Why has Labour increasingly benefited? In the 1960s and 1970s this was largely
because of the malapportionment components plus abstentions. In the 1990s
gerrymandering, abstentions and minor party influences all played a part.
Three reasons generated this change in Labour’s fortunes – given that its geography
of support remained very much the same across the 14 elections and the Boundary
Commission procedures did not change markedly.
1. The negative impact of the cracked gerrymander. A cracked gerrymander is risky
for the benefiting party: constituencies with small majorities are vulnerable if its
opponent performs well at an election. Labour benefited from its large vote share
increase in 1997 (allied with the Conservatives’ lowest share), winning many
constituencies in the usually pro-Conservative cracked gerrymander areas. The
gerrymander bias component was worth 48 seats to Labour as a consequence.
2. Labour’s focused campaigns in 1992 and 1997. Labour paid relatively little
attention to its safe seats at these two contests, knowing it would almost certainly
win them all – especially in 1997. In the absence of intensive local campaigns,
turnout was generally low, increasing Labour’s advantage from the abstentions
component (from 10 seats in 1987 to 20 in 1992 and 33 in 1997) without it losing
any seats.
3. Tactical voting (the British term for strategic voting). In 1992 and, especially
1997, the volume of tactical voting in Conservative-held seats increased
substantially, as an increasingly sophisticated electorate (many of them
determined to unseat the Conservative candidates) responded to cues provided by
the parties and other interest groups to support the opposition party best-placed to
achieve that. In general, the second-placed party in Conservative-held seats
increased its vote share by more than the average amount whereas the third-placed
party’s share fell (often absolutely). As a result, many of the second-placed parties
won – increasing the number of minor party victories – whereas the number of
wasted votes per seat lost by third-placed parties fell. (On tactical voting see
Johnston et al, 1997, and Evans et al 1999.)
Together, all three strategies meant that Labour substantially reduced both its number
of surplus votes per seats won and number of wasted votes per seat lost (which for the
first time fell below the Conservative level). Not only did it increase its vote share
substantially between 1992 and 1997, therefore, it also increased the efficiency of its
vote share: it got a much better return on its votes (a higher seats:votes ratio) than ever
before.
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