motivation could be that the buildup of goodies gives certain hawks a hard-on for blowing their load (Buck Turgidson syndrome), and they become a dominant faction over more patient and realistic types.

i don't understand? :)

He claims that pooled efforts with limited budget synergy is nonsense, and opposing forward deployment of EU member forces to bypass mobility challenges because it may increase vulnerability is nonsense.

[spmetla]

Whatever the potential capabilities of Russian or Chinese conventional force in the future, their use will remain a high-risk, high-cost proposition that detracts from their other vectors (diplomacy, economics, asymmetric war). If they can get their way in a situation by other means - which they almost certainly can - then they will shun direct confrontation. The one countervailing motivation could be that the buildup of goodies gives certain hawks a hard-on for blowing their load (Buck Turgidson syndrome), and they become a dominant faction over more patient and realistic types.

The countervailing motivation is the one that I'm worried about. Both Russia and the PRC play the victim card a lot for domestic consumption and one day those people that really want revenge for the past will be in a position to make those decisions. That desire for revenge against "The West" will probably force a war for domestic politics despite cooler heads advising otherwise. That combined with their common view that the West is weak and degenerate and would fold easily at the first significant blood letting could blunder them into a war. Sorta like Saddam didn't think Bush would invade without the backing of the UN Security Council causing him to try and bluff or Hitler thinking that France and Britain wouldn't go to war over Danzig. Jingoism, revanchism, and nationalism make for good domestic propaganda until that forces politicians to go to war for fear of looking weak.

To the main point of the thread however in relation to the EU. What type of EU military or European national militaries would you think appropriate for the return of Russia and hard power?

Interesting read on one way, though I don't think Germany is really fit to lead an EU military for obvious WWII memories related reasons (for reasons of political will):
Germany Is Quietly Building a European Army Under Its Command
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/22/...r-its-command/

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Every few years, the idea of an EU army finds its way back into the news, causing a kerfuffle. The concept is both fantasy and bogeyman: For every federalist in Brussels who thinks a common defense force is what Europe needs to boost its standing in the world, there are those in London and elsewhere who recoil at the notion of a potential NATO rival.

But this year, far from the headlines, Germany and two of its European allies, the Czech Republic and Romania, quietly took a radical step down a path toward something that looks like an EU army while avoiding the messy politics associated with it: They announced the integration of their armed forces.

Romania’s entire military won’t join the Bundeswehr, nor will the Czech armed forces become a mere German subdivision. But in the next several months each country will integrate one brigade into the German armed forces: Romania’s 81st Mechanized Brigade will join the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Response Forces Division, while the Czech 4th Rapid Deployment Brigade, which has served in Afghanistan and Kosovo and is considered the Czech Army’s spearhead force, will become part of the Germans’ 10th Armored Division. In doing so, they’ll follow in the footsteps of two Dutch brigades, one of which has already joined the Bundeswehr’s Rapid Response Forces Division and another that has been integrated into the Bundeswehr’s 1st Armored Division. According to Carlo Masala, a professor of international politics at the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich, “The German government is showing that it’s willing to proceed with European military integration” — even if others on the continent aren’t yet.

European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker has repeatedly floated the idea of an EU army, only to be met with either ridicule or awkward silence. That remains the case even as the U.K., a perennial foe of the idea, is on its way out of the union. There’s little agreement among remaining member states over what exactly such a force would look like and which capabilities national armed forces would give up as a result. And so progress has been slow going. This March, the European Union created a joint military headquarters — but it’s only in charge of training missions in Somalia, Mali, and the Central African Republic and has a meager staff of 30. Other multinational concepts have been designed, such as the Nordic Battle Group, a small 2,400-troop rapid reaction force formed by the Baltic states and several Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and Britain’s Joint Expeditionary Force, a “mini-NATO” whose members include the Baltic states, Sweden, and Finland. But in the absence of suitable deployment opportunities, such operations-based teams may as well not exist.

But under the bland label of the Framework Nations Concept, Germany has been at work on something far more ambitious — the creation of what is essentially a Bundeswehr-led network of European miniarmies. “The initiative came out of the weakness of the Bundeswehr,” said Justyna Gotkowska, a Northern Europe security analyst at Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies think tank. “The Germans realized that the Bundeswehr needed to fill gaps in its land forces … in order to gain political and military influence within NATO.” An assist from junior partners may be Germany’s best shot at bulking out its military quickly — and German-led miniarmies may be Europe’s most realistic option if it’s to get serious about joint security. “It’s an attempt to prevent joint European security from completely failing,” Masala said.

