Great Power contentions

[Pannonian]

Good demonstration of the probabilistic nature of fragmentary explosions. Those artillery hazard radii you see are more like 'this can theoretically happen if you're very unlucky.' What I don't understand is why... the subjects act like NPCs.
https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/...19856999268352 [VIDEO]

What do you mean?

[Montmorency]

What do you mean?

*sigh*

A grenade or mortar round fell within a couple meters of every man in a section, leaving one badly wounded. The rest scramble, but almost immediately de-aggro and keep walking as though nothing happened, while the third at least stops to look back at the injured comrade.

Seems like anomalous behavior for humans.

[Hooahguy]

NPC behavior is exactly what it is. Its a kinder explanation than they just dont give a rats behind about their comrades. Im not sure which is more disturbing tbh.

[CrossLOPER]

It's very difficult to know how you are going to react, even if you are trained. However, footage like this leads me to believe that they either have not had sufficient training, are exhausted, and/or don't really care. It mostly looks like a total lack of leadership or direction.

[Montmorency]

It's also possible that a dictator likes to screw around with world leaders just to feel important (cf. tthe 5-hour Macron-Putin meeting or whatever it was). Would be hilarious if any of these events had some connection to Trump's Macron dossier.

[Pannonian]

Russian tanks in Kyiv

[CrossLOPER]

It's also possible that a dictator likes to screw around with world leaders just to feel important (cf. tthe 5-hour Macron-Putin meeting or whatever it was). Would be hilarious if any of these events had some connection to Trump's Macron dossier.

I was referring to the preceding posts, but it is indeed alarming that world leaders seem to have difficulty reading human beings. If someone spoke to me that way, I would interpret it as a subtle "f*ck you". I am not sure this is a cultural thing, although Putin's words seem to have been tailored in such a way that a typical western male would receptive.

"I'm at the gym. I'm going to watch the game. I'm just a bro like you. We're buds. Catch you later."

[Hooahguy]

An excellent article about how the Russians were defeated around Kyiv. (if its paywalled let me know).

[Montmorency]

Seems like Ukraine has launched its expected general offensive in the South. The strategy may be to squeeze the Kherson bridgehead until it runs out of supplies. Other aspects may include bisecting the bridgehead to cut the Kakhovka dam off from Kherson, or to push from Zaporizhzhia toward Tokmak, the only rail junction linking Kherson with occupied Donbass. Almost nothing solid has yet emerged about events on the ground.

The Ukrainian sergeant slid the captured Russian rocket launcher into the center of a small room. He was pleased. The weapon was practically brand-new. It had been built in 2020, and its thermobaric warhead was deadly against troops and armored vehicles.

But the sergeant, nicknamed Zmei, had no plans to fire it at advancing Russian soldiers or at a tank trying to burst through his unit’s front line in eastern Ukraine.

Instead, he was going to use it as a bargaining chip.

Within the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, Zmei was not just a lowly sergeant. He was the brigade’s point man for a wartime bartering system among Ukrainian forces. Prevalent along the front line, the exchange operates like a kind of shadow economy, soldiers say, in which units acquire weapons or equipment and trade them for supplies they need urgently.

Most of the bartering involves items captured from Russian troops. Ukrainian soldiers refer to them as “trophies.”

“Usually, the trades are done really fast,” Zmei said last week during an interview in Ukraine’s mineral-rich Donbas region, where the 93rd is now stationed. “Let’s just call it a simplification of bureaucracy.”

“We have hopes for Kyiv,” said Fedir, one of the brigade’s supply sergeants and an understudy of Zmei, referring to military commanders in the capital. “But we rely on ourselves. We aren’t trying to just sit and wait like idiots until Kyiv sends us something.”

Such was the case in early May, when the 93rd — a renowned unit that had fought in almost every major battle of the war — was operating around the Russian-occupied city of Izium. Zmei, who before the war owned a small publishing house that specialized in dark fantasy novels, received an innocuous text message from a nearby Ukrainian commander.

“Hi,” the message read. “Listen, here’s the thing, we have a needless tank, a T-72 a bit damaged.”

“And we’d exchange it for something nice,” the commander added.

[...]

