Great Power contentions

[spmetla]

As I explained, and was well-known since early in the war, Scholz has now made it explicit that he will not consent to the transfer of Leopard 2 to Ukraine unless the US contributes at least a token quantity, even single digits, of Abrams.

Either way, the penny packet bullshit continues.

Yup, Scholz has shown himself as completely unfit to try and lead Germany in this crisis. I'll give him credit for getting Germany off Russian gas so quickly but the Zeitwende he announced in February has not come about.

Hope the new German Defense Minister can reform the Bundeswehr and its ties with industry some.
Also hope the US is willing to send a company of Abrams M1A2s just to force the Germans hands. The Ukrainians have show capable of handling multiple different vehicles and getting them some sustainment report. As for the fuel guzzling, the T80s they field also have gas-turbine engines so it shouldn't be unknown to them what to do with the Abrams. I've had to watch Abrams destroyed by poor use in the hands of Iraqis and Saudis, would much rather see them face the foe they were designed against by a country that has shown a knack for fighting.

Both Turkish L2s and Iraqi T-72s (and Saudi export Abrams) suffered as much from obsolescence of their technical characteristics as user error, and the lesson coming through this war is once again 'Only 21st-c. tanks are worth anything if you actually plan to fight a serious war.'

At the very least though, western tanks due have higher rates of crew survivability, something extremely valuable in order to first get crews to expose themselves to danger and secondly to retain that cadre of experienced tankers.
The Abrams are certainly not obsolete by any means but the Sep4 finally upgrades the FLIRs again, though the system is due for replacement primarily because it just isn't designed for all the networked warfare/data sharing that future systems can field.
I won't speak to the armor but it seems to have done well enough that the US just hasn't even considered investment in Reactive Armor as a supplement yet. The frontal arc of the Abrams M1A2s and Challenger 2s should be top notch, the Leo2s are probably damn good too though they don't use DU materials. All MBTs though will be vulnerable to the sides and top.

Was glad to see the Swedes sending over CV-90/4s and more artillery as well as the Danes, even the French are considering sending over Leclercs. Think Western arms industry are seeing that future sales of platforms and keeping their factories open for present day spare parts may depend on their performance in the only true conventional war since Desert Storm. The CV-90s are impressive IFVs, always thought the US should have used those for the basis of a Bradley replacement instead of opting for the Puma and then going for this new optionally manned boondoggle.
Would like to see how Leclercs hold up in combat, the French have always had a different approach to armor that hasn't had a chance to show itself since WW2 as the AMX30s in Desert Storm were obsolete even then.

There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders
before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position
for many years. While Taiwan?s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its
navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers
are prisoners of war.

Well, the PRC has certainly demonstrated to Taiwan's people that promises will not be kept as seen in Hong Kong so hopefully if it comes to blows the Taiwanese have the will to resist.

Haven't read the report yet but will do so. I still can't see a China that depends on maritime trade for food and fuel starting a war over Taiwan until they could garruntee to keep the US Navy beyond the Malacca Straits and and Guam.

[Hooahguy]

Im hoping that the western allies are starting to understand that since Russia is gearing up for a long war, the best thing for them to do is to not give Ukraine just enough to sustain themselves, but enough to actually end this. Which requires more advanced stuff. Like I see no reason why we shouldnt be giving them ATACMS now.

[Montmorency]

Tanks and APCs/IFVs will be critical for Kyiv to retake the rest of its territory, but they may not be enough. Kyiv needs to have superior combined arms capability to breakthrough prepared defensive positions. Hopefully, this change in thinking will extend to other capabilities.

I mean, there were people pointing this out many months ago, but the wrong lessons were taken from the September Offensives and talk drifted to the margins. I've specified since October that the reasonable approach is to refrain from sending up equipment in penny packets with half-trained crews and instead train up two NATO-equipped divisions from scratch, on NATO soil, preferably one mech (Leo2) and one tank (Abrams). Now Zaluzhny says he needs 300 tanks and 600 AFV or whatever; assuming the divisions are organized around 3 brigades or equivalent as maneuver elements, that tally is in the vicinity of two divisions' TOE.

This is exactly the shock force structure that could be productively assigned to Zaporizhzhia as their exclusive area of responsibility, and tasked to the offensive. Legacy ZSU formations would hold the flanks.

The US, in recognition of the need to build capacity, has promised to train a whole 500 Ukrainians in Germany in combined arms, which you may notice is not a division. The British have promised to train another 20K Ukrainians in at least basic infantry MOS throughout 2023, so they plus advanced US forces could easily manage the process of standing up a divisional formation and its replacement reserve (NB. the US Army is apparently in the initial stages of reverting from brigades back to "penetration" divisions, and so is the VSRF; brigades aren't as bad as battalions for elementary operational-scale units, but they're still evidently inadequate for sustained large-scale combat). In principle, European NATO could plausibly train 100K+ in various MOS, probably 80K as a minimum when accounting the UK, US bases, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and Poland alone. The Baltics and Nordics could handle the rest, leaving the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia as odds and ends (I don't know how willing or capable other countries would be wrt training missions).

Another division should be trained in the US itself.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

100K individuals for a training mission in the US alone, from say May through December 2022, wouldn't amount to as much of a hurdle as one may imagine. 25K for a large divisional formation plus replacement reserve; 10K for separately-assigned specialists in SAM, artillery, radar, and other systems and their maintenance and repair crew (cf. 100 Ukrainians are heading to the US for training on the operation of a Patriot battery); 5K as the core for a future rebuilt Ukrainian air force once the extant one runs out of frames; several thousand officers up to colonel rank for training or retraining to NATO standards; 10K for training in logistical, administration, and assorted other specialties... Less than half the nominal figure would be training for individual replacement into existing frontline units. European NATO could have trained and equipped another full division. Non-training forces in the US active branches and National Guard would have to participate in order to maintain regular training resources for regular American recruits, but I don't see how it isn't mathematically manageable. The Ukrainian recruits would have to be sorted in such a way as to ensure minimal English-language proficiency to begin with among training cadres (heavily limiting the pool of recruits), but I figure half of Ukrainians age 20-40 have or could quickly reach minimal proficiency, and women volunteers could be leveraged as well. It's not like all of NATO's soldiers are preoccupied with something else. And as I said, the PLA could only dream of attaining this kind of hands-on institutional experience of mass civilian mobilization. As a fringe benefit, the program would bind Ukraine to the Anglosphere culturally and politically in the long-term.

This process should have begun last spring, but it's never too late I suppose.

On the other hand, Estonia and Denmark are ostensibly willing to transfer ALL their artillery assets to Ukraine, which may prefigure the kinds of thoroughgoing commitments that are needed.

Now if the US can squeeze South Korea's stockpiles to forward a few hundred thousand 155mm shells to Ukraine, and makes medium-term arrangements with Korean and Australian producers, then from 2024 onward we can ensure at least a million 155mm shells to Ukraine per year - probably 1.5 million - just with new production and sustainable stockpile drawdowns. As long as NATO is comfortable being short of their pre-war stockage as late as a decade from now. I don't believe there are as many DPICM shells in physical existence left as some believe however.



If you need it, more information on German escalation logic, which has been applied since the beginning and is generally in alignment with the German public's attitudes.




I chanced this Youtube rec even though I haven't played Combat Mission in over a decade, and it is the most insightful and perspicacious overview of Cold War Soviet doctrine I've ever seen in any form. It's also generally instructive in a number of key concepts in battle, such as tactical initiative, positional battle, the value of mass, mobile defense, and more.

[Montmorency]

What was the US DoD's 155mm shell production target for 2025, 500K total? As cited in December or November I think. Now they're announcing a target of 90K/month for 2025, a sextupling of 2022 or 2021 production.

Given what we've seen of Russian production surges in tanks and missiles, and recent estimates of new production of 3 million tube arty shells in 2023 (or already in 2022? I can't keep track, but pre-war I saw estimates of a surge capacity of 1 million annual), and the ability of Romania, Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia, and Poland to spin up or even restart production of Soviet caliber munitions on short notice, and help Ukraine to establish its own production on their territory by the end of 2022,

I think we should take it as a rule that war industries in any given country have a lot more spare capacity than they let on. And this isn't even total war! Although now my former predictions, going back to last summer, that materiel exhaustion would force both sides to largely pause throughout 2024, may be out of step with the times.

US and NATO could easily train up those two divisions I go on about and donate a single lot of one million 155mm shells from stockpile and accumulating production. Ukraine's consumption of 100+K 155mm/month over 8 months or so has been something like the minimum needed to hold their ground, and has likely kept many of their 155mm systems idle for lack of ammo, while also encouraging the overburdening of advanced systems such as the PzH2000. A proper offensive needs to be well-resourced for concentrated and sustained firepower.

Hopefully Zelensky finally acts on that corruption this year too.

pushing conventional ammunition production to levels not seen since the Korean War

I'm pretty sure 90K/month would be typical of US production during the Cold War, maybe even low.

[spmetla]

What was the US DoD's 155mm shell production target for 2025, 500K total? As cited in December or November I think. Now they're announcing a target of 90K/month for 2025, a sextupling of 2022 or 2021 production.

I don't recall the original number but it is an impressive improvement. I imagine that the defense contractors see it vital to up their own capabilities and fast before those contracts for shells go to a combination of overseas firms. Hopefully, the US sees the importance of at least mothballing the machinery and tooling to ramp up production for all our vital wartime needs for the future. Why do we have to re-learn the shell crisis in every war?

I think we should take it as a rule that war industries in any given country have a lot more spare capacity than they let on. And this isn't even total war! Although now my former predictions, going back to last summer, that materiel exhaustion would force both sides to largely pause throughout 2024, may be out of step with the times

I imagine that all depends on if they've kept the capabilities to make stuff at least in warehouses and so on. Sorta like the US could never make the Saturn V rockets anymore as the tooling and individual expertise of the engineers faded together with poor document management.
These companies being private businesses I could see a lot just getting rid of tooling and machinery once they don't see prospective orders on the horizon. I look at also things like the F-22 for which the tooling was deliberately destroyed so that those manufacturing secrets can't leak out when placed in storage which is undoubtedly less protected than current production tooling.

US and NATO could easily train up those two divisions I go on about and donate a single lot of one million 155mm shells from stockpile and accumulating production. Ukraine's consumption of 100+K 155mm/month over 8 months or so has been something like the minimum needed to hold their ground, and has likely kept many of their 155mm systems idle for lack of ammo, while also encouraging the overburdening of advanced systems such as the PzH2000. A proper offensive needs to be well-resourced for concentrated and sustained firepower.

I don't think we'll see division sized training during this fight, something that the US and NATO just doesn't have the capacity for when it's for a country in which English isn't the primary or secondary language. Also, good trainers are hard to come by, especially ones that can bridge the cultural and language barriers to reach the students. As we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan the idea of just assigning people to be advisors and trainers without a special selection process leads to forged reports, poor training, and an unprepared military.
For all those artillery systems, I'm actually curious also as to the reset capabilities, barrels have lifespan which this current fight is exceeding monthly. A lot of these artillery systems need to be taken out of the fight and have their barrels rebored or replaced.

A proper offensive will need a heck of a lot or resources. In the short term though, I hope that we keep seeing a ramp of ADA support to Ukraine as to go on the defense those resources first need to be protected. The Russian strikes on infrastructure have moved a lot of Ukrainian ADA assets to protect their cities making those frontline troops more vulnerable.

Hopefully Zelensky finally acts on that corruption this year too.