“Gaps” in the Bundeswehr is an understatement. In 1989, the West German government spent 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, but by 2000 spending had dropped to 1.4 percent, where it remained for years. Indeed, between 2013 and 2016 defense spending was stuck at 1.2 percent — far from NATO’s 2 percent benchmark. In a 2014 report to the Bundestag, the German parliament, the Bundeswehr’s inspectors-general presented a woeful picture: Most of the Navy’s helicopters were not working, and of the Army’s 64 helicopters, only 18 were usable. And while the Cold War Bundeswehr had consisted of 370,000 troops, by last summer it was only 176,015 men and women strong.

Since then the Bundeswehr has grown to more than 178,000 active-duty troops; last year the government increased funding by 4.2 percent, and this year defense spending will grow by 8 percent. But Germany still lags far behind France and the U.K. as a military power. And boosting defense spending is not uncontroversial in Germany, which is wary of its history as a military power. Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel recently said it was “completely unrealistic” to think that Germany would reach NATO’s defense spending benchmark of 2 percent of GDP — even though nearly all of Germany’s allies, from smaller European countries to the United States, are urging it to play a larger military role in the world.

Germany may not yet have the political will to expand its military forces on the scale that many are hoping for — but what it has had since 2013 is the Framework Nations Concept. For Germany, the idea is to share its resources with smaller countries in exchange for the use of their troops. For these smaller countries, the initiative is a way of getting Germany more involved in European security while sidestepping the tricky politics of Germany military expansion.
“It’s a move towards more European military independence,” Masala said. “The U.K. and France are not available to take a lead in European security” — the U.K. is on a collision course with its EU allies, while France, a military heavyweight, has often been a reluctant participant in multinational efforts within NATO. “That leaves Germany,” he said. Operationally, the resulting binational units are more deployable because they’re permanent (most multinational units have so far been ad hoc). Crucially for the junior partners, it also amplifies their military muscle. And should Germany decide to deploy an integrated unit, it could only do so with the junior partner’s consent.
Of course, since 1945 Germany has been extraordinarily reluctant to deploy its military abroad, until 1990 even barring the Bundeswehr from foreign deployments. Indeed, junior partners — and potential junior partners — hope that the Framework Nations arrangement will make Germany take on more responsibility for European security. So far, Germany and its multinational miniarmies remain only that: small-scale initiatives, far removed from a full-fledged European army. But the initiative is likely to grow. Germany’s partners have been touting the practical benefits of integration: For Romania and the Czech Republic, it means bringing their troops to the same level of training as the German military; for the Netherlands, it has meant regaining tank capabilities. (The Dutch had sold the last of their tanks in 2011, but the 43rd Mechanized Brigade’s troops, who are partially based with the 1st Armored Division in the western German city of Oldenburg, now drive the Germans’ tanks and could use them if deployed with the rest of the Dutch army.) Col. Anthony Leuvering, the 43rd Mechanized’s Oldenburg-based commander, told me that the integration has had remarkably few hiccups. “The Bundeswehr has some 180,000 personnel, but they don’t treat us like an underdog,” he said. He expects more countries to jump on the bandwagon: “Many, many countries want to cooperate with the Bundeswehr.” The Bundeswehr, in turn, has a list of junior partners in mind, said Robin Allers, a German associate professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies who has seen the German military’s list. According to Masala, the Scandinavian countries — which already use a large amount of German-made equipment — would be the best candidates for the Bundeswehr’s next round of integration.

So far, the low-profile and ad hoc approach of the Framework Nations Concept has worked to its advantage; few people in Europe have objected to the integration of Dutch or Romanian units into German divisions, partly because they may not have noticed. Whether there will be political repercussions should more nations sign up to the initiative is less clear.

Outside of politics, the real test of the Framework Nations’ value will be the integrated units’ success in combat. But the trickiest part of integration, on the battlefield and off, may turn out to be finding a lingua franca. Should troops learn each other’s languages? Or should the junior partner speak German? The German-speaking Dutch Col. Leuvering reports that the binational Oldenburg division is moving toward using English.

[Montmorency]

To the main point of the thread however in relation to the EU. What type of EU military or European national militaries would you think appropriate for the return of Russia and hard power?

TBH, I don't know or care enough to give a good answer. Part of it has to wedge into the political and logistical vulnerability of Russo-Chinese aggression: they probably can't hold foreign land for long. Course that comes down on the post-invasion side of things.

How does emerging tech come into it? Ultimately (unfortunately) autonomous weapons systems won't be foreclosed as an avenue of research, at least not by the US and China. The thought of furious citizen resistance might cow any adversarial administration, but if you can just exterminate them with some drone-bombs...

[Montmorency]

Merkel thinks we're all flacked.

Instead, she wanted to talk about the Peace of Augsburg, signed in 1555.

The chancellor has made frequent excursions into history lately. Indeed, the Peace of Augsburg also came up four weeks ago during her visit to the residence of the German ambassador in Washington. The treaty initiated a 60-year phase of peace between Protestants and Catholics after the bloody turmoil of the Reformation and it initially seemed as though people had finally come to their senses. But that image turned out to be a deceptive one. In 1618, a war began unlike any the Continent had ever seen before. By the time the inferno ended 30 years later, large parts of Germany had been depopulated and many cities left in ruins.

