Great Power contentions

[Shaka_Khan]

[spmetla]

Certainly, a worrisome event, RIP to the two civilians killed.

This is more the scenario I was worried about but with the idea that Russia would have bowled over Ukraine and the war would have come right up to the borders of NATO countries (Poland, Hungary, Romania), as well a Russian move into Moldova.
Glad the above sentence is not the case and this seems to be either an embarrassingly bad miss or a deliberate provocation to try and it the nerves of various NATO countries that it is Russia they are opposing.

Think Poland probably invoking Article 4 and convening the NATO ambassadors for consultations seems the right move. Probably will see more NATO ADA units put on Poland's border area and an urge to get more top-shelf military hardware to Ukraine to enable them to win and do it soon as the longer it drags out the more potential there is for 'error's like these missiles.

Just like every North Korean barrage into South Korea doesn't set off a war, proportionality and cool heads seems the right attitude of the day.

However, if provocations like this continue or escalate and end up being deliberate, I could see NATO imposing a no-fly zone within certain distance of the NATO border with clear language the bases or units that fire into this area will face NATO strikes in response. It'd be a tight rope to walk between that and outright war but it could be done, short of Poland invoking Article 5 at which point WW3 is on.

[Montmorency]

Yes, the Russian military does a good job of leaving them all over the place for the Ukrainian military to capture and use. They clearly have enough to throw them away when they run out of fuel. Truly a decadent society like Japan in the 80s.

weh

[Crandar]

It looks like the missile was Ukrainian, so I don't expect any serious repercussions. If this is confirmed, Kiev should have taken responsibility immediately. It was a tragic mistake and part of the blame still lies with Russia for initiating hostilities. Their aggressive denials put the Baltic states in an embarrassing position and give the opportunity to Moscow to depict Ukraine as completely unreliable.

[Montmorency]

Another point I should admit being confidently wrong about is dismissing the possibilty that WW2-style decoys (e.g. arty, radars, SAMS) could be effective in the 21st century of high-resolution (sometimes) loitering optics and thermal and other enhanced imaging. Well, for months now clips have appeared of Russia attacking Ukrainain decoys. I've even seen a couple of Russian decoys. Seriously, can we pour one out for all the pre-2022 military experts who made their bones teaching that contemporary warfare was a heavily-technical pursuit that came completely distinct from what characterized 20th century industrial warfare?


Ukraine recently announced that it was restarting production on Soviet-caliber artillery ammunition, though it isn't clear to me if this is a plan in action or has already been achieved at some level. At any rate, I wonder how they're providing power to production, and if the facility is located in an underground or hardened location.

It looks like the missile was Ukrainian, so I don't expect any serious repercussions. If this is confirmed, Kiev should have taken responsibility immediately. It was a tragic mistake and part of the blame still lies with Russia for initiating hostilities. Their aggressive denials put the Baltic states in an embarrassing position and give the opportunity to Moscow to depict Ukraine as completely unreliable.

I'm pretty sure all of this was hashed out behind the scenes in a matter of hours if not minutes. The identity of the missile as an S-300-mounted missile was known to the public rather quickly, about 12 hours from the incident AFAIK. So we can assume it was known to the Polish and American authorities almost immediately. OSINT can identify missile wreckage almost on sight from photographs, and I don't imagine NATO governmental resources are any less in that respect. Radar and ballistic data would also have mathematically determined/excluded the origin of the missile once analyzed, maybe even faster than visual identification of wreckage. The Polish and American government likely had even more information than the Ukrainian one at the time.

To add a little detail, the S-300 is an air-defense platform used prominently by both sides, and while Russia has been reupurposing them as ground-attack artillery - we don't need to discuss the technical characteristics of a SAM missile when the distance from the nearest likely Russian launch site would have been the better part of a thousand kilometers, and Ukraine's AD was responding throughout the day to a nationwide bombardment by cruise missiles.

So I don't think there's any blame to apportion to Ukraine here with regard to potential international tensions.

[Montmorency]

The best way to describe the nature of battle in this war, if not still conventional warfare in general, might be the WW2 of minor powers, except everyone has loads of mobility, long-range fires, and ISR. That's it.


That Western countries only seem to be locking in expanded industrial capacity and orders after th better part of a year in, is just stupid. I haven't read these articles in full, so maybe someone can tell me if they contain any reference to an explanation from our authorities for this apparent oversight?
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business...hells-handing/
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/16...-low-industry/

[CrossLOPER]

weh

If you saw a bunch of abandoned Abrams tanks in Iraq, you would get the sense something is not right.