The commander’s requests were modest: a transport truck and a couple of sniper rifles in return for the Russian trophy tank. But Zmei told his customer, “This is too few things for a tank, write down what else you need.” The commander responded that he had plenty of tanks and wanted only the items requested.

When the commander mentioned all the tanks in his unit’s possession, Zmei sensed an opportunity to expand the trade. He wanted more tanks, and noted that the 93rd had foreign-supplied anti-tank missiles and U.S. portable surface-to-air missile systems available for a swap.

“Can get the launchers for a Stinger, NLAWs, various large stuff for a trade — and a lot of that,” Zmei said, referring to some of the Western weapons, which cost tens of thousands of dollars apiece.

Of the more than half-dozen soldiers interviewed for this article, most said that this underground economy was driven by the need to survive. Sometimes, they said, that meant circumventing a clumsy bureaucracy.

Although soldiers said that they were supposed to send captured equipment up the supply chain back to Kyiv, they noted that there was little effort to investigate the underground exchanges, let alone punish anyone for doing it.

In Michael’s squalid kitchen are printouts tacked to the wall listing the Western equipment his battalion desperately needs: encrypted radios, semiautomatic grenade launchers and Polish 155-millimeter howitzers, known as Krabs.

A Krab unit commander named Andriy said that his howitzers were not available for trade, though he might consider a swap if offered a French self-propelled artillery piece in exchange.

The 93rd currently only possesses old Soviet-era artillery pieces that have worn out barrels and are low on ammunition.

“I have to go and buy everything and trade things, and bring it all here,” Michael said.

The same kind of informal trade, or otherwise 'borrowing' of personnel and crewed vehicles, was observed during WW2. But not to this degree, I feel like.

Throughout the war it's been reported of both sides, from Ukrainian militia to Russian Spetsnaz, how heavily they have relied on crowdfunding and individual procurement of basic infantry equipment, drones, and even vehicles.

It's not quite a pre-modern way of war, but it's hard to find a truly applicable modern term, including "capitalist" or "neoliberal." Gamified?

[spmetla]

Seems like Ukraine has launched its expected general offensive in the South. The strategy may be to squeeze the Kherson bridgehead until it runs out of supplies. Other aspects may include bisecting the bridgehead to cut the Kakhovka dam off from Kherson, or to push from Zaporizhzhia toward Tokmak, the only rail junction linking Kherson with occupied Donbass. Almost nothing solid has yet emerged about events on the ground.

Been watching it closely too. Wishing them the best of luck, however, if they cannot retake Kherson it bodes ill for their ability to retake any dug in part the Russians hold. Assuming they do take it though it would change the calculus on Russia's part significantly as their 'land-bridge' to Crimea would once again be under threat and the Kherson/Crimea canal could be blocked again further putting the Russians in Crimea in a sorta of siege, especially as artillery gets in range of Crimea itself.

Looking at the videos of the Ukrainian army operating there I'm still of the mind that those older Leo1A5s and Marder1s should be sent over. If the Ukraine has to assault dug in Russian positions supported by Dutch YPR-765s (just modified M113s APCs really) then they'd be much better served by the more capable Marders and the support of light MBTs like the Leo1A5.

The same kind of informal trade, or otherwise 'borrowing' of personnel and crewed vehicles, was observed during WW2. But not to this degree, I feel like.

Throughout the war it's been reported of both sides, from Ukrainian militia to Russian Spetsnaz, how heavily they have relied on crowdfunding and individual procurement of basic infantry equipment, drones, and even vehicles.

It's not quite a pre-modern way of war, but it's hard to find a truly applicable modern term, including "capitalist" or "neoliberal." Gamified?

Processing captured goods and putting into formal logistics channels has always been a difficulty in war. Trading actual platforms like artillery systems though is something quite crazy, really shows what a logistical bind Ukraine is in. Switching from Soviet standard to NATO standard mid-war isn't easy, not to mention the sheer variety of systems of each standard they have in inventory.

[Montmorency]

Omegalul: Popular Russian milblogger celebrates an alleged Russian artillery strike against a Ukrainian military hospital (a war crime), hopes that it was deliberate, complains that it wasn't routine for the past 6 months.

