Great Power contentions

[Montmorency]

I don't actually know if the rail link between Melitopol and Donetsk is cut; I'd like to see it confirmed in more detail. It would explain the erratic actions of Russian forces in Kherson lately however. If the rail link is not operational, then it really seems pointless to me to invest in a Zaporizhzhia offensive before units can be freed up from Kherson and while humid weather will be more of a problem than usual for the next month.

Blowing the dam seems to harm Crimean water access quite a lot. Thankfully a deeper investigation of the expected spillage and topography of the area suggests that only thousands rather than tens of thousands will be killed, but anyway most of the flooding would occur on the east bank of the river, destroying quite a lot of Russian ordnance unless they've thoroughly evacuated the whole area. I still think this is all just getting ahead of siege conditions by removing the civilian population of the bridgehead.

The limitation of Gepards is that they are very expensive (though SPAAG in general could be cheaper) and present a larget target profile, whereas MANPAD squads, while less able to react left of boom than a radar-enabled platform, can better saturate an area with limited self-exposure by their nature. Either way with these short-range solutions you have to wait for a deck-flying plane or helicopter to just happen to pass over the effective radius, and unless it's an open area a tracking missile will have a better chance to perform than the AA gun. But if it's an open area you exacerbate the vulnerabilities of the AA gun as a platform. This is why a Gepard or other AA gun is best suited for defense of fixed emplacements or infrastructure, where in principle it is possible to achieve excellent preparation and coverage with just a few units and enemy ground or artillery forces are not a threat.

The number of targets or potential targets to defend does call for many units, but only a few hundred for all of Ukraine IMO, not thousands as in WW2. This is because of the synergistic effect of a comprehensive IADS incorporating AAA, SHORAD, and LORAD/HIMAD. The powerful overlapping radars of long or medium-range systems, if well-integrated by C3, can prioritize and assign incoming targets economically while achieving near-total coverage of all truly essential objects (it's a bad idea to try to protect everything). So while Ukraine has probably been exaggerating its intercept rate for Russian drones and missiles, it may not be far from 50% as it is.

Even a quick and dirty digital upgrade package for existing 23mm AA in Ukraine would probably take a year to roll out at scale (assuming someone were actually getting to work on it), minimum half a year, so to be clear this is all theoretical and probably won't be demonstrated in this war unless it drags on for years. But if these packages were ready off-the-shelf, I do believe just a few hundred would be enough to offer an overall 90+% intercept rate.

As it is the Russian bombing campaign is more successful than I initially understood, with Ukrainian authorities claiming damage to something approaching half the power system (mostly transmission). I have a strong feeling we could have avoided this situation with Iran...

Perun has a good video just out on SAM systems in the Ukraine War, and something I didn't know is that Ukraine started out with a reported 250 S-300 systems (HIMAD), which must have been the overwhelming factor in keeping the Russian airforce low or at bay. Imagine how many Russia must have started with, not to mention S-400s, the new S-350s, or all the mid/short-range platforms? It's no wonder Ukraine has been slowly, over weeks, shifting HIMARS tactics from low-effect logistics/infrastructure strikes to counter-arty and counter-SAM (what it was designed for). I also didn't know that the inoperation of Russian SAM radars during the first weeks was ordered by opcom to avoid friendly fire (which we have seen recorded on both sides throughout the war). The NATO SAMs such as IRIS and NASAMS are only mid-range, and few in number, but they're desperately needed to take pressure off the limited S-300 missile stockpile, even if the NATO missiles are more expensive (a reminder that sticker price is less important than physical availability).


Clutch cruise missile intercept just hundreds of meters from a power plant, though seemingly following a prior hit on the facility (that's the coin flip for you).
https://twitter.com/War_Takes/status...43511904538624 [VIDEO]

[Montmorency]

Some developing stories to track:

1. As early as the immediate aftermath of the last Ukrainian breakthrough in Kherson around Oct. 6, Russian forces were reported to be preparing to relocate heavy equipment out of the bridgehead. Now it seems a large-scale withdrawal from the current contact line is underway.
2. Ukrainian probing attacks have been noted throughout Zaporizhzhia, which has been relatively quiet for at least 3 months.

If the substantial collapse of the Kherson bridgehead is imminent, a Zaporizhzhia offensive does become more plausible. Let's wait and see.

Hell of a thing if the Kerch Bridge incident does in 2 weeks what HIMARS couldn't in 2 months.

[Montmorency]

To update the foregoing:

There have been some minor Ukrainian gains in Kherson, but it wasn't a Russian retrenchment, just normal ongoing combat. Most of the evidence still points to the Russians evacuating pro-Russian civilians and a lot of heavy equipment, making good use of the Kakhovka Dam while they still can and continuously fortifying Kherson City itself. There are some troop rotations with murky objectives, in that it's unclear what the quality of troops on either end of the substitution is (viz. high for high, low for low, low for high, high for low).

Strange happenings continue in Zaporizhzhia, but still at at an absolute level not much higher than the northern international border of Ukraine.

From what I understand of Internet chatter, and I may be wrong, Ukraine is using at least some Gepards in a cleverer way than we imagined here. Since some Shaheds are used against battlefield targets (besides recon or grenade drones), or otherwise have to fly a long cross-country route relatively slowly, Gepards stationed not far from the front can be in a position to vector themselves to an intercept, to use terminology loosely.

[spmetla]

I haven't seen much happening there or along any front, at least not noteworthy. The repulse of the Russians at Bakmut seems the only item of real interest but I think right now for both sides the autumn rains are the big factor. Offensive action would be restricted on the road networks, getting ready for the winter is probably a major factor. When the frost starts to harden the soil perhaps, they'll be some action on either side.

From what I understand of Internet chatter, and I may be wrong, Ukraine is using at least some Gepards in a cleverer way than we imagined here. Since some Shaheds are used against battlefield targets (besides recon or grenade drones), or otherwise have to fly a long cross-country route relatively slowly, Gepards stationed not far from the front can be in a position to vector themselves to an intercept, to use terminology loosely.

From what I understand, they proved vital during the Kharkiv offensive too as the ground gained was too fast for the larger systems to keep up safely so they needed to rely on the Gepard, MANPADs when dismounted from vehicles to provide some point air defense. Same with the Tungsukas and Shilka systems of soviet vintage.

I'm curious if the system has had kills besides drones.

On the political side, I'm irritated at the progressive wing of the US Democrats asking Biden to engage in negotiations with Russia directly. The worst thing that can happen is to throw Ukraine under the bus or make deals about them without them. I know the US did the same in the Korean War but in that we were the major combatant contributor for the South, in this case we are just the major backer and are not shedding blood at all. If the Ukrainians are ready to negotiate then so be it, giving in to Putin's nuclear threats is a slippery slope. Could mean that in future conflicts like Taiwan that China just says that any arms shipments will be sunk and any effort to stop those actions will be met by nuclear force to hold the US back.
Scholz criticized over China's Cosco bid in Hamburg port
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-scholz...ort/a-63505648

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz came under fire from both allies and the opposition on Thursday over a reported plan for Chinese investment in the Port of Hamburg.

The deal, which public broadcasters NDR and WDR say is being promoted by Scholz, will allow Chinese shipping firm Cosco to acquire a major stake in a container terminal at the port.

There is reportedly a dispute between Scholz and several government ministries over the bid, amid concerns that it would give Cosco too much of an investment share in the port. Cosco, which is headquartered in Beijing, is already the Hamburg port's biggest client.

NRD and WDR reported that all six ministeries involved in reviewing the investment deal have rejected the plans.

I'm pretty disappointed in Scholz so far. The German 'rearmament' has been halfhearted and slow, the support for Ukraine has been there but always a step behind other allies so to see him still have advocated for the biggest Authoritarian threat of the future to make further inroads in German infrastructure seems to continue the naivete of the past.
There's no need to completely decouple from China but surely there should be a reconsideration of how making big deals with potential rivals puts one's own national security at risk.

[Montmorency]

We already knew this, but in an interview a Ukrainian intel chief admitted that the Kakhovka Dam bridge has remained fully operational throughout Ukraine's fielding of HIMARS (because it's a dam). He called it the only fully operational LOC the bridgehead has maintained. So indeed, the loss of the Kerch Bridge will very likely prove the decisive factor in this drawn-out battle displaying unexpected Russian strengths.

I'm pretty sure someone jumped the gun on the Progressive Caucus statement, as it was drafted in June and basically all signatories either rejected the statement or denounced its release. Hence by the time of your posting it had been publicly retracted. Regardless, it is embarrassing to the US and damaging to the Democratic Party in the run-up to the election.

