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Thread: Great Power contentions

  1. #511
    Darkside Medic Senior Member rory_20_uk's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Wrong lesson. The Ukraine War proves the opposite, that headcount is still essential. One of the worst drags on Russian performance is that they have too few infantry, which is why most of their (successful) assaults have been spearheaded by elite infantry behind masses of untrained separatist conscripts, and most of Ukraine's (successful) defenses have been secured by similar masses of untrained volunteer militias. Until the mythical battlefield of autonomous swarms of drones and rovers emerges, relying on tech solutions (tech-fetishism) is self-destructive unless you're the USA. NATO countries could do worse than establishing robust reserve systems capable of rapidly mass-mobilizing civilians to "mere" moderate competency across all specialties from infantry to intelligence, since "moderate" is always better than "untrained."

    Poland alone has delivered more in valuation than the UK. You are deeply underestimating cumulative EU contributions so far, or overestimating British ones, even if everyone's contributions have fallen short of adequate (excepting the Baltic states).

    NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.


    The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.
    I'm 100% civilian so I'll not embarrass myself in arguing the make up of a military army. I was thinking that for a defensive force, a levee en masse armed with anti armour can quickly make attacks extremely costly whereas investing on high tech stuff is all very well and good until the Russian cruise missiles cripple the bases before the next "definitely not a war" happens - you can't disperse tanks / planes / helicopters that much.

    So the UK is number 2 in value of aid. Of course another way of looking it is percentage of GDP and then the Baltics and Poland shoot higher as do all the countries who were behind the Iron Curtain. funnily enough. Who isn't high on the list are Germany, France and Italy - the Tin Man, the Lion and the Scarecrow respectively - although all three countries vie for each role. Craven, cowardly apologists and deniers seems so far to be a good summary.

    Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now. The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.

    This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's. Congress has demanded more troops to be station over in Europe and of course I'm delighted since NATO has increased the number of troops on high alert... without saying and specifics. And high alert is anything from 2-3 days to 6 months this does rather matter.

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  2. #512
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    NATO should be developing its doctrine and force structure on the assumption of tight future joint operations, which would be best fitted according to comparative advantage. In that case the UK could invest more in its navy. In the more likely scenario that everyone continues to avoid the hard choices and sovereignty-limiting collaboration that the world's challenges require, the UK would be better off just scrapping their navy and investing most of the returns in anti-shipping platforms and standoff fighters.

    The sad - though double-edged - reality is that in the 21st-century, high-tech and capitalist-efficient military manufacturing has a lead time of years. Spare capacity does not meaningfully exist, machine tools are irreplaceable, and there is no more suddenly retooling a nail factory and its workforce to produce airplane parts, or whatever. I'm not sure, if the EU and US leaderships had committed in March to stand up a new complex for the Soviet-grade artillery calibers that Ukraine cannot replenish, that they could have under any circumstances reached the production stage before 2023 - and at thousands per month at that. Where basic artillery ammunition is some of the simplest war materiel that exists, behind bullets. If you want spare or scalable capacity, you have to pay for it well beforehand.
    I think NATO is adjusting correctly to the Russian threat. The UK is investing much more in its Navy and I hope continues to do so, having a capable UK ground force and RAF though are equally important as they provide significant contributions to the Baltic security rotations, which as a nuclear power and as a 1st rate military in quality is significant.
    The slow lead time in manufacture is sad and expected, NATO countries would have had to continue maintaining their large stock piles in the post war era and continue to keep manufacturing lines open despite the last 20 years of war being a counter-insurgency focus. No excuse really but people like me that are advocates for a strong defense are usually seen as war mongers and ignored in favor a 'peace dividend.' The stupid but correct logic in a well-armed military for deterrence is that it is doing its job well if it never has to be used for war if the deterrent is credible enough. A hard sell for almost every government which would rather spend money on education and health care which have much more visible returns on investment short of war breaking out.

    I think we're seeing the start of a proper Western rearmament though; the corporate cultures being forced to decouple with Russia and probably recalculate their investments in China will see a more polarized and economically independent factions over the next decade, especially as we try and restrain China's demands for its place under the sun.

    Yes, creating some F-35s out of thin air isn't going to happen overnight. BUT Germany has many (a few hundred I think) tanks that they pretended didn't exist (Rheinmetall had to call bullshit on that one) and I am sure they are not alone in having heavier weapons mothballed that relatively quickly can be brought up to scratch. Certainly in Europe there is no greater threat than Russia - and they'll never do more good than now.
    I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.
    At least the older warsaw era inventories of eastern and central europe are being cleared out for donation including finally some Slovak MiG-29s while the neighboring countries make up for capability gaps like the Czechs covering air policing for the Slovaks and the Germans providing their own German manned patriots for air defense.

    The USA National Guard and even the police departments have a vast amount of older equipment which they frankly don't need (in the case of the police, positively shouldn't have) and logistically a lot might be easier to make new than collect some is probably worth the effort. Finally, there is The Rest of the World who have a lot of weaponry, most of it is either Russian or NATO compatible and again could be purchased.
    As a member of the National Guard, I'd rather not give away the functioning equipment we have, the US Army doesn't use us as a last resource branch but rather an 'operational' militia/reserve force so every four years each Brigade deploys in some capacity (training or peacekeeping missions due to the lack of wars now) so we actually need that equipment. Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.
    As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine. There's no police armor or artillery forces (let's hope we stay sane and keep it that way). There's also the thing that even if they had good equipment for Ukraine that it'd be owned at the County or State level and not within the capability of the Federal government to gift to a foreign power.

    If it were up to me there'd be Ukrainian pilots training on export versions of the F-16s, JAS-39 Gripens, Leopard 2A4s- 2A6s, CV-90s and Marders, as well all older cold war stock Leopard 1s and M60s MBTs while continuing the supply of rocket and cannon artillery in all forms. Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.