I hope so too, can only imagine the strains he has to deal with. After a year of war and with the prospect of regaining the Feb23 borders less likely much less dreams of the whole of Donbass and Crimea he's undoubtedly got no shortage of people that would be game for a negotiated settlement. Whatever Russia's starting '23 offensive ends up being will need to be decisively defeated and followed with a counterattack that regains some significant ground somewhere for Zelensky to keep the factions within his government on side as well as keep international support on side.
I say so because even in 1940, the reason the US never undertook production of Spitfires or any British systems was in part because large parts of the US expected Britain to be defeated and would rather have production go into new systems like the British paid for development the P-51 Mustang.

Russia still looks unable to win outright but a frozen conflict or ceasefire such as the Korean War scenario is essentially a Russian victory as they keep what they have so far.

Looking forward to seeing how Challenger 2s, Abrams, and Leo2s perform in a conventional war without air dominance in place. Was pleased to see the Germans offer up the Leo 2A6 versions which have the improved armor and the longer caliber gun. Wondering what version Abrams will go overseas, I imagine M1A1s without the DU armor which is still not allowed for export, which would make them excellent systems overall but not as good as the latest Leo2s and Challenger 2s. The Leclercs being on the table is still very interesting as I mentioned earlier. The war-nerd in me wants to see what lessons are learned from this war in armor design. Will be interesting to see after this war what Ukraine does for tank production as they'll have access to the best of Western systems to develop something other than a T-64/T-80 based hull and turret.

[Montmorency]

I don't recall the original number but it is an impressive improvement. I imagine that the defense contractors see it vital to up their own capabilities and fast before those contracts for shells go to a combination of overseas firms. Hopefully, the US sees the importance of at least mothballing the machinery and tooling to ramp up production for all our vital wartime needs for the future. Why do we have to re-learn the shell crisis in every war?

Interesting (mark that date)......
https://www.newscientist.com/article...ranium-rounds/

I imagine that all depends on if they've kept the capabilities to make stuff at least in warehouses and so on. Sorta like the US could never make the Saturn V rockets anymore as the tooling and individual expertise of the engineers faded together with poor document management.

We've already observed the Russians producing or restoring tanks, missiles, and munitions at what is very likely a faster rate than the highest pre-war estimates I had found for their production. So we should take this as a real thing, supporting the general concept.

These companies being private businesses I could see a lot just getting rid of tooling and machinery once they don't see prospective orders on the horizon. I look at also things like the F-22 for which the tooling was deliberately destroyed so that those manufacturing secrets can't leak out when placed in storage which is undoubtedly less protected than current production tooling.

AFAIK the US government owns most arms industry plants and leases them to the private firms, so maybe... At any rate, we wouldn't be hearing estimates of 1+ million 155mm shells in 2025, which is more than double the estimated target from last fall, if there weren't some basis to it. This latest estimate is not only more than double the recent targeted tripling on 2022 production, it is in excess of last December's NDAA authorization for multi-year contracting in 155mm shell purchasing. I haven't recalled US firms or the US government bluffing on production like that, if it were a bluff.

I don't think we'll see division sized training during this fight, something that the US and NATO just doesn't have the capacity for when it's for a country in which English isn't the primary or secondary language. Also, good trainers are hard to come by, especially ones that can bridge the cultural and language barriers to reach the students. As we saw in Iraq and Afghanistan the idea of just assigning people to be advisors and trainers without a special selection process leads to forged reports, poor training, and an unprepared military.

Would the US military really have no one beyond the training specialists to teach this stuff? Is mass mobilization another area where we have no protocols or capabilities to activate? I would ask who the British have been tasking with their training mission; granting that they only train Ukrainians as individuals and maybe very small units, and only in 3-month waves or whatever it was, but they've definitely trained more Ukrainians last year (20K at least) than they do British recruits in any given year. That seems like a relevant indicator.

Note that the aim isn't to match the US training cycle and its particulars 100%, but to instruct in and build the required proficiencies at scale, as every country did in WW2. Right now, the US is training what I understand to be a model combined-arms battalion - 500 soldiers - in Germany for up to 2 months. It's just hard for me to believe that with some organization the US and European NATO combined couldn't scale this up to a divisional formation. Perhaps our standing units could even elect/volunteer the best teachers among enlisted and officer ranks?

The recently-announced 100+ initial Leopards, btw, are a fine basis for a Euro mechanized division. The UK has promised to train another 20K Ukrainians this year. Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Poland, I see now reason why all could not handle at least 10K each, the Nordics another 10K... Seems like with calculated foresight we could have divvied up responsibilities among NATO and paired the Leopard pledge with a British-German divisional training program. Or still could as long as we initiate the admittedly long and involved process. At the very very least, if we legitimately cannot stand up divisions of any quality from scratch, why not brigades? Isn't it self-evidently superior to train an armored formation with accompanying mounted infantry elements for 6+ months rather than to train individual crews for arbitrary distribution for 1-2 months? It's not the spring of 2022 anymore.

I don't think language is that big an issue with the size of the Ukrainian volunteer pool. I doubt good statistics exist, but from what relevant tidbits I've found half of Ukrainians aged 20-40 should have the minimum English proficiency required to start basic training - and they can learn along the way, they do have 6+ months. Technical specialties and officers would need a higher starting level of English, but overall it's one of the more surmountable barriers.

For all those artillery systems, I'm actually curious also as to the reset capabilities, barrels have lifespan which this current fight is exceeding monthly. A lot of these artillery systems need to be taken out of the fight and have their barrels rebored or replaced.

The most recent figures I saw are 66% availability among 155mm systems at any given time. But this is exacerbated, as I was saying, by overreliance on certain platforms such as the PzH2000, which does seem to be less operationally reliable than advertised, but even so routinely gets pushed to a high tempo for any cannon with daily fire missions over 100 shells. Even with the humble M777, it seems to be common to park single guns or batteries near a hot zone and keep them firing steadily for days, something that has probably contributed to the relatively-poor survivability of M777s even aside from wear and tear. Fully-trained crews, more stockpiled/dependably-allocated ammo, and a larger pool of systems would help spread the burden and afford more fire support to a broad front.

A proper offensive will need a heck of a lot or resources. In the short term though, I hope that we keep seeing a ramp of ADA support to Ukraine as to go on the defense those resources first need to be protected. The Russian strikes on infrastructure have moved a lot of Ukrainian ADA assets to protect their cities making those frontline troops more vulnerable.

The large number of munitions is also a buffer against interdiction and attrition from enemy action, which has to be priced in. We hear a lot about HIMARS strikes on Russian depots, but the Ukrainians have lost depots too - just at a seemingly much lower rate.

I hope so too, can only imagine the strains he has to deal with.

Just one example of Zelensky's limitations, whether deliberate or hapless - of course these were much commented on in the year prior to the invasion - were his efforts from early in his term to protect the very crooked, but well-connected, Yanukovych judge Pavlo Vokv, chief judge of the Kyiv District Administrative Court. The US State Department actually went so far as to sanction Vovk last month. But if the alliance can lean on Ukrainian elites adequately, Zelensky's personal probity could be beside the point.
@Gilrandir

Russia still looks unable to win outright but a frozen conflict or ceasefire such as the Korean War scenario is essentially a Russian victory as they keep what they have so far.

I mean, I notice stuff. I noticed all of Ukraine's flaws on the offensive in Kharkiv in last May, east of the Oskil River in the fall, in Kherson in the fall... I noticed their struggles repelling small-scale infantry wave attacks in Donetsk even while advancing elsewhere. I've noted how these tie into repeated complaints about the level of training, discipline, organization, and command across UFOR. I[ve discussed these matters in more detail elsewhere, but by the end of last spring it was clear to me that Ukraine had little hope of recapturing pre-2022 territory without dramatic escalation of aid (more than we've seen yet). But even I have ended up overestimating the Ukrainians and underestimating the Russians repeatedly. Pro-Ukraine cheerleading only serves to contaminate the information space and undoubtedly clouds decision-making even among many NATO governments.

I imagine M1A1s without the DU armor which is still not allowed for export,

I had heard that our designated major allies are categorically extended an offer to import DU Abrams as well as DU projectiles, but none of them have taken up the offer because of the environmental complications of DU.

[spmetla]

Would the US military really have no one beyond the training specialists to teach this stuff? Is mass mobilization another area where we have no protocols or capabilities to activate? I would ask who the British have been tasking with their training mission; granting that they only train Ukrainians as individuals and maybe very small units, and only in 3-month waves or whatever it was, but they've definitely trained more Ukrainians last year (20K at least) than they do British recruits in any given year. That seems like a relevant indicator.

Note that the aim isn't to match the US training cycle and its particulars 100%, but to instruct in and build the required proficiencies at scale, as every country did in WW2. Right now, the US is training what I understand to be a model combined-arms battalion - 500 soldiers - in Germany for up to 2 months. It's just hard for me to believe that with some organization the US and European NATO combined couldn't scale this up to a divisional formation. Perhaps our standing units could even elect/volunteer the best teachers among enlisted and officer ranks?

Mass mobilization hasn't been practiced in earnest in a long time in the US (WW2/Korea). The draft went out over forty years ago, the GWOT wars were all with volunteers or mobilized reserve formations.

Our training is very specialized, to be a drill instructor has high prerequisites. School house instruction in the various job skills for officers, a lot of the classes are from retired officers (contractors) with maybe a third being uniformed personnel. Also, our promotion system in the military looks for operational experience, people fear going to the training realm as they may fall behind their peers that stay on the line.

Up to BDE level, the US would be very good at teaching. Divisional though, that's a lost art as we undid our whole divisional structure post-Iraq invasion. Divisions become just admin HQs, don't know when we last practiced maneuvering divisions against divisions in Corps level exercises but probably not since the Iraq invasion itself. The US practices Division war and greater really through staff simulations which are damn good for a lot of friction of war but will never be as good as large-scale practices such as the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940.

The scale up potential is there but part of the problem with the bureaucratic nature of the US military is there exists no unit setup for that training function. There are SFABs for training up smaller sized units (BNs for example) but for larger training they'd either have to take a wartime MTOE unit and task it to train another unit instead of focusing on itself (like we did in Iraq and Afghanistan). Best option would be for the Army to create a new TDA unit (Congress would have to approve) setup for Corps and Division training of foreign units/allies. With a war that will go on at months/maybe years, relying on hodge podge training units like in GWOT will only hurt our own readiness while not providing the greatest training to our supported ally. Also, I'm sure it'd be best to have a special unit with vetted personnel as there are plenty of folks in the US military that believe the far-right media and don't want the US to support Ukraine if not out-right okay with Putin's actions.

I had heard that our designated major allies are categorically extended an offer to import DU Abrams as well as DU projectiles, but none of them have taken up the offer because of the environmental complications of DU.

The DU armor has no environmental complications, its the ammunition that can have problems, and that's more so from the DU micro dust created when it's piercing armor and then any subsequent explosions from the penetrated tank.
The armor itself though would only be an environmental risk if penetrated or if someone wanted to dispose of and just left sitting somewhere at which point the steel/composite casing would eventually expose the DU over decades of rusting.

But even I have ended up overestimating the Ukrainians and underestimating the Russians repeatedly. Pro-Ukraine cheerleading only serves to contaminate the information space and undoubtedly clouds decision-making even among many NATO governments.

I feel you 100% on this, though it is difficult to contain enthusiasm during ongoing victories. I think the last year has been eye opening for what public perception must have been like during WW2 in the US and elsewhere. The media talks about expecting Germany to collapse right after Paris fell and the eye opener of the Ardennes offensive. Same in Germany, I can only imagine the heights of their arrogance after the fall of France, having defeated the enemy they could not beat in four years during the last war, instead they did it in a matter of weeks, they no-doubt felt sure of success against the enemy they did beat in the last war.

