Great Power contentions

[Montmorency]

Correction: I cited one of my reposted maps to MilitaryLand when it was obviously War_mapper's. Maybe I was originally planning to use the former's.

[Crandar]

Some more analysis of the situation:

There are several things going on at once.

1. The Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv ended a few days ago, it failed to achieve most of its operational objectives and a lot of the troops in that offensive are redeploying in other areas or directions. However, it did gain enough ground to allow them to bombard the supply link between Russia and Izyum. Izyum is a major staging point for Russia's offensive into Donbass. The fact that their logistics train is within the range of Ukrainian artillery, prevents Russia from using rail transport to Izyum. This is a significant constraint, because using motor transport for supply simply isn't as fast or efficient, it lengthens resupply times, which imposes additional constraints on the operational planning of any maneuvers around Izyum.

Currently, Russia has managed to recapture Rubizhne and Ternovoye. So there is a bit of back and forth here. This obviously keeps Ukraine off-balance and prevents them fortifying the area and shelling the other side of the Severskiy Donets river (Izyum's side) with impunity.



2. In the Donbass area there are generally three main Areas of Operations (AOs). First, is the Izyum direction. These are Russian forces pushing out of Izyum into Barvinkove (South-West) and around the Liman/Slavyansk (South-East). The offensives in this direction are relatively stalled. Russians are taking their time in securing key hills and areas. They are advancing steadily and carefully, and this area has been a total meat-grinder for Ukrainian troops.

Ukraine has been trying to maintain a cohesive defensive perimeter around the Liman area. Weeks earlier, they were attempting to break the Russian offensive here through counter-attacks and by contesting key terrain and urban areas. These gambits have largely failed. Russians have steadily taken tactically important areas around Liman. Logistics haven't been completely cut off, but all major lines of communication and supply are within the range of Russian artillery.

At this point, Ukraine is focusing on maintaining the defensive perimeter and bleeding off Russian troops. The assault on the city of Liman itself has reportedly started today and Russians are reporting that they occupied most of the city and pushed Ukrainians to the Western half of the city. So far, I cannot confirm this directly, but it's likely to take days to capture the city anyway, so we'll know one way or another.

3. The second AO in Donbass is around the Severodonetsk salient. This is the Lysichansk-Severonetsk pocket that has been the main focus of both military analysts and Russia's forces. The cities are slowly being choked off. Russia captured the key city of Popasna a couple weeks earlier. The city of Popasna is surrounded by hills, these hills are the tallest point in the immediate area of several hundred kilometers. A week ago, Russia launched a major offensive out of Popasna.



This offensive has been very successful, but it still hasn't achieved it's main operational objectives. Those objectives are, the tallest hill in the area (I'm not sure if they captured this yet or not, hard to tell), and the city of Soledar. The city of Soledar is the next major point from where Russia can threaten the entire river valley, and definitively control the highway between Bakhmut and Lysichansk. Russians have already captured most of the hills that are next to that highway, so in the next few days Lysichansk and Severodonetsk is finally going to be "operationally encircled", with all major supply and communication lines cut off for good.
There are several thousand troops stuck in this salient, and Ukraine has already lost the capability for an organized retreat. At this point, any retreat is likely going to take losses and will require a significant rear-guard action. Within the next few days, even that possibility is going to be lost. So Ukraine has to make some hard choices in this area.
Furthermore, the Popasna offensive has given Russia the opportunity to go more South, and surround Svetlodarsk. There is also a sizeable Ukrainian contingent there. Reportedly, there have been mass evacuations attempted from that city, but it is likely that it is too late to get those troops and people out of that city. There are only a few towns between Russia and total encirclement of Svetlodarsk.

3. The third AO is the area is directly next to Donetsk, which is pretty much the most fortified area of the Joint Force Operations line. The city of New York and Avdeevka, as well as areas South-East of that line, are difficult to take in a head on assault. Throughout the entire war, this line has been largely static. Russians have been inching in this direction, and they've seized some key intersections, but right now, the offensive is largely on hold while operations in other areas continue.

Once Russia has more force availability or perhaps, command resources to organize a proper assault, we are likely to see Russia attempt to avoid major strongpoints, and come at both New York and Avdeevka from the rear or other vulnerable directions. There is a lot more to write about this general AO, but as this front is largely static (as is everything South and East of it), there is no necessity to get in the details at this time.

4. Finally, the last major area is the South, in Kherson Oblast. In the past few weeks, Russians have recaptured 80% of what they lost in Ukraine's counter-offensives in May. Kherson Oblast is now completely under Russian control, and Russian forces are in position to threaten both Mykolaiv and Krivoi Rog.

The fighting in this area over the last two months has essentially been Russia controlling the entire engagement. This is definitely the area where Russia has been the most competent, retreating in a timely a manner, and effectively counter-attack and destroying Ukrainian artillery. The only real slip-up here was much earlier in the war when Ukrainian artillery destroyed an entire airfield of helicopters (8-10 attack helicopters + a rather large supply train).

According to Russian and Western sources, Russians have been digging in and preparing a defensive cordon around their captured territory in this region. It is likely they intend to keep Kherson. Furthermore, both Russians and Ukrainians report that they are preparing a large counter-offensive in this direction. We saw the first sign of this counter-offensive today, with a fairly significant artillery barrage across the line of contact in this area.