    This really shouldn't be something the USA should have to do the heavy lifting on - they are paying for Ukraine's weaponry whilst the EU pays for Russia's.
    I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.

    EDIT:
    Excellent look at the problems of German rearmament.
    https://youtu.be/8jDUVtUA7rg
    Last edited by spmetla; 07-04-2022 at 22:43.

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  3. #513

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by rory_20_uk View Post
    I'm 100% civilian so I'll not embarrass myself in arguing the make up of a military army. I was thinking that for a defensive force, a levee en masse armed with anti armour can quickly make attacks extremely costly whereas investing on high tech stuff is all very well and good until the Russian cruise missiles cripple the bases before the next "definitely not a war" happens - you can't disperse tanks / planes / helicopters that much.
    Notably, Russia has fired up to 3000 (?) ballistic, cruise, anti-ship, and anti-radar missiles at Ukrainian ground targets over 4 months. Just Ukraine. We have relearned the lesson that strategic bombardment must be truly massive in scale - much more than a few thousand missiles - or concentrated with other means in a short timespan to effect more than a nuisance to the target (*cough*Tomahawks*cough*).

    So believe me, even a thousand Russian (conventional) missiles spread across all of NATO, to the exhaustion of their stocks, would hardly be worth noticing beyond the original media outrage.

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    I think NATO is adjusting correctly to the Russian threat. The UK is investing much more in its Navy and I hope continues to do so, having a capable UK ground force and RAF though are equally important as they provide significant contributions to the Baltic security rotations, which as a nuclear power and as a 1st rate military in quality is significant.
    The slow lead time in manufacture is sad and expected, NATO countries would have had to continue maintaining their large stock piles in the post war era and continue to keep manufacturing lines open despite the last 20 years of war being a counter-insurgency focus. No excuse really but people like me that are advocates for a strong defense are usually seen as war mongers and ignored in favor a 'peace dividend.' The stupid but correct logic in a well-armed military for deterrence is that it is doing its job well if it never has to be used for war if the deterrent is credible enough. A hard sell for almost every government which would rather spend money on education and health care which have much more visible returns on investment short of war breaking out.
    Cumulative armament did of course make this war feasible, as it did the world wars... Russia can never escalate from saber rattling in the absence of its enormous Soviet-era stockpiles of countless thousands of missiles and millions of shells. Europe by and large does not need to expand its armed forces, but it does need effective scalable industrial base and reserve capacities, as well as further doctrinal and command integration. I remain convinced that even the US military can expand its capabilities by reviewing its procurement and doctrine even if it freezes its budget for a decade.

    This article makes some good points. Why does Army doctrine remain that

    The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy?s armed forces by battle?Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive.?
    when the material advantage has shifted back to the defense in war and the US military itself expects all potential peer conflicts to have a defensive nature?

    Russia: Defensive battle to exhaust Russian material advantage and initiative until NATO is sufficiently mobilized, then air-based reduction of Russian forces concluding with a ground offensive to push them back into Russian borders (tens to low hundreds of miles of movement).
    Taiwan: Minimal contribution of American ground forces.
    North Korea: South Korean defensive battle at DMZ fortifications until Northern artillery and airpower are neutralized. I should actually look up what the doctrinal purpose of the current American contingent in South Korea is in the event of a Northern invasion, but I'm pretty sure the South Koreans are supposed to do the bulk of the ground combat, including offensive ops.

    No one's stupid enough to license an invasion of Iran, and we're not deploying brigades to Israel or the Indian subcontinent. Does the army expect to bound across the African savannah in the future?

    Also, as the US is the major deterrent force for the 1st World in Europe and East Asia it's best we don't erode our capability too much.
    See above. Our deterrence factor is not affected by running a deficit in some Army or Marines heavy platforms this decade. Off the top of my head, France has given away ~20% of its Caesar SPGs to Ukraine (12 units), and the US has donated well over a hundred of its 1000 M777 howitzers. Even if I don't hear correctly that the Marines are supposed to transition away from M777s anyway, if we've given this much, we can afford to give more. We're surely not going to miss another hundred artillery pieces anytime.

    I think there's some sort of unofficial EU/NATO policy against supplying German tanks, even the older Leopard 1s. I recall about two weeks ago Spain was mulling sending its Leopard 2A4s that have been in long term storage and then backed out with a line of 'they're in too poor shape to send' which is a piss-poor excuse because that really to me means disposable so send them to be refurbished and then onto Ukraine. Same with the older Leo1s, like you wrote, Rheinmetall has quite a few but no okay to send despite having made clear since a few days after Feb 24th that they can be refurbished and sent. The Germans seem to have quite a hang-up about German "Panzers" fighting the Russians in the Ukraine again, simply ludicrous.
    AFAIK there's a policy against supplying Leclercs and Challengers and M60s as well.

    As for police forces, well for one the equipment they have that is 'military' are really just wheeled APCs, tall ones at that to be good against mines/IEDs, honestly not very good for a straight up fight like in Ukraine.
    We've sent Humvees and Bushmasters, it would do.

    Former warsaw bloc members of NATO probably don't have the manufacturing capability for boosting production of ammo and spare parts in the quantity needed by Ukraine so I think we need to try and switch them to NATO equipment during the war so that the effort can be sustained longer.
    Whether in Europe or the US, some NATO government really should have tried to launch new manufacturing capacity for Soviet-grade ordnance by now, even if it wouldn't come online until next year. There's no sense in leaving Ukraine to shelve hundreds and hundreds of perfectly good pieces for lack of ammo; it just commits to overreliance on NATO platforms, increasing their attrition and war-and-tear.