We repeat once again: as a result of the strike, the wounded servicemen of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were liquidated. [Ed. Formatting from source]

We do not understand why in Syria the field hospitals of Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State were massacred, while in Ukraine only (inshallah) they begin to reach this after six months of SVO. [Ed. Formatting mine]

But it's no secret what I believe should be done with fascists.

[Hooahguy]

Been watching it closely too. Wishing them the best of luck, however, if they cannot retake Kherson it bodes ill for their ability to retake any dug in part the Russians hold. Assuming they do take it though it would change the calculus on Russia's part significantly as their 'land-bridge' to Crimea would once again be under threat and the Kherson/Crimea canal could be blocked again further putting the Russians in Crimea in a sorta of siege, especially as artillery gets in range of Crimea itself.

Looking at the videos of the Ukrainian army operating there I'm still of the mind that those older Leo1A5s and Marder1s should be sent over. If the Ukraine has to assault dug in Russian positions supported by Dutch YPR-765s (just modified M113s APCs really) then they'd be much better served by the more capable Marders and the support of light MBTs like the Leo1A5.

Agreed on all points. From the latest maps we have, it looks like the Ukrainians are trying to split up Russian forces into a pocket northeast of Kherson while maintaining pressure on the road to Kherson itself. If they can achieve that, it would be a huge blow for Russian forces in the area. Theres a great podcast recently posted about this by people much smarter than me. Only about 30 mins long but very informative and even-keeled. From their analysis the strategy seems to be slow but steady progress forward, with Ukrainians routinely rotating forces to keep them fresh rather than an all-out offensive that would be high-risk, high reward. I also agree with their analysis that this could very well be the decisive offensive of the war. As we head into winter and a European energy crisis sets in (or even a recession), we could be looking at reduced Western support. A Ukrainian victory in Kherson could ensure continued support while a defeat could drive Ukraine to the negotiation table sooner than it might have wanted to.

[spmetla]

Yeah, the slow steady progress seems a good tactic for Ukraine in this area. Russia is restricted in how it can supply its troops, Ukraine has been excellent in targeting logistical and C2 nodes while Russia hasn't had much to answer to HIMARS. The recent appearance of HARM missiles that work with Ukrainian MiG 29s is a game changer as it allows Ukraine to conduct suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions as well as target Russian counterbattery radars too. That together with the increasing capabilities of Ukrainian air defense and artillery make the idea of Russian victory in the time period of the next few months a none-factor.
Ukraine's lack of armored vehicles though sadly restricts them to only doing this very slow and deliberate creeping offensive. It may get them Kherson and perhaps even cut off Crimea but I can't see how such an approach will work in the east of the country. Ukraine needs more tanks and IFVs to increase their offensive capabilities too though at this point such donations would really only be in time for winter and spring.

Gotta say though, I'm happily surprised at how more or less together the EU has remained during this energy crisis.

[Montmorency]

I have some old and new thoughts to share on the offensive, but I'll sit on it for another day or two. It seems Ukraine husbanded the resources to at least probe Russian defenses throughout Kharkiv Oblast while advancing in Kherson. Russian bloggers have speculated on a Ukrainian buildup in Kharkiv for a while now, but all simultaneously shat themselves on the 6th so hopefully it's a real dog's dinner for them. Meanwhile, Ukrainian SOF keep raiding across the Siversky Donets in northern Donetsk and vlogging through villages (3 or 4) on the Russian-occupied side.



According to the latest news, Russia plans to procure millions of rockets and shells from North Korea, which will buy Russia's artillery arm months of stable performance (range for Russian cannon ammunition consumption in 200 days, not counting mortars or wastage, should be 3-7 million according to my mental meta-analysis of estimates). At least it would leave NK as even less of a security concern. We've seen Russia documented dipping into Belarus's depots before; how much did they leave for Lukashenko?



Gets the point across without fiddling with additions to or subtractions from real Chinese defense spending.

[rory_20_uk]

It appears that Ukraine have something of an advantage until they reach the river where assaulting will then become much more difficult. Of course I hope that Russia's army shatters and we see mass surrenders etc etc.