People need proper context on weather in Ukraine, so I wrote the following for general use (adding the observation that this week is about as wet as Kherson has been or will be in a while):

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Some points on weather in Ukraine...

Weather is a concrete effect of temporal and local conditions, not a videogame-like global status effect (-25% movement). Too often when I see discussion of mud effects in Ukraine it is being treated as the latter, as though one moment Ukraine is frozen or dry and the next a 10-foot wall of mud covers everything for weeks.

Ukraine's mud effects usually manifest around March-April and October-December. There is mud before and after these months, but less of it in aggregate. Ukraine is muddier overall during these months not necessarily because they are wetter months - Ukraine is rainiest in May through July, and precipitation trends vary by region - but because they are very *cloudy* months. To simplify, if we can think of Ukraine's solsticial days as being 16 and 8 hours long respectively, around these benchmarks the days are 50% clear or overcast, respectively. Soil and air retains more moisture under cloud cover, and skies are clearest during summer (besides warm).

Ukraine is warmer now than it was during those famous years of WW2. That should be no surprise. See the image: average annual temps are up by 2-3 degrees Celsius. While the climate has brought somewhat more precipitation in the long run since the 40s, the trend has been declining since the late 20th century, and climate disruption should also have reduced cloud coverage and will allegedly increase the frequency of both droughts and extreme precipitation events. (I'll just mention that I have seen passing comments that Ukraine is set to become climatically wetter in its marshy north & sub-Carpathian west and drier in its south.) There are also many more roads and urbanities scattered about than in the bygone peasant-dirt era, and it's super-important to foreground the well-chronicled German difficulties with mud in the macroregion against their reliance on horses, foot infantry, and more primitive motor vehicles on paths through hundreds of miles of sheer dirt.
https://climateknowledgeportal.world...ity-historical



I discussed some of this at the beginning of the war. At the time, I predicted a limited mud effect because that winter was reportedly warm and dry. Indeed, visual and primary accounts indicated that both sides had little trouble moving off-road, and Russia's mission-killed vehicles were usually lost to crew abandonment and inadequate fueling rather than terrain. Of terrain effects, driving into water might even have been comparably common to bogging down. Although part of the Russian strategy at the time, pushing large armored columns through towns without preparation, relied more on road-bound movement than normal, I don't believe this was an intended adaptation to mud since GSRU didn't really plan the invasion as such, rather a triumphant march or a crude shock and awe rush. Indeed, we saw more off-road action from late March through April as the Russians began to fight seriously, when mud ought to have been peaking.

So... Ukraine's summer was also warm and dry, as it was throughout Europe; *most* days in the area of Lysychansk were in the 80s or 90s! This fall and winter may promise to be as well. It has, to reiterate, been a warm and dry year for Ukraine. You can see where this is leading. Or I did, and so checked the monthly forecasts when the counteroffensives began in late summer and again recently. While the Ukrainian and Russian commands no doubt pay more attention to weather than I do, I could already sense the limits of the autumn weather effect.

According to the extended weather forecasts I checked, key proxy towns like Kupyansk/Svatove would primarily see rain in late September, late October, and mid-November. Recall how the recent breakthrough and mobile phase around Lyman occurred in the last week of September and the first week of October, when the ground should have been relatively muddy. Kherson, IIRC the most arid and canalized region in Ukraine other than Crimea, has been and is forecast to just be pretty dry and even partly or fully sunny most of the time. Moreover, I've read that the soil of Kherson is more sandy than clay-like and therefore inherently less susceptible to muddiness than soil in the east, although I don't know how much confidence to place in this or how it interacts with the canal architecture. Kherson should experience wet weather in late November through early December this year however.

NB. Because the root of seasonal mud is insufficient evaporation by solar radiation, the level of muddiness can be cumulative over time before freezing temperatures predominate (thus spring tends to be muddier than fall).

Now, winter will come before long. On the home front, the months of January and February will be the hardest for Ukraine and the people of Europe, and there will likely be at least one major offensive on each side during this period. But don't be all like 'huehuenhue deep freeze endless tundra Mother Russia General Winter plbplvpfdfp.' The climate of the foreseeably-contested parts of Ukraine - Kherson, Donetsk, Luhansk - is, from my point of view, well comparable to New York City, downstate NY, and Albany, maybe. Winter temperatures will usually range from high teens to low 30s, and many if not most days will see afternoons above freezing. Ground often won't have a chance to freeze thoroughly, especially not in the South, but it will be cold, damp, and compact. Depending on localized temperatures and rain/snowfall levels, compact will sometimes transition to loose. This should continue to not be enough to disrupt planned offensives, though it will be taken into account both downrange and as it comes up.

In summary, climate variation, climate change, modern infrastructure, technology, and techniques are all things, and weather effects on terrain are temporal and local rather than comprehensive and uniform. Don't digest a video clip of a tracked vehicle with unsoiled road wheels driving over mild mud to conclude that 'a curtain has descended across the country.' None of this is to dismissively contend that mud in Ukraine has no tactical or strategic implications. It has and it will. Vehicles will be slower off-road and will require more maintenance. But it's less than many seem to imagine, and it will manifest at different times in different places and with varying levels, which commanders on both sides will anticipate and react to as it comes up. It will often be surmountable, especially since neither side is liable to be attempting sweeping coordinated maneuvers across many kilometers of open ground.

For reading on the effects of cold weather on materiel and personnel, see MilitaryLand's recent primer.

[Shaka_Khan]

This is intense!

[Montmorency]

Yes, very videogamish.

Speaking of games...



Now that would be quick, cheap, and dirty, but I wonder how successful it can be against maneuvering drones larger than commercial quadcopters. Also, the effective range surely can't be beyond a kilometer, which is so last-ditch as to not be worth the trouble in defending fixed infrastructure from attack.

[rory_20_uk]

Cheap clouds of attackers really require cheap, clouds of defenders. If software could be developed to mesh a load of simple articulated mounts together and was able to use both for detection as well as AA this could be effective (or at least effective enough to justify the outlay) against the small, slow, simple attacks that would just overwhelm current systems. Clearly having it all manually operated is bordering on a joke.

[Montmorency]

Clearly having it all manually operated is bordering on a joke.

Oh, we need manual operators to monitor and maintain the equipment to begin with, or it'll almost certainly misfire or malfunction in like 5 minutes. Even basic tech like small arms has that habit when left unsupervised.

But really what is needed is this kind of guidance system coupled with manned flak cannons. Modern weapon systems from tanks to artillery already tend to have digital fire control or targeting assistance for human operators anyway; trying to foist the entire mission onto subpar algoritihms right now would be a needless downgrade. And Ukraine for one is not experiencing a desperate manpower shortage.

In the future, if mini-drones can achieve a high level of machine swarm intelligence, then defense systems will have to respond by becoming more automated in turn, but that's a ways off. Once we see mass drone terror attacks we'll know the military applications are approaching.

[spmetla]

You'll still want manual operators of a sort to decide whether or not to engage. Think AI making kill decisions is something I'm not comfortable with yet.

Think there will be a lot more high-end systems like this too. While investing in the ultra cheap is useful it'd be suddenly very impotent against slightly better drones.
I imagine we'll see these less capable systems assigned to Companies and Battalion levels again while proper air defense goes to Brigades and above.
Friendly/foe markers or beacons will certainly be vital and I imagine that spoofing as friendlies will be used by threat Drones too.

https://youtu.be/pb5_F4_Eod8?t=78

[Montmorency]

So according to Shoigu, probably 100K draftees have been rushed in-theater by now, half in combat roles. The nominal remaining 200K would probably all arrive by the end of November, but we'll likely get evidence if some are being withheld for proper training. To be clear, 300K can only be treated as a floor on mobilization over the past month given its indiscriminate character, and it yet continues at a slower pace. Moreover, the deferred round of routine conscription is about to begin, and I suppose we find out whether the conscripts will finally be committed to combat and whether serving conscripts will be stop-lossed onto indefinite contracts.

The UFOR advance on the Svatove Line early in the month has been bitterly stalled for the past 3 weeks as the RuFOR defense had been consolidated enough to maintain constant spoiling attacks west of the P66/07 highway. The initial UFOR failure after September 10 to pursue and exploit the collapse of the Izyum bridgehead, and the contemporaneous failure to take Lyman by storm, left UFOR with no option but to grind the flanks of the Oskil River defenses village by village for 3 weeks. The subsequent UFOR failure to exploit and pursue the collapse of the Lyman Pocket may by then have been baked in, as the backup line along the Krasna River and its western bluffs (east of P66/07) had plenty of time to entrench. There was at least some attempt made, with UFOR crossing the Krasna in at least one location between Svatove and Kreminna, but the bridgehead was forced back almost immediately.