    I think it is key though that the US continues to do the heavy lifting as it is the least vulnerable to Russia's hydro-carbon diplomacy and has the benefit of everything we do for Ukraine is watched by Beijing in regard to gauging US support for Taiwan. Europe's weening of Russian energy should have started eight years ago but better late than never and hopefully the promised investments in defense (especially Germany) lead to a revamping of much atrophied industries.
    It would be fine if the US prioritized the military, logistical, and training components, and the EU offered its checkbook for economic sustainment and reconstruction. Financial losses in Europe from this war are very real and could escalate by the end of the year, but Germany should be paying for refugees in Poland and Moldova and the UK should be covering Ukraine's loans (grants). Or just the EU itself (see below). Regardless, I would prefer to see the EU countries collectively or bilaterally taking up the great preponderance of non-military support for Ukraine from now on.

    I had seen this one.

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    But notice:

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    Last edited by Montmorency; 07-04-2022 at 23:44.
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  4. #514
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    And let's not forget that the most valuable component of a multi-million pound tank is not the weapon, the armour, or the engine; it is its crew. Equipment production can be scaled up. Efficiencies can be found to produce things more quickly. But personnel cannot be trained more quickly than they are, and practical experience is priceless. Hence arguments of drawing down manpower because of new warfare doctrine misses the point.

    I point anyone who's interested to a youtuber called Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain. Employed as a tank historian by World of Tanks, he is also highly prized by the US military, being one of the last active members to have seen action in both an Abrams and Bradley. IIRC he was fast-tracked for promotion to his current rank (Colonel) for precisely this reason: experience of old school warfare.

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  5. #515

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Shower thought: Technically the history of "drones" is much longer and more winding than this analogy allows... but the timespan between the public emergence of powered flight as a hobbyist technology (~1906) and its mass-industrial application in combat (1915/16) mirrors the trajectory of light/medium drones a century later.


    Whoa



    Quote Originally Posted by Pannonian View Post
    And let's not forget that the most valuable component of a multi-million pound tank is not the weapon, the armour, or the engine; it is its crew. Equipment production can be scaled up. Efficiencies can be found to produce things more quickly. But personnel cannot be trained more quickly than they are, and practical experience is priceless. Hence arguments of drawing down manpower because of new warfare doctrine misses the point.

    I point anyone who's interested to a youtuber called Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain. Employed as a tank historian by World of Tanks, he is also highly prized by the US military, being one of the last active members to have seen action in both an Abrams and Bradley. IIRC he was fast-tracked for promotion to his current rank (Colonel) for precisely this reason: experience of old school warfare.
    Mind the balance!

    Strictly speaking,what we've seen in this war is that crews and infantry rapidly mustered and trained over a few weeks are good enough to take to field, sometimes to greater effect than ought be expected (e.g. Ukrainian NATO artillery). Yet lead time on new runs or new capacity to produce the weapons systems can drag on into years. (For example, the Russians reportedly have only a handful of machines for boring artillery cannons, and might not be able to produce new ones in the war's timeframe.) A crew or infantryman trained at high expense to exquisite standards in all individual, unit, technical, and combined arms dimensions are a great thing to possess, but they have to be supplemented by mass-mobilized recruits and reservists; remember the fate of the British Regular Army in 1914. These need to have access to equipment and vehicles in order to join the fight in anything but the most trivial application, whether the equipment is sourced from storage or a fresh production line (technically import is another source but not a reliable or deep one these days).

    Thus the throughput of equipment to the point of use is the bottleneck in war planning and execution - it remains so after all these years. War evidently hasn't changed enough for quality to decide all.

    Which isn't to imply an inevitable return to WW2 levels of output - it's just no longer feasible even in the context of another world war, despite the increase in gross population since then. But maybe it calls for a return to late Cold War military-industrial capacity and storage (such as when global arms manufacturing and surplus permitted Iran and Iraq to source hundreds of new tanks and planes off the market in short order.

    The readiest rebuttal is to avoid going too far in the other direction from quality of men and materiel, or you end up in the same place as the Russian Armed Forces - loads of equipment, crappy manpower, and not enough of it. That's why I recommend a European emphasis on mid-grade surge capacity in both.

    Of course, one might also point out that the crash course lead time for the stuff that really matters to specifically American expeditionary power - ships and planes - is so hopelessly protracted that all of the above doesn't even matter that much as long as we don't plan on becoming enmeshed in a years-long ground war in Asia...
    Last edited by Montmorency; 07-06-2022 at 06:14.
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  6. #516
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Shower thought: Technically the history of "drones" is much longer and more winding than this analogy allows... but the timespan between the public emergence of powered flight as a hobbyist technology (~1906) and its mass-industrial application in combat (1915/16) mirrors the trajectory of light/medium drones a century later.


    Whoa





    Mind the balance!

    Strictly speaking,what we've seen in this war is that crews and infantry rapidly mustered and trained over a few weeks are good enough to take to field, sometimes to greater effect than ought be expected (e.g. Ukrainian NATO artillery). Yet lead time on new runs or new capacity to produce the weapons systems can drag on into years. (For example, the Russians reportedly have only a handful of machines for boring artillery cannons, and might not be able to produce new ones in the war's timeframe.) A crew or infantryman trained at high expense to exquisite standards in all individual, unit, technical, and combined arms dimensions are a great thing to possess, but they have to be supplemented by mass-mobilized recruits and reservists; remember the fate of the British Regular Army in 1914. These need to have access to equipment and vehicles in order to join the fight in anything but the most trivial application, whether the equipment is sourced from storage or a fresh production line (technically import is another source but not a reliable or deep one these days).

    Thus the throughput of equipment to the point of use is the bottleneck in war planning and execution - it remains so after all these years. War evidently hasn't changed enough for quality to decide all.

    Which isn't to imply an inevitable return to WW2 levels of output - it's just no longer feasible even in the context of another world war, despite the increase in gross population since then. But maybe it calls for a return to late Cold War military-industrial capacity and storage (such as when global arms manufacturing and surplus permitted Iran and Iraq to source hundreds of new tanks and planes off the market in short order.