I imagine that North Korea can create the low tech munitions that really hasn't massively changed in c. 50 years - and they'd be delighted to be paid in oil / food / vaccines for it. They could send the older stuff from storage which helps them keep their stock nice and shiny. How quickly they can send material is a question - but they can probably prioritise arms trains and even ships would be slow but would work. Again, whether China will use this as a back-door way of supplying Russia (in the well worn "the enemy of my enemy is a problem for later") or whether bleeding Russia's army white is just a good thing and any issues they have with the USA is predominantly a Naval issue.

The best defence of Taiwan is that China would be the proud owner of a large island with almost all infrastructure has been destroyed and millions of shell shocked civilians who are extremely hostile to the new regime, having suffered hideous losses getting there and having widespread unrest in mainland China as so many only children have been killed. Probably all high tech equipment was either destroyed in the invasion or destroyed to prevent China getting it - and of course all company money has long gone abroad. In short, sabre-rattling continues to be more useful than the destabilisation that an invasion would cause - ignoring whether there'd be a wider war and the associated trade embargoes.

[Montmorency]

Yeah, it's time. We underestimated Ukraine again.

I wrote the following on the Kherson Offensive almost a week ago for my personal notes.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

1. In the end UFOR didn't spring any fancy maneuvers across theaters. It seems analysts were correct to dismiss the existence of such capabilities. This is about as straightforward and limited an offensive as could be designed within organizational constraints while still aiming at any significant objective.

2. There was some discussion as to whether to contemplate these attacks as a "real" offensive or as a Great Raid or as an enhanced shaping operation, but I don't personally see much meaningful distinction at this juncture.

3. UFOR initiated with unsophisticated frontal assaults up and down the Kherson Front. These were of course costly to the vanguard, but they sufficiently captured RuFOR attention and disorganized the defenders' dispositions that UFOR could isolate forward villages and pin down some RuFOR reserves (mostly various VDV elements) while tightening up their axes of advance at the most promising junctures in the bridgehead, thereafter applying more conservative tactics. The preponderance of forces are committed in the general direction of Nova Kakhovka.

4. With such an offensive concentrating on the Kherson bridgehead, the expectation is only secondarily that UFOR would maneuver to seize territory around RuFOR strongholds and push towards the river. Rather, the strategy of pressuring the gestalt bridgehead is paramount (thus the two months of shaping by damaging bridge crossings and RuFOR logistics, air defense, and command & control). Ukrainian authorities have indicated as much themselves. The object is to try to exhaust local stockpiles of munitions through intense engagement while doing one's level best to throttle continuous resupply over the river, with an effect comparable to, I guess, exhausting one's opponent in a game of Mercy. At some point, the theory goes, RuFOR should lack the fuel and munitions to effectively react to UFOR advances, at which point the defenders experience cascading failure.

5. Relative RuFOR losses have also been high, but we won't know the balance for a long time. However, it seems their throughput into the bridgehead by airlift and ferry amounts to dozens of vehicles and who-knows-what else daily, despite the bridge crossings coming under much heavier and more regular fire than ever before. It is clear that despite the UFOR pre-offensive campaign to degrade RuFOR logistics in the region, the bridgehead defense had been well supplied. Most of the defenders, in particular the VDV divisions, appear motivated and have offered stiff resistance. More maneuver will be needed to pocket RuFOR defenders and expedite the degradation of lines of supply and maintain tolerable inputs of personnel and materiel for the attacker.



6. The ultimate success of the Kherson campaign in leaving the bridgehed untenable for RuFOR depends on how long and consistently UFOR can maintain this level of pressure while interdicting or constraining opposition resupply. More specifically, how well the RuFOR munitions throughput and expenditures have been calculated, their effectiveness in degrading UFOR assault elements, and UFOR's operational budget & reserves. Unless UFOR leadership has badly miscalculated, the bridgehead will<i>eventually</i> be reduced to a Stalingrad/Severodonetsk-type city garrison.

7. It is also possible that UFOR does maintain a certain shock force in operational reserve to break through somewhere around the area of main effort at a decisive moment and exploit towards the Dnieper, but this is purely hypothetical. In such a case the disorderly collapse of a large sector of the RuFOR line is conceivable.

