In my opinion, following the results of the first year of the war, the opposing sides have practically returned to their original position of complete uncertainty and unpredictability. Illusions that this war could end with a quick victory for one of the parties were nullified by the end of the year. Hopes for a possible quick outcome of the war, which a year ago had yet to be born, were, in my opinion, dispelled by the end of the year and remained behind the stern of history.
What do we understand now and what we did not understand six months ago? The populations of both Ukraine and Russia are not ready to give their governments a mandate to conclude peace at the cost of territorial concessions (for Russia, at the cost of giving up the occupied territories that it considers its own). And there, and there is a clearly expressed will to war. But:
- New mobilization no longer looks like an insurmountable obstacle for the Kremlin, while the continuation of mobilization in Ukraine requires more and more efforts;
- Economic sanctions against Russia have not led and in the near future obviously will not lead to the collapse of its economy, they create problems, but do not deprive the ability to continue the war for a long time, calculated in years;
- The readiness and ability of the West to provide military assistance to Ukraine is far short of the scale that would allow Ukraine to turn the tide of the war, and in connection with the upcoming elections in the United States, the chances of a sharp, multiple quantitative and qualitative, and most importantly, lightning-fast increase in this assistance are small. [
Ed. Remember that Biden only has ~$5 billion in drawdown funding to work with until FY 2024]
Thus, Ukraine, faced with perfidious aggression from Russia, on the eve of spring 2023, finds itself in the same difficult situation as on the eve of spring 2022. But if at that time the Western allies were guided by the outcome of the battle for Kyiv as a criterion for the “survivability” of the Ukrainian state project, now such a criterion is the outcome of the battle for Donbass. This is actually in a sense really “Stalingrad of the 21st century”. Both Moscow and Kyiv understand this very well. No wonder Putin addresses the nation in the shadow of Mamaev Kurgan. True, he confused the parties a little.
Recent lightweight statements about the supposedly imminent and inevitable end of the war after the de-occupation of Crimea (it was promised by the summer) have subsided. Ukraine is bleeding, and it is not yet up to large-scale offensive operations. But most importantly, it becomes obvious that even if this happened (the de-occupation of Crimea), it would not be the end point of this war, but only a prologue to its next bloodier phase.
A purely military victory over Russia seems to be more of an illusory and disorienting goal, and the bet on a quick Russian revolution (the uprising of the oligarchs and other utopias), under which the entire current sanctions agenda was formed, obviously failed. Against this background, an extremely unpleasant alternative looms:
- either the West (primarily the United States) stops playing the game of "no peace, no war, but help to Ukraine "a teaspoonful three times a month"" and gets involved in the war in full, taking all possible consequences and risks, with this connected,
or Ukraine will sooner or later be pressured (and from both ends) to negotiate a truce on extremely unfavorable terms for it.
Moreover, the later this happens, the worse the conditions will be, since the negotiations now and the negotiations after the loss of the defensive lines created over the course of eight years in the Donbass will differ greatly in their agenda. However, the defeat of the Russian army in the Donbass will give Ukraine a significant head start. But inflicting such a defeat with the current level of support from the West is very difficult.
More about this - in the latest program of Vitaly Dymarsky "Road Map" with Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
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