    The readiest rebuttal is to avoid going too far in the other direction from quality of men and materiel, or you end up in the same place as the Russian Armed Forces - loads of equipment, crappy manpower, and not enough of it. That's why I recommend a European emphasis on mid-grade surge capacity in both.

    Of course, one might also point out that the crash course lead time for the stuff that really matters to specifically American expeditionary power - ships and planes - is so hopelessly protracted that all of the above doesn't even matter that much as long as we don't plan on becoming enmeshed in a years-long ground war in Asia...
    Germany produced loads of AA guns in the last year or so of WWII, despite it being known that the best anti-aircraft defence was fighter planes. Why? Because Germany was so short of fuel that it couldn't afford to properly train new pilots. Leading to new pilots being practically cannon fodder for the decently trained allied fighter pilots. Rather than produce more fighter planes that were to be manned by inadequate pilots, they turned instead to AA guns which required lower levels of training to be effective (albeit nowhere near as effective as fighter planes).

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  7. #517

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    lol I substituted the name of the British politician in the other thread


    Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).

    Meanwhile, news since early May suggested that Excalibur contributions to Ukraine were minimal, but this week's US aid package to Ukraine lists "1000 high-precision 155mm shells", almost certainly Excalibur, so in the context of the dozens of Krab, PzHaubitze 2000, CAESAR, M109 Paladin, and other platforms Ukraine has already received, it seems plausible that the Allies have developed a considerable respect for Ukraine's needs in artillery parity. I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.


    You'll probably never get the post on LDPR fighters I once planned to write, but I see ISW noted that "140 thousand" conscripts have been mobilized since the beginning of the war, which presumably does not include the standing separatist armies from the outset. On one hand, Russia has probably exhausted the readily accessible pool of conscripts in occupied Donbass below the level of total war. The population under Russian control must be around 3 million, so they're at half of WW2 Soviet mobilization levels. On the other hand, it means the Ukrainians face over a hundred thousand more separatists than they did at the beginning of the war. Once more, either side would be at a standstill without its respective horde of minimally-trained paramilitaries. Also why I don't think Russia attempts to annex the Donbass unless it can secure an armistice while the full oblasts are under their control; designating them as first-class Russian citizens would come with more legal rights from military coercion.
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  8. #518
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Dailykos has a particular bias in its Ukraine analysis, but there are some useful nuggets, such as that the HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur). Explains why allegedly the Allies don't intend to contribute more than 15 cumulative HIMARS to Ukraine (with up to 12 currently in or on the way to Ukraine).
    Certainly, expensive munitions but looking at the ammo depots and C2 nodes hit since these have arrived, I'd say worth the cost. Even with Western support Ukraine won't get a quantitative edge over Russia in artillery but if range and precision are better for Ukraine, they can cause a lot of hurt.

    I don't know if ATACMS rockets for HIMARS (the 300km range ones) have the power to break up the Kerch Strait bridge, but if they do, it would be a fantastic allocation.
    I agree, however if I were the commander on the Southern front, I'd do night strikes against docked naval ships, subs, and harbor facilities in Sevastapol first alongside their airbases too. This together with a destruction of Kerch Strait bridge would really hurt Russia logistically. I imagine over the next few weeks we'll see a lot of railyards going up in smoke as Russia still seems bound to these for supply. I also think that if the Black Sea fleet ends up forced to hole up along the Caucasus coastline that'd limit the ability to do effective cruise missile or shore bombardment roles if the Ukrainians end up successfully pushing south and east of Kherson.

    Curious if we'll see a larger and more successful offensive by Ukraine in the south given that Zelensky has ordered it to be liberated. So far Ukraine hasn't been able to muster the numbers and effects to do more than nibble away at village after village.

    Also, curious as to Russia's next offensive, I think they'll preserve what strength they have right now to try and blunt any Ukrainian counter-offensive and then push to take the whole of Donetsk and if possible, push on Mikolayiv.

    Fall and winter aren't too far away and I'm worried what further gas supply shenanigans Russia will do to Ukraine and Europe as a whole.

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    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

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  9. #519

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    HIMARS GMLRS rocket costs about as much per unit as the Excalibur 155mm projectile (>$100K), and the US arsenal is probably significantly less than 50 thousand of the latter (which is still several times more GMLRS than Excalibur).
    I screwed that up, "less than 50 thousand" was supposed to refer to GMLRS; Excalibur inventory is in the 4 digits as far as I know (e.g. IIRC one of the last few years the procurement was just over 900 units).
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  10. #520
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Certainly, expensive munitions but looking at the ammo depots and C2 nodes hit since these have arrived, I'd say worth the cost. Even with Western support Ukraine won't get a quantitative edge over Russia in artillery but if range and precision are better for Ukraine, they can cause a lot of hurt.



    I agree, however if I were the commander on the Southern front, I'd do night strikes against docked naval ships, subs, and harbor facilities in Sevastapol first alongside their airbases too. This together with a destruction of Kerch Strait bridge would really hurt Russia logistically. I imagine over the next few weeks we'll see a lot of railyards going up in smoke as Russia still seems bound to these for supply. I also think that if the Black Sea fleet ends up forced to hole up along the Caucasus coastline that'd limit the ability to do effective cruise missile or shore bombardment roles if the Ukrainians end up successfully pushing south and east of Kherson.

    Curious if we'll see a larger and more successful offensive by Ukraine in the south given that Zelensky has ordered it to be liberated. So far Ukraine hasn't been able to muster the numbers and effects to do more than nibble away at village after village.

    Also, curious as to Russia's next offensive, I think they'll preserve what strength they have right now to try and blunt any Ukrainian counter-offensive and then push to take the whole of Donetsk and if possible, push on Mikolayiv.