Weak exploitation is kind of a pattern with Ukraine, since there was also the failure to exploit RuFOR's sudden retreat following the breakthrough along the Dnieper River contemporaneous with the capture of Lyman. This deficit spells trouble for UFOR's operational prospects, and suggests Ukraine will never be able to force the surrender of large numbers (>1000) of RuFOR in a single battle (even granting that 21st century warfare may be too mobile to commonly accomplish this in the normal course of maneuver). In related news, Ukrainian losses in armor/AFV seem to have been quite elevated this month.

One way or another these sequenced underperformances in exploiting breakthroughs allowed RuFOR defenses to remain organized, and strengthen, in Luhansk and have arguably greatly extended the timetable for territorial reclamation overall (and increasing flows of Russian draftees will only contribute to stability). Evidently Ukraine will not secure the west bank of the Aidar River this year, and probably not even Kherson City (though the city should be besieged by then).



So OK, we know what Ukraine has to accomplish in Luhansk. It's the same process as earlier, moving village by village until the main defensive line can be compromised and gradually outflanked. The downrange UFOR strategy likely relies on crawling along the Siversky Donets River to secure the oxbow up to the confluence with the Aidar River tributary - in order to set conditions to open a heavy flanking maneuver into Luhansk SE of Lysychansk, towards Alchevsk in LPR territory (as opposed to the extremely inefficient alternative of recapturing all of northern Luhansk and attempting a direct assault of Luhansk City across the Siversky Donets). Therefore UFOR will maintain the goal of securing a bridgehead between Kreminna and Svatove in the coming weeks.

But this is a difficult environment, relatively-compact with a lot of open ground to assault over. Lately the more productive area has been in the north, on the outskirts of Svatove itself and to the town's northwest. Obviously UFOR has an imperative to couple any southern penetration and flanking against the Svatove Line with a northern counterpart. Proximately, one would expect a location between Svatove and Nyzhnia Duvanka. But UFOR also might see a benefit in moving cross country toward Troitske.

A deep flanking maneuver toward Troitske has a number of benefits. First, it captures the most transport-critical border town under Russian control for a couple hundred miles, anchoring UFOR's northern flank. Second, it cuts one of two rail routes through Starobilsk. Third, it opens a number of routes along highway roads either in the southern direction along the Svatove Line or eastwards toward Starobilsk, enabling further operations. But it's not easy terrain with exceptionally poor infrastructure, so I suspect UFOR might try penetrating both north and south of Nyzhnia Duvanka, and using the P66 highway to roll both north and south (towad Troitske and Svatove respectively).

Meanwhile, UFOR still clearly intends to use Bilohorivka (south of the SD, just west of Lysychansk) as a springboard to retaking Lysychansk and Popasna. If this could be accomplished alongside the bypassing of Kreminna and Severodonetsk, all of these major urban concentrations could be cut off from resupply (examine the map) and captured at leisurely pace. Thus RuFOR's great Donbass Front would have its northern flank unhinged and the stage would be set for the later operations into the LPR core.




If the assault into LPR (southern Luhansk) is bound to be realized only in 2023, that extends the timeframe for a Zaporizhzhia offensive with eastward hook into the DPR, because the greatest threat to the Donbass Front would be to pressure it from both flanks, in a reversal of what RuFOR endeavored with little success back in the spring. Moreover, if the Kherson bridgehead persists for so long, those forces can't be transferred to Zapo. But there is an alternative to one great Zapo offensive (too much to bite off). If Kherson City itself cannot realistically or in remotely-timely fashion be carried without storm (during a siege the civilians would suffer more than the occupiers anyway), then so be it - capture it from the EAST instead.

Beryslav and the Kakhovka Dam absolutely need to be secured in the coming weeks as an unbreakable supply line for Russia. Despite the loss of the Kerch railway, UFOR is still not attriting and interdicting the defenders' supplies sufficiently. Removing the dam route compacts the bridgehead while placing the Dnieper under much better fire control, constraining the throughput of the ferries and the the barge bridge. This is more or less all pre-requisite to compacting the bridgehead to just Kherson City. Then, we remember that the loss of rail transit through Crimea affords UFOR half a year to run wild in the South (and hopefully by then ATCMS would be available to extend that). In other words, a difficult siege can be obviated by devoting all reserves, and most of the Kherson battlegroup, to a westwards Zapo offensive. The latter will no longer be needed to finish the job west of the river in this scenario, becoming available for other uses. A successful operation to recapture or bypass Melitopol has to take place at some time anyway, and it would inherently force a departure from or surrender of Kherson City without a proximal fight.

Since UFOR's strategy has been visibly motivated by political considerations at various times, this approach may further be indicated with regards to reaching the Crimean isthmus and attempting a bridgehead into the peninsula before its defenses can be perfected (and of course before the connection with Russia can be fully repaired). As a mirror to RuFOR political considerations, this approach might also cost Luhansk the focus of GenStaff-RU/Putin and thereby weaken its defenses at a crucial juncture downrange.

Just a few words on what shape such a Zapo offensive, perhaps executed in January, might take. It would be the most operationally-complex UFOR offensive to date, having to secure very long flanks along the axes of advance.

The indispensable first-phase target has to be the road-hub of Tokmak, for obvious reasons. Vasylivka also has to be taken, because it opens a main highway straight down from Zapo City, and also enables a relatively-easy westward march to isolate Enerhodar. The whole area NW of Melitopol is pretty insignificant strategically, but it does contain the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, whose reclamation is a non-military priority for Ukraine. Vasylivka might be important enough to approach directly, or it might be cut off from the south by a push out of Tokmak. Either way, UFOR would then be able to open multiple axes toward enveloping Melitopol from the north and NW. This would almost certainly be the most important sector of any Zapo offensive.

UFOR would have to advance south and SW of Tokmak to encroach on Melitopol itself, and hopefully begin to envelop it from the south.

Another road hub, Polohy, right on the frontline, would also likely have to be captured to establish the extreme flank of the entire offensive. Optimistically, the highway between Polohy and Berdyansk would be a major axis of advance and might eventually form the obverse line securing the rear of the offensive and defining future offensives toward Donetsk and Mariupol.

Just UFOR reaching Melitopol might be enough to get Kherson City abandoned, although in practice UFOR could reach Crimea itself and Russia would arguably still leave a few thousand men trapped in Kherson to fight to the death/surrender.

Russia would make heavy use of the coastal highway connecting Melitopol and Mariupol in this scenario. It's kind of the only transverse major road in the entire region, besidse the very vulnerable Mariupil-Polohy highway, so there would be little alternative (also why UFOR would have to sever it somewhere). If UFOR can achieve an initial breakthrough the defense would have a generally difficult time in this region, but if UFOR is bogged down then it could easily take a month or more of determined offensive action just to reach Melitopol.

To reiterate, the premise for these scenarios is a continued lack of conventional success in Luhansk and Kherson.



Note that the distance from Svatove to Starobilsk is 50km, and the distance from Mariupol to Melitopol is 150km. The length of the Svatove Front is 100km, as would be the maximum depth of a Zaporizhzhia offensive.

[Montmorency]

To go into a little more detail, for example on Svatove, these musings are somewhat readily evident, but I felt more confident speaking at length because it does appear to be what Ukrainian forces have been up to the past week, however slowly. It helps to take a closer look at the geography.

(For reference, Svatove is about 5km north to south.)




Those ridge-like features you see, in particular to the west of the Krasna River, are bluffs overlooking the river valley. That highway P66, still under RuFOR control west of Svatove, runs along a sort of bare plateau. While possessing these heights would make observation of the Svatove Line across the river, they are also possessed of little in the way of cover or human structures, making them vulnerable to RuFOR artillery. Notice how the P66 represents rather difficult terrain for an attacker across several kilometers, whereas along the river - beneath the bluffs - is a belt of built-up areas. So if UFOR needs to make a penetration between Kreminna and Svatove, it has to be at Krasnorichenske [1], and in order to approach Krasnorichenske, UFOR needs a foothold in Ploschanka [2] and Chernopopivka [3] - consistent with repeated reports of attacks on those villages. Krasnorichenske would be a staging ground not just for attacks toward Svatove or Kreminna, but also toward the east; one of the few good eastward roads in the sector passes through the town. The boxed cluster of villages is also an objective, in order to secure the frontal approach to Svatove (even if frontal attacks on Svatove are unlikely to be the MO). UFOR's aims in this sector are in short to push up the hills to clear and make use of P66 to set conditions for attacks over the river, with the eventual goal of undermining the Svatove Line and forcing a retreat from Svatove and Kreminna. The bluffs being the real challenge to maneuver past, since the river itself is in places just a creek.