[Montmorency]

Days after I commented on the successful deployment of decoys in Ukraine, evidence emerged of Russia striking its own radar decoy in Kherson, the west bank it abandoned. It set up the decoy 2 months ago and then attacked it last week, though Ukraine seems to have ignored it the whole time it was under Russian control.
https://twitter.com/JohnB_Schneider/...16172191580160

A disloyal decoy.


The Oryx/Bellingcat OSINT people have done it again.

At the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, the SAA had on paper approximately the following number of armored tracked vehicles:

Tanks
T-55: 2 000
T-62: 1 000
T-72: 1 500

Armoured Personnel Carriers
BMP-1: 2 000
BMP-2: 100

Support Armoured Vehicles
BVP-1 AMB-S: 100
ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”: 400
armored recovery vehicles: 130

Self-Propelled Artillery
2S1 Gvozdika: 300
2S3 Akatsiya: 100

Note: The numbers of pre-war SAA armored tracked vehicles should be regarded as optimistic estimates. Some armored vehicles were lost in past decades without being accounted for, while many others were not operational (or even beyond repair) at the start of the Syrian Civil War due to being in long-term storage with minimal or no maintenance. Given these factors, more realistic initial numbers would be about 33% lower than what is listed above.

Those are visually confirmed alone. The Iraqi Armed Forces could probably easily roll over the SAA. (The spike in early 2020 is from Turkey demonstrating why air defense won't save you from drones if it isn't turned on.)

[CrossLOPER]

https://www.pcgamer.com/russian-inte...alker-larpers/

Between this and the SIMs 3 saga, I am not entirely sure what the FSB spends the majority of its time doing.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/video...nation-sims-3/

[Montmorency]

https://www.pcgamer.com/russian-inte...alker-larpers/

Between this and the SIMs 3 saga, I am not entirely sure what the FSB spends the majority of its time doing.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/video...nation-sims-3/

LARP became hyperreality. The Zone is a dangerous place for even the best-prepared.




EDIT: Allegedly Ukrainian domestic production of Soviet-caliber artillery has finally launched. Every aspect of this is very, very secret, so we won't get much evidence for a long time - but given Ukraine's resource constraints and the substantial damage its energy grid has suffered, without more objective data it will remain hard for me to believe that this production is above the artisanal level. Increases in the availability of Soviet cannons in combat missions would be a form of evidence.

[Montmorency]

From the IEA's energy efficiency report:



Across Europe, 7 countries accounting for 80% of residential gas use plan to ban new gas heating connections.

For example, Germany plans to put in place an implicit ban on new fossil fuel heating from 2024, when all newly-installed heating systems must be supplied by at least 65% renewable energy. France plans to ban new gas connections to buildings from 2023, Austria intends to implement a ban from 2023 and the Netherlands will require heat pump installations or heat network connections in buildings from 2026. The United Kingdom has announced plans to prohibit new gas heating systems and boilers by 2025, and ban them for all buildings by 2035.

The worm is turning. This will bring Europe in line with the similar ban schedules of some states and cities in the US. Economics is a weak area for me, but I don't see the math for Russia to either diversify to other commodities in the next decade, or replace the majority of its revenues through new partners. Global gas demand will either zero out or reach self-sufficiency almost everywhere before 2040.

Only renewables (and nuclear fusion?) permit energy independence.

[spmetla]

The worm is turning. This will bring Europe in line with the similar ban schedules of some states and cities in the US. Economics is a weak area for me, but I don't see the math for Russia to either diversify to other commodities in the next decade, or replace the majority of its revenues through new partners. Global gas demand will either zero out or reach self-sufficiency almost everywhere before 2040.

Yup, Russia could have used its ample base of scientists, engineers, and large skilled workforce together with ample natural resources to become a balanced world class economy in the post-Soviet era.
Instead, the Oligarchs and political cronyism decided to enrich themselves, turn Russia into merely an exporter of petro-chemicals, fertilizer, and metals, and staunch revanchism for losing their 'place in the sun' in Europe.

The apparent OPEC solidarity with Russia though is of increasing interest. The US public has long soured on our having to protect and invest in Saudi Arabia and Co., now surely the professional diplomats and strategists in the US and Europe may finally see that the Saudis never were and never will be our friends.

This is where I'd like Biden continuing to invest in shale oils in the Americas and where I