    Fall and winter aren't too far away and I'm worried what further gas supply shenanigans Russia will do to Ukraine and Europe as a whole.
    What's the most effective way of isolating Crimea, and is it feasible for Ukraine to do it?

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  11. #521

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    A series of polls by Rating Group show that Ukraine and Russia are now very different societies. Ukraine does not share Vladimir Putin’s complexes about the last 30 years. Over the last decade, positive answers to the question ‘Do you regret the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991?’ have been on a rising trend in Russia, up from 55% in 2010 to 63% in 2022. In Ukraine, the number was not too far behind in 2010, at 46%; but it is now only 11%. Moreover, under Zelensky and his predecessor, President Petro Poroshenko (2014–19), Ukraine has successfully shifted to a ‘more European’ way of commemorating the Second World War. In contrast to Putin’s pobedobesie (‘victory frenzy’, the obsession with 1945), 80% of Ukrainian respondents defined 9 May as a day for ‘remembrance of war victims’ in 2022, while only 15% saw it as ‘Victory Day’. In 2012, the figures were the other way around in Ukraine: only 18% referred to remembrance, while 74% still thought of victory. Victory in ‘World War Two’, rather than the Great Patriotic War – the Soviet framing – is also placed in a broader and more national context. All historical ‘fighters for independence’ are now placed in the same pantheon, including not only nation-building stalwarts like the Cossack hero Bohdan Khmelnytsky and the historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, but also previously more controversial figures like Ivan Mazepa, who lost the Battle of Poltava in 1709 (up from 44% in 2012 to 76% in 2022); Symon Petliura, the controversial leader of the short-lived Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1918–19, who allied with Poland and whose supporters committed pogroms (up from 26% in 2012 to 49% in 2022); and even the interwar nationalist leader Stepan Bandera (up from 22% in 2012 to 74% in 2022).
    Reminder of how utterly and irrevocably Putin and the Russian ultranationalists wrecked Slavic unity and, ironically, all positive vestiges of the Soviet legacy.

    If one looks at it objectively, Putin is one of the worst Russian leaders of all time. Little needs to be said of the plundering and feudalization of Russia's long-term socioeconomic prospects, but just refer to Russia's foreign relations with its former co-republics.

    Belarus: Puppet state, so long as the extremely-unpopular local strongman can be kept in power
    Ukraine: Mortal enemy
    Baltics: Mortal enemy
    Moldova: Worsening relations
    Georgia: Adversarial
    Armenia: Trapped between Turkey and Azerbaijan, desperate for any Russian assistance, offers little in return
    Azerbaijan: Increasingly distant, increasingly self-assertive in the region
    Central 'Stans: All openly balancing Russia with China AFAICT


    Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.
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  12. #522
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Russia is in a worse position with essentially every former SSR compared to the beginning of Putin's rise to power. To be fair to him, he wasn't alone in devising Russia's course; the entire elite power structure of Russia has long deserved the 1918 treatment.
    His fixation on "hard power" and trying to oppose 'the West' instead of use its better aspects for advancement have been really hinderances for Russia's sphere. I don't think he gets that a bit more soft power and using the cultural and historical ties could lead to a much more voluntary set of nations looking to Moscow. He's just gathering allies that are in opposition to the US lead world order, not allies working toward any other goal at all.
    Looking at Kazakhstan's recent statements in opposition to recognizing Russia's breakaway 'republics' in Ukraine are a good indicator of how awry the invasion has gone. Even if Putin took all the Ukraine at this point it'd still be a strategic loss as Russia will remain in a poorer position in the world than it was a year ago. It's only a stronger position if he looks at the map of Europe like a 'Hearts of Iron' player which is not realistic for today's world, something that caused most of Europe to completely mistake posturing for negotiations which were actual preparations for invasion. Russia is not North Korea.

    The PRC has definately played the game better.

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  13. #523

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    I hear Romania is restarting 152mm production. @edyzmedieval




    oooooo

    Tangential rant: Let's be frank re: the "simplicity" (cf. quantity) argument that the essayist dismissively touches on. Aircraft, given their cost, numbers, and absolute complexity, are currently just platforms where technology is going to produce more of an edge than in almost any other military application. While for the sake of example there's probably no real procurement, technical, or logistical cost advantage at scale for, say, buying 5 T-64BV over a single T-90M, as ground vehicles the former can probably perform at 80% relative to the latter in a cumulative sense for intended MBT roles. They will both have similar speed, maneuverability, and vulnerability on the full-spectrum modern battlefield, and they both even arm the same 2A46M 125mm cannon. So in abstract there's a case for maintaining a cheap old workhorse for mass mobilization in a domain like armor to supplement the crack gear and personnel.

    But if you could substitute a wing, or even two, of F-104 for a squadron of F-35, would you make that choice? The technological leap between second-generation and fifth-generation jet computer and missile technology (and especially stealth where available) is simply incalculably greater than that between second-gen tanks and topline 3rd-gen tank armament, armor, and countermeasures, which combat would undoubtedly reveal. What would be the point of, for example, swarming F-104s against a squadron of F-35s if it's not implausible that the F35s can standoff engage and destroy all of the F-104s with zero loss? Because that's what technological disparity can bring in the air.

    (These might be videogamish matchup examples - one more than the other - but they serve to illustrate the cross-differences between Quality vs. Quantity branches)

    Arguments about the need to recall the lessons of industrial warfare are essential without taking them to literally require a return to thousands of turboprop plane and welded-steel tank units! It just indicates a need to rebalance between desired capabilities and expected aggregate survivability and availability (or lack thereof) in large-scale conflict. Contemporary doctrines will have moved on properly with extant conditions in most respects.
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  14. #524
    Ja mata, TosaInu Forum Administrator edyzmedieval's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    I hear Romania is restarting 152mm production. @edyzmedieval
    Correct, we still use the 152mm howitzer so restarting production for those shells is something that's also in our benefit at least temporarily.