The only real upside to this being a drawn-out war though is it really does away with the peace-niks. Peace at any cost really isn't worth it, there are things worth fighting for and in order to fight for those things one must first be capable of a fight. No need for Europe to return to a fully armed camp like the Cold War or the 1910s, but no need for naivete of the 1990s and 2000s either. Should be eye-opening for US foreign policy too, don't waste our good will on what may be lost causes (Iraq and Afghanistan) and save armed intervention for when the chips really are down (WW3) or to preserve the current world order (Kuwait in 1990, Ukraine now, or Taiwan in the future).

[Montmorency]

Alright, I'll acknowledge that recreating divisional - at the formation level - training capabilities would be much harder than training an equivalent force in brigades. But then, do you have any comment on the US (and Russia) reportedly planning to return to divisional structure and move away from brigades as core operational units? Seems like Ukraine would also be an excellent application and spur of that doctrinal shift in real time. We need to exercise our bureaucratic flexibility anyway.
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/20...choice/378234/

The Army’s brigade combat teams may have been the signature units of recent wars, but service leaders believe future conflicts will be dominated by divisions and even corps, officials said Monday.
[...]
The secretary said this focus on larger formations would be part of the Army’s upcoming doctrine on multi-domain operations, Wormuth said.

“To realize this vision and build the Army of 2030, we are transforming our force structure and evolving how we fight. We must do this to prepare for the challenge of large-scale combat operations, strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, and to be ready if deterrence fails,” she said.

Rainey pushed back on any would-be critics who say the Army is “going backwards” by going to a division. “And that is absolutely not the case. First of all, everything we're doing is threat-informed.”

The brigades will also have to get smaller in order to survive and move, he said—but did not say how much smaller or what kind of weapons and gear would have to be shed.

Relevant:

Poland is able to train [UA] brigade and equip it with T-72 tanks and IFVs.
“We will be able to both equip and train [UA] soldiers by the end of March at the brigade level” - Deputy Prime Minister of Poland, Minister of Defense Mariusz Błaszczak

For realz, how is it all of NATO combined* couldn't have proceeded from last spring to establish OSUT for many UA brigades, or even those reinvented divisions, for deployment through Winter/Spring 2023?

*Not counting Turkey, Hungary or any of the Balkans

The phrase "where there's a will there's a way" is only cheap here because it's fitting.

A few more details on my thinking. We're all aware that unit training times have varied considerably across wars, stages of wars, branches, specializations, and countries. Six months is a bit of an arbitrary figure, but there are a few things that go into it:

1. IIRC that US Army infantry in WW2 were standardized to at least 26 weeks of basic and advanced training.
2. A 6-month one-station training mission would allow many of the inevitable kinks in the process to be caught and addressed in real time.
3. 6 months is a solid and predictable block of time for bureaucracy to organize everything that needs to happen on both sides of the Atlantic (accounting for pre-planning), and for Ukraine's GenStab to plan their operations according to a schedule.
4. The 6 months should be followed by at least a few weeks of capstone 'courses' taught by Ukrainian veterans (some of whom may have already been integrated into the unit) to synthesize US or NATO training with Ukrainian doctrine and real-world experience. This would happen to occur as the unit transitions toward deployment to Ukraine (though not necessarily direct deployment into combat), acting as a bridge between environments.
5. The replacement reserve trained alongside the core unit(s) would be calculated at a size sufficient to sustain a large-scale offensive for, say, one month. The NATO parties involved in the establishment of these units would subsequently have all the needed infrastructure in place to act as mid-term replacement training centers.


NATO-tank pledges so far:

[Furunculus]

the flood of L2's begins. war attrition stocks.

[spmetla]

Alright, I'll acknowledge that recreating divisional - at the formation level - training capabilities would be much harder than training an equivalent force in brigades. But then, do you have any comment on the US (and Russia) reportedly planning to return to divisional structure and move away from brigades as core operational units? Seems like Ukraine would also be an excellent application and spur of that doctrinal shift in real time. We need to exercise our bureaucratic flexibility anyway.

The US has partially re-established divisional structures again, part if will be putting things like artillery, cavalry squadrons, engineer battalions under the division HQ again instead of divested to the BDEs. Brigades will be smaller again but will rely on Divisions for those supporting arms. It's a slow process though because you have rebase units and we still will only have a few divisions with multiple Brigades in a close area for training together.
I agree we need to exercise bureaucratic flexibility. A higher level training structure looking at operational and strategic levels of war would be very useful for partnering with our allies for future but would need this administration to advocate such a structure and then congress to approve its organization. As it is we'll continue with ad hoc training. The UK being a smaller country and military is more flexible in this regard, especially as what affects general European security affects the UK directly, a harder sell for our American isolationists.

For realz, how is it all of NATO combined* couldn't have proceeded from last spring to establish OSUT for many UA brigades, or even those reinvented divisions, for deployment through Winter/Spring 2023?

Think a lot of people with their heads in the sand. I'm glad it's Biden in charge and not Trump but Biden is certainly behind the curve in leadership for a lot of this too. But that's been a problem for a long time with the US, getting people in charge with a long view that also aren't shackled by scandals and domestic politics is rare outside of a few branches of government.
This is why I was so appalled at the limp and ineffective response of Obama and Merkel to the 2014 invasion. That should have been a cuban-missile crisis moment. In hindsight, the fact that the Russians used 'little green men' instead of outright uniformed Soldiers shows they were almost expecting intervention and wanted some deniability for a way to back down without losing face leading to a negotiation for probably Crimea at the least.
Instead, Putin got a fiat-accompli and it only galvanized his will. Glad the US and NATO were actually on the ball for supporting Zelensky once it was clear that Ukraine wouldn't fold.

the flood of L2's begins. war attrition stocks.

Will be interesting to their impact when they get on the battlefield in the next few months. One or two armor brigades with modern MBTs and IFVs and good artillery and engineer support could end the stalemate if employed correctly, especially as most of what their facing are modernized T72s and T80s, the few T90s are mostly A versions and not the latest M versions, of which even the latest production ones on the front seem to have had some shortcuts taken in lower quality reactive armor applied and probably shortcuts in the complex systems within too.

Hope Krauss-Maffei increase production capability to some sort of wartime footing. New hulls and lots of spare parts are going to be in great demand in a few weeks/months and likely to remain in demand for years in a general rearmament and restocking of Europe following this war.

[Montmorency]

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

[Furunculus]

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

they don't have to get creamed, they just have to be employed in the purpose of war. thousands of tanks are already burned out hulks in the last year alone. everything supplied up until now and in the coming year is war attrition stocks.

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

[spmetla]

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

Absolutely, but now that the status quo has changed it won't be as difficult for future governments to supply arms to warzones, same with the swiss finally allowing export of that Gepard ammo. Not need to try and be 'brave' if a precedent has been set.

Now if only my Austrian cousins could decide that they need to amend their constitutional neutrality as Russia's actions should show a need to take sides and allow better integration into EU defense planning and better integration into NATO short of actually joining.
Now would be a good time to be donating Uhlan and Pandur IFVs APCs as well though that's about all to be spared in the tiny Austrian inventory.

If you want K2s to overtake L2s, pray for the latter to get creamed in Ukraine. Or I guess for the German government to shit the bed in its foreign relations and relationship with its arms industry.

I don't the K2s will overtake L2s simply because the Germans though not a military heavyweight quantity-wise still build excellent equipment. The K2 is just slightly more modern than the Leo2s as it's designed with modern networked warfare systems and active/passive protection systems already in mind. The recent KF51 "Panther" testbed vehicle will likely serve as a baseline for the future Franco-German tank project, with those two nations building a fleet which combined will at least be low thousands we can expect many other European countries to hop on board with those or more used Leos.
I think the Leo2A5s and A6s will do very well though, very capable with very good frontal arc protection. Of primary importance though are the optics are some of the best in the world, should allow for true hunter-killer capability.

The K2s will probably have a good market in Eastern Europe once Poland sets up shop as there are a lot of countries that want tanks that are independent of Germany, the US, and Russia for various reasons. French and British ones are usually too expensive so if Poland is able to license export with Korea then the K2 will do well.

The talk of MBTs while important though, I think the CV90s and Bradleys will actually be of more significant impact, especially if the US sends significant quantity of Bradleys in the next few months, getting infantry through the dangerous open ground to assault the enemy infantry is what Ukraine has lacked. MBTs can provide the direct fire support necessary to get the IFVs up there but no MBT in the world will clear a trench line or enter and clear a building.

Which the Ukrainians were allowed to put in an order the Lynx IFV and more CV-90s and start getting those off the production line. If industry knows that they have an order for 500 of vehicle X they can actually ramp up production, this drip drip drip of donations without the donating country then placing a new order for rearming themselves doesn't allow industry to predict future orders and adjust their manufacturing capacity accordingly.

On a side note, I hope the US does the minimum of at least painting the donated vehicle OD Green, seeing those desert tan medical APCs evacuating casualties was frustrating as it showed how little planning went in on the US side for how to go about donations.

Now if only we can fast-track some F-16s for Ukraine and get them to place an order for a large number of Gripens (I think the ideal fighter/attack aircraft for them).

[Montmorency]

Think a lot of people with their heads in the sand. I'm glad it's Biden in charge and not Trump but Biden is certainly behind the curve in leadership for a lot of this too. But that's been a problem for a long time with the US, getting people in charge with a long view that also aren't shackled by scandals and domestic politics is rare outside of a few branches of government.

Ukrainian colonel Kostiantyn Mashovets:

I don’t think that before the end of March the Ukrainian tank brigade on Leopard-2 will pass a full-fledged combat coordination and reach the minimum combat capabilities

. Moreover, we need at least three such brigades. [Ed. Huh, sounds like a division]

I wouldn't blame Biden too much here, as to my knowledge he has never been a 'military buff' (not that I am); the closest he came was being a military father and being specialized somewhat in foreign policy as a Senator and VP. I doubt war doctrine or the micromanagement of US military capabilities were ever remotely on his agenda. I'm not trying to aggrandize myself, but let's say the "cleaned up" version of my disconnected thoughts on advanced US assistance to Ukraine are ideas I have very rarely seen touched upon in the commentary of even generals. It demands a level of creativity, commitment, and initiative that probably isn't abundant among military tops - moreover, buffeted as they are by orthogonal currents of national (geopolitical) conservatism and optimism bias about Russian or Ukrainian progress. There were not a few arguing in 2022 that the most advantageous course of events for the US is for Russia to be trapped in a years-long quagmire that drains its military and economic potential, a viewpoint hardly conducive to decisive Ukrainian reconquista.

Now if only my Austrian cousins could decide that they need to amend their constitutional neutrality as Russia's actions should show a need to take sides and allow better integration into EU defense planning and better integration into NATO short of actually joining.

I'm badly misremembering the joke, but hasn't the Austrian military/government commonly been referred to as 'the fifth directorate of the FSB' for many years?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Austri...n_intelligence

Now if only we can fast-track some F-16s for Ukraine and get them to place an order for a large number of Gripens (I think the ideal fighter/attack aircraft for them).

Congress authorized training for F-15 and F-16 platforms back in July, which I assume has been taken up already. Ukraine's government suggests more details will be forthcoming soon.