The re-capture of Kherson Oblast is a realistic goal for Ukraine. They are well supplied in this area, and infrastructure is mostly intact here. They have direct lines to Western aid and Russia has been reluctant to use a lot of their air-power here. However, Russian forces in this area are also well-supplied, they're also competently lead and they are expecting an attack.

So, if this major counter-offensive materializes, this'll probably be the first time where Russia is a defender expecting an assault, and Ukraine is the attacker. It'll be interesting to observe the results.

These comments were made in Discord, so obviously there's no link available, but I remembered to add one for the most recent update (yay!):

Northern Front

The Kharkiv offensive stalled out a few weeks ago, Ukraine re-deployed most troops in other areas. Russia has been grinding some of their losses here back under their control.

This is the latest Russian claimed map.




Donbass AO

Russia is effectively rotating troops. They are also taking turns with sustaining offensive action. I.E., if there is an offensive out of Popasna, when it stops, there will be an offensive out of Izyum or Donetsk. This effectively keeps pressure on Ukranian forces pinned in the Donbass AO.

Russia's breakout of Popasna since mid-May has been effective. They have occupied part of the Bakhmut-Lysichansk highway, rendering this pathway unusable. Routes in an out of the salient still exist, but they are all well within the range of Russian artillery. Further South, Svetlodarsk has largely fallen without a big fight.

The Izyum axis is currently centered around Liman. Ukrainian forces fled the city after fiercely fighting for a few days. Russians purposely left an "escape" route open to encourage Ukrainian military forces to exit the city, lest the path be closed off completely. Russians claim that they closed the path anyway, to catch the soldiers retreating. I cannot verify that claim and I am skeptical of boisterous Russian claims for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, it is highly likely that some retreating units were indeed captured, though that numbers is probably very small.

Either way, the capture of Liman was swift and possibly suggests Russia's new-found expertise with urban warfare. One thing people overlook with Mariupol, is that the siege period was over relatively quickly. The "mop-up" took a long time due to a small number of Russian units committed. It was clear that Russia favored a very systematic approach that minimized casualties and manpower requirements. Speed was not a major factor. Hence why Azovstal was surrounded for several weeks afterwards. At least that's what Kofman and Rob Lee suggested when this subject came up on a video conference a couple weeks ago. This "expertise" has reportedly transferred over to Russia's other units as they've taken key concepts out of that siege and applied them to other cities. The capture of Liman was lightning quick, Ukraine's willingness to retreat here has certainly helped, but the assault itself was definitely competently executed.

With the Fall of Liman, the entire northern side of the Donetsk river is now firmly under Russian control. Russia does not need to necessarily force a crossing, as they already control a major crossing point at Izyum, and they are likely going to seize Lysichansk. The next few objectives in the Donbass AO is thus the destruction of the Severodonetsk salient, the capture and crossing of the Bakhmut valley, and then, perhaps, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk.

Kherson AO

Kherson Oblast has been under Russia's full control for roughly 3-4 weeks now. Reportedly, Ukraine has gathered up to 30 Battalions to reclaim this area. The first two attacks were battalion sized in the area of Davidy Brod, and a couple other towns that I don't know the name of in English. Either way, these offensives have been reportedly crushed, and I'm not getting a lot of chatter from Ukrainian channels about any real offensive success, so I am inclined to believe Russian claims.

However, these are small attacks, the Ukrainian offensive on Kherson has not really started at all. I would expect at least a massive artillery barrage before a major offensive. A Brusilov treatment, so to say. This hasn't happened yet. 30 Battalions is a big force, that's 18-26,000 troops and a lot of armor. Moreover, this equipment will be fresh and Western-supplied. Ukraine has the force concentration needed for a breakthrough. Russia's defenses consist of... maybe 10-14 confirmed BTGs? Either way, VERY ROUGHLY, some 10,000 troops. These troops have seen combat for 30-45 days straight. They've taken losses (albeit light ones). However, they've been dug in for 3 weeks and expecting a major attack. This will be the first time where Ukraine is the attacker and Russia is the Defender.

As you can see, the 3:1 adage of Attackerefender here is met. Moreover, this ratio will only increase due to Ukraine being the attacker, and therefore, having their choice of the battlefield and time of the attack. Local superiority can be easily achieved here. I am expecting an assault on the Northern half of Kherson Oblast, to throw the Russian forces back across the river. Then, an offensive to force Russian forces back into Kherson, before finally, besieging and taking the settlement. The time span for this operation could be weeks if not months, so don't be in too much of a hurry.

[Montmorency]

Severodonetsk is kind of a red herring - the twin city of Lysychansk is the key in Ukraine's strategy of using the Donets River as a barrier to Russian concentrations. It's within a mile of Severodonetsk, just across the river, so fording under fire is basically impossible for the Russians so long as Lysychansk remains in Ukrainian hands. Whereas if Ukraine loses Lysychansk by storm or by withdrawal, the river becomes almost useless as Ukraine will hold too little of the Southern bank to anchor their lines, with the eventual result being full withdrawal back to Slovyansk/Kramatorsk.

Indeed, the latest news is that over the past two days Severodonetsk has been abandoned without much of a fight by Ukraine, in much the same way that Lyman itself was.