    ROMARM (Romanian arms manufacturer - owned by the state) is producing a good number of ammo supplies, shells & other equipment, both for old standards (7.62) and also for NATO standards. (5.56)
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  15. #525

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Surprised Mark Sumner at DailyKos was the one to put out this notice, but it's welcome.

    Early in the invasion of Ukraine, those interested in following the war discovered that they had some friends in high places—places anywhere from 200 to 800 miles above the ground. Not only has intelligence been available in terms of satellite imagery (some of it from free sources), but NASA’s FIRMS Fire Map has become a staple in tracking what’s happening on the front lines and behind the front lines. However, at this point, the value of FIRMS has plummeted and the possibility of misreading this data has reached an all-time high.

    The FIRMS Fire Map, which is created from two types of instruments spread across multiple satellites, is intended for tracking exactly what the name implies: fires. Technically, it spots “thermal anomalies” or “hot spots.” The hot spots located by FIRMS infrared tools are points that stand out, temperature-wise, from the background, and have been literal life savers when it comes to tracking wildfires in both the U.S. and around the world. That the FIRMS data also turned out to be aces at picking up flashes from artillery and the explosions of missiles was a happy accident—“happy” only in the sense that it provided much-needed support for people engaged in Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), not for anything actually happening on the ground.

    But at this moment, using FIRMS data as an indicator of anything happening in Ukraine takes a good deal more scrutiny and expertise than it did a month ago. Here’s why.

    First, take a look at this map of the area in eastern Ukraine.

    At first glance this aligns pretty well with what we know is happening when it comes to conflict. Russian forces are trying to get to Bakhmut, near the center of this image, so it makes sense they would be bombarding Ukrainian forces in the area. Ukrainian forces are surely trying to take out Russian artillery. So they’re probably shooting up the backfield. Except … that cluster of shots over near Alchevesk is a good 40km into Russian-held territory. The spots south of Krasnyi Luch are even farther in the red zone. So … High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) seeking out artillery stockpiles?

    Before you answer, take a look at this war-torn battlefield.

    This looks pretty bad. However, a quick glance at some of the names on this map will show that this is actually on the Romania/Bulgaria border. It’s an area where, so far as anyone knows, Russian artillery is not engaged in shelling towns and not a single HIMARS is firing missiles. Why is the map so spotted with hot spots? Because … hot spots.

    First of all, it’s summer. FIRMS is not immune to being thrown off by a reflective surface or toasty bit of asphalt (though the system keeps a list of known/fixed hot spots and filters them out, so sure false spots are transient). Second, it’s dry. So there are actual fires. Some of those hot spots are FIRMS doing its duty and reporting places where trees are ablaze. Third, it’s summer, and it’s hot, and it’s dry. So farmers all over Europe are burning off the stubble left after the harvest of spring crops.

    Most of that winter wheat that was greening up Ukraine back in April was harvested in May or June. Farmers like to burn off those fields in the summer to kill off weeds, prevent the spread of diseases, and drive out pests. Burning also helps put some of the nutrients from last year’s crop back into the soil for the next year. In any case, fields in many areas are burned in the summer in preparation for planting in the fall. Take a close-up look at these hot spots, whether in Romania or Ukraine, and the great majority are out in a patchwork of farm fields. And yes, Ukrainian farmers are still farming right through all this mess. Those guys who were towing tanks with their tractors are not going to get intimidated now.

    This doesn’t mean that FIRMS is useless. However, it does mean that a casual glance at the FIRMS Fire map is a dangerous way to spot military activity at this time.
    This was pretty obvious when I first peeped FIRMS mapping back in March: all of Ukraine, and Europe, was smattered with anomalies. I actually first realized the nature of the interpretive challenge when trying to sort out whether anomalies in the area of occupied Chernobyl were supposed to be reported forest fires or military activity.

    But the abuse of FIRMS only seemed to reach epidemic levels over the past month, when a number of commentators, even good ones, were trying to apply facial assessments to FIRMS maps to determine volume of artillery fire in this or that Ukrainian or Russian-held piece of territory. I'm not going to say that's totally illegitimate, but... like with reconstructing fragmented ancient scrolls, one has to be cautious not to exceed what one already knows for sure coming in, yet also refrain from commiting source incest in a circular fashion. FIRMS can more properly be used to corroborate video evidence and ground reporting, or at most suggest the geographical extent of confirmed combat at a tactical level.




    Which classic authors or contemporary media properties does this put you in mind of?
    https://twitter.com/francis_scarr/st...92984946974720
    Last edited by Montmorency; 07-21-2022 at 05:36.
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  16. #526

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Wonder what role this month's Russia-Iran summit (among other MENA pressure) played in Russia's formal submission to Ukrainian agro exports. Or maybe it's also that Russia wants to restore its own exports and accompanying revenue, on the assumption that expected Ukrainian revenue flow is low enough that it would have been made up by NATO grants/credit anyway in the short term.
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  17. #527
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Nothing too critical in this, just revisiting the use of anti-tank guns that we had discussed a few months ago.

    Seems they're being used as indirect fire AT guns, quasi artillery I guess, I guess with the right spotters it can be done. Interesting to see them digging so they breach can recoil enough as AT guns are much lower in profile. At this high angle of fire for an AT gun they should get good penetration of most vehicles assuming its a good hit, even with dated 100mm AT guns.

    Guess in a war, guns are guns, best use em.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HOqLDIDOT4
    Last edited by spmetla; 07-29-2022 at 02:34.

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  18. #528
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Nothing too critical in this, just revisiting the use of anti-tank guns that we had discussed a few months ago.

    Seems they're being used as indirect fire AT guns, quasi artillery I guess, I guess with the right spotters it can be done. Interesting to see them digging so they breach can recoil enough as AT guns are much lower in profile. At this high angle of fire for an AT gun they should get good penetration of most vehicles assuming its a good hit, even with dated 100mm AT guns.