This is all relatively straightforward. The conditions north of Svatove are trickier to navigate. Similar geographies apply, and you can clearly see the value of Nyzhnia Duvanka for advances to the north, south, or east - just like Krasnorichenske. However, it's further behind the current frontline than Krasnorichenske, with more hills to cross. Therefore it's more difficult a town to bite off at once, which is why I figure UFOR will seek to envelop Nyzhnia Duvanka itself rather than just advancing on it from the west along the road through Kuzemivka [4]. That entails pushing cross-country through two belts of villages (boxed) to the NW of Nyzhnia Duvanka.

Recall that the Oskil River line only had its final disintegration with the fall of Lyman prompting the retreat from Borova. By analogy, Svatove would only be abandoned by RuFOR if it were outflanked to the extent that both the E-W highways feeding it were at imminent risk of being cut. So I doubt UFOR takes the effort to go deep cross-country between those highways east of the river. The conservative approach would be to just roll up and down the villages along the river and maybe to Travneve [5]. You can see how, at the current methodical rate, it would take until the end of the year to clear the Svatove Line.



In other news, joint Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation is trying to modify TB-2 to carry AA missiles. Anti-drone/missile patrol is a brilliant repurposing for a platform that is usually sidelined when the enemy has functioning IADS. Yet another obvious idea that heretofore basically hadn't been implemented.

Flak Cannon in Anti-Drone War



Drone in Anti-Drone War

[spmetla]

Those ridge-like features you see, in particular to the west of the Krasna River, are bluffs overlooking the river valley. That highway P66, still under RuFOR control west of Svatove, runs along a sort of bare plateau. While possessing these heights would make observation of the Svatove Line across the river, they are also possessed of little in the way of cover or human structures, making them vulnerable to RuFOR artillery. Notice how the P66 represents rather difficult terrain for an attacker across several kilometers, whereas along the river - beneath the bluffs - is a belt of built-up areas. So if UFOR needs to make a penetration between Kreminna and Svatove, it has to be at Krasnorichenske [1], and in order to approach Krasnorichenske, UFOR needs a foothold in Ploschanka [2] and Chernopopivka [3] - consistent with repeated reports of attacks on those villages. Krasnorichenske would be a staging ground not just for attacks toward Svatove or Kreminna, but also toward the east; one of the few good eastward roads in the sector passes through the town. The boxed cluster of villages is also an objective, in order to secure the frontal approach to Svatove (even if frontal attacks on Svatove are unlikely to be the MO). UFOR's aims in this sector are in short to push up the hills to clear and make use of P66 to set conditions for attacks over the river, with the eventual goal of undermining the Svatove Line and forcing a retreat from Svatove and Kreminna. The bluffs being the real challenge to maneuver past, since the river itself is in places just a creek.

Agree totally with your analysis, additionally with the current rains/mud those bare plateaus are unusable for effective mechanized warfare and too bare for infantry combat so the slow crawl of advancing to move up artillery and make a position untenable due to fires and return to WWI sorta combat seems the norm for now.

Weak exploitation is kind of a pattern with Ukraine, since there was also the failure to exploit RuFOR's sudden retreat following the breakthrough along the Dnieper River contemporaneous with the capture of Lyman. This deficit spells trouble for UFOR's operational prospects, and suggests Ukraine will never be able to force the surrender of large numbers (>1000) of RuFOR in a single battle (even granting that 21st century warfare may be too mobile to commonly accomplish this in the normal course of maneuver). In related news, Ukrainian losses in armor/AFV seem to have been quite elevated this month.

One way or another these sequenced underperformances in exploiting breakthroughs allowed RuFOR defenses to remain organized, and strengthen, in Luhansk and have arguably greatly extended the timetable for territorial reclamation overall (and increasing flows of Russian draftees will only contribute to stability). Evidently Ukraine will not secure the west bank of the Aidar River this year, and probably not even Kherson City (though the city should be besieged by then).

I think Russia's withdrawal took Ukraine by surprise too as well as the initial breakthrough being as effective as it was. To maintain and really exploit breakthroughs in this type of warfare I think Ukraine would need a much more robust logistical capability like the US with masses of HEMMT fuel and ammo trucks, palletized loads, lots of armored recovery vehicles and so on. Not to mention I still think that Ukraine needs better MBTs to create a breakthrough at all with combined arms warfare. When conducting SOSRA for effecting a breach there will always be enemy weapon systems that haven't been suppressed or destroyed. MBTs need to be able to provide direct fire support for engineer assets making a breach and then proofing lanes, MBTs need to be able to sustain some hits to do this effectively, something the T72 series hasn't proven capable of.
Also think that Ukraine may need a lot more of the less glamours but essential engineer capabilities like MICLICs.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2XWipK_V6Gc

Come Spring, Russia's draftees should have been able to make up the training deficit so Ukraine will not likely have manpower superiority except for carefully resourced offensives.

[Montmorency]

We can forgive the shortcomings in the Izyum operation given that GSUA did not anticipate this much success, nor seemingly the Russian retreat. But they had literally a month to prepare the noose for Lyman, a small brigade-equivalent pocket with one road to safety. Yes, the US military would have dominated the entire battlespace, but if the Ukrainians could have pushed even a company of T-72s out onto the road from the littoral forested area along the north bank of the SD river, they would have been able to pick off fleeing columns from a distance essentially unopposed. It does require good communications and timing when the enemy is mobile enough to initiate and complete a retreat in a couple of hours, but still. We should also have mixed feelings about the Russian retreat in Kherson early in the month. Yes, it was all rather orderly aside from the rout along the river, but nevertheless this was great terrain for pursuit, UFOR was well-prepared in the area, and still the enemy was able to execute a 20km retrograde to seconary or tertiary positions basically unopposed. An all-in push might have been enough to cause a cascading rout and thus compress the bridgehead more, but instead the prepared RuFOR lines are with minor adjustments where things settled for the 3 weeks up to now. Ukraine's going to have to figure this one out at some point.

One thing I've noticed about both sides' advancing columns in drone footage is that they're very conservative under fire. They display indecision as to where to drive when shells start falling, or bunch up together (why?!), or just freeze. As always it's a question as to how representative such incidents are of the tactical baseline, but it does comport with another common observation that once, say, a mounted platoon or company tactical group starts taking any losses at all, they usually disengage and return to base soon after. I suspect it speaks both to a lack of discipline under fire and the fact that assaults in a given section of the line are usually not more than company-sized (and therefore more fragile).

If 100K draftees are currently serving in Ukraine already (including those lost already), half in combat roles, mostly in Luhansk, then the front there is actually already not too far from WW2 density. Even taking at face value some claims that draftees are still usually used to fill out rear echelons. Say 50K against 100K across 100km.

Speaking of trench warfare, here's a Ukrainian clip from the trenches showing some corpses lying just over the top (which side's is unclear).
https://twitter.com/i/status/1586189751715258368 [VIDEO]

This is the kind of mud the Svatove region presented with last week (a rainy week). You can't drive like this (skip ahead) over it, but it's definitely traversable. But you wouldn't want to do it over a preregistered expanse.
(The poster's story is that he was taxied to a frontline town to assemble evacuees overnight, to be collected the next day.)

Lately Ukraine has been posting some wild kill claims on enemy equipment and personnel, almost unprecedented ones (e.g. 100 tanks and 200 AFV in the past week). Naturally with the stable fronts OSINT verification has reverted to earlier form, making the gap between claimed and observed quite remarkable. I can extend the benefit of the doubt to Ukrainian command by now, but I do wonder about what activity underlies these claims.

Interesting factoid: The average age of Russian draftees is 35, citing the same address delivered by Shoigu the other day. That's pretty much the mandatory retirement age for enlisted and NCO in the US military IIRC. Incredibly servile people, today's Russians. In one of Meduza's recent investigations, that on the well-known doomed reservist platoon sent to perform reconnaisance by fire, the surviving deserters actually made their way to Belgorod to complain about their mistreatment to the military commisariat there; they were immediately shipped back to the front.