Revising the first bullet entirely, I don't believe it's premature to say that things are proceeding in form for Ukraine. Their forces appear to be steadily advancing along much of the front in Kherson, as well as (at least) probing in Zaporizhzhia and near Izyum, and have just opened a Russian-anticipated yet still surprising axis in Kharkiv that has produced dramatic advances in a day. Ukraine has in the past days already displayed more operational acumen than Russia at anything, and achieved a more effective advance than anything Russia has enjoyed since the beginning. It seems the plan was to feint substantial Russian reserves toward Kherson, effect inevitable logistical degradation (being achieved by the offensive), and then opportunistically attack along key axes against dilute Russian resistance.

That's a pretty good reason for Ukraine's apparent decision not to commit a decisive balance of forces to Kherson at the outset. Indeed, a decisive attack into Zaporizhzhia with fresh formations is not out of the question.

I'd like to add that if Ukraine did reach Beryslav or Bilozerka in Kherson, it could begin to cover much of the downstream river itself with direct fire and barrel artillery, making the bridgehead immediately unsustainable with respect to the operation of vehicles or artillery. I would consider this an urgent priority given the rate at which GMLRS rockets for HIMARS are being expended to keep the bridges and river crossings under constant interdiction (HIMARS fire missions against river crossings during the offensive have reached a level of daily intensity equivalent to a week's worth pre-offensive).


In other news, according to my current estimate against Oryx (using a 1.25-1.5x multiplier range, assuming a proportional distribution of unspecified recorded losses), Russia has lost at least a quarter of its post-Cold War T-72 models (T-72B3), and at least a third of similar T-80 variants (T-80BVM). T-72B3s alone represented about half of all active Russian tanks before the war. Tough to replace when Russian hardware makes systematic use of Western advanced and off-the-shelf electronics. No wonder they basically pulled all T-90s from combat duty after April. The material situation continues to justify the prioritization of reactivated and refurbished Cold War models. (I'll believe 3rd Korps has any significant number of T-90s assigned when I see them show up in the loss sheets.) Hopefully with the Kherson offensive Ukraine can return to repleneshing its armor inventory with captures.

[Montmorency]

Cursed.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

Military history tends to repeat itself a bit because of the dominant impact of terrain. This has long been a known element of warfare.

[Montmorency]

Ukrainian vanguard said to be on the outskirts of Kupyansk.

Parody of Russia's Baghdad Bob-esque kill claims throughout the war:




I wouldn't be surprised if Ukraine is back to 200 KIA daily with these offensives, but you gotta love recent Oryx updates:

RuFOR, added today: 5 tank; 23 AFV; 6 arty
UFOR, added today: 1 tank; 1 BMP


In principle the Russians should eventually lose something on the order of 200 tanks and 1000 AFVs just defending the Kherson bridgehead (based on my understanding of initial strength) since the loss of all that equipment is inevitable and reinforcements continue to trickle in even now.

If this war protracts like Iran-Iraq, both Ukraine and Russia will be fielding suchlike by the end of 2023:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Military history tends to repeat itself a bit because of the dominant impact of terrain. This has long been a known element of warfare.

The German OOB in that map was 18 ID and 3 AD, whereas as of the beginning of the week the Ukrainians had, I don't know, 15 brigades in the same AO? Many of them militia or irregular. The active elements of the offensive this week were just 3 brigades according to Zelensky. Somehow very few seriously anticipated an attack in an area where Russia had maybe 2 or 3 soldiers per square kilometer.


I love the way classical authors did ontologic philosophy.

There are 6 types of person:

1. Friendly
2. Mesomorphic
3. Allergic to wool
4. Former enemy
5. Not yet born
6. Emperors
7. Bonus kind who are seventh



EDIT: Reportedly a French documentary that puts Macron in a better light for his Russia policy. Non-French speakers would need to paste the French captioning into a translator. There's also a clip from it floating around presenting part of a phone call between Macron and Zelensky on D-0 in which the latter pleads for [Macron] and the NATO leadership to ask Russia to back off.