The question for June is whether Russia can expand its Popasna salient to force a Ukrainian retreat from Lysychansk. Of course the troops garrisoning Severodonetsk will be redeployed to strengthen defenses around that salient, but at some point Ukraine does need to reclaim some of that Popasna salient just to relieve the constant pressure on the defenders.

In the medium-term the loss of bridgeheads across the river is a hindrance to Ukraine's objectives of retaking all this territory east/north of the river, but I've never understood all the discussion of the Battle of Donbass as though Severodonetsk were of supreme and immediate tactical significance.

The Izyum salient has AFAICT literally not budged a square kilometer since late April; both sides are in a holding pattern there.

I'll need to catch up on what's going on in Kherson Oblast; so far it seems like Ukraine wants to force out the Russians north of Nova Kakhovka and threaten the city itself (holding Nova Kakhovka is necessary for the security of the Kherson City rear area).

[Montmorency]

Looks like I was wrong about Severodonetsk. Over the past couple of days the defenders have reportedly launched a sweeping counterattack through the city. Is the idea to invite Stalingrad attrition?

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Pro-Russian milblogger Yuri claims the origin of the counterattack in the political leadership of Ukraine countermanding the military's strategy, a reversal which will certainly lead the Luhansk defenders to their doom. This debacle is being orchestrated on behalf of the interests of the US and UK, who have nevertheless already cut Ukraine loose, and naturally the only remaining matter for discussion is how the former Ukraine will be divided between Russia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary following its imminent collapse (maybe once some patriotic generals assassinate Zelensky).

Elsewhere he expressed cultivated disgust toward the Ukrainian military promoting an upcoming Ukrainian LGBTQ Pride event in Poland this month. To repost:




Here's a contrarian essay about what lessons to take from the Ukraine war. It basically argues, since we have to acknowledge the indispensability of high throughput of men and materiel in high-intensity conventional warfare, both Russian and American (and NATO) doctrines of warfare are wrong and we wouldn't execute any better than Russia against Ukraine despite our alleged advantages in technology and quality.

I agree with the premise and have addressed it before, but I do think the author underestimates the effect of technology, training, sustainment, leadership, discipline, and the like in conventional warfare. If only raw manpower, materiel, and other resources counted then the Soviet Union should have conquered continental Europe by 1944 without ever iterating on their organizational practices from 1941 (something the author explicitly notes as opposite the case). Endless T-26s and Enemy at the Gates infantry swarms would have done the trick. But my point about the US acceding to mass-casualty wars is supported; whether it's naval war or land war, the US does stand at risk of stumbling into the kind of situation the BEF, the Regular army, did in 1914.

What is comforting about blaming the Russian failures on their practice, rather than their doctrine, is that it relieves Western militaries of any requirement to thoroughly examine their own doctrine. This is important because, as the various articles note, the doctrine for a river crossing operation is similar across militaries.
[...]
The river-crossing story highlights the real ailment afflicting both the Russians and their Western observers: chronic inexperience in offensive combat against a competent adversary that is able, in today?s description, to contest all domains in a protracted war that generates high numbers of casualties. Neither Russia nor the West has had operational or combat experiences relevant to the war in Ukraine in over a generation, if not actually since World War II.
[...]
Consequently, in Ukraine, we are seeing the return of the imperative for force preservation, rather than force protection. This is currently beyond the consciousness of Western militaries and current combat casualty care capacity.

Importantly, these levels of casualties in the Ukraine war also call into question the ability of Western armies to maintain adequate fighting strength in other than short wars with modest casualties. Much is being made of the Russians relying on hastily mobilized reserves to replace losses. Ironically, as has been demonstrated since the Napoleonic Wars, the lev?e en masse is a requirement for protracted state warfare at this level.

This new reality essentially means that there is nowhere for a relatively large formation to hide. Surprise, particularly at a limited number of potential crossing points on a river, may not be possible. Thus, these types of physical deception operations may also be pointless. Finally, given the sophistication of many sensors, smoke screens may be less useful than in the past.

Consequently, the analysis of the Ukraine war needs to address another unasked question: What if this view that quality people and leaders are the most important ingredient in modern warfare is wrong? What if Stalin was correct that quantity has a quality all of its own? If that is the case, then the Ukrainians may need much greater assistance if they are to survive a Russian-style grinding war of attrition.

Additionally, as the United States plans for how it will compete and potentially fight China and Russia in the future, the approach should be characterized by humility and an intense desire to challenge existing assumptions, concepts, and capabilities, rather than to validate current approaches.

But we should well remember that the same type of Red Army destroyed the vaunted Nazi Wehrmacht during World War II in a long, grinding war of attrition supposedly suffered from the similar centralized leadership and hastily trained soldier maladies as today.
[...]
What should have been considered then and now is why the German forces were crushed by such an inferior adversary? Perhaps enough people, materiel, and an indomitable will to fight despite privations and setbacks are exactly what are really necessary to endure and win in peer warfare.

Yes, and without superior leadership, training, and tactics Germany would never have had the chance to even start a second world war. Because they would have lost horrendously in a couple of years the first time. The author's dichotomous analysis strays into over-reductiveness.

Obligatory Fat Leonard - but Fat Leonard was veritably just Milo Minderbinder.

