Great Power contentions

[Crandar]

The analogies with Azerbaijan are unconvincing. Azerbaijan took back the Azerbaijani lands, which had been conquered by the Armenians 25 years ago. The land was globally recognized as Azerbaijani, despite being ethnically cleansed and under Armenian military occupation.

[Kagemusha]

Russian air assault starts near Kiev: https://twitter.com/i/status/1496805801628995587

[Furunculus]

Russian air assault starts near Kiev: https://twitter.com/i/status/1496805801628995587

just heard from polish radio (we've been into Wielun in the car), that russian forces were at the ring road going around kiev....

[Montmorency]

The analogies with Azerbaijan are unconvincing. Azerbaijan took back the Azerbaijani lands, which had been conquered by the Armenians 25 years ago. The land was globally recognized as Azerbaijani, despite being ethnically cleansed and under Armenian military occupation.

The perceived legitimacy of the claims is irrelevant to the geopolitical impact. Putin, Xi, et al. didn't sit there thinking 'Ah, so it's allowed to take territory from another state as long as it's within internationally-recognized borders.'

We should interpret the event functionally as open season on irredentism.

[Crandar]

What perceived legitimacy? Everyone recognized these lands as Azerbaijani. How can an act that conciliates the de facto with the de jure situation be described as irredentist? As I said, he didn't take any territory from Armenia, since Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territories, according even to Armenia itself. Also, unlike Russia, Azerbaijan was not diplomatically isolated. That was more true for Armenia, which is largely why it was crushed in the conflict. I don't know from where Putin got his inspiration (not sure how China is relevant), probably from nowhere, if I had to guess, but Azerbaijan is one of the worst examples imagined. It would be more appropriate for Ukraine, if it had invaded the Donbass, in order to throw out the Russian occupying troops.

[Montmorency]

I've heard a lot of reports that NE Ukraine (Sumny/Chernihiv) are being penetrated, deeply at that, which dovetails with this report from a month ago that the Ukrainian army was designating most of the area between Kiev and Kharkiv undefendable. Seems a little odd, since those areas have the most forest cover in Eastern Ukraine AFAIK. Or maybe this is also part of the Ukrainian army's supposed doctrine of organizing regulars for guerrilla operations subsequent to the opening phase of conflict, if the rest of Eastern Ukraine isn't conducive for it (Ukraine's typical terrain made it almost a green zone for German forces during WW2, I've read, with almost all partisan activity being concentrated in and around the borders of contemporary Belarus). Any corrections on this point are appreciated.

[For clarity, this is just a pre-war map highlighting the oblasts in question]

What perceived legitimacy? Everyone recognized these lands as Azerbaijani. How can an act that conciliates the de facto with the de jure situation be described as irredentist? As I said, he didn't take any territory from Armenia, since Armenia occupied Azerbaijani territories, according even to Armenia itself. Also, unlike Russia, Azerbaijan was not diplomatically isolated. That was more true for Armenia, which is largely why it was crushed in the conflict.

I'm telling you that's beside the point. Whether you think Azerbaijan was justified in starting a new war doesn't change the fact that two conventional forces clashed, one lost bad, and had to give up territory (and it's not inconceivable that Azerbaijan could have occupied all of NK/A and much of Armenia had Russia not intervened diplomatically). If you just have a strong sense of Azerbaijan being 'good guys', I repeat, that's irrelevant. They could be the very best like no one ever was, or worse than Hitler. Consequences are a function of power, not good or bad. A small country like Azerbaijan used war to (re)take land for the nation. If they can do it, so can (potentially) anyone else. The implications of such a weltgeist are immediately accessible.

Frozen territorial claims have been heating up everywhere over the past 15 years from the West Pacific to Atlantic Africa, but the 2020 war was the first time since WW2 that anyone I know of has been able to settle them by force. Azerbaijan won. Armenia can't touch them, and was lucky to retain its government; the people of NK/A were lucky to avoid ethnic cleansing. Armenia could in the future get roiled into a suicidal war of revenge, or Azeri leadership a hankering for conquest, but the variables are permanently changed. From the Azeri POV they enjoyed almost a total success (and we should hope they are satisfied). World leaders can observe these developments for themselves. Don't rule out Cypriot unification within the decade, for an example closer to home.

I don't know from where Putin got his inspiration (not sure how China is relevant), probably from nowhere, if I had to guess, but Azerbaijan is one of the worst examples imagined.