    Guess in a war, guns are guns, best use em.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HOqLDIDOT4
    Makes me think of the remark that Operation Barbarossa was the biggest moving tank museum in history.

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  19. #529

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Nothing too critical in this, just revisiting the use of anti-tank guns that we had discussed a few months ago.

    Seems they're being used as indirect fire AT guns, quasi artillery I guess, I guess with the right spotters it can be done. Interesting to see them digging so they breach can recoil enough as AT guns are much lower in profile. At this high angle of fire for an AT gun they should get good penetration of most vehicles assuming its a good hit, even with dated 100mm AT guns.

    Guess in a war, guns are guns, best use em.
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4HOqLDIDOT4
    Notice the reference later in the video to the earlier-discussed practice of commuting to the frontline: "We spend most of the day at work and come back in the evening, take a shower, have dinner, and go to bed... If we're not called up, it's a day off."

    I have no idea how AT cannons could be useful as indirect artillery, but then again, we've seen footage of both Russian and Ukrainian tanks in makeshift batteries providing indirect fire (effectiveness unclear to me). Maybe it just lends more support to the argument that the armor arm must evolve back in the direction of the assault gun or SPG archetype.

    This war has exposed a lot of categorical myths about the nature of 21st century warfare. Fixed fortifications and semi-trained infantry, tankers, and gunners have all re-emerged to play a fundamental role, with lesser but surprising contributions from anti-tank mines and centralized partisan and stay-behind operations.
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  20. #530

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Lol. "European Decolonization," Serbian Brotherhood edition. (Yugoslavia is just flatly named Serbia here. Not just Serbia even, but "Serbian Tzarate.")

    Last edited by Montmorency; 07-30-2022 at 22:17.
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  21. #531

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    ...
    Vitiate Man.

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  22. #532
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Notice the reference later in the video to the earlier-discussed practice of commuting to the frontline: "We spend most of the day at work and come back in the evening, take a shower, have dinner, and go to bed... If we're not called up, it's a day off."

    I have no idea how AT cannons could be useful as indirect artillery, but then again, we've seen footage of both Russian and Ukrainian tanks in makeshift batteries providing indirect fire (effectiveness unclear to me). Maybe it just lends more support to the argument that the armor arm must evolve back in the direction of the assault gun or SPG archetype.

    This war has exposed a lot of categorical myths about the nature of 21st century warfare. Fixed fortifications and semi-trained infantry, tankers, and gunners have all re-emerged to play a fundamental role, with lesser but surprising contributions from anti-tank mines and centralized partisan and stay-behind operations.
    Just a note. Stugs in WWII were under the command of artillery, with crews consisting of trained artillerymen, whereas tanks were crewed by tankers. Stug sights included ranges for indirect fire. AFAIK their guns were the same. So my guess is the use of AT guns for indirect fire consists mainly of training.

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  23. #533

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Another 'D'oh' moment: Why wouldn't AT mines be worth their weight if IEDs are?
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  24. #534
    Stranger in a strange land Moderator Hooahguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Lol. "European Decolonization," Serbian Brotherhood edition. (Yugoslavia is just flatly named Serbia here. Not just Serbia even, but "Serbian Tzarate.")

    *snip*
    There's a US version too, which is hilarious.

    Click image for larger version. 

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    Unironically Id love to see a Republic of Lakotah. Also its clear that the author knows less than nothing, because a) if it truly was decolonization then it would all be Native land (which at this point I support tbh), and b) the Republic of Mormons would be called Deseret before anything else.

    Also France randomly being in there made me laugh. Like what is France going to do with Missouri lol. At least them taking back Louisiana makes sense.
    Last edited by Hooahguy; 08-02-2022 at 01:25.
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  25. #535

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Hooahguy View Post
    There's a US version too, which is hilarious.

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    Unironically Id love to see a Republic of Lakotah. Also its clear that the author knows less than nothing, because a) if it truly was decolonization then it would all be Native land (which at this point I support tbh), and b) the Republic of Mormons would be called Deseret before anything else.

    Also France randomly being in there made me laugh. Like what is France going to do with Missouri lol. At least them taking back Louisiana makes sense.
    Decolonization means the restoration of old colonies. Although it's unclear how this could happen in the United States if the European states are themselves decolonized.

    The most egregious history fail is a Confederate States without South Carolina or Georgia.

    It's telling that some of the only full countries this account would prefer to exist are a Serbian empire and the Confederate States of America.
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  26. #536

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Something I don't understand. While I've spend distinctly less time closely following the Ukraine war over the past month, and some analysts such as Henry Schlottman have been disengaged, there has been a lot of commentary about possible redeployments of Russian troops from southern Kharkiv oblast (i.e. Izyum bridgehead/Lyman area) to the general southern theater, with the assessed purpose of providing an operation reserve

    As of August 2 JominiW had 12 BTG in the Kherson bridgehead, which is in the realm of reported strength over most of the past 4 months.

    Already some Ukrainian government sources (whom I don't deem reliable for such details) claimed 30 BTGs in the Kherson bridgehead since a few days after the first Ukrainian bombardment of the bridges in the area (~July 19).

    A less well-known OSINT account, commonly cross-cited, finds up to 50 BTGs in Kherson oblast alone, with a slight majority cis-Dnistrian.





    But this seems unbelievable to me on several counts. First, that RuFor would have transferred so many units deep behind their lines in the south, when the obvious means of reinforcing against an expected offensive, such as in Zaporizhzhia, is to build defenses in depth close to the frontline. Second, that RuFor could have up-to-doubled their fully-formed complement of forces in the Kherson bridgehead either within just a couple of days once the bridges came under fire, or over time after the bridge's ability to support extensive movement, let alone of heavy equipment, had been badly compromised. And does rail capacity to move multiple brigades along a single, single-track line through the south uo to the river even exist? Or if it was by motor transit, such vast convoys would have easily been detected by satellite, presumably to be disseminated throughout the Internet.