[spmetla]

The Ukrainian success at Kharkiv is certainly great to watch right now. Izium cut off and if they retake Kupyansk then the major rail and roadways supplying most of that front for Russia are cut off.

I'm so pleased that Ukraine can time and time again pull off some great military feats that prove my naysaying and pessimism as wrong. The war isn't won but these successes after so many months of war will have huge effects on Russian morale and combat effectiveness. When propaganda can no longer explain away the movement of the frontline in the losing direction the pressure on Russia and Putin's regime as a whole will increase substantially.
Soldiers can and will fight but if the cause looks lost and the motivation was already questionable then risking your life for the benefit of your corrupt chain of command breaks down. The current Ukrainian successes will likely have unit morale and cohesion effects (on the Russian soldiers) as negative as after the pullout of the Kiev front (or feint lol...).

I just hope Ukraine can maintain this momentum before fall and winter, best of luck to them.

I'm curious if Sarmation is still lurking in here and would like his perspective some. His viewpoint on Russia's failures this many months in would be interesting as they'll have huge effects on the Balkan region as a whole if this continues. His view as anti-NATO and pro-Russian would be an interesting perspective to see how this conflict plays out in the Balkan region. Serbia may remain pro-Russian but it'll be an increasingly difficult position if Russia looks like the new 'old man of europe.' Future Russian revisionism and revanchism will remain threats but this will likely be the cement that maintains the dissolution of the Soviet and Russian empires and perhaps finally discredit strong man rule in Russia enough to allow some sort of democratic institutions to finally creep in to hold the power structure accountable.

[Montmorency]

Ukraine: *doesn't sicc the Grand Army of the Republic on Crimea*
Russians: Must be because 200000 of the chemically-enhanced neo-Nazi supersoldiers have already been slain by our boys.
Ukraine: Yes, do think so.

For now this is a pure rumor that will be clarified by the time I check on things tomorrow, but Ukraine is said not only to have largely sealed the Izyum pocket, but also charged into the city itself from behind. Almost all Russia's combat personnel are across the river south of the city, or were as of the beginning of the week. For this development to be possible as described, the Russian command would essentially have had to completely fail to reorganize its Izyum grouping's dispositions to react to its progressive envelopment.

The thing is, they're so incompetent I can believe it; throughout the Kharkiv Offensive they've been running limited attacks out of Izyum towards the villages south of it that Ukraine recaptured last month (and which it took 2-3 months for Russia to capture in the first place). As though nothing had changed. On the other hand, Russian commentators tend to assure us that Ukraine's momentum has run out and a devastating backhand awaits from Kupyansk. I'll be checking in tomorrow.

[CrossLOPER]

If the defenses are collapsing as soon as they fail past the front line, then the Russian military is in even worse shape than anyone thought. Will the northeast fall in the same way as the north did? Will the east be able to hold on with those losses?

[Montmorency]

I'm going to have to do a lot of catching up, but I gather that the Izyum pocket is in the process of surrendering...

There are few comprehensive military history analogies but you could almost call the past two weeks a low-rent replication of the two hooks by Army Groups A and B in Fall Gelb. The Third Republican Army and the Russian Army appear to have quite similar pathologies of command, control, and communications (not to say that the Russian force composition has been looking increasingly like a potpourri of feudal levies, client auxiliaries, mercenaries, and palace guards, and it already gave that impression from the beginning).

The Ukrainian success at Kharkiv is certainly great to watch right now. Izium cut off and if they retake Kupyansk then the major rail and roadways supplying most of that front for Russia are cut off.

I'm so pleased that Ukraine can time and time again pull off some great military feats that prove my naysaying and pessimism as wrong. The war isn't won but these successes after so many months of war will have huge effects on Russian morale and combat effectiveness. When propaganda can no longer explain away the movement of the frontline in the losing direction the pressure on Russia and Putin's regime as a whole will increase substantially.
Soldiers can and will fight but if the cause looks lost and the motivation was already questionable then risking your life for the benefit of your corrupt chain of command breaks down. The current Ukrainian successes will likely have unit morale and cohesion effects (on the Russian soldiers) as negative as after the pullout of the Kiev front (or feint lol...).

I just hope Ukraine can maintain this momentum before fall and winter, best of luck to them.