[Shaka_Khan]

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-p...ne-2022-11-11/

U.S. in talks to buy South Korean ammunition for Ukraine, official says

Josh Smith and Mike Stone

SEOUL/WASHINGTON Nov 11 (Reuters) - Washington wants to buy South Korean artillery shells to send to Ukraine, a U.S. official said on Friday, even as Seoul insisted that the United States must be the ammunition's end user and that its policy against lethal aid for Ukraine is unchanged.

The U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss ongoing negotiations, confirmed that Washington wanted to send South Korean 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine.

The official said that Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) funds could be used to purchase the ammunition, but that it was unclear whether it would be shipped though U.S. territory.

South Korea's defence ministry, however, said that its position of not providing lethal aid to Ukraine is unchanged and that the negotiations are being conducted "under the premise that the U.S. is the end user."

"In order to make up for the shortage of 155mm ammunition inventories in the U.S., negotiations are ongoing between the U.S. and Korean companies to export ammunition," the ministry said in a statement.

The U.S. official warned that news of the talks could threaten the deal.

A U.S. ally, South Korea has sought to avoid antagonizing Russia, both for economic reasons and because of the influence that Moscow can exert with North Korea.

Citing U.S. officials familiar with the deal, the Wall Street Journal said the agreement would involve 100,000 rounds of 155mm artillery rounds that would be delivered to Ukraine.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has called on South Korea to provide weapons, which he said would be "indispensable".

Last month South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol said Seoul has not provided any lethal weapons to Ukraine, after Russian President Vladimir Putin said such a decision would destroy bilateral relations.

U.S. National Security spokesperson John Kirby said last week that Washington had information that North Korea was covertly supplying Russia with a "significant" number of artillery shells of its own for use in Ukraine.

Moscow and Pyongyang have denied any arms shipments.

[spmetla]

Glad to hear it, South Korea is certainly turning into one of the key points of the modern defense industry as its new contracts with Poland have shown.


As for the other news of the day, Kherson in again under Ukrainian control, celebrating locals in the streets. The Russians look like they got the bulk of their personnel and a sizeable amount of equipment across the river but they have been setting conditions for quite some time. At the very least, this undoes the 'referendum' of a few weeks ago, takes dreams of Mikolayiv or Odessa off the table short of a complete reversal of the situation.
Militarily, it seems the right call, the far side of the river was an untenable position. The ground war is now essentially the South East, Donetsk, and the North East, all of which have been the scene of large scale construction of defensive works. It should give the Russian Army some breathing space. The morale factor is probably two fold, it does save manpower and troops will appreciate not being sacrificed for a precarious position, however those that had been sent in to hold the position and lots comrades in the months since Ukraine announced its Kherson offensive it will be bitter-sweet.
Politically, it seems extremely damaging to Putin. It seems that telegram and twitter are loudly decrying this surrender of 'Russian' territory. Revenge attacks against Ukrainian infrastructure won't cut it for messaging. I imagine he is demanding his generals get a significant battlefield victory this fall/winter and not wait to reap the benefits of properly training his mobilized personnel and replacements.

Glad to see such scenes of celebration as we see in Kherson and it happening on Veterans day too. Ukrainian Soldiers certainly have earned this victory, hats off to them. Just wonder what they do next, my predictions are always off so I look forward to their next surprise as I hope they try to take advantage of some momentum as Russian soldiers deal with the morale effects over the next few days.
At the very least, the 'land bridge' will be mostly under cannon and rocket artillery range with HIMARS able to target most of the routes in and out of Crimea, though I imagine Ukrainian precision munitions expenditure needs to be curtailed some. Even the vast US reserves of PGMs must be getting thin.

[Montmorency]

I don't really understand how the Polish government is proposing to pay for attaining one of the most powerful world militaries this decade. Frankly it's worrying. It would be one thing if Ukraine had fallen to Russia and Poland intended to be capable of going it alone.

Pretty much the situation in Kherson, as you describe. As soon as Ukraine had its local breakthrough near the long-standing frontline along the Dnieper around October 6, it retrenched sharply halfway to Beryslav, and reports surfaced even then that specialized equipment would be transferred to the east bank. Then shortly after the rail bridge to Crimea was disabled, rumors jittered about of an impending Russian retreat towards Kherson or even a full abandonment of the bridgehead. I didn't believe it then, but clearly the loss of LOC over the bridge was fatal to the bridgehead in time. Evidently Surovikin and/or Putin recognized the strategic unsustainability of the venture and unraveled it in such a way as to buy time.

It's worth noting that both with Kyiv and with Kharkiv I was surprised that GSRU cut all their gains loose rather than maintaining select footholds to distract UFOR with battles of attrition (as they had in fact done at small scale north of Kharkiv City in the spring). What has emerged as a rock-solid pattern with Russian command is that they're far more conservative and flexible on the defensive than on the offensive, and Putin himself is willing to give up highly-symbolic territory. While it might bode well for war termination in the future, it also make's UFOR's life difficutl and I don't think GSUA has a strategic answer to their opponent's force preservation posture on the defensive.

Anyway, in Kherson once again, for whatever reason, UFOR declined to closely pursue the enemy rearguard. Yes, the Russians had a month to prepare, but so did the Ukrainians. What I don't understand is why the Antonivsky Bridge and Kakhovka Dam at least weren't under constant rocket interdiction. I'm not aware of any Bilohorivka-crossing-tier concentrations of smashed Russian materiel along the river, which is what one would expect. From here on a winter Zaporizhzhia offensive of some type is foreordained, because the Luhansk front is now so dense and fortified. The survival of the VDV will complicate the scenario greatly. It will be a sign of Putin's desperation if Russian conscripts are finally committed to stabilize the theater, and so far the escape of the Izyum grouping and the Kherson grouping appear sufficient to maintain the integrity of Russian lines and hold the Ukrainians to a crawl-like pace analogous to Wagner in Donetsk.

As for GMLRS and Excalibur, IIRC the US inventory of the former was no more than 50K pre-war, and less than 10K of the latter. There are no reliable estimates of GMLRS deliveries, but I think all Excalibur deliveries have been specified in our aid documents - something like at least 2K. Of GMLRS, given the high rates of expenditure against fixed infrastructure I would estimate (keeping a few steps hidden) that at the very minimum 5K have been expended in 4.5 months, possibly many more.

If we produce an expected 10K GMLRS (some of which Ukraine should now have a claim on through contracts) and 1K Excalibur next year, that is adequate to keep Ukrainian precision artillery on life support. As for standard 155mm deliveries, the monthly allotments from the US have been getting smaller and smaller, having delivered at least 1 million so far IIRC (not counting allies). Hence the US is reportedly imitating the German Ringtausch proposal and requesting 100K shells from South Korea to replenish the US inventory (and thus free up more US stock for Ukraine).

The situation with ATACMS is much thriftier as noted previously, with estimates of our stockpile ranging from 1-2K - and we would be much more loathe to give these up for their range (from our doctrinal perspective of standoff missions). The scarcity of the system may be one reason for our refusal to deliver it to Ukraine. The only thing ATACMS would be good for, at an average delivery rate of 1 rocket per day, would be to keep the Kerch Strait bridge closed and strike a few of the largest supply depots in Donbass. That's not trivial however, so if UFOR succeeds in breaking past Melitopol the excuses really ought to fade.

The Russian Lancet kamikaze drone has come to field service in numbers recently (making a handful of appearances in previous months), and it is making a splash in successfully targeting Ukrainian artillery and SAMS. It is fulfilling exactly the mission we hoped in April Switchblade 600 would, being approximately similar in size and payload. But Switchblade 600 is reportedly not even in serial production yet and has not seen action in Ukraine, whereas the sanctioned Russians can put out batches of their own new models. I don't think we should be above duplicating the Iranian Shahed-136 at relatively-similar price, and just swarming some Iranian military bases with hundreds of them just to around; it's easily within our capabilities. The sclerotic US military procurement/industry needs to enter a thorough reform process, including way more competition (including from the government if need be). No idea what Phoenix Ghost has been put through in Ukraine, since evidence for its usage is non-existent, but the US recently announced the delivery of another large batch, so I wonder what's going in with that.

[CrossLOPER]

Anyway, in Kherson once again, for whatever reason, UFOR declined to closely pursue the enemy rearguard.

Low-worth target? High risk in terms of losses and giving away hardware positions? Encouraging retreat? I could think of a few reasons, but I suppose someone ran the numbers and decided rapidly recapturing Kherson with minimal conflict was the best move. I can imagine most major city centers are going to have the same resolution, unless the Russian government/military decides to destroy everything completely on its way out and spend the next decade firing masses of low-quality rockets over the border every other week.