[Montmorency]

Another article purporting that the contemporary US Navy is fatally flawed.

I posted earlier about a US strike in Syria that may have been improperly undertaken, with the resultant death of dozens of civilians. DoD claims to have investigated and found that almost everyone affected by the strike was a combatant. No procedural improprieties were admitted either.

"No Rules of Engagement or Law of War violations occurred," the investigation said.

In addition, the commander "did not deliberately or with wanton disregard cause civilian casualties," it said.

The report said that "administrative deficiencies" delayed US military reporting on the strike, giving the impression that it was being covered up.

The Times cited an initial assessment of the incident saying that about 70 civilians could have been killed.

Pentagon Spokesman John Kirby said that 52 combatants were killed, 51 of them adult males and one child, while four civilians died, one woman and three children.

Another 15 civilians, 11 women and four children, were wounded, he said.

Asked if anyone was being punished for the civilian deaths, Kirby said the investigation did not find the need to hold any individuals accountable.

The probe "did not find that anybody acted outside the law of war, that there was no malicious intent," Kirby said.

Over the past month we've had a lot of reporting about munitions depletion on both sides of the Ukraine war, reaching out into European inventories as well. All of Russia's reported advances since April have come about according to a reversion to conservative artillery-heavy doctrine, with potentially a majority of active RuAF infantry having been eliminated since the start of the war. Recently Ukrainian government and military voices disclosed an even more extreme depiction, that even with the accelerating incorporation of NATO-standard 155mm platforms to frontline units, the Russian artillery maintains a 10-15-time proportional advantage over Ukrainian artillery, of which the gun artillery has become limited to "5000-6000" shells fired daily.

In other words, Ukraine can only field a few hundred tubes at any given time - across the entire frontline - due to the reliance on legacy Soviet platforms and resource constraints. No wonder they are willing to field NATO-donated 155mm caliber Caesar, Krab, and M777 given only a few weeks' training. And of course the Switchblade 300 loitering drones are of almost no use against opposing artillery, being very short range (there are apparently still no Switchblade 600 in Ukraine yet, and the specs of the Phoenix Ghost are obscure).

I don't know how many shells Russian armament industry has been producing monthly this year, or what their projected capacity is, but it seems certain that even Russia's Cold War stocks will have to be exhausted by the end of the year, no matter how massive - many millions of shells and rockets expended. On the other hand, to my knowledge there is no other country in Europe that can still produce Soviet-grade munitions, whereas 155mm caliber and other such items are manufactured worldwide. Even the US to my knowledge only has about a million 155mm shells stockpiled, though NATO-wide production is surely well in excess of the practical throttle of the ceiling of donatable artillery pieces.

We relearn the lesson that there is no stockpiling for peer-peer war. Shell hunger is inevitable.

Since the Ukrainian military has a relative surplus of infantry compared to Russia, the ongoing struggle over Severodonetsk makes some sense. The Ukrainian president's office has estimated that Ukraine has lately suffered 200 personnel killed daily, which extrapolates to the total loss of a brigade weekly (American generals shit their pants at the prospect). If the vast majority of these losses are inflicted by opposing artillery, it's to Ukraine's advantage to shift the proportions while enduring the same losses. But Ukraine is not a totalitarian country, so it can't really funnel militia light infantry into meat grinders while protecting professional units to the extent Russia can.



Russian Ministry of Affairs summarizing a recent talk Putin gave:

President Vladimir Putin: There is no in-between, no intermediate state: either a country is #sovereign, or it is a #colony, no matter what the colonies are called. And a colony has no historical prospects.

If a country is not able to make sovereign decisions - it's a colony.

In that talk he also compared himself to Peter the Great, who "returned" land from Swedish occupation to Russia.



How much does one have to hate America in order to uphold Russian fascism?

This is why many in the commentariat are failing to appreciate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably happy with how his invasion of Ukraine is turning out, he says.

The Western foreign policy community has assumed for a long time that Russia under Putin had similar notions of what it means to be a world power, had more or less accepted the rules of the post?World War II international order, and was moving?albeit with setbacks?on a similar neo-liberal economic trajectory.

But, argues Wilson, something completely different has been going on in Putin?s mind. He has only been marginally interested in building stability and prosperity as the West would understand it. Rather, his entire project has been about building Russia?s ability to be a coercive, expansionist and undeniably great power, with control concentrated in the hands of one person.

The Russian translation of ?great power? is velikaya derzhava, the second part of which is a cognate of a verb that means to seize or to hold, and Putin?s worldview represents a continuum of Russia?s imperial mythos.

Wilson points to the work of historian Stephen Kotkin, who has calculated that, over a period of about 450 years, Russia expanded outwards at a rate of 100 to 150 square kilometres a day, in the process engulfing 184 different nationalities or ethnic groups.

And that expansion continues, Wilson says: Russia now claims roughly half of the Arctic.

This imperial worldview has always been in evidence, he says.

For example, in 2005, Putin established a commission to rewrite Russian history textbooks. ?It produced a textbook for history teachers. In that book was the remarkable paragraph that said most of the Russian politically conscious class rejects the present boundaries of the Russian Federation. They are inadequate to protect Russia?s security.?