I'm curious if Sarmation is still lurking in here and would like his perspective some. His viewpoint on Russia's failures this many months in would be interesting as they'll have huge effects on the Balkan region as a whole if this continues. His view as anti-NATO and pro-Russian would be an interesting perspective to see how this conflict plays out in the Balkan region. Serbia may remain pro-Russian but it'll be an increasingly difficult position if Russia looks like the new 'old man of europe.' Future Russian revisionism and revanchism will remain threats but this will likely be the cement that maintains the dissolution of the Soviet and Russian empires and perhaps finally discredit strong man rule in Russia enough to allow some sort of democratic institutions to finally creep in to hold the power structure accountable.

Useful article, and commentator generally:

But how about the people who buy it, repeat it, and create their own variations on its themes? What could possibly account for all these contradictory and absurd positions, which have been uttered at different times by the same people? All these sentiments are all the product of a single proposition: the Western democracies are always wrong, both morally and practically. When the West struggles and fails, it’s because of its decadence and senility, a sign of its imminent collapse, when it prevails, it’s because of its dastardly wiles and the limitlessness of its ill-gotten resources. Russia’s appeal in the West, which crosses the traditional boundaries of right and left, is irresistible for those who believe the worst crime imaginable is Western hypocrisy. Since this hypocrisy is the only unforgivable sin, Russia’s crude and cynical exercise of power, it’s barely plausible justifications for its actions, its overt gangsterism at home and abroad, is seen as a virtue.

Contra the bold, unfortunately, the opponents of the "West" tend to be generally fascistic, either national socialist or national bolshevik in their outlook, and they really hate the "liberal" version of American cultural hegemony (see also Hitler's declamations against Mickey Mouse and jazz). Thus they support Cuba and Venezuela at their worst, brutal despotism in Syria and Russia, Serbian revanchism, persecution of Muslims throughout Asia, and so on. They have no other political models to look toward after all, and they lack the soundness of principle and conscience to adopt new ones. The West deserves a lot of criticism, but just recklessly hating it from a reactionary perspective - also quite common a framework among the American Right, who hate America more than anyone else - is, well, deplorable.

The cynical pose, which flatters itself on being always undeceived, is in practice highly gullible and distinguishable from naivety only in the sour churlishness of its affect. These attitudes should be expected in the nether regions of the press and intelligentsia, where people make their livings writing semi-pornographic conspiracy literature and closely identify with the mob. But these stances have infected the broader intellectual climate as well. The whole pamphlet literature of the demi-monde provides a new language that sounds provocative and fresh compared to the stale banalities of bien-pensant humanitarian liberalism. It is tempting material for those who treat both life and politics as an irresponsible flight from one pose to another. Even among the putatively more serious, there’s just the simple need to find some take that appears oppositional and critical.

Hehe

[Hooahguy]

There are rumors flying around that Ukrainian troops have entered the remains of the Donetsk International Airport. While the airport itself probably isnt functional anymore, its symbolic value is legendary within the Ukrainian armed forces. And if the rumors end up being true, well, we could very well be looking at the end of the DPR/LPR in the not too distant future.

[CrossLOPER]

airport itself probably isnt functional anymore

It is one of the most destroyed sites throughout the conflict from 2014. It is not even recognizable.

[Montmorency]

Seems most of the forces in the bridgehead south of Izyum have actually escaped over the two crossings near the confluence of the Oskil and SD rivers over the past 3 days unfortunately, though perhaps not with most of their vehicles (e.g. infantry packed into trucks and AFVs). The UA bridgehead near Lyman couldn't break out in time to seal the gap between rivers, and the Ukrainian forces along the Oskil River (inc. Kupyansk) have been more or less paused on the west bank, consolidating gains.


Unrelated:



Actually, that netrocentric warrior crap or whatever would be good to have for this sort of Kharkiv chaos. Both the operations room and sergeants on the ground having near-perfect situational information of the state of a staggered and rapid advance would generate a lot of efficiencies, potentially. Though a single soldier's loadout falling into enemy hands seems like a serious vulnerability vector.