    Third, though tangentially I believe this analyst is severely lowballing the quantity of separatist combat elements, if there were only a brigade or two left to contest the Bakhmut front against the Ukrainians, RuFor would absolutely not suddenly have retained the combat power to restart the process of gradual territorial gains in the past week.

    The reports of Russian retrenchment from the Izyum bridgehead are too much to ignore, but there's something off here. Like, if the embedded analysis were true in describing the allocation of forces between Melitopol and Izyum, then the Ukrainian counteroffensive, whenever that is, would be better off trying to contain RuFor to Kherson province while swinging east to join an eastern advance from Kharkiv to perform a pincer around the entire separatist zone - rather than playing to the expectation of some sort of southern offensive.
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  27. #537

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Seems the Ukrainians blew up some facilities and at least 8 planes in a Crimean airbase. American and Ukrainian authorities have put forward a number of vague and/or contradictory explanations for how this might have occurred, suggesting Ukraine wants to obscure their capabilities to a degree.


    I knew from the beginning of the war that estimating crew or passenger casualties from vehicle losses was going to be tricky. Even when vehicles aren't destroyed or captured when parked with no or minimal crew, even a record of a catastrophically-destroyed vehicle allows the possibility that the explosion occurred at a length from impact, allowing passengers to escape, or maybe even as a followup well after combat subsided. Crews and passengers abandon vehicles for all sorts of reasons, often related to panic - put even a tank under enough machinegun fire or small arms fire, or within some proximity to artillery detonations, and the human element might decide to take their chances elsewhere. (In case you ever feel like cursing a wargame's morale model.)

    We've seen some crazy footage of the survivability of tanks. If you're not badly injured or disoriented, even a couple of seconds before detonation or deflagration can be enough to leap out of a hatch, depending on countless unique factors.

    This clip might take the cake. A full-mounted BMP takes a pretty serious hit, perhaps from a missile. The front part - engine compartment? - immediately goes up in flames. Yet even so, I count at least 6 soldiers escaping the burning vehicle in decent shape, which amounts to up to an entire mechanized infantry squad associated with a BMP (vehicle crews are drawn from passenger squads) escaping a permanent vehicle writeoff more or less intact.

    https://twitter.com/i/status/1557075448198303744
    Last edited by Montmorency; 08-11-2022 at 03:39.
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  28. #538
    Headless Senior Member Pannonian's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    Seems the Ukrainians blew up some facilities and at least 8 planes in a Crimean airbase. American and Ukrainian authorities have put forward a number of vague and/or contradictory explanations for how this might have occurred, suggesting Ukraine wants to obscure their capabilities to a degree.


    I knew from the beginning of the war that estimating crew or passenger casualties from vehicle losses was going to be tricky. Even when vehicles aren't destroyed or captured when parked with no or minimal crew, even a record of a catastrophically-destroyed vehicle allows the possibility that the explosion occurred at a length from impact, allowing passengers to escape, or maybe even as a followup well after combat subsided. Crews and passengers abandon vehicles for all sorts of reasons, often related to panic - put even a tank under enough machinegun fire or small arms fire, or within some proximity to artillery detonations, and the human element might decide to take their chances elsewhere. (In case you ever feel like cursing a wargame's morale model.)

    We've seen some crazy footage of the survivability of tanks. If you're not badly injured or disoriented, even a couple of seconds before detonation or deflagration can be enough to leap out of a hatch, depending on countless unique factors.

    This clip might take the cake. A full-mounted BMP takes a pretty serious hit, perhaps from a missile. The front part - engine compartment? - immediately goes up in flames. Yet even so, I count at least 6 soldiers escaping the burning vehicle in decent shape, which amounts to up to an entire mechanized infantry squad associated with a BMP (vehicle crews are drawn from passenger squads) escaping a permanent vehicle writeoff more or less intact.

    https://twitter.com/i/status/1557075448198303744
    Have you heard of Nicholas Moran, aka the Chieftain? He's probably contributed more to laypeople's understanding of the practicalities of tanking, with his best known contribution being the "Oh bugger, the tank is on fire" test. Which explains the surprisingly high survivability of the much-criticised M4 Sherman, and the low survivability of the much-praised T-34.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q6xvg5iJ4Zk

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  29. #539

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Ukraine might be flexing an ability to carry out attacks deep within Crimea.

    If, as the hope goes, these attacks anticipate a large-scale offensive to sever Russian holdings through Zaporizhzhia, then regardless of just how many units RuFor has transferred to the west, one would really hope that the recent actions foreshadow a capability and plan to disable the Kerch Strait bridge with the kickoff. Russia loses perhaps the majority of its supply capacity into Crimea and southern Ukraine in that case. No matter how significant the obstacles to maneuver warfare, "trapping" a large force with a limited logistical chain in Crimea/Kherson genuinely could lead it to 'die on the vine' beneath a campaign of attrition in a way that couldn't be accomplished under extant circumstances.

    But as before, if it doesn't develop soon then I don't see how Ukraine can take advantage of the disruption before it's remediated (as many of the logistical issues in Donetsk have been by now).
    Vitiate Man.

    History repeats the old conceits
    The glib replies, the same defeats


    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 



  30. #540

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Good demonstration of the probabilistic nature of fragmentary explosions. Those artillery hazard radii you see are more like 'this can theoretically happen if you're very unlucky.' What I don't understand is why... the subjects act like NPCs.
    https://twitter.com/Militarylandnet/...19856999268352 [VIDEO]
    Vitiate Man.

    History repeats the old conceits
    The glib replies, the same defeats


    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 



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