?Anders Fogh Rasmussen, who was then the secretary-general of NATO, goes to Moscow, and says to Mr Putin, ?I?ve come with a package of proposals to reform Russian NATO relations.? And Putin says to him on camera, ?I don?t want to reform Russian NATO relations. I want NATO abolished.??

Also in that year, Wilson notes, a senior Russian official came to Chatham House in London. The official said, ?Putin is not so silly as to think that he can recreate the Soviet Union, but there is a core of the former Soviet Union that is properly ours?Belarus, Ukraine and northern Kazakhstan. And it would be nice to have it back.?

In 2018, Putin unveiled what Wilson describes as a ?rather frightening array of new doomsday weapons, including a nuclear-armed torpedo that says, ?You didn?t listen to us. Look at these weapons and listen to us now.??

All of this was accompanied by ?lurid and strident propaganda 24/7 on Russian television, pushing anti-Western messages,? explains Wilson. An important part of this propaganda campaign was the idea that Ukraine is not a country or a people. ?Putin said that very early on to George Bush. Again, we didn?t listen,? he says.

It?s therefore likely that Russia believes it is now demonstrating strength on its own terms by being able to wage what Wilson refers to as the ?Russian way of war?.

?There?s an expression in Russian that translates as ?To be tender-hearted does not become a sword?,? says Wilson. What this means in practice is the exercise of extreme brutality towards civilians, combined with an indifference to Russia?s own casualties.

right now, Putin may not be feeling dissatisfied with the way things are going, despite all the assertions that the invasion is a disaster for him.

According to Wilson, Russia?s Black Sea blockade and destruction of Ukrainian infrastructure means that what Putin has achieved is the probable end of Ukraine as a viable nation-state.

?Yes, the losses have been far higher than expected, in terms of both manpower and material. Yes, the attempt to take Kyiv was a notable failure. But if you look at how Putin defines winning, it would be, if Ukraine can?t be reintegrated back into the Russian empire, then no one will have it.?

We really wound up falling into the same trap as the Interwar world did with Germany, though until 2014 it was quite excusable for overwhelming contextual reasons.

[Pannonian]

The key is western rearmament, and we need evidence that it's happening (not "going to happen"). If we do actually rearm, we have a common standard across NATO, and we collectively have a far bigger industrial base than Russia. If Ukraine gets a chance to retrain, we can pipeline these materiel to Ukraine even as we're equipping ourselves, until there is no material difference between Ukrainian and NATO military. However, if we talk about rearming, but do nothing of the sort, then we're not using our industrial base.

[Montmorency]

Excellent piece consolidating flaws in economic sanctions strategy, which has always been "under-theorized."
https://scholars-stage.org/of-sancti...tegic-bombers/

Sanctions are like strategic bombing, in that they often seem to be conceived and applied as a way to pressure "the masses" to turn on their elites and thus bring change to governmental policy undesirable to the sanctioning agent.

There are many plausible reasons one might inflict economic harm on an opposing country: pain might be used to try and compel a foreign power to change its behavior. Restrictions might be intended as a bargaining chip for the eventual war settlement negotiations. Or they might be kept in place to degrade the Russian economy over the long term, thus frustrating Russian attempts to modernize their military in the decades to come. The use of sanctions may be principally about credible deterrence—the threat of sanctions will only deter hostile powers from taking actions if they believe we are willing to accept the costs of employing economic weapons. We must act now to make those threats credible in the future.

It is not clear to me which, if any, of these rationales motivate our current sanctions regime. The popular press shows an extraordinary disregard for this question. New York Magazine asks “Are the Sanctions Against Russia Working?” without ever stating what work the sanctions should be doing (see also Michael McFaul’s argument that “sanctions are working, but need to work better” ). The Washington Post describes “why sanctions can be so effective” without telling us what they are effective at achieving. The New York Times reports a list of every sanction the United States has levied to “pressure” Russia without writing a line on what this pressure aims to accomplish.10

The aims matter. There is a difference between a sanction campaign that attempts to destroy an enemy industrial complex vs. a campaign aimed at compelling an enemy to change their aggressive behavior. In security parlance, that second sort of campaign is labeled coercive diplomacy. “Escalation is the currency of coercive diplomacy,” writes Richard Nephew in The Art of Sanctions. ]If your aim is “to inflict some measure of pain in order to change [the] policy” of an enemy state, then [B“opponents must believe that you are not only prepared to go further, but that doing so is inevitable without resolution of the underlying problem.” The goal of the sanctioning state is to offer a choice: “you can stop this now or suffer worse.”[/B]12

But in order to offer this choice, the sanction setters must also “define [the] minimum necessary remedial steps that the target state must take for pain to be removed.”13 Have we done this? Do we have any clear idea of what specific steps the Russians should take for the West to let up on the pain it now inflicts? On the other hand, can we credibly commit to escalate the pain we impose if Moscow does not change course? Or have we repeated the error of sanction’s regime against Iraq, where the sanctions were so onerous to begin with that the U.N. could neither negotiate easily nor threaten further?
[...]
In the realms of diplomacy and hard power we have reduced the linkage of ends, ways, and means down to formula. This is not true when it comes to economic coercion. Earlier I quoted from Lawrence Friedman and Jeffrey Michael’s The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. The book is a compendium of the debates theorists and practitioners have had about the nature of nuclear forces and nuclear posturing from 1945 to the present day. It is 804 pages long. It references hundreds of sources. A similar compendium of sanctions strategy—perhaps it would be titled The Evolution of Economic Coercion—could not be written. There simply is not a comparable wellspring of theory and practical experience to draw on.
[...]
But for the moment we grope in the dark, as the strategic bombers once did. We, like them, are condemned to inflict mass suffering because we lack the theory to do otherwise.