I saw someone suggest F-5s for Ukraine, and my reaction to that is that a platform whose most advanced hypothetical upgrade branch (not existing units) could put it on a level with Ukraine's obsolescent Mig-29s is just a deathtrap for invaluable Ukrainian pilots.

they don't have to get creamed, they just have to be employed in the purpose of war. thousands of tanks are already burned out hulks in the last year alone. everything supplied up until now and in the coming year is war attrition stocks.

and germany has already shit the bed. the military is a tool of foreign policy - kellog-briand be damned - and every supplier that has tussled with germany over re-export licences will be thinking twice next time. all the way back to the ancient GDR towed artillary that germany prevented estonia gifting to ukraine in April 2022.

If L2s are perceived to "perform well" then it's a boon to their reputation. So you wouldn't like this to come about. If they only come off a bit better than Ukraine's T-64BVs, then their long-standing shine wears off to some extent. Or if they perform well but still get knocked out by the dozens or more, then platforms who haven't been similarly tested have an opening for brand salesmanship to naive politicians.

There have always been export shenanigans - the cousin war to this one, Iran-Iraq, was a nightmare of them - and as long as Germany's industry is willing and permitted to produce, I would wait and see to confirm that there are any practical ramifications at all to Germany's blundering so far. Germany has very few L2 customers outside the broad Europe-zone, and the European customers tend to have strong incentives to continue with L2.

Now, if something drastic were to occur beyond the current record, to be vague, maybe. But in the end, Germany has passed the final test put before it, so there are now barriers to the future sensitization of the issue; where and when else are we left to expect Germany to aggravate its partners on Ukraine policy? Is Germany going to deny the use of Turkish Leopards in Syria suddenly? Before that next level approaches, this all reminds me of the idea that the international community was going to sideline the US because of the Iraq War, or because of how devastating the Trump administration was from the start - it's always more complicated than that.

Separately, we could also imagine a bunch of countries dumping their entire L2 stock (i.e. their entire armored branch) during the war and leaving an opening for a fresh start, but that's a see-it-to-believe-it scenario.


EDIT: I think this Russian article is a little too pessimistic on the availability of contemporary Russian ATGM/AP tech, and more so if judged against export Abrams without DU armor, but here is yet another comment to the effect of my hobby-horse:

- An armored group of 30-50 Abrams tanks is unlikely to affect the situation in the operational sense, - the director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies is sure, - but if there are already 200 or 300 units, then they, if used correctly, can become a significant operational factor. In general, the point of the limited supply of Western weapons is not so much aimed at a “decisive Ukrainian victory” (which is most likely unlikely), but mainly at the exhaustion and gradual “grinding” of Russian forces.

Can we all agree that Ukraine needs an Abrams division and a Leopard 2 division - fully-trained - to retake the South? Also, ATACMS to suppress the Kerch Strait Bridge.

[spmetla]

I wouldn't blame Biden too much here, as to my knowledge he has never been a 'military buff' (not that I am); the closest he came was being a military father and being specialized somewhat in foreign policy as a Senator and VP. I doubt war doctrine or the micromanagement of US military capabilities were ever remotely on his agenda. I'm not trying to aggrandize myself, but let's say the "cleaned up" version of my disconnected thoughts on advanced US assistance to Ukraine are ideas I have very rarely seen touched upon in the commentary of even generals.

Fair enough, it is something to show though for the cultural divide between the military and the rest of the country.

The lack of a 'war doctrine' is part of a problem as a country, there is no guiding vision for what we should be in five years much less fifty years in relation to the world. There are domestic goals for each party and not much in the realm of foreign policy. A professional bureaucracy and some well written treaty obligations are the things that keeps the US more or less on track (the 'deep state') from looking completely rudderless.

It demands a level of creativity, commitment, and initiative that probably isn't abundant among military tops - moreover, buffeted as they are by orthogonal currents of national (geopolitical) conservatism and optimism bias about Russian or Ukrainian progress.

It's a fair point but in general that's what keeps the US strong is that our military doesn't try to guide national policy, the problem is when the two political parties cannot collaborate at least on what our strategic policies are as now no one is really making consistent policy choices.

There were not a few arguing in 2022 that the most advantageous course of events for the US is for Russia to be trapped in a years-long quagmire that drains its military and economic potential, a viewpoint hardly conducive to decisive Ukrainian reconquista.

I've heard those voices too. I'd much rather this end quicker and more decisively. I don't want Russia ruined by a decade long war against it's neighbor anymore than I want that for Ukraine as it makes rebuilding both as well as rebuilding trust that much harder.

I'm badly misremembering the joke, but hasn't the Austrian military/government commonly been referred to as 'the fifth directorate of the FSB' for many years?

You're remembering the joke correctly. I'm just wishing that they'd fully join the west instead of this quasi neutral but not neutral positioning. Even for their army my second cousin said there's a military saying of roughly "god help austria because we can't."

Separately, we could also imagine a bunch of countries dumping their entire L2 stock (i.e. their entire armored branch) during the war and leaving an opening for a fresh start, but that's a see-it-to-believe-it scenario.

That'd be a terrible choice as they'd lose a generation of armored warfare expertise, better to keep even a token capability to have some institutional knowledge retained rather than get rid of it completely and then try to rebuild. Military capability goes far beyond purchasing systems as we all know.

I think this Russian article is a little too pessimistic on the availability of contemporary Russian ATGM/AP tech, and more so if judged against export Abrams without DU armor, but here is yet another comment to the effect of my hobby-horse:

I think Russian ATGMs will perform very well against NATO Tanks if the Ukrainians get too close. Especially as they'll not be operational until there's some leaves on trees again and Russia has relearned the value of infantry in the past year so I expect Russian infantry to be quite potent in defense.

Can we all agree that Ukraine needs an Abrams division and a Leopard 2 division - fully-trained - to retake the South? Also, ATACMS to suppress the Kerch Strait Bridge.

I think they need a division's worth of IFVs more than MBTs but yes, large armored formations are absolutely necessary for them to have offensive capabilities again. The current commitment of western tanks is beneficial for counter attacks and limited penetrations, no true exploitations like at Izium.

[Montmorency]

Fair enough, it is something to show though for the cultural divide between the military and the rest of the country.

The lack of a 'war doctrine' is part of a problem as a country, there is no guiding vision for what we should be in five years much less fifty years in relation to the world. There are domestic goals for each party and not much in the realm of foreign policy. A professional bureaucracy and some well written treaty obligations are the things that keeps the US more or less on track (the 'deep state') from looking completely rudderless.

It's a fair point but in general that's what keeps the US strong is that our military doesn't try to guide national policy, the problem is when the two political parties cannot collaborate at least on what our strategic policies are as now no one is really making consistent policy choices.

Yes, and I appreciate their civic loyalty, but they do advise the POTUS. Based on the public commentary of representatives like Milley, I assume most of the advice the administration has gotten is more on the order of caution and gradual escalation. I mean, these are the stars who oversaw the War on Terror. Biden has always been able to call on common sense to push back in the latter domain, but to develop an alternative concept of Ukraine policy requires more than common sense, especially when almost every politician’s bones vibrate to the frequencies of domestic politics. I don’t know how POTUS and VPOTUS and SecDef have privately theorized this conflict over time; that is appropriately hidden information. But it seems to me they weren’t looking at Russian mobilization and the evaporation of Ukrainian momentum in early fall as a red flag moment, or they would have visibly acted on it. Or they would have briefed with heterodox staff officers who might have pointed them in the direction of a longer-term plan. To have the insight to overlook the assurances of the most authoritative subject matter experts in this context is a rare trait. At most you could say Biden should have learned to trust the judgement of ranking generals and spooks less after 2021, but that doesn't point a way forward either.

Or maybe the JCoS, or Austin, or Harris, or whoever, have advocated an aggressive role for the US all along and Biden is the one who demurred, who knows. The war will likely end before we learn the details. It's straightforward for a government like Poland's, which doesn't need to particularly reformulate any policy or implement sophisticated military tasks (before now).

I think they need a division's worth of IFVs more than MBTs but yes, large armored formations are absolutely necessary for them to have offensive capabilities again. The current commitment of western tanks is beneficial for counter attacks and limited penetrations, no true exploitations like at Izium.

Certainly, that’s why I called for the Leo division to be mechanized rather than armored. If there truly is a flood of L2s coming, the division could be reinforced or separate brigades established.

[Montmorency]

Developing a few observations scattered through previous posts on our strategic unseriousness: The Ukrainians don't have anywhere near enough 155mm shells stockpiled for an operational offensive - and that's why they didn't conduct one despite expectations.

To refine my previous estimates, still rather arbitrarily, the ZSU would have to have aggregated at least half a million shells globally. In the first place to achieve a provision of 10K/day for the theater of operations alone (say 2K/day elsewhere), extending to one full month in duration, while leaving slack for wastage, attrition, interdiction, as well as a strategic reserve of some nature as a contingency. At least half a million.

IIRC through the end of 2022 the alliance delivered at least 1.25 million 155mm shells, although more precisely the US delivered at least 1.025 million. According to DoD press releases, in November and December the US delivered 104.7K rounds, including Excalibur, RAAMS, and presumably non-combat rounds. During the fall various commentators were remarking on the gradual decline in overall military aid, partially reversed this month (besides the new armor and training we we have pledged 91.3K 155mm shells).

Regardless, it should be clear that ever since the September offensives Ukraine has been near-continuously drawing down its levels of 155mm ammo. We have been more generous than I expected with Excalibur PGMs, perhaps donating half our stockpile so far*, but at an average rate of depletion of 100K/month (well-attested as a kind of floor even) since May, Ukraine has used - probably at least - 900K of 1250K rounds delivered up to now. Of course, I shouldn't fail to mention such pledges as the British one from this month to procure 100K 155mm from third parties, but the reality is that if we would like to see a UFOR offensive around May, we ought to be looking out for another 500K in fresh pledges before then, to account for ongoing depletion.

Without a sign of that nature, we should assume UFOR will remain too exhausted to conduct operations beyond counteroffensives.

One of the finest Russian milbloggers, after considering the prospects of future offensives on either side, somewhat convergently remarks:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I think it is necessary to separately pronounce an extremely important idea - there may not be offensives at all. Neither Ukrainian nor Russian.

Despite the fact that both sides of the conflict regularly declare that they are preparing for certain strategic-level operations, at the current time, neither the Armed Forces of Ukraine nor the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have any real opportunities to conduct such operations. This thesis is best confirmed by the very course of hostilities in recent months - it is characterized by exclusively local operations, which indirectly indicates the serious exhaustion of both armies.

Strike groupings for offensives are, first of all, logistics and command and control systems, training of personnel, competent officer cadres, and not just a concentration of masses of equipment and people. And here we are faced with a significant problem - not a single country in the world currently has not only training programs for officers in the event of mobilization, but even training programs for soldiers (with the possible exception of the People's Liberation Army of China).

For example, during the summer campaign (and specifically during the Kharkiv-Izyum operation), British advisers found an interesting solution by forming Ukrainian assault units by breaking down some personnel units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

They resorted to the model of using company-tactical groups - compact, manageable, equipped with trained personnel (for small units it is easier to find and train sergeants, officers and privates, bringing their training to a certain level of quality).
At the current moment in time, Ukraine sets itself the task of a completely opposite nature - to create a corps of tens of thousands of military personnel and thousands of pieces of equipment, which requires a completely different level of organization and resources.

In the army of the Russian Federation, things are similar; she adapted to fight in small units, and this allows her to achieve local successes, as, for example, in Soledar. But it is unlikely that such an approach can be applied within the framework of certain large-scale operations, where, on the contrary, massing is necessary.