You don't need a lot of imagination or effort to understand it, he laid out his [I[motivation[/I] in great detail, as have his cronies. He's a palingenetic Russian ultranationalist, with all that entails. What my post described was the development of the opportunity at this point in time. Why here, why now? I don't think it's a coincidence that China and Russia immediately took on a more escalatory posture to their respective claims as the dust settled in the Caucasus.

China is in the picture because it has very similar aspirations wrt Taiwan, and haven't carefully built the second-most powerful military in the world just for the sake of posturing.

But we can at least safely rule out Republican Senator of Alabama Tuberville's (the Slavic version of his name might be Bulbashovka) account: “He can’t feed his people. It’s a communist country, so he can’t feed his people, so they need more farmland.”

rumour has it that italy and france are vetoing kicking russia out of the SWIFT intebank system:

https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/statu...92887732297730

The US should of course finance whatever is needed, including any short-term production boost Saudi Arabia can be convinced to release, but the EU really needs to take a hard line and start issuing more bonds on this very special occasion. EU countries need to take the opportunity to agree on a comprehensive energy security/decarbonization package. While the bandage is already being ripped off, seize the moment to do as much as possible.

[Crandar]

It's not about Azerbaijan being the goodies or the baddies, but that the comparison was completely unsuitable, for the legal and diplomatic reasons I cited. Could Cyprus be reunited? Yes, sure, if something like the previous referendum passes. Could Turkey conquer the rest of the island. Not a single chance, in Greece only the crazies of the Golden Dawn believe in that stuff.

As for Putin's motivation, you make the mistake of buying his bubble intended for domestic purposes and then spinning it to fit the dominant narrative in geopolitical discourse since the '90s about ideology being a primary factor. Not sure about the dust settling either. It's been more than a year since the Armenians capitulated.

EDIT: Fidonisi has been taken. Zelenski is presenting its defense as the Ukrainian Hotgates. He's too melodramatic I believe, which might actually undermine morale.

[Montmorency]

Live maps of the military dispositions have begun coming out for what they're worth, this one from militaryland dot net. I think an earlier version displaying just the starting deployments supports the impression that Ukraine planned to largely abandon the NE, with something like 3 brigades for the whole area compared to 9 or 10 around Donbas.

It's not about Azerbaijan being the goodies or the baddies, but that the comparison was completely unsuitable, for the legal and diplomatic reasons I cited. Could Cyprus be reunited? Yes, sure, if something like the previous referendum passes. Could Turkey conquer the rest of the island. Not a single chance, in Greece only the crazies of the Golden Dawn believe in that stuff.

As for Putin's motivation, you make the mistake of buying his bubble intended for domestic purposes and then spinning it to fit the dominant narrative in geopolitical discourse since the '90s about ideology being a primary factor. Not sure about the dust settling either. It's been more than a year since the Armenians capitulated.

EDIT: Fidonisi has been taken. Zelenski is presenting its defense as the Ukrainian Hotgates. He's too melodramatic I believe, which might actually undermine morale.

A country can conquer land that is legally its or not, and with or without diplomatic support from other countries. But the fact on the ground is that very success or failure of conquest, which is the part that I've repeatedly emphasized. The question is ultimately whether world leaders believe the comparison is suitable. I'm confident many do, because observers have no reason to link or restrict the lessons of that war to the quality of some legal justification. That sounds naive. Azerbaijan didn't accomplish what it did by the exercise of law.

So, Putin has spoken and governed as a nationalist his entire career, exalted the Russian Empire and Russian Soviet power, derided Ukrainian autonomy, spent a lot of political and economic resources on trying to suppress it, and finally declared - in his capacity as autocrat - a very likely ruinous (to all sides) European ground war, Europe's and Russia's biggest offensive since the advance against Berlin in 1945, on the stated premise that Russia cannot allow the existence of a divergent Ukraine as a matter of national pride, propriety, and security. Your reaction to this is that you have no idea why he's invading, but that his stated reasons have nothing to do with the truth? C'mon man.

Though separately on the future of the Azeri-Armenian conflict as such, reading this analysis leaves me discouraged. Almost 100 killed counted since the Nov 2020 ceasefire in border clashes, compared to fewer than 200 from 2015 to the 2020 war (excluding 2 – 11 April 2016), though this year has been quiet.


Audio supposedly from the island battle Crandar mentions. All 13 defenders were killed. I'm assuming it was a volunteer assignment.

"We are a Russian ship, lay down your arms."
"Russian ship, go yourself."

The senselessness of war.