[Montmorency]

Low-worth target? High risk in terms of losses and giving away hardware positions? Encouraging retreat? I could think of a few reasons, but I suppose someone ran the numbers and decided rapidly recapturing Kherson with minimal conflict was the best move. I can imagine most major city centers are going to have the same resolution, unless the Russian government/military decides to destroy everything completely on its way out and spend the next decade firing masses of low-quality rockets over the border every other week.

None of these considerations apply in a straightforward manner. First, we should remember that Kherson City itself was far out of reach of UFOR - urban combat was not in the public agendas of either Russia or Ukraine. In a retreat, Ukrainian soldiers would always reach the city well after it had been cleared out of opposition. The issue here is the thousands of square kilometers of the overall bridgehead that Russia had held with tens of thousands of personnel, and had the task of wrapping up control over. In principle, we should ask why UFOR didn't follow the military textbook here (it also had not in the past), and attack into a retreating enemy in order to disorder them and make a retreat into a rout. Even if most of RuFOR had completed crossing over by then, it should have been possible to rout and perhaps even capture a few thousand of the rearguard and stragglers.

The generic reasons why militaries do this or seek to across history and especially in mass industrial wars are well-known and readily apparent. When examining the particulars of the Kherson bridgehead though, we can also see why your objections shouldn't apply.

The bridgehead historically was populated by Russia's best remaining skilled fighting force (other than arguably Wagner Group): the VDV, airborne. They proved their tenacity and skill on the defensive over many months, beyond that of their abilities on the offensive (*cough*). There were 2-3 divisions of these in the bridgehead, making the bulk of the remaining VDV globally and presenting one of the highest-value targets for destruction in the entire theater of war. Removing Putin's elite from the field by one or other means would weaken his ability to establish strong defensive networks or train new troops for the remainder of the war. Also, it would give the Russian nationalists a stroke.

I do not believe the risk of losses to enemy action is per se a barrier to Ukraine in this war, since for the past 3 months they've run continual Russian-style offensive actions and frontal attacks throughout Kherson and elsewhere, losing hundreds of armored vehicles and probably several thousand men in the process. In the case of a pursuit action, in all but the most bungled execution the enemy will suffer an order of magnitude higher losses (as we actually saw during the September Kharkiv offensive). If UFOR is willing to assault RuFOR trenchworks from the front, taking a retreating force from behind seems less onerous. Giving away hardware positions is similarly not relevant when the enemy is leaving the area.

UFOR's posture during these events doesn't have bearing on encouraging retreat or not (though their historical willingness to persist on the offensive must have been one factor in the Russian decision to retreat). Ultimately, as discussed, the strategic position in Kherson hinged on the defender's ability to sustain supply lines to their forces. The failure to do so is why a retreat was forced on RuFOR, and this wouldn't have changed if UFOR started attacking more vigorously over this week. Indeed, trying to send disorganized and retreating forces into a strong enemy advance would be a recipe for complete annihilation, which is why it doesn't really happen.

The one reason I can think of that would connect episodes in this war is that Ukraine's de facto decentralized command and control is such that GenStab still hasn't figured out a way to avoid heavy friendly fire and other such incidents in a, so-to-speak, uncontrolled advance. If this is the reason, maybe it's even a sound one, since it suggests UFOR would not be able to execute a general and rapid pursuit in a way that damages the enemy effectively, but if so it detracts from Ukraine's war effort to the extent it is not addressed. Like not being able to chase after a limping goon in flight because you'll trip over your shoelaces. Ukraine can't win the war without more breakthroughs and routs like the Kharkiv Offensive, unless we reach the 'sociopolitical collapse of Russia' scenario that it's unwise to count on.

But it is an absolute mystery why the Russians were not heavily bombed on the bridges and ferries out.

[CrossLOPER]

Maybe there was an agreement where they would not be attacked for a certain period if they agreed to abandon the city.

In other news, what comes after sledgehammer executions? The wheel? The rack? Gibbeting?

[Montmorency]

That has been suggested, but it's so hard to believe when the benefit ultimately rests with one side. But it may be a long time before we learn about the backroom dealings of the war.

A sledgehammer execution is typical mafia stuff, you need the right mindset to extrapolate.

[CrossLOPER]

Do you honestly think that Russian forces have a choice at this point?

Short of mass mobilization and attacking with >10 to 1 losses, I am not sure if there is any possibility of maintaining the campaign. Even if you do have some success, what then? With what are you going to hold? What are you going to hold?

Let's say that before spring, a massive campaign is launched and Russia suffers another hundred thousand to a quarter of a million losses. What would drive the economy? What would you do with the wounded? Could you exist without building primitive factories sending crude iron boxes to the front all across the territory? I don't think that anyone on the RF side has the appetite for the type of daily losses that Stalin would consider a rudimentary necessity. Could a society exist?

[spmetla]

The bridgehead historically was populated by Russia's best remaining skilled fighting force (other than arguably Wagner Group): the VDV, airborne. They proved their tenacity and skill on the defensive over many months, beyond that of their abilities on the offensive (*cough*). There were 2-3 divisions of these in the bridgehead, making the bulk of the remaining VDV globally and presenting one of the highest-value targets for destruction in the entire theater of war. Removing Putin's elite from the field by one or other means would weaken his ability to establish strong defensive networks or train new troops for the remainder of the war. Also, it would give the Russian nationalists a stroke.

I do not believe the risk of losses to enemy action is per se a barrier to Ukraine in this war, since for the past 3 months they've run continual Russian-style offensive actions and frontal attacks throughout Kherson and elsewhere, losing hundreds of armored vehicles and probably several thousand men in the process. In the case of a pursuit action, in all but the most bungled execution the enemy will suffer an order of magnitude higher losses (as we actually saw during the September Kharkiv offensive). If UFOR is willing to assault RuFOR trenchworks from the front, taking a retreating force from behind seems less onerous. Giving away hardware positions is similarly not relevant when the enemy is leaving the area.

It's an interesting conundrum, I too think they would have been better off pushing an advantage harder. The dynamic between fighting the enemy versus fighting for territory are often at odds in war. The Ukrainian leadership must have chosen to not push too hard and save that equipment and manpower for later, perhaps the political value of this type of victory now is worth it.

Additionally, the Russians if pushed too hard would likely stand and fight, a trapped enemy is sometimes the most dangerous as they have nothing to lose. I'm sure the Ukrainian command has a decent respect for the Russian fighting potential when properly motivated and led.

But it is an absolute mystery why the Russians were not heavily bombed on the bridges and ferries out.

If the rumors of Russians being told to change into civilian clothing before fleeing are true then it may have been to avoid the propaganda value of what would look like shelling fleeing civilians that are pro-Russian. This would have the potential to be used for propaganda in the remaining occupied areas to show those that have collaborated or at least been neutral-ish to side with Russia openly or face the wrath of the Ukrainian 'nazis' cleansing areas of ethnic Russians post liberation.
Being a maneuver warfare guy I'm not too up to speed on effective information operations but the past eight months have certainly been eye opening.

Do you honestly think that Russian forces have a choice at this point?

Short of mass mobilization and attacking with >10 to 1 losses, I am not sure if there is any possibility of maintaining the campaign. Even if you do have some success, what then? With what are you going to hold? What are you going to hold?

Let's say that before spring, a massive campaign is launched and Russia suffers another hundred thousand to a quarter of a million losses. What would drive the economy? What would you do with the wounded? Could you exist without building primitive factories sending crude iron boxes to the front all across the territory? I don't think that anyone on the RF side has the appetite for the type of daily losses that Stalin would consider a rudimentary necessity. Could a society exist?

Those are absolutely valid and rational points. The question really has to be, is Putin and the rest of the Russian leadership still totally rational actors at this point? Given how poorly the war has gone and the likely prospect of a palace-coup if they are fought back to pre-Feb 24th borders or worse (for the Putin regime) the 2014 borders I can believe that they would sacrifice a million losses to hold what they have and force another 'frozen conflict' ending to be continued in a few years after licking their wounds. Perhaps the WW2 example of how much the USSR sacrificed to stop and then beat back the Nazis makes the Russian leadership too dismissive of casualties as that would make them weaker than the 'Man of Steel' and not fit to lead Russian resurgence.