But regardless of how thoroughly or fatuously our governmental actors theorize it, sanctions aren't merely a tool against Russia's invasion - they must comprehensively degrade Russia's state capacity, which 'surgical' sanctions against the military-security complex can not accomplish even if they could be invented. We should hesitate to dismantle the adversarial sanctions regime before the Russian state renounces imperialism. And that's just not a promise a Putinist government could deliver credibly even if brought to those terms. If Cuba and Iran are the classic cases for sanctions relief, there's really no country that Russia in its present form could benefit ahead of, not even North Korea.

[Pannonian]

Excellent piece consolidating flaws in economic sanctions strategy, which has always been "under-theorized."
https://scholars-stage.org/of-sancti...tegic-bombers/

Sanctions are like strategic bombing, in that they often seem to be conceived and applied as a way to pressure "the masses" to turn on their elites and thus bring change to governmental policy undesirable to the sanctioning agent.




But regardless of how thoroughly or fatuously our governmental actors theorize it, sanctions aren't merely a tool against Russia's invasion - they must comprehensively degrade Russia's state capacity, which 'surgical' sanctions against the military-security complex can not accomplish even if they could be invented. We should hesitate to dismantle the adversarial sanctions regime before the Russian state renounces imperialism. And that's just not a promise a Putinist government could deliver credibly even if brought to those terms. If Cuba and Iran are the classic cases for sanctions relief, there's really no country that Russia in its present form could benefit ahead of, not even North Korea.

We should aim to take things back to the Cold War, diplomatically and economically. It'll hurt us, but it'll hurt Russia a hell of a lot more. Make it the new norm until Russia can persuade us otherwise.

[rory_20_uk]

Compared to the Cold War, the importance of Russia has radically shrunk - only their nukes matter. They've lost Eastern Europe, Central Asia and are a shadow of what they were. China used to be the junior partner now is an order of magnitude bigger in their economy and view Russia as a somewhat useful proxy for deflection to Europe and cut price resources.

Cut them off. With any luck Belarus and the other colonies will break away, diminishing them further.

It will hurt since Europe's "leaders" has pinned most of their fuel to a single autocrat as opposed to a range of autocrats.

[Montmorency]

I was disappointed by the Switchblade 300 - dedicated 40mm grenade suicide drone - when I checked the spec sheet, but this article includes a comment that some Ukrainians even prefer relying on the tactical drones and quadcopters with jury-rigged underslung grenades that we've seen from both sides so far.

Ouch!

I actually can't figure out if Ukraine's defense industry has not had native 152mm production for many years (other than a few Kvitnyk guided rounds), or if there's actually been production in the thousands yearly by Ukroboronprom, the primary national defense-industrial concern. This month the same also announced "contracts for the purchase of tens of thousands of ammunition for ground artillery," which may refer to imports. But if so, imports from where? There may also be Czech or Slovak companies producing low quantities for their domestic Dana system, but I haven't heard of any other ongoing production or capacity in Europe.

[Crandar]

On the drones. Too vulnerable for their cost.

[rory_20_uk]

Drones should ideally be cheaper than the missiles used to destroy them. So the high tech ones from the USA probably rarely make sense - perhaps as a slightly cheaper stand off launch platform for missiles to help get a bit more range.

Otherwise more simpler ones would make sense if they could erode the enemy's air defences since they do have a finite number of missiles to use.

Is there a place for having decoy drones to release chaff / flares to muddy the waters?

[Crandar]

It's a matter of tradition/philosophy as well. American military equipment is supposed to be of extreme quality, but also costly and time-consuming to fix. Russian/Soviet, on the other hand, is inferior, but also less costly and much easier to fix. I understand why the US, an affluent nation with an unsurpassed logistical organisation prefers the first approach, but, in my uneducated opinion, the Soviet perspective is much more efficient for the vast majority of countries. Maintenance of American equipment has led to some rather tragicomic situations in the less professional armies of the NATO members. Comical because of all these harmless malfunctions under peaceful conditions, but also tragic, considering all that tax money wasted.

[spmetla]

US stuff is definitely way too expensive to maintain for most countries, same actually for most NATO/Western produced equipment in general. Usually you'd need maintenance contracts, contracted technicians etc... This is why for Afghanistan the US was buying the ANA Mi-17 Helos instead of Blackhawks and Chinooks until Congress had a hissy fit.

US drone tech is also from 20 years of uncontested airspace, think the US Navy probably has the most advanced drones for contested environments but not cheap throw away ones for ground-based controllers near the front line.

We do have some cheaper small ones like the Raven hand launched UAS but the gap between that and the next level up Shadow UAS is where the Ukrainians need something cheaper but more capable than the small cheaper stuff we have.

Drones with strike capability are good but the US ones also are able to operate within the whole network of US aircraft so there'd be EA-18 Growlers or something else jamming radars and other supporting things that the Ukraine can't replicate and are far too sensitive for the US to lend-lease.