The plans of the commands and military-political leaderships can be arbitrarily ambitious, but 2022 has demonstrated very well that ambitions often do not match reality.

For this reason, the denouement of the events of the current year may follow some completely boring scenario for the layman, which does not include either a repetition of Verdun somewhere in the swamps of Chernobyl, or the rapid march of the Abrams in the southern Ukrainian steppes.

But I disagree that Russia lacks the juice to assemble a serious army-echelon offensive at some point in the coming months, in pursuit of the supreme political goal of pushing to the Donetsk oblast line. Despite its continuous frittering of combat power and readiness in constant small-scale attacks up and down the front (whose main objective itself was to attrit and pin down Ukrainian strategic offensive resources).


*Unless the phrasing "precision-guided 155mm artillery rounds" includes something like HERA, but M549 HERA was recorded in use from at least May, whereas the first confirmed deployment of M982 Excalibur projectiles was around the beginning of September.

[Montmorency]

Also, it seems the US government is out of money to commit to combat aircraft transfers (as opposed to training). The only real way to implement such transfers directly from US stocks is via the Presidential Drawdown Authority (source of most American material aid to Ukraine so far). But as of now the PDA has no more than $5 billion remaining for the rest of Fiscal Year 2023. Given the probable valuation of even a few dozen jets + logistical train, Biden would rapidly max out his credit limit at a critical juncture for ground operations in Ukraine, even if the delivery would take place a year from now. Congress needs to handle this one separately. (For context, Biden approved more than $5 billion worth through PDA - half the Congressional limit for FY2023 - just in January.)


Rambling shower thoughts on how the image of war as a "young man's fight" came about. I think this really entered mass consciousness starting with WW1 and fledging by WW2, but the necessary factor was the 18th century advent of levee en masse in the context of young societies. Even in the first half of the 20th century, the European and North American populations were still skewed young, though perhaps already older than the typical contemporary society. In the US for instance, half the population was under 25 in 1915, and half under 30 in 1940, compared to a projected half under 40 in 2025. In a society with a downward-skewed age structure, mass mobilization without emphasis on young men is senseless and unfeasible, though as with Germany and the USSR you might get made fun of for recruting "boys and old men" if your pool of available young men shrinks enough. But even the US, during WW2, recruited at least a few million men in their late 20s and 30s, already comparable to the modern US military age structure (1/3 over 30).

Past societies with massive standing armies, such as the Romans, were also naturally forced to abide by this principle, but because their standing armies were a permanent feature of life, and veteran soldiers served until well into middle age, the linkage of a seasoned soldier with a mature man would have remained.

But in general, the image of a soldier or warrior in the minds of historical humans would probably have been something like a grizzled 30-year-old. I'm sure differences in the capacity for recruitment and retention, the level of economic specialization and value generated by mature workers, and the (non-)existence of social scientific fields such as statistics contributed as much as the inherent value of experience over youth.

If there are major wars 50 years from now, it is highly likely that large numbers of middle-aged men will be conscripted, unless Africa somehow doesn't follow the same demographic pattern or autonomous weapons systems become truly ubiquitous. At any rate, West's brief historical episode of imagining that older men can't perform on the battlefield is coming to an end (and yes, don't expect a different story with "overweight" or Class 1 obese people).

[spmetla]

But in general, the image of a soldier or warrior in the minds of historical humans would probably have been something like a grizzled 30-year-old. I'm sure differences in the capacity for recruitment and retention, the level of economic specialization and value generated by mature workers, and the (non-)existence of social scientific fields such as statistics contributed as much as the inherent value of experience over youth.

I'd agree that'd be the expectation but for most of history those grizzled warriors started into their professions as kids.

Past societies with massive standing armies, such as the Romans, were also naturally forced to abide by this principle, but because their standing armies were a permanent feature of life, and veteran soldiers served until well into middle age, the linkage of a seasoned soldier with a mature man would have remained.

I think that's because the current level of warfare and technology is again creating a barrier of expertise that conscripts can't fill. I think that's reflected throughout history too, melee combat with armor was a very specialized skill set which had warriors that would generally continue to serve for decades. The less 'skilled' or prestigious things such as skirmishers required plenty of bravery but were generally considered youth jobs.
The period of mass industrial warfare from bayonet muskets to bayonet bolt actions (really all 'skirmisher' style warfare when you think about it) had a very low training level to create acceptable minimums of effectiveness. Yes, there were pockets of elites but generally that 'eliteness' faded very quickly with attrition in regular combat conditions. The implementation of machine guns and explosive artillery then turned warfare into something much more complicated that required much more coordination between all those different 'arms' in a way that has not had to be so closely coordinated before.
The current era seems even more complicated though we see at the low end that waves of minimally skilled conscripts are of value still but not for decisive short campaigns/battles within a war.

I'm quite curious what thought processes are going on in the Swiss, Israeli, Finnish, S. Korean, and Taiwanese higher commands for their draft/militia systems. Is there any real point in drafting people for short periods unless that skill set is retained and polished or at least prevented from dulling by keeping servicemembers in various forms of reserve status after their period of service? Should the initial service period be lengthened but the pool of draftees inducted reduced? Should the reserve obligations occur more frequently and be of more technical natures?
The Ukrainians have definitely demonstrated the importance of a reserve system though Perun has highlighted some major bottle necks in its effectiveness. Additionally, the need for skilled soldiers will probably create lengthier reserve obligations for more technical fields ie: if you operated ADA systems or tanks in your regular service period then you need to serve XX number of years longer in the reserves or perhaps more often within a shorter period.

[Montmorency]

I'd agree that'd be the expectation but for most of history those grizzled warriors started into their professions as kids.

Well, if covering the 20s age range, yes, but experience has always been prized and there's inescapably a correlation with age in practice (and then capitalists invented the unpaid internship).

Yes, there were pockets of elites but generally that 'eliteness' faded very quickly with attrition in regular combat conditions.

There were certainly elite infantry units in the age of pike and shot, and during the Napoleonic era. Discipline, courage, and tactical acumen are universal target skills. Napoleon's Guards were famously old-timers.

But as you point out regarding veteran warriors/soldiers, in an industrial ground war the most experienced and professional core will face extreme attrition, so one has no choice but to lean into "lowered entry standards" in age, weight, health, prior experience, level of motivation, etc. (although I have no idea how this could be extended to a future air war, where airframe production will tend to outrun pilot production).

Just a week ago we had one of the most well-known Rubloggers (Rybar) admit on national television that 50% of the pre-war VDV (~35K actual standing strength) were lost by the time mobilization was launched, or within 7 months of fighting (peaking in the first and 7th months). In my attempt to validate these figures I arrived at 40% lost, 50% if including voluntary separation, resignation, and desertion. But still, the point remains - elite or no, the VDV could hardly survive as an organization without sipping at the mobilization tap. (I'll always return to the combat history of the Grossdeutschland Rgt. in Operation Barbarossa, pressed into action by command time and again until less than platoon-strength, then reconstituted as the elite PzGren. division we all know and, know.)

The bottom line is that social expectations changed once everyone got with the program - overdetermined by the demographics of modernity - that quantity has a quality of its own. The US Army, after all, could be formed around just 50K "operators", but that would be a pretty bad idea.

The current era seems even more complicated though we see at the low end that waves of minimally skilled conscripts are of value still but not for decisive short campaigns/battles within a war.

I think where we've seen the Western post-Cold War 'party line' on the inherent sophistication of the mission survive is in the realm of complex coordinated action, where both sides struggle most of the time. Lack of training and skill is a big part of the reason, alongside C4 constraints (which also involve training and skill, among officers), that the primary assault 'unit' of the war is the Company Tactical Group. Otherwise, this war has pretty much blown the theory that contemporary conventional warfare is pointless outside the remit of highly educated and specialized combat experts out of the water. For God's sake, in many ways the current Russian practice is more archetypically Stalinist than Stalin's USSR ever really engaged in, and even the German Volkssturm got probably 1-2 months' training (compared to mere days for thousands of 1st echelon militia and mobiks today).

As it turns out in real-world practical application for both sides, you can learn how to drive and shoot and tactically handle a howitzer, MLRS, or T-series tank in just a month after all, and on-the-job training trumps all. It's been commented repeatedly for example that many Ukrainian soldiers, militia and draftee, have had zero instruction on the usage of the many platforms of Western IMVs and RPGs that have filtered through to the frontline in haphazard fashion; sometimes the print-on instruction set (e.g. one LAW or AT-4 in a clip) might be all they have to rely on. It's amazing how much raw bulk still matters, even when in absolute terms it's not very present in concentrated form. Although there might be some negative repercussions to not taking the time to drill discipline, military regulation, physical fitness, squad cohesion, and suchlike, besides the referenced inability in massive-scale combined arms battle stuff.

I'm quite curious what thought processes are going on in the Swiss, Israeli, Finnish, S. Korean, and Taiwanese higher commands for their draft/militia systems. Is there any real point in drafting people for short periods unless that skill set is retained and polished or at least prevented from dulling by keeping servicemembers in various forms of reserve status after their period of service? Should the initial service period be lengthened but the pool of draftees inducted reduced? Should the reserve obligations occur more frequently and be of more technical natures?

The Finns and Swiss probably have it right that the priority in the conscription obligation is frequent and effective refresher training for maintenance of readiness. In this regard, a middle ground between pure conscription and a volunteer army would promote more optimal allocation of limited resources in initial as well as continuing training (this will vary in particulars by country). By the by, Finnish volunteers in Ukraine have apparently been known to claim that the regular troops of both sides are inferior in training to the Finnish conscript. I'm inclined to believe them, even if chauvinism might color the firsthand assessments, after the past year of warwatching, and hearing of how Finnish conscripts outsmarted US Marines in joint exercises.

[Montmorency]

Seems like the US has secured bases in the Philippines, compensating for the Solomon Islands.

Norway will buy 54 new generation Leopard-2A7 MBTs to replace its older versions of the same model, and has an option for 18 others, the government announced on Friday. The South Korean MBT K2 lost this competition.

Germany intends to transfer 88 Leopard 1 and 15 Gepard to Ukraine. The good thing about the Leopard 1 is that its armor is definitely not worse than the AMX-10RC, but its latest projectiles should have a decent ability to defeat the side armor of any Russian tank except maybe T-90M, assuming very, very careful deployment. But we should really be planning a general strategy around L2/Abrams going forward, rather than diluting Ukraine's limited tankist corps among scads of obsolete equipment.

Hopefully the arrival of GLSDB, even just a few dozen through the first half of the year, will neuter Russian initiative by disrupting their logistics as acutely as HIMARS did in July of last year. Unless the Russian offensive comes this month, we're going to see a lot of tectonic energy released around May-June.

The EU plans to increase the number of Ukrainian servicemen who will be trained by Western instructors and on European training grounds from 15 to 30 thousand.

As part of the EU mission, the Bundeswehr offers, among other things, combat training for companies and tactical training for the brigade headquarters and its subordinate battalion headquarters. The German proposal also includes instructor training, medical training and weapons systems training in close cooperation with industry.

According to initial plans, Germany wanted to train a brigade of up to 5,000 Ukrainian soldiers within the first few months. The number should also depend on how many soldiers the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine will be able to send for training given the ongoing war.

Spurred by Russia, Germany rolls out 3-year plan to fully equip all armed forces personnel

Elsewhere, Germany has agreed to provide NATO with a first operational land division in 2025 to support the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), while long-term targets of providing a modern mechanized division by 2027 and a further two divisions, to the alliance by 2031, both remain.