[Montmorency]

You heavily underestimate how much gas Russia has left in the tank however. Their forces in Ukraine might already double what they started with in terms of personnel, and even a high estimate of 2500 tanks and 5000 AFVs lost represents only a third of their reserves before it truly hits critical (when existing frontline forces can no longer receive replacements beyond Humvee/Tigr or T-55 tier). And I have to keep repeating, Ukraine - in Kharkiv, in Kherson, in Donetsk - has shown little ability to overcome dense, prepared Russian defenses through combat. We might have to hope for an internal Russian collapse, military or sociopolitical, before a forceful reclamation of territory, and that's not likely at all - yet.

The stage is now set for an exchange of one major offensive/counter-offensive between both sides during the winter. With rapid progress impossible in Luhansk, it's quite plausible both sides will choose to confront each other in Zaporizhzhia. That may be the ultimate test of Ukrainian military capacity. If Ukraine can make significant progress in maneuver warfare in Zaporizhzhia, then the issue is settled and we have good reason to believe they can reclaim all or most of their pre-2014 territory within 1-2 years. If they stall quickly and the operation devolves into a grind-by-village, then without substantial additional assistance (such as mass training to NATO standards including for officers) we should only expect a return to pre-2022 borders in that timeframe.

Of course there are those in the US administration, such as Gen. Milley, who believe we have done enough and should begin looking to freeze the Ukraine War in its current arrangement so as to reprioritize toward China. But while China might seem to be approaching its moment of last opportunity in the next year or two, all the experts say there won't be a militarily-serious crisis in the SCS until at least late-decade, so we really should tie up the loose ends in Europe first. (If we do it right, Ukraine will be supplying weapons on contract to Taiwan by that time.)

It's an interesting conundrum, I too think they would have been better off pushing an advantage harder. The dynamic between fighting the enemy versus fighting for territory are often at odds in war. The Ukrainian leadership must have chosen to not push too hard and save that equipment and manpower for later, perhaps the political value of this type of victory now is worth it.

Additionally, the Russians if pushed too hard would likely stand and fight, a trapped enemy is sometimes the most dangerous as they have nothing to lose. I'm sure the Ukrainian command has a decent respect for the Russian fighting potential when properly motivated and led.

I was envisioning a rout toward the bridges (which the Russians blew behind them), causing an overall panic and disorganized flight, creating more opportunities for striking massed personnel and a greater proportion of abandoned intact equipment.

Here's a question I've been chewing. You might have too little information to answer properly, but given what you know of both-sides' dispositions in Kherson this fall, how would the US Army have handled an imminent opfor withdrawal if the Ukrainian forces were replaced by equivalent American ones - and the Air Force were out of the picture?

If the rumors of Russians being told to change into civilian clothing before fleeing are true then it may have been to avoid the propaganda value of what would look like shelling fleeing civilians that are pro-Russian. This would have the potential to be used for propaganda in the remaining occupied areas to show those that have collaborated or at least been neutral-ish to side with Russia openly or face the wrath of the Ukrainian 'nazis' cleansing areas of ethnic Russians post liberation.
Being a maneuver warfare guy I'm not too up to speed on effective information operations but the past eight months have certainly been eye opening.

Hmm, but there's been no suppression of news even on official Ukrainian media of the *wink wink* disposal of remaining collaborators in liberated territory, such as Izyum. Collateral aversion might complicate things, but uniformed personnel or not Russia's military vehicles would remain identifiable from the air.

[spmetla]

I was envisioning a rout toward the bridges (which the Russians blew behind them), causing an overall panic and disorganized flight, creating more opportunities for striking massed personnel and a greater proportion of abandoned intact equipment.

Here's a question I've been chewing. You might have too little information to answer properly, but given what you know of both-sides' dispositions in Kherson this fall, how would the US Army have handled an imminent opfor withdrawal if the Ukrainian forces were replaced by equivalent American ones - and the Air Force were out of the picture?

I was hoping for a rout too but nothing of the sort appeared, though unlike Izium, the Ukrainians weren't about to cut them off so no rout necessary.

Taking the USAF out of the picture is difficult as it's a key part of our war doctrine, hence why the USAF gets so much funding. Without the USAF, well the US would likely be able to conduct an effective armored/mechanized attack. The US would certainly push its advantages in night fighting, using the fact that all our infantryman have NVGs and IR aiming devices as standard issue. Our vehicles have superior thermal optics to that of anything Russian so that would help a lot. The Abrams can take a lot more punishment than any T72 series can, the Bradley would show its age though still potent. The Strykers would be extremely limited in use though.
Our major advantage would be in using intelligence for effective targeting of enemy vulnerabilities on a scale the Russians can't imagine, including non-lethal means. Using this to create 'multiple dilemmas' should muddle the effectiveness of Russian counter actions leaving the fight to the lower level and whatever tenacity they care to put up, which if they were fighting actual US and NATO I think would up their morale and willingness to sacrifice a bit.
The major difference though is that if the US Army creates a breakthrough, it can sustain it deep into the enemy's support zone and continue the attack. This weakness on the part of Ukraine is unfortunate as it keeps most warfare in the realm of WWI or Italian theater WW2 levels of advances. I kinda feel like those fools in WWI when I keep hoping that each advance and breakthrough may allow for real exploitation of that advantage, something we've only seen in Kharkiv.

The major weaknesses for the US would be of course that we haven't fought a conventional war since we invaded Iraq in 2003 and they certainly were in worse shape than they were in the Gulf War. IEDs and occasional fire fights with insurgents won't have prepped any of our combat vets for sustained artillery attacks, minefields in depth covered with direct fire weapons, and in general an enemy that fights in cohesive units with a lot of fire power. I don't think the US public understands that we'd have a very significant casualty count, especially in the type of audacious attacks required to create break throughs and then attempt to exploit that advantage. I can only what if the gulf war if the Iraqis had been actually skilled and motivated to cause even a fraction of the 50k deaths that Bush Sr was worried about in the "mother of all battles."

With that, we are quite vulnerable to enemy attacks, ADA systems are few and far between, there's a reason we don't have Stingers in production anymore. Common tasks from before the GWOT era like digging in at each halt and integrating obstacles for defense are more practiced on paper than in the real world for fear of ruining training areas from too much engineer work. The US could use some large 'Louisiana Maneuvers' type events again to practice warfare with Divisions and Corps beyond mere simulations of that scale that simply can't capture all the friction of war.

The US Army would go on the attack because it's better to have the initiative and we're just not setup for defense like we were in the 80's ready to use Air-Land warfare to beat back the Soviet hordes coming through the Fulda Gap. Cutting them before they retreat across the river would be a definite goal as such a defeat of the Russians would eliminate their elite combat power as effectively as the USAF's interception of the Republican Guards retreat from Kuwait along the "highway of death" did. Not to mention every general since antiquity has been trying for another Cannae, a river on one side is a key factor to get that.
I could easily imagine we'd have pushed for a penetration east of Kherson and then branch east and west along the river to deny river crossing sites for retreat and then essentially clear pockets of resistance piece meal as they'd be isolated and ineffective without support from their Command nodes and artillery support.
The US Army though hasn't fought on home/allied turf in a long time though, so it'd be more difficult to claim 'collateral damage' when it's your own or allied/countryman for the most part, living on the battlefield.

[CrossLOPER]

You heavily underestimate how much gas Russia has left in the tank however. Their forces in Ukraine might already double what they started with in terms of personnel, and even a high estimate of 2500 tanks and 5000 AFVs lost represents only a third of their reserves before it truly hits critical (when existing frontline forces can no longer receive replacements beyond Humvee/Tigr or T-55 tier). And I have to keep repeating, Ukraine - in Kharkiv, in Kherson, in Donetsk - has shown little ability to overcome dense, prepared Russian defenses through combat. We might have to hope for an internal Russian collapse, military or sociopolitical, before a forceful reclamation of territory, and that's not likely at all - yet.

You assume that the reserves are usable, and that parts, and technicians, are available to make them reliable.

Ukraine has no need to engage these positions, and it would be counter-productive to do so. Cutting off lines of supply, playing diplomacy, holding existing lines, and probing defenses until more force is mustered has been the primary strategy, and it is working.

I am far more concerned about civilian populations in Ukraine and how they will handle colder conditions with worse sanitation. I see no reason why defensive equipment and civilian supplies cannot be streamlined to flow forward. No chance of "escalation" there. Anyone who is still using that word in all seriousness is delusional anyway.

The way forward is to continue to enforce sanctions and close the gaps. No T-34s or T-14s in sight, so they aren't that deprived.