[spmetla]

Live maps of the military dispositions have begun coming out for what they're worth, this one from militaryland dot net. I think an earlier version displaying just the starting deployments supports the impression that Ukraine planned to largely abandon the NE, with something like 3 brigades for the whole area compared to 9 or 10 around Donbas.

I've been using a different one but seems to be tracking similiarly:
https://liveuamap.com/

As for the NE, when you look at it with the river to the East and then the heavy Russian force at Karkiv it turns into a pocket that could get cut off. A shorter line of defense instead of a no step back approach makes sense against a superior force, especially considering that's what Manstein had to do in almost the same area after Stalingrad was lost.

The Russian loss of that VDV helicopter Battalion (this is just an estimate) at Gostomel airport is certainly a tremendous set back. Like market garden it may not change the course of the war but certainly let the enemy know you're still a potent fighting force.

Supposedly a heck of an air battle/air defense over Kiev tonight, can only wonder what's happening. The 'Ghost of Kiev' rumor about some lone Ukrainian pilot becoming an overnight Ace are unproven just yet but who knows. The rumors of it though are the type of thing that oddly enough help the nerves of the guys on the ground.

Audio supposedly from the island battle Crandar mentions. All 13 defenders were killed. I'm assuming it was a volunteer assignment.

"We are a Russian ship, lay down your arms."
"Russian ship, go yourself."

The senselessness of war.

Followed that too, truly horrible for those that died there. A sensless death but heroic none the less, especially in our 'european culture' which has always admired doomed last stands from Thermopylae to the Alamo and beyond.

So, Putin has spoken and governed as a nationalist his entire career, exalted the Russian Empire and Russian Soviet power, derided Ukrainian autonomy, spent a lot of political and economic resources on trying to suppress it, and finally declared - in his capacity as autocrat - a very likely ruinous (to all sides) European ground war, Europe's and Russia's biggest offensive since the advance against Berlin in 1945, on the stated premise that Russia cannot allow the existence of a divergent Ukraine as a matter of national pride, propriety, and security. Your reaction to this is that you have no idea why he's invading, but that his stated reasons have nothing to do with the truth? C'mon man.

Following the squashed protests today around Russia though I'm glad to see not all there have bought into his nationalist view. Though they won't change the outcome perhaps the economic pressures, internal domestic pressures, the oligarch pressures, and if this war goes on long and poorly the military pressures can do something to oust him for someone saner.
The next few days will continue to be interesting, Russia's full might hasn't come to bear yet though the initial assaults have not proven easy.

The question is ultimately whether world leaders believe the comparison is suitable. I'm confident many do, because observers have no reason to link or restrict the lessons of that war to the quality of some legal justification. That sounds naive. Azerbaijan didn't accomplish what it did by the exercise of law.

I think the only thing different in the Azeri example is that it was a limited war over territorial claims, a peace deal with the Armenians was an option. The wars of regime change like in Iraq or now in Ukraine leave no one to make peace with, this one being tied with territorial claims though makes it even more difficult.
The Azeri war certainly showed force can change borders with conventional arms. Iraq tried it with Iran and then with Kuwait both with failed results but had they succeeded it would have changed the status quo for sure, no such sanctions happened to the Azeris, no such outcry but then they are more western aligned and the territory in question was de jure theirs though ethnically and defacto Armenian. Another population change (ethnic cleansing/evictions) there will make the change permanent.

[spmetla]

Certainly, terrifying watching the war's coverage on twitter. Seems Ukraine is putting up more of a fight than the Russian's expected though with the major breakout in the South to Kherson and the current battle over the airport west of Kiev who knows how long they can hold. The casualties on both sides must be intense though, based off what I've seen so far probably KIA in the high hundreds and WIA in the thousands for Russia and KIA and WIA in the high thousands for Ukraine.

The current cyber attacks on Russian websites are likely from the US/NATO which together with the war being close to NATO borders will create very dangerous possibilities for expansion of the war. Can very easily see scenarios where Russia's shoot down NATO aircraft or do artillery barrages against Ukrainian positions near Romania or Poland leading to the possibility of escalation. This thing is extremely dangerous.

The current 1984-esque thinking by China is mind boggling of we 'respect Ukraine's sovereignty' while also saying this is not an invasion and they understand 'Russia's legitimate security concerns.'

I'll expect Finland and Sweden to either go outright NATO applicants or just short of in military partnership in the near future.

The fate of Moldova will be interesting as that is still a sore spot for Romania as the people are ethnic Romanians that Russia has repeatedly separated from Romania and tried to russify over that last two centuries.