To Merkel, the Peace of Augsburg is much more than some distant historical date. Rather, it is a warning of just how thin the varnish covering civilization really is.

Donald Trump? For her, he is a man who has turned back the historical clock to zero hour and casts doubt on everything that has united the West for decades: NATO, trade agreements and the United Nations.
[...]
Vladimir Putin? A president who was once full of admiration for the West's performance, but at some point realized he would never be able to trigger an economic turnaround in his country and is now fully committed to brute force and repression, in Ukraine, in Syria and in Russia itself.

China? Proof that it is not impossible to reconcile a dictatorship with a market economy. Europe? Quarrelling, weakened by Brexit and paralyzed by agonizingly long decision-making procedures.

In the fall of 2016, Merkel evidently seriously considered withdrawing from politics. People she spoke to at the time say it was almost painful to see how coldly and soberly Merkel assessed her own situation -- the hatred she now provokes and the weariness that a long run as chancellor inevitably brings with it, especially in the age of instantaneous new media.

If Hillary Clinton had won the election in the U.S., Merkel would not have run again, says one person who speaks with her on an almost daily basis.

Merkel, it was said after Trump's election, had become the leader of the free world. But that's nonsense. She's a hardworking politician who has been around for ages and everyone knows her -- from the Saudi crown prince to Li Xi, the party secretary of Guangdong Province, with whom she had lunch a week ago Friday. They all appreciate her detailed knowledge, intelligence and patience. Yet like any leader who has been in office for a long time, Merkel is particularly good at explaining what is not possible.

In her thoughts, Merkel is actually more revolutionary. She feels everything needs to move much faster, in Europe and in Germany, which can't even manage to build an airport in its capital city -- in stark contrast to a China that can build entire metropolises from scratch within just a few years. During her trips to China, there is always a hint of appreciations for the Chinese government, which isn't burdened by protracted planning approval procedures and where no politician is forced to laboriously explain himself to the citizens. China is governed from the top down.

Something has to happen, Merkel said with concern as she traveled back to Berlin, impressed by the drive of Beijing's leaders. And then, in the same breath, she went on to explain why nothing could happen: because her hands are tied by German federalism, by the center-left Social Democrats in her government, and by the CSU, which often acts as more of an adversary than as a sister party.

Merkel says she doesn't lead by speeches and appeals. She acts as if it's a German virtue to reach your goal without much talk. But the truth is that she shirks the work of finding the right words to rally people around ideas that don't yet have majority support. Could Brandt's détente policy have existed were it not for great speeches? Or German reunification? One of the traits of the late Merkel era is that the chancellor's own silence fuels the very apathy that she so deeply laments.

[rory_20_uk]

"Vigorous" empires generally focus on the results they want and frankly bulldoze through changes that are good overall and ignore (or perhaps compensate) those whose lives are ruined. Be that the Romans, the British, the USA, China,

Then when things start to become sclerotic they invariably are eclipsed by others - China is not overly concerned with getting everything right and having endless meetings and consultations of every wrongdoing. They just get on with it; in the UK this was a pretty similar mindset to the Victorians where projects were completed with a loss of life we would not countenance today.

That could well then lead to the fact there appear to be few "big ideas" at the moment in Europe. Pride in anything might upset some group somewhere and so fear of making a decision leads to indecision and stagnation.

[Husar]

I wasn't aware that Merkel had any ideas.

Also, shirk should be the word that describes scratching your fingernails on a chalkboard.

[Fragony]

You still use these, figures

[rory_20_uk]

Poland is throwing its toys around. Perhaps because they are not going to be given so much money in the future in exchange for their autonomy...

[edyzmedieval]

Apparently Juncker averted a trade war and has managed to keep the trading going with USA without tariffs.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Apparently Juncker averted a trade war and has managed to keep the trading going with USA without tariffs.

Getting a somewhat better deal has been the sole purpose of all the Trumpian trade threatwork.

[a completely inoffensive name]

Conservatives are taking this as a big win. Sad. Did we even get anything down on paper?

[Montmorency]

EU/Germany's main goal to avoid tariffs on auto and industrial goods.

Conservatives are taking this as a big win. Sad. Did we even get anything down on paper?

Someone verify this for me: Trump admin made a similar set of aspirational "deals" with China ~April, but these haven't been followed up on and instead escalating rounds of sanctions have been exchanged. Now Trump is threatening to sanction all US-China trade.

Am I right?

What it looks like to me is, Trump wants to foist American exports - such as exist - onto the world while sharply curtailing the permeability of America to imports from the world. Very free trade. Much fool.