?We are talking about 30,000 army personnel as opposed to 6,000 [to support the new land division plan],? noted the official. ?These are units that will have to go into battle, with what they have at their disposal, on a permanent basis.?

[US] Army network design for 2025 to focus on division level for first time

The Army has adopted a multiyear strategy involving the incremental development and delivery of new capabilities to its integrated tactical network, involving a combination of program-of-record systems and commercial off-the-shelf tools. Those ?capability sets? now provide technologies to units every two years, each building upon the previous delivery. Capability Set 21 was primarily designed for infantry brigades, whereas Capability Set 23 is focused on Stryker brigades and Capability Set 25 is focused on armored brigades. However, Capability Set 25 will also focus on the division holistically for the first time.
[...]
?Like all things, we change, right? We change, we adapt, based on what our adversaries are doing, based on the environment around us. For many, many years now, we?ve been in a brigade-centric Army. As I?m sure everybody in this room is aware, we are now going back to the division as the unit of action,? Potts said.
[...]
With Capability Set 23, the Army for the first time will field its integrated tactical network equipment to a division headquarters as well as enabler units, creating a communication bridge from maneuver brigade combat teams, to their support elements, to the division headquarters. It will be fielded to the 82nd Airborne Division in Fiscal Year 2023.

Told you. It doesn't take a strategic genius to figure this out.

Gosh, mid-2023 is set to be the most brutal phase yet.


EDIT: jfc even the French deploy Company Tactical Groups (SGTIA)

[spmetla]

Love that picture of the balloon reaction! The sheer quantity of airtime that stupid balloon got was incredibly irritating, hope all these are typically shot down as they enter US airspace instead of as they exit in the future.

Seems like the US has secured bases in the Philippines, compensating for the Solomon Islands.

Yup, and not by a great diplomatic action by the US but rather backlash in the Philippines by the PRC throwing its weight around.

Germany intends to transfer 88 Leopard 1 and 15 Gepard to Ukraine. The good thing about the Leopard 1 is that its armor is definitely not worse than the AMX-10RC, but its latest projectiles should have a decent ability to defeat the side armor of any Russian tank except maybe T-90M, assuming very, very careful deployment. But we should really be planning a general strategy around L2/Abrams going forward, rather than diluting Ukraine's limited tankist corps among scads of obsolete equipment.

If nothing else the Leo1s will free up modernized T-72s for frontline use and serve as training platforms for Leo2 turrets (the integration of the loader for the most part).
Leo1s do have the benefit of using a cannon with absolutely no shortage of stocks in NATO as well as very modern thermal systems. As infantry support in a light tank role they'll do very good work as it frees up proper IFVs to move forward with dismounts inside as well as free up the most modern tanks for destroying enemy tanks etc....

The general strategy should certainly be around the L2s though, the Abrams doesn't have repair facilities in Europe yet while Leo2 does so I think that'll be the most important factor as it becomes more common.

Told you. It doesn't take a strategic genius to figure this out.

Gosh, mid-2023 is set to be the most brutal phase yet.

Absolutely right, pity that the folks in charge took so long to wheel this out, too many people hoping that the war would be won by somebody within a year.

There were certainly elite infantry units in the age of pike and shot, and during the Napoleonic era. Discipline, courage, and tactical acumen are universal target skills. Napoleon's Guards were famously old-timers.

Yup, I'll point out though that most elite units were of course those that had the discipline and skill to close with and engage in melee combat leading to the 'cult of the bayonet' persisting well into WWI by which time it was no longer a tactical weapon for breaking the enemy but rather just another melee weapon for individual combat when necessary.

The bottom line is that social expectations changed once everyone got with the program - overdetermined by the demographics of modernity - that quantity has a quality of its own. The US Army, after all, could be formed around just 50K "operators", but that would be a pretty bad idea.

Yup, and the presence of several divisions more in the US Army National Guard is of strategic importance as the shrinking active component cannot provide enough of a deterrence on its own against near-peer enemies is now smaller than what was used to fight Desert Storm. That's why I get irritated at US Army boondoggle buying as for ground warfare it's best to focus on the basics when it comes to equipment instead of 'landwarrior systems' and so on. How about a very good modern IFV instead of some nonsense item, how about a replacement for the Abrams instead of hoping for a magical F-22 of the ground.
More importantly though, I'd like the US Army to try and 'grow' a division or two more too.

The Finns and Swiss probably have it right that the priority in the conscription obligation is frequent and effective refresher training for maintenance of readiness. In this regard, a middle ground between pure conscription and a volunteer army would promote more optimal allocation of limited resources in initial as well as continuing training (this will vary in particulars by country). By the by, Finnish volunteers in Ukraine have apparently been known to claim that the regular troops of both sides are inferior in training to the Finnish conscript. I'm inclined to believe them, even if chauvinism might color the firsthand assessments, after the past year of warwatching, and hearing of how Finnish conscripts outsmarted US Marines in joint exercises.

I'm inclined to believe the Finns in that regard too. The US and NATO plus EU members in general have put a premium in some basic fundamentals for infantry combat with night fighting, modern communications, excellent first aid instruction, and decent marksmanship as priorities employed by empowered NCOs that are able to make tactical decisions.
The right mix will certainly vary for each nation though I hope the bigger NATO countries do put a little more thought into it. Germany's goals are ambitious but military service is still looked down upon so I think they need some sort of conscription to enable it to be a large enough force overall though relying on a core of professionals.

As it turns out in real-world practical application for both sides, you can learn how to drive and shoot and tactically handle a howitzer, MLRS, or T-series tank in just a month after all, and on-the-job training trumps all. It's been commented repeatedly for example that many Ukrainian soldiers, militia and draftee, have had zero instruction on the usage of the many platforms of Western IMVs and RPGs that have filtered through to the frontline in haphazard fashion; sometimes the print-on instruction set (e.g. one LAW or AT-4 in a clip) might be all they have to rely on. It's amazing how much raw bulk still matters, even when in absolute terms it's not very present in concentrated form. Although there might be some negative repercussions to not taking the time to drill discipline, military regulation, physical fitness, squad cohesion, and suchlike, besides the referenced inability in massive-scale combined arms battle stuff.

Yup, basic level skills are easy to train on, especially in the realm of operating equipment. The more difficult things are training to work as a unit, sending and receiving accurate info in extremely stressful situations, calling for accurate artillery fire and making corrections, and most importantly the core of NCOs and Officers that make the plans to integrate and sustain all those capabilities. A reserve pool of potential leadership is arguably more important than a large reserve pool of riflemen.

[Montmorency]

Situation in the TO.

Since late January, there have been:

*the first large-scale probes in Zaporizhzhia since last spring
*a renewed reckless frontal assault on Vuhledar (first-wave brigades were wrecked, but more seem to be being assembled) even bigger than the disastrous attacks around the beginning of November
*numerous reports of a culminated Wagner being superseded by VSRF units long held in reserve (Prigozhin has announced that he will no longer be recruiting convicts - but the Ministry of Defense now is instead)
*some of the hardest Russian counterattacks out of Svatove and Kreminna since the front was last mobile in October
*relatively-heavy bombardment in the border areas of Sumy and near Kharkiv City

Two months ago I did predict that late January would be the best time of the winter campaigning season to launch large-scale attacks, but these are just small-scale attacks with greater regularity; I was figuring in the context of a traditional concerted push, because to do otherwise is to squander concentration and weather conditions more favorable for relatively-rapid movement. Instead this looks like a gradual elevation of temperature almost everywhere.

Bakhmut's operational circumstances have continued to deteriorate, after a lull in the second half of January. I had predicted at the beginning of the year the city would fall by the end of February at least, but a retreat within a week (mid-February) is now foreseeable without a more aggressive defense on the part of UFOR. For whatever reason, the fortress-town of Marinka, of which Russia controls at least half by now, is a case study in aggressive Ukrainian mobile defense and commitment of reserves to counterattacks. The city has been brutally-contested since last March, but because it is such a critical defensive node anchoring the entire line from the Dnieper to Avdiivka, UFOR seems to have invested in maintaining control. Something similar might be assessed with regard to Vuhledar. Whereas the story in Northern Donetsk has from the days of the Battle of Popasna last spring been one of UFOR conservation of reserves and maybe artillery coverage until the last minute. The relative reliance on Territorial Defense and National Guard units to hold frontline trenches in static defense has always contributed to higher losses and enemy gains in this sector, and I don't understand why. Targeted battalion-size counterattacks to restore the status-quo from time to time would hardly break the bank of the strategic reserve or limit; Bakhmut for one is also a critical defensive node and anchor, and at this rate a fallback line would have to be about 10 miles east of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. For example, the loss of the village of Yakovlivka at the beginning of the year obviously allowed the flanking of the truly excellently-situated fortress-town of Soledar, which had withstood frontal assaults for up to 6 months by that time. Predictably, Soledar was immediately flanked and for the past month RuFOR used the breach to expand one of their most significant salients since last spring. All of that could basically have been nipped in the bud with a decisive counterattack to seal the initial, pretty tiny, breach.

Bakhmut will have held out 7 or 8 months, but the relatively-rapid breach of an excellent defensive network (which ultimately compromises the integrity of the whole defensive line of the central fronts) this year under apparent conditions of relative rationing of artillery firepower on the RuFOR side demonstrates continuing serious incapacities on the part of UFOR command, small-unit competence, or individua soldier motivation. Over the past couple weeks GSUA has affirmed several times that its paramount objective is maintaining control of Bakhmut. I'm not sure I've seen many concrete actions to secure that objective, with reinforcements and aggressive defense continuing to be deprioritized before the retention of the strategic reserve (there are some contraindications to this judgement in the past week however), yet announcing that you're going to redouble efforts to hold an area you're actually planning to cede is the kind of public relations stupidity one only really sees from Russia. IIRC even with Severodonetsk-Lysychansk, the government's posture was that it intended to protract the fight for as long as possible, not that it guaranteed full concentration on restoring a stable defense.

If I'm wrong about GSUA, we may finally see the enigmatic "Offensive Guard" shock corps commited to combat or whatever other formations exist in the strategic reserve.

But to return to speculation on the construct of "Russian offensive", while it's possible the Russians do something corny as hell like schedule one discrete offensive push to begin February 24, it's possible that another strategy is taking shape. Namely, they may be deliberately predicating on an upcoming UFOR retreat from Bakhmut as a trigger to expend all accumulated reserves and supplies in a general offensive from Zaporizhzhia to the end of the mutual state border. Basically, this would be an attempt to take advantage of a moment of disorganization to try to replicate most of the initial invasion OPLAN from a year ago, and overwhelm UFOR defensive throughput to the extent that a weak point to exploit opens up somewhere along the broad front. The near-term strategic goals would still be the occupation of Donetsk Oblast and to push UFOR west of the Oskil River.

Such a strategy would not be as favorable for Ukraine as a poorly-resourced attack out of Belarus, but it would still seem to disadvantage RuFOR considerably except in the low-probability, high-risk scenario where UFOR's lines collapse from the pressure or GSUA severely miscalculates in allocating resources between fronts. The only real advantage is the same as with the original, deficient, Russian plan, which had the virtue of creating uncertainty and surprise as to where to granularly prioritize defensive allocation. But both sides are more prepared than they used to be, even as RuFOR is overall weaker, making shock and awe even less viable than it was a year ago by all appearances. The losses to RuFOR in this OPLAN would in all likelihood be so severe as to relegate them to the low-rate attrition characteristic of last autumn for the rest of 2023, and it would ensure that Putin has to commit to a new wave of overt mass mobilization. If this is really the plan, then GSUA would be vindicated in withholding an extensive strategic reserve.

