In the good times, yes. When there are no 'consequences' to doing nice economicky things that make us feel all EUropean.
But these are not the good times, and we expect 'the state' to step in and do extraordinary things to preserve our declining welfare.
Germany benefits from the single currency by having its natural foriegn exchange rate suppressed by the wider currency region. Its goods are cheaper, but by the same token it raises the exchange rate for the wider currency region. Making their goods more expensive.
And this happens whilst engaging in none of the normal solidarity acts that nation states engage in to normalise wealth potential within the 'regions':
Federal US taxation is ~25% of GDP and the variation in spending levels between rich and poor states is ~5% of GDP, so a variation of roughly 20% of federal spending.
How big a budget would the EU need to be able to slosh around 5% of combined GDP into the poor regions (bearing in mind the current budget is only 1% (and heavily constrained by CAP payments)?
The other point is that americans accept this, they are all american, whereas we are rapidly finding out just how german the germans are, and finnish the finns are, when it comes to firehosing cash at nations they consider to be essentially delinquent! In the UK this ‘sloshing’ occurs in the form of:
a) National pay-bargaining which benefits poorer regions (teachers, nurses, etc)
b) National social benefits more generous than poorer regions could afford alone (eg.housing benefit in glasgow)
c) Targeted regional development grants/discounts to encourage business growth (objective 1 EU/WEFO funds)
d) Additional infrastructure spending to support the local economy (the mainland-skye bridge)
e) Operating national services hubs from depressed regions to boost wages (DVLA in swansea, etc)
Unless Germany recognises the ‘familial’ relationship, and the obligation that goes along with that, then it needs to leave for the good of its neighbours.
This principal applies equally to the netherlands and finland, but since it is Germany that is the driving economic power for the euro’s sake the answer must be ‘right’.
One mechanism to equalise this foriegn exchange disparity would be eurobonds. To compensate for a higher than natural foriegn exchange rate the wider currency union would borrow collectively, and thus lower their borrowing costs on the back of Germany’s strength.
The quid-pro-quo would be that Germany’s cost of borrowing would rise, as it too would be borrowing through the wider currency union and would see its strength diluted in consequence.
What is happening right now is commonly termed “wanting to have your cake, and eat it too“, an attitude considered ugly by weaker members of the polity who consider that cake to be shared treat.
An economic union cannot exist long term without a political union from which to draw legitimacy from for the acts that it must take in regulating society.
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