Russian/Soviet stuff I wouldn't necessary always put as inferior, for present day yes, but that's mostly because there was a 20 year gap of investment in the Russian arms industry. Before the fall of the USSR they produced good stuff, the major difference though is that they always kept reserves of all the previous generation equipment available for use too. The lack of reserve equipment and ammo throughout NATO (apart from the US) is what's hindering support to the Ukraine right now. The Germans can't even provide Leopard 2s to the countries that want them in exchange for giving Ukraine T-72s. The major NATO countries used to have 1000s of tanks in service and in reserve, not low hundreds in service with maybe dozens of reserves.

Looks like the MiG-29 gifting drama may come up again but now that heavy weapons have been going to the Ukraine for months without any real Russia blowback or escalation this is now just something to be expected.
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/3...rs-help-report
Slovakia offers Poland, Czechia a scheme to provide MiG-29s to Ukraine: report

Slovakia will transfer its MiG-29 fighter jets to Ukraine in exchange for temporary airspace protection from Poland and Czechia, reports suggest.

Talks to implement the scheme have been happening in the context of a similar exchange which could see Slovakia receive German-made Leopard 2 tanks in exchange for delivering Soviet-era T-72s to Ukraine, according to a report by Business Insider.

Slovakia has been named as one of the likely candidates for providing Ukraine with new fighter jets since March 2022, shortly after the start of Russia?s full-scale invasion of the country.

Numerous weapons systems have been transferred from Slovakia to Ukraine, including S-300 air defense systems.

NATO will certainly be working with a much more common inventory of items following the emptying of soviet era stocks as donations.

[Pannonian]

In case it hasn't been mentioned yet, Ukraine has been granted EU candidate status. AFAIK it means there are no arguments against their accession in principle, and it's a matter of them reaching the required levels.

[Pannonian]

Russian SAM.

[Furunculus]

In case it hasn't been mentioned yet, Ukraine has been granted EU candidate status. AFAIK it means there are no arguments against their accession in principle, and it's a matter of them reaching the required levels.

Great news. I hope they get in.

I also hope they aren't strung along, as the disillusionment that causes actually reduces the coherence/happiness of the candidate and the external security of the EU.

Turkey being a great example here.

[rory_20_uk]

In case it hasn't been mentioned yet, Ukraine has been granted EU candidate status. AFAIK it means there are no arguments against their accession in principle, and it's a matter of them reaching the required levels.

So... Ukraine wants loads of weapons and ammo, including tanks and heavy artillery and rockets to fight an invader right now. Ideally a couple of months ago.

The EU gives them a to-do list of things that once they've finished they will be considered for entry. Assuming the vote passes. Unanimously. Is the EU going to send the tens of billions to rebuild everything? Time will tell.

Turkey should never have been promised that they might enter since their currency is not stable (hopefully lessons were learned from Italy and Greece) and less democracy than Hungary.

[Furunculus]

Turkey should never have been promised that they might enter since their currency is not stable and less democracy than Hungary.

Perhaps, perhaps not. But they were and are being 'promised' membership.
They did deserve a lot more than a customs union for defending europes southern flank for twenty plus years in the cold war.
Perhaps full membership should never have been offered, and that something akin to Ukraine's DCFTA would have been more appropriate.

But no, they have and continue to be strung along and it has had the following consequences:
1. It has created public disillusionment in Turkey with the EU that has been exploted by populists.
2. The EU has turned what is a strategic nexus from a strong bastion in a dangerous part of the world into a weakness being exploited as that same nexus acts as a balancing power (including balancing against the EU).

In short, the EU pushed Turkey outside the tent, turned them around, and invited them to take a piss into their tent. Stupid.

[rory_20_uk]

Yes, the EU screwed up again. They seem to enjoy allowing political flights of fancy rather than anything approaching a strategic approach as to what they want to do. Adding increasingly powerless countries which have equal voting rights as Germany and France is madness.

Turkey is a strong addition to NATO, but not so much the EU.

Ukraine needs the support of ongoing sanctions of Russia, reduction in purchases of Russia's exports, and weaponry now. Once the Eastern border has been sorted, reconstruction has been at least started at this point it would be worth considering starting to talk about accession to the EU.

[Shaka_Khan]

[Furunculus]

Hmmm, recognition that the Defence Command Paper, its Future Soldier 'fix' and army procurement generally are a disaster.

Will it have any readacross into the IR foriegn policy paper? i.e. how much UK Defence resource is poured into the Ukraine 'problem'.

[Pannonian]

Just in time for this 1937 moment, the government are cutting the Armed Forces by 10,000. We will be spending 2.5% of our GDP on defence, but not until 2030.

In other news, Mr. Chamberlain, in response to statements that Europe is on the brink of war, announces that the BEF will be cut by 10,000. Defence spending will be increased, but those increases won't take place until 1945.

[rory_20_uk]

Just in time for this 1937 moment, the government are cutting the Armed Forces by 10,000. We will be spending 2.5% of our GDP on defence, but not until 2030.

In other news, Mr. Chamberlain, in response to statements that Europe is on the brink of war, announces that the BEF will be cut by 10,000. Defence spending will be increased, but those increases won't take place until 1945.

Unlike the 1930's headcount isn't as important as equipment. You might have noticed that drone warfare is increasingly common and requires few soldiers to oversee.

Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.

If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.

The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.

[Pannonian]

Unlike the 1930's headcount isn't as important as equipment. You might have noticed that drone warfare is increasingly common and requires few soldiers to oversee.

Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.

If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.

The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.

I dream of a government that didn't waste 33bn in dodgy covid contracts (as per the NY Times), including 8bn written off in PPE that wasn't fit for purpose (as per Rishi Sunak earlier this year). We know of one of these contracts, 150m or so to a Tory peer after a meeting with Johnson overrode the protests of the civil service. None of the PPE bought in that contract was ever used, of course, as they didn't fit the required criteria (as the protesting and overruled civil servants knew). Imagine if that 33bn was put towards something other than giving away taxpayers' money to Tory donors and friends and family.

And this is why Johnson does what he does. He knows that running on perpetual Brexit wins him elections. All I did was talk about how the government was doing sweet FA about defence, and someone immediately points to Europe and says, they're bad. The Tory strategy is to keep picking fights with Europe and other culture wars, and reap the votes. They don't even have to implement Brexit in any concrete way. All they have to do is keep saying "Protect Brexit", and the Leavers will flock to them.

[rory_20_uk]

I dream of a government that didn't waste 33bn in dodgy covid contracts (as per the NY Times), including 8bn written off in PPE that wasn't fit for purpose (as per Rishi Sunak earlier this year). We know of one of these contracts, 150m or so to a Tory peer after a meeting with Johnson overrode the protests of the civil service. None of the PPE bought in that contract was ever used, of course, as they didn't fit the required criteria (as the protesting and overruled civil servants knew). Imagine if that 33bn was put towards something other than giving away taxpayers' money to Tory donors and friends and family.

And this is why Johnson does what he does. He knows that running on perpetual Brexit wins him elections. All I did was talk about how the government was doing sweet FA about defence, and someone immediately points to Europe and says, they're bad. The Tory strategy is to keep picking fights with Europe and other culture wars, and reap the votes. They don't even have to implement Brexit in any concrete way. All they have to do is keep saying "Protect Brexit", and the Leavers will flock to them.

Talk about a particular view...

The UK for all its faults is paying more as a share of GDP for several years and has given a lot more to Ukraine than many others. So, "sweet FA" is a highly biased way to view it as I pointed out.

Blair gave banks vast sums of money via PFI - hospitals took loans at a high rate and the banks flipped them since they were effectively government backed. Its almost as if the party in power always finds ways to enrich themselves. No one is defending it and I'm boring myself in repeating variants of independant oversight that I think should be in place.

[Pannonian]

Talk about a particular view...

The UK for all its faults is paying more as a share of GDP for several years and has given a lot more to Ukraine than many others. So, "sweet FA" is a highly biased way to view it as I pointed out.

Blair gave banks vast sums of money via PFI - hospitals took loans at a high rate and the banks flipped them since they were effectively government backed. Its almost as if the party in power always finds ways to enrich themselves. No one is defending it and I'm boring myself in repeating variants of independant oversight that I think should be in place.

One would think that the most important oversight would be voting out the government so that someone else who isn't quite as corrupt (maybe David Lloyd George or something) can have a go at rolling back all the cronyist and illiberal measures this government has been putting in. Except that the Tories know that Europe is still a winning argument, as we see again and again. They're in trouble again? Look, EU. And they don't even have to push that argument themselves any more, as others will happily forward that argument for them.

[Furunculus]

And if that is what they are doing, it is working splendidly!
Since you bring up brexit all the time even when talking about quite separate topics, all the while insisting that the gov't only does it to troll you.
Boris gets to live rent free in your head.

[Montmorency]

It's been so long that I've forgotten what I wanted to post about here. Might have been the role of LDPR fighters.

Unlike the 1930's headcount isn't as important as equipment. You might have noticed that drone warfare is increasingly common and requires few soldiers to oversee.

Wrong lesson. The Ukraine War proves the opposite, that headcount is still essential. One of the worst drags on Russian performance is that they have too few infantry, which is why most of their (successful) assaults have been spearheaded by elite infantry behind masses of untrained separatist conscripts, and most of Ukraine's (successful) defenses have been secured by similar masses of untrained volunteer militias. Until the mythical battlefield of autonomous swarms of drones and rovers emerges, relying on tech solutions (tech-fetishism) is self-destructive unless you're the USA. NATO countries could do worse than establishing robust reserve systems capable of rapidly mass-mobilizing civilians to "mere" moderate competency across all specialties from infantry to intelligence, since "moderate" is always better than "untrained."

Did you miss the part where the UK is going to give another ?1 billion in military aid? What is the EU doing? How many billion? To be fair, the EU has given the Ukraine a piece of paper as opposed to weaponry, tanks, planes etc so I guess that is almost as useful.

Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

If the UK should be spending on the Armed Forces, it should be on the Navy, since we are an Island and money is extremely limited.

NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.

The elephant in the room is the dozen countries in between who it might be nice if they could do... something useful. Even if it was giving the USA a load of cash to send over their equipment. Germany is very slowly doing something, but their Defence companies export c. 75% of what they make due to all the red tape.

The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.

[Furunculus]

Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

https://twitter.com/radeksikorski/st...70366816391168