Still, it's another possibility to watch out for. A more traditional concentrated offensive remains my expectation, or at most a two-prong out of Luhansk and Southern Donetsk with a constant fixing component in the center (Avdiivka-Bakhmut axis). Whether this month or delayed until April (I do think GSRU will feel incentivized to act quickly to generate an advantage before NATO-equipped armored formations, and especially GLSDB, can be deployed).



What makes Bakhmut significant - besides being the largest town the two sides have directly contested since last June - is that allowing it to be outflanked as it has, and then captured, allows RuFOR to squeeze out the Siversk-Bilohorivka salient to the north, and to gradually roll up the remaining Ukrainian fortified line from Toretsk to Marinka to the south, which would force a reanchoring of the entire UFOR right wing back to Zaporizhzhia City.

The former is basically fatal to the UFOR effort to advance into Luhansk. The desire to establish mutual support for the flanks of a planned push into Luhansk on both sides of the SD River was strong enough that UFOR undertook a series of counterattacks in July to maintain a presence in Bilohorivka (the easternmost point of control for UFOR on the map), near the site of the destruction of a Russian battalion in May during a fording attempt. At the rate Bakhmut is being flanked, Siversk and everything east of it will have to be abandoned as soon as the end of winter.

The latter, though it would unfold over months, at least through the summer, deprives Ukraine of a whole network of highly-successful fortifications, pushes the defense toward more rural and open areas, subjects the major city of Zaporizhzhia to conventional bombardment, and drives the frontline back from the Sea of Azov in such a way as to dramatically complicate any future southern offensive, while potentially giving Russia space to restore rail logistics between Melitopol and Donetsk.

I've gently pointed out for months that Ukraine does not have unlimited space to cede, and in the context of the advent of mobilization it has obviously failed to attrit RuFOR's total fighting power, even if one optimistically estimates the ratio of irrecoverable RuFOR casualties at 2:1. Attrition has always been a dead-end long-term strategy for Ukraine, as opposed to the development of decisive maneuvers that bite and hold territory that Russia cannot recover. At some point GSUA has to be less conservative with offensive resources, even if it fears they can't be replaced with Western assistance in the future; this keeping the powder dry "until you see the whites of their eyes" business has gotten out of hand.

[spmetla]

Two months ago I did predict that late January would be the best time of the winter campaigning season to launch large-scale attacks, but these are just small-scale attacks with greater regularity; I was figuring in the context of a traditional concerted push, because to do otherwise is to squander concentration and weather conditions more favorable for relatively-rapid movement. Instead this looks like a gradual elevation of temperature almost everywhere.

I'm curious as to if the ability of both sides to strike obvious troop and supply concentrations is what's limiting the ability to truly concentrate combat power to what you suggest and I agree as more likely for success.

Bakhmut for one is also a critical defensive node and anchor, and at this rate a fallback line would have to be about 10 miles east of Slovyansk-Kramatorsk. For example, the loss of the village of Yakovlivka at the beginning of the year obviously allowed the flanking of the truly excellently-situated fortress-town of Soledar, which had withstood frontal assaults for up to 6 months by that time. Predictably, Soledar was immediately flanked and for the past month RuFOR used the breach to expand one of their most significant salients since last spring. All of that could basically have been nipped in the bud with a decisive counterattack to seal the initial, pretty tiny, breach.

I've also wondered at the lack of a substantial counterattack. Perhaps they are waiting for the Russian attack there to culminate or those concentrations of resources to be allocated elsewhere before doing so. Counterattacks are quite vulnerable and usually done by a reserve element so to do so may commit the area's last real reserves and risk a break through by the enemy, who knows though. Artillery superiority still works where the Russians are able to mass these systems.

Still, it's another possibility to watch out for. A more traditional concentrated offensive remains my expectation, or at most a two-prong out of Luhansk and Southern Donetsk with a constant fixing component in the center (Avdiivka-Bakhmut axis). Whether this month or delayed until April (I do think GSRU will feel incentivized to act quickly to generate an advantage before NATO-equipped armored formations, and especially GLSDB, can be deployed).

I figure the Russian planners are definitely worried about the battlefield effects of top-tier NATO equipment. HIMARS had an outsized impact, air defense donations have closed the skies in general to the Russian air force, perhaps they fear that modern MBTs will enable decisive penetrations of concentrated defenses and the end of the stalemate. I personally don't think the new MBTs will have that type of an effect as mines and modern ATGMs will still work well against any new tank especially as the numbers being donated are too small for whole BDEs to be similarly equipped. Challenger 2s with British HESH ammo though should be outstanding for destroying those pre-fab bunkers we've seen.
The GLSDB will have the biggest effect probably, just hope that we give Ukraine cluster munitions too. DPICM is a hell of thing and the arsenal of various fragmentation cluster munitions were all designed with the idea of countering numerically superior infantry.

I've gently pointed out for months that Ukraine does not have unlimited space to cede, and in the context of the advent of mobilization it has obviously failed to attrit RuFOR's total fighting power, even if one optimistically estimates the ratio of irrecoverable RuFOR casualties at 2:1. Attrition has always been a dead-end long-term strategy for Ukraine, as opposed to the development of decisive maneuvers that bite and hold territory that Russia cannot recover. At some point GSUA has to be less conservative with offensive resources, even if it fears they can't be replaced with Western assistance in the future; this keeping the powder dry "until you see the whites of their eyes" business has gotten out of hand.

Yup, attrition is a dead-end strategy for Ukraine. We'll see though if the GSUA's conservatism plays out in the end, I too hate the current strategy but without the info that they have I'm just a monday morning quarterback.

[Montmorency]

I figure the Russian planners are definitely worried about the battlefield effects of top-tier NATO equipment.

Remember that a winter offensive by both sides was touted widely and quasi-officially since November, so the Russians wouldn't necessarily be acting out of hand in what we observe. And political considerations that apply now would have applied in late 2022, when the winter campaigning season was being sketched out. To the extent anything is instigating Russian actions before time, it should be fear of GLSDB, because that would definitely stall any large-scale action in progress within days if deployed.


In the context of Russia's strategy to outlast Ukraine's alliance while maintaining constant offensive initiative to spoil Ukrainian counteroffensives, first let us be guided by this post by Russian political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov, which is in in fact applicable to the state of affairs since the beginning of last fall and doesn't actually state anything novel for us:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

In my opinion, following the results of the first year of the war, the opposing sides have practically returned to their original position of complete uncertainty and unpredictability. Illusions that this war could end with a quick victory for one of the parties were nullified by the end of the year. Hopes for a possible quick outcome of the war, which a year ago had yet to be born, were, in my opinion, dispelled by the end of the year and remained behind the stern of history.
What do we understand now and what we did not understand six months ago? The populations of both Ukraine and Russia are not ready to give their governments a mandate to conclude peace at the cost of territorial concessions (for Russia, at the cost of giving up the occupied territories that it considers its own). And there, and there is a clearly expressed will to war. But:
- New mobilization no longer looks like an insurmountable obstacle for the Kremlin, while the continuation of mobilization in Ukraine requires more and more efforts;
- Economic sanctions against Russia have not led and in the near future obviously will not lead to the collapse of its economy, they create problems, but do not deprive the ability to continue the war for a long time, calculated in years;
- The readiness and ability of the West to provide military assistance to Ukraine is far short of the scale that would allow Ukraine to turn the tide of the war, and in connection with the upcoming elections in the United States, the chances of a sharp, multiple quantitative and qualitative, and most importantly, lightning-fast increase in this assistance are small. [Ed. Remember that Biden only has ~$5 billion in drawdown funding to work with until FY 2024]
Thus, Ukraine, faced with perfidious aggression from Russia, on the eve of spring 2023, finds itself in the same difficult situation as on the eve of spring 2022. But if at that time the Western allies were guided by the outcome of the battle for Kyiv as a criterion for the “survivability” of the Ukrainian state project, now such a criterion is the outcome of the battle for Donbass. This is actually in a sense really “Stalingrad of the 21st century”. Both Moscow and Kyiv understand this very well. No wonder Putin addresses the nation in the shadow of Mamaev Kurgan. True, he confused the parties a little.
Recent lightweight statements about the supposedly imminent and inevitable end of the war after the de-occupation of Crimea (it was promised by the summer) have subsided. Ukraine is bleeding, and it is not yet up to large-scale offensive operations. But most importantly, it becomes obvious that even if this happened (the de-occupation of Crimea), it would not be the end point of this war, but only a prologue to its next bloodier phase.
A purely military victory over Russia seems to be more of an illusory and disorienting goal, and the bet on a quick Russian revolution (the uprising of the oligarchs and other utopias), under which the entire current sanctions agenda was formed, obviously failed. Against this background, an extremely unpleasant alternative looms:
- either the West (primarily the United States) stops playing the game of "no peace, no war, but help to Ukraine "a teaspoonful three times a month"" and gets involved in the war in full, taking all possible consequences and risks, with this connected,
or Ukraine will sooner or later be pressured (and from both ends) to negotiate a truce on extremely unfavorable terms for it.
Moreover, the later this happens, the worse the conditions will be, since the negotiations now and the negotiations after the loss of the defensive lines created over the course of eight years in the Donbass will differ greatly in their agenda. However, the defeat of the Russian army in the Donbass will give Ukraine a significant head start. But inflicting such a defeat with the current level of support from the West is very difficult.
More about this - in the latest program of Vitaly Dymarsky "Road Map" with Mikhail Khodorkovsky.

Whatever the specific Russian and Ukrainian plans ahead, it is understood that UFOR will rely on its reserves to, if not exactly deliver a backhand counteroffensive, then harry Russian flanks and logistics in a similar way to the tactics of a year ago.

I've mentioned this before, but to be complete I should have included in my previous post the one attritional factor that is of special value in this war, that being mass prisoner taking. Capture is the best form of attrition because it has the potential to eliminate much larger quantities of personnel than combat attrition and at lower cost, while also bringing in equipment that might otherwise be lost to all sides. A large POW event (i.e. >1000) also acutely forms holes in the front that the enemy may not have time to stabilize, unlike with even elevated day-to-day attrition. But on a mechanized battlefield this type of attrition has become very difficult to accomplish, on account of the unprecedented mobility and dispersion of combat elements. Usually geography that hinders mobility will be the primary enabler. The most successful example being the full siege and investment of Mariupol, where the defenders had nowhere to break out to. Ukraine had its best opportunities in Izyum and Kherson, but could not move fast enough to prevent successful withdrawals. In the case of Kherson, as I have belabored in the past, the lost opportunity was in a rapid advance toward the Dnieper to bring about the surrender of several divisions of crack VDV troops; in the end, GSRU followed their conservative pattern in ceding compromised territories and took a full month to execute an outstanding evacuation. From here on out Ukraine will have few opportunities to execute and benefit from mass surrenders, unless for example they prosecute such a successful campaign in the south that they somehow surround Melitopol or Mariupol, or press Russian formations against the coast of the Sea of Azov. But such a successful campaign is much less likely on account of the prior missed opportunities to remove the best RuFOR assets.

[spmetla]

Remember that a winter offensive by both sides was touted widely and quasi-officially since November, so the Russians wouldn't necessarily be acting out of hand in what we observe. And political considerations that apply now would have applied in late 2022, when the winter campaigning season was being sketched out. To the extent anything is instigating Russian actions before time, it should be fear of GLSDB, because that would definitely stall any large-scale action in progress within days if deployed.