[spmetla]

I'm totally okay with soldiers fleeing without the heavy equipment.
Poor morale is contagious, if they left their equipment and fled to safety it's going to negatively affect them and other units in the future. Units that held together and withdrew will despise those that fled or speak out creating further divide. Leadership that may have acted in the interest of saving trained bodies of men will be questioned and made to pay for the national embarrassment.
Those that are 'professional' soldiers in it for a career will be less likely to risk their lives in attacks for a war that looks increasingly hopeless.

Putin's regime is on shaky standing, at some point he may have to make calculations like Lukashenko and have to withdraw in order to save the military structure before that structure can turn on him. WWI led to the Russian Revolution, what will this special military operation lead to?

Wonder how the PRC feels about shackling themselves to the sick man of Europe?

[Montmorency]

This can't be allowed to happen in Kherson, though in principle it's harder to escape in such a manner. Certainly wading-depth fords over the Dnieper are lacking that area. But when it comes to the chance to remove most of the extant VDV - almost the RuAF's last remaining reliable infantry formation - from play, that's indispensable.

Meanwhile it sounds as though the Russians are just going to double down on frontal assaults into Donetsk, redeploying from Kharkiv and the south to increase the mass there. Reports of Ukrainian attacks into Donetsk and Horlivka and Lysychansk were someone's disinfo or propaganda, by the way. The reality is that there have been a handful of desultory Ukrainian probes of Russian lines in those areas. The Ukrainians routed a few overstretched brigades and triggered the flight of a few more, that doesn't mean the entire opposition is going to panic arbitrarily.

While it's easy to hindsight an operation, and this was a clear victory, if the Chuhuiv-Balakliya battle grouping had had one more brigade available - to exploit aggressively along the Oskil River - and the UA defensive force between Izyum and Slovyansk had collected the means and initiative to drive through the Russian flank just 5 kilometers against the SD River through Pasika-Studenok, then that entire bridgehead would legitimately have been sealed off. Such a compromised position would almost certainly have forced Russia to cede post-February gains in Luhansk and retreat to the old line by the end of October. Ah well.


https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/...08302085177345 [VIDEO]

Example #231 on why it's absolutely senseless to use vehicle losses (even "destroyed") to estimate casualties.

[rory_20_uk]

Wonder how the PRC feels about shackling themselves to the sick man of Europe?

If you're right behind someone it is so much easier to stab them in the back.

Shackling? They trade mainly in dollars and heavily with both the USA and the EU / the West generally. Most of their resources also come via routes that the West could interdict rather than Russia's sphere. Frankly, beyond saying they'll help what have they done? They could have already sent vast numbers of IFVs / Tanks / etc (especially since most Chinese material hasn't been tested in war) - even if for money and not as a gift - but it appears they've not.

China and Russia share enemies but equally are intense rivals. China would prefer if everyone lost and focus continues in Eastern Europe rather than let's say the China Sea.

[Montmorency]

China and Russia share enemies but equally are intense rivals. China would prefer if everyone lost and focus continues in Eastern Europe rather than let's say the China Sea.

That is so, but by entailment China does not want Russia to lose, badly.

Chinese Firms Are Selling Russia Goods Its Military Needs to Keep Fighting in Ukraine
Rising exports of microchips, aluminum oxide, other dual-use items undermine Western push to stall Russian war effort

Chinese exports to Russia of microchips and other electronic components and raw materials, some with military applications, have increased since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, complicating efforts by the U.S. and Western allies to isolate the country’s economy and cripple its military.

Chip shipments from China to Russia more than doubled to about $50 million in the first five months of 2022 compared with a year earlier, Chinese customs data show, while exports of other components such as printed circuits had double-digit percentage growth. Export volumes of aluminum oxide, which is used to make the metal aluminum, an important material in weapons production and aerospace, are 400 times higher than last year.

The rise in reported export values may partly be explained by inflation. But the data shows that many Chinese tech sellers have continued to do business with Russia despite U.S. scrutiny.

The Chinese exports, while just a sliver of the country’s overall exports, are a source of concern for U.S. officials. The Commerce Department added five Chinese electronics companies to a trade blacklist last month for allegedly helping Russia’s defense industry, both before the invasion and after it began.