[Montmorency]

I do recall reading of the First Gulf War that the US government and military leadership were via the media preparing the public for a hard fight and KIA on the order of thousands. Hyping up the Republican Guard for example. We didn't expect the Iraqi resistance to collapse the way it did as quickly as it did (we've always been rather poor at judging our opposition).

It's not controversial to contend that the cleansing of Vietnam Syndrome as a result of our curbstomp in Kuwait, coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union, went to our heads far too much, leaving the typical American's mentality more arrogant and detached from global realities than ever. For 30 years everything's looked like another variation of the Dream Team creaming the competition with one hand tied behind the back, especially to the militaristic mainstream media. It's been my opinion since the beginning of the war that far more than the risk of nuclear escalation, the administration's refusal to commit any US forces to combat in Ukraine has been guided by the fear of political blowback that would attend even hundreds of casualties.

Our biggest disadvantage if taking up the brunt of ground combat in Ukraine would be having to take a few weeks and a few thousand casualties to relearn the lessons of conventional warfare that the Russians and Ukrainians have been exposed to for the better part of a year. It would take a few incidents of platoons or encampments suffering under artillery fire to learn how best to deploy in the field. Or, on the other hand, maybe we would just bomb the Russians a heck of a lot and they would surrender en masse at first contact like the Iraqis - but it's not something to bet on.

Fear of collateral damage, or its public relations implications at least, might hinder operations, particularly air operations (even if in my - unrealistic - scenario only the UA air force is available)*. During WW2 we killed many thousands of French and Italian civilians without much compunction, though it would be hard to cause as much harm in skirmishes among already-depopulated villages. I would expect the Ukrainian government to stipulate non-aggression against urban centers, or maybe they would approve a heavily refined version of our Syrian ROE.

*Since in my scenario you would still have the extensive Army rotary aviation available, would the US attempt a Hostomel-like penetrating air assault package against the Kakhovka Dam to seal it to transit, or would commanders be too conservative following the Russian example?

Apparently DoD plans to upgun the Stryker to 30mm. I hope the Bradley replacement, whatever they're calling it now, will have a better ATGM than the TOW.

US IADS has never been as well-developed as the abundant and range-interlocking SAMs Russian doctrine calls for, because our air force was once again supposed to be the first line of defense/offense. And maybe that's fine. But there's no getting around the need for small-scale missile and drone defense, like a CIWS but smaller, cheaper, automated/AI-assisted and widely distributed. Within 20 years we should really be relying on solar-powered laser platforms for this.

You assume that the reserves are usable, and that parts, and technicians, are available to make them reliable.

Ukraine has no need to engage these positions, and it would be counter-productive to do so. Cutting off lines of supply, playing diplomacy, holding existing lines, and probing defenses until more force is mustered has been the primary strategy, and it is working.

I am far more concerned about civilian populations in Ukraine and how they will handle colder conditions with worse sanitation. I see no reason why defensive equipment and civilian supplies cannot be streamlined to flow forward. No chance of "escalation" there. Anyone who is still using that word in all seriousness is delusional anyway.

The way forward is to continue to enforce sanctions and close the gaps. No T-34s or T-14s in sight, so they aren't that deprived.

I mean, the reserves have been usable so far, so that's been a pretty safe assumption through today. Russa is thought to have replaced the large majority of its armored losses so far from active reserve and storage. That's the fact of the matter we have to contend with.

The stuff that worked for Ukraine before doesn't apply anymore. The circumstances on the flanks have changed. It's all frontal assaults from here on out.

We're actually loosening sanctions to allow Russia to export fertilizer and crops more easily, because the Third World wants the goods first and foremost. (Can we start using "Third World" again?) Probably has something to do with Russian negotiations on the grain deal, since part of the original deal was that Russia gets to export its agro products (but for some reason it didn't shake out that way).
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/...ilizer-exports

[spmetla]

I do recall reading of the First Gulf War that the US government and military leadership were via the media preparing the public for a hard fight and KIA on the order of thousands. Hyping up the Republican Guard for example. We didn't expect the Iraqi resistance to collapse the way it did as quickly as it did (we've always been rather poor at judging our opposition).

In fairness to the Bush Sr administration, the Iraqis had been in a conventional war the previous eight years with Iran so they had assumed the Iraqis had learned some things and that the elite Republican Guard was something to respect. Both points ended up false and having looked at the bits of video available from the Iran-Iraq war, both sides had pretty awful Soldiers, no professionalism, engagements were at WW2 distances. One would assume that Saddam would have tried to learn the lessons of the Yom Kippur War and the Iran-Iraq war and professionalize but nope, just more corruption.
Side note, I imagine the Saudis would be just as awful as the Iraqis under Saddam, lots of cool kit but I doubt they take the training seriously. Looking at their performance in Yemen they look like awful soldiers too. Great at war-crimes though!

It's been my opinion since the beginning of the war that far more than the risk of nuclear escalation, the administration's refusal to commit any US forces to combat in Ukraine has been guided by the fear of political blowback that would attend even hundreds of casualties.

I think the risk of nuclear escalation is the number one issue. Once its the US directly involved, we'd have to commit completely, sending a contingent to fight on behalf a foreign government without the full force of the US military behind them would be a criminal misuse of Soldiers.
I don't the casualties would be the blowback, just the fact that the US is at war again, less than a year after leaving Afghanistan. Besides, it's clear that our defense industry needs to retool beyond just getting sweet contracts for limited runs of equipment. I think we have enough inventory to beat the Russian Army in Ukraine, an effort beyond that and global in scale would require the US to mobilize the nation again as in WWII.

*Since in my scenario you would still have the extensive Army rotary aviation available, would the US attempt a Hostomel-like penetrating air assault package against the Kakhovka Dam to seal it to transit, or would commanders be too conservative following the Russian example?

I don't think the US would do an Air Assault in this threat environment, just too many MANPADS around. Attack aviation though would be used enmasse like in the Gulf War to saturate areas with enough apaches to achieve destruction of the enemy and deal with short range air defenses.
Where I could see Air Assaults would be onto the far side of the river and into Crimea in support of SOF as well as to essentially a light infantry foothold prior to heavy forces coming in, sorta like the airborne drops before D-Day. Though without the USAF these would be of a success chance like Hostomel.

Apparently DoD plans to upgun the Stryker to 30mm. I hope the Bradley replacement, whatever they're calling it now, will have a better ATGM than the TOW.

Yup, the new Strykers will at least be capable of engaging BMPs and BTRs, something the previous gen couldn't do except the very troubled Mobile Gun System strykers which were POS. The Bradely replacement will be a long time coming due to budget cuts and the requirements keep changing. The dream of unmanned IFVs able to attack the enemy without risking US blood is driving us into another acquisition black hole. I'd like a capable IFV like the Puma or CV-90s but able to pack a whole squad in the back, alongside that have an unmanned weapons vehicle. Making one vehicle do both is a waste, an unmanned vehicle that has crew and passenger space is too big to be useful and will make the system too expensive meaning we keep using the Bradley for decades more.
As for the TOW it's a good system, just needs to be upgraded to not be dependent on the old guidance systems, would be nice to have top-attack capability.
I just hope the US can look at what the next MBT should be. The 'infantry mafia' have already determined that our new light tank isn't a 'tank' but Mobile Protected Firepower vehicle. They like so many in the US would like to be rid of tanks as we don't make great tanker movies and keep forgetting that tanks do more than fighting other tanks, like creating breakthroughs.

[Montmorency]

Yup, the new Strykers will at least be capable of engaging BMPs and BTRs, something the previous gen couldn't do except the very troubled Mobile Gun System strykers which were POS.

Funnily enough, this limited run of assault gun Strykers actually have a counterpart in the rare Russian Sprut system. It seems neither are very useful, but since MGS is supposed to be retired as of this year, why don't we send the lot of them to Ukraine?

EDIT: Also on the point of sanctions, I should have mentioned that the EU and the U.S. Treasury Department and State Departments are working with major banks to facilitate cooperation with Russian energy firms such as Gazprom, at least in the areas of "humanitarian aid, energy, and agriculture." Russia is even asking for its agricultural bank, Rosselkhozbank, to be reconnected to SWIFT, though it's not clear that this is even being considered.

[CrossLOPER]

I mean, the reserves have been usable so far, so that's been a pretty safe assumption through today. Russa is thought to have replaced the large majority of its armored losses so far from active reserve and storage. That's the fact of the matter we have to contend with.

Yes, the Russian military does a good job of leaving them all over the place for the Ukrainian military to capture and use. They clearly have enough to throw them away when they run out of fuel. Truly a decadent society like Japan in the 80s.