The Russian offensive we've seen so far though has been rather lack luster though. It threatens the Svatove-Kremina area primarily and Bakmut as well though with tactics that don't bode well for the future as it's really mostly infantry/artillery numbers that allow for any success.

The disaster in their combined arms attack in Vuhledar shows a major lack of skilled coordination among the different parts of a combined arms attack. Most worrisome for the Russians should be that the seem to mindlessly continue forward into a minefield despite heavy losses. I get doing that if you're close to the enemy trench it nearly at the assaulting through phase but this just doesn't seem to be the situation. I imagine there's a lot of 'no retreat' orders going on as well as no alternative or branch plans developed if an attack doesn't go as planned.
I'm just curious if the Ukrainians will do better when the eventually go back on the offensive, I'm optimistic and hope they do so. Attacking a dug in an opponent after first breaching a minefield is difficult work, something the US hasn't done since Desert Storm so doing so without air superiority is quite a difficult problem.

Whatever the specific Russian and Ukrainian plans ahead, it is understood that UFOR will rely on its reserves to, if not exactly deliver a backhand counteroffensive, then harry Russian flanks and logistics in a similar way to the tactics of a year ago.

The did seem to work for the Germans from 1942 onwards fairly well. The pre-emptive attempts to take the initiative through offensives that couldn't be sustained burned our far more resources than well timed counter attacks with limited attacks beyond the previous line of contact.

Fingers crossed for the future though.

[Montmorency]

To elaborate on the limited counterattacks we've seen so far... I mean, for an example of the kind of counterattacks we have been seeing from UFOR in Bakhmut (spot the hidden object)

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

And I'm not even sure if this and other similar I've heard of are operational-level or just successful examples of tactical counterattacks (small-unit commanders have always been allowed to perform tactical counterattacks, but if they fail on the basis of their available assets they usually have to pull back without higher-echelon support).

At any rate, this was not the place UFOR needed to achieve a successful counterattack, IYKWIM.

It's just nothing like we see in the south, where GSUA immediately moves up multiple brigades whenever it looks like a fortress might fall, or the north, where UFOR has insisted on Russian-style relentless offensive actions for the past 4 months (to almost zero net gain). For the entire war, the Ukrainians have deprioritized their central front, and only their central front, to an extent I just can't find good justification for.

I'm always willing to be proven wrong by a brilliant gambit.

The Russian offensive we've seen so far though has been rather lack luster though. It threatens the Svatove-Kremina area primarily and Bakmut as well though with tactics that don't bode well for the future as it's really mostly infantry/artillery numbers that allow for any success.

Since they just keep accumulating fresh formations behind the front according to various reports, we should assume this phase hasn't reached its peak. The renewed assault on Vuhledar began around Jan. 23/4 for example.

The disaster in their combined arms attack in Vuhledar shows a major lack of skilled coordination among the different parts of a combined arms attack.

The Vuhledar episode is an interesting one. I assume there has been no change in command over this sector since the capture of Pavlivka in mid-fall that gutted the two Naval Infantry brigades present here. It also scores another point for the relative operational and tactical acumen of Wagner commanders and cadres over those of the VSRF marines, paratroops, motor infantry, and so on. Granting that the Wagner way of war only works on the basis of unlimited manpower, but the relative optimization of resources and capabilities is undeniable.

It's just not clear that there is any coherent VSRF plan in the south, only scattered frontal assaults on strongholds. There has been only the most token attempt to outflank the built-up area of Vuhledar, and that was more or less just moving the axis of frontal attack about 1-2 miles east or west from the dead-on assaults. And to be clear, the Ukrainian loss ratio is far more favorable at Vuhledar than at Bakhmut. If the average Russian unit was led/fought like the VSRF at Vuhledar, Ukraine might still be at its starting lines across Donetsk, and sporting a 1/3 global loss ratio or less. While anything could change in the coming days, the sustained disinterest in attacking at scale at multiple points between strongholds simultaneously is just odd. Why assemble a couple divisions' worth of motley forces at a single small town if you're just going to feed companies into a meatgrinder day by day?

To preface with some observations on the role of mines in warfare:

In WW2, many millions, even tens of millions, of AP and AT mines were used by all sides. I doubt more than a million mines, including RAAMS and other air-delivered, have been deployed in the Ukraine War (not counting individual minelets). Today many more engineering tools and platforms exist for clearing mines ahead of advancing elements. Yet both sides seem to have almost as much trouble overcoming minefields as they do suppressive artillery fire.

In WW2, due to the quantity of enemy forces and the lack of channeling infrastructure (e.g. roads), it was relatively easy to overcome minefields with mass and momentum. Taking a small fraction of casualties due to mines would not typically have an operational impact because the rest could simply keep moving. Because enemy forces would move over a broad front in large numbers, it also made sense for defenders to disperse their mines over a spread of potential routes in order to maximize the overall likelihood of tripping.

In the Ukraine War, there is a synergistic effect of low mass, high channeling, and higher ratio of mines to enemy fighting elements that keeps even dumb landmines surprisingly potent.

This is a low-mass war for its overall size. Even when there is a density of forces approaching WW2 levels, as much as a brigade per 3 kilometers, the typical size of a discrete offensive unit has been a company-sized battlegroup, maybe even a demi-battalion, of variable composition. These battlegroups usually do not conduct integrated maneuvers with other units over a given mutually-supportable frontage. Both sides have usually operated this way, though to be fair Ukraine did manage multi-battalion concurrent actions on a near-daily basis for about a month last year, whereas the Russians haven't able to manage that since the spring. Because these offensive elements have so little mass, it takes only a few losses to stop the whole group in its tracks. A disorganized or pinned group can then be boxed in by enemy artillery, tactical drones, or rapid reaction elements, and thus be routed or destroyed. Unlike in WW2, losing handfuls of vehicles to mines can paralyze all offensive action for the day across an entire AO.

It is easier to channel attacks in the current war than it was in the past. There are many more roads and built-up areas than there used to be. The Ukrainian plains often unfold until broken up by roads or treelines (which often run alongside roads). Modern motorized forces may naturally prefer to stick to roads without a conscious effort to do otherwise, compared to the infantry-heavy forces of yore. Mud effects are overrated, but they are one localized factor that can encourage an offensive element to stick to roads. Because of this channeling effect, an intelligent defender can usually predict where the primary enemy grouping will appear, optimizeand accordingly turn those stretches into killzones.

While, as with other categories of equipment, or numbers of personnel, there are far fewer mines in play in Ukraine today than in WW2, the absolute number is still enough to make mines ubiquitous.

Put it all together and you have a still-large quantity of mines, concentrated on narrower axes of advance, facing smaller offensive groupings. The result is fragility (and also an explanation of why commanders on both sides tend to converge on bunched-up columns on roads for offensive arrangements).

To be sure, offensive actions don't all have to involve 5 or 10 vehicles all moving up as a column along a treeline - and they don't. They could be spread out, cross-country, no problem. But then you run even harder into the limitations of low mass, which are that spreading out 5 or 10 or even 20 vehicles, and their accompanying dismounts, over say a kilometer is going to drastically reduce their ability to bring concentrated fire on an enemy position, or to mutually-support and sustain each other once losses start to register. And there are only so many feasible axes of advance; prearranging even a single mine kill on a detached platoon could take it out of the fight for all intents and purposes. Maybe there are clever ways that can be abstracted away from local conditions to keep a company bunched up without driving it over a likely minefield, but they certainly aren't widely known. The risk will always be present.

(It should separately be noted that air-delivered mines such as RAAMS - which may have been responsible for knocking out a T-90M recently - only further complicate the commander's operating environment since they can deliver mines minutes ahead of an attack to what may even have been a completely clear area.)

Unsurprisingly then, we see the same the pattern manifested among most of these dozens of attacks toward Vuhledar, even if they have to barge through the wrecked columns of their predecessors to continue. When the attackers do disperse, by the way, it tends to be after they've already made contact, which is to say taken losses... or so it seems to me after viewing countless videos of Russian attacks in progress.


As far as I can perceive it, the only reliable means* to overcoming minefields in Ukraine is to return to mass-reliant 20th century doctrines and concentrate overwhelming mass to break through into the enemy rear, regardless of losses (the mass should have been calculated to support maneuver and exploitation regardless of initial casualties). In Vuhledar for example, it might have overwhelmed the defense to advance a platoon-sized column every 100m for a 3-km frontage at once, with a full brigade moving up as tactical reserve. That does mean if one of your buddies gets nicked on the wrist by a stray splinter, you must keep attacking until you reach a predetermined stop point or there's no physical capacity to continue as a unit. I don't know how the US did it in WW2, but I do recall that in Stalin's Red Army it was strongly discouraged to stay behind to render aid to comrades. In their own way, determined mass is the doctrine exemplified by Wagner, reliant as it is on echeloned infantry shock forces and flexible field artillery. And yes, the Wagner doctrine looks awfully similar to 1918 German tactics, but we study those for a reason.

*One alternative might be to train sapper squads to run ahead of the main assault, maybe with those backpack-sized kits, but I don't have any idea of the details. Seems like there aren't enough mineclearing kits/platforms and reckless young men to make that a doctrinal functionality, since they'll suffer truly atrocious losses. Commanders will just have to accept some degree of mine attrition to core assault units no matter what.

[kevinsstelly]

All the news is already about this war between Ukraine and Russia! When will this war end! So many unfortunate people are dying!

[Montmorency]

Desultory escalation continues in the north and south (with negative gains). To paraphrase analysts, 'the maximum that can be achieved by such methods is to distract UFOR from counteroffensive preparations.' Whereas the persistent Luhansk counterattacks over the past 4 months had supported this goal with fewer casualties for RuFOR, and the Bakhmut/Central Donetsk Campaign has usually achieved relatively-high attrition against UFOR (while expending lives the Kremlin doesn't care about, viz. soldiers of fortune, separatists, and convicts), the north and south seem to be turning into areas of rapid exhaustion for RuFOR.

Rumors about the RuMOD suppression of Wagner circulating for over a month definitely seem accurate, as it is all but confirmed on both sides and all the way up to Prigozhin himself that Wagner has been removed from the first line almost everywhere. The only exception is said to be north of Bakhmut, which is after all the only place the Russians have been advancing the past week, not long since having regained momentum in the whole AO at the end of January. Not only has Wagner been stopped from participating in most offensive actions, it has been cut off from most sources of recruitment and progressively strangled of supplies.

There's still one week in which to watch for big developments, but at the moment a combination of late Ukrainian reinforcements, a Russian strategic decision to expend resources attacking everywhere in the TO, and factional infighting kneecapping the most successful ongoing Russian campaign and formation, may have staunched the bleeding Ukraine started the year with.

I'm very disturbed by US DoD's estimate of 9K KIA and 20+K WIA Wagner so far (mostly the past two months) though. My previous estimates had come out to, or would extrapolate to, double that (20K KIA, 40K WIA or otherwise discharged). And I'm usually conservative in my casualty estimates. I'm unsure of what to make of this assuming figures like at least 50K prisoners and 10K contractors recruited over the course of the war are accurate.
(To be clear, I had used higher recruitment figures than that wrt my casualty estimates)



Not sure if real.

small, globe-trotting balloon declared “missing in action” by an Illinois-based hobbyist club on Feb. 15 has emerged as a candidate to explain one of the three mystery objects shot down by four heat-seeking missiles launched by U.S. Air Force fighters since Feb. 10.

[Furunculus]

Poland and South Korea has signed a contract to create a joint consortium which will be tasked with producing 820 K2PL tanks and nearly 500 K9PL self-propelled howitzers in Poland:

https://twitter.com/visegrad24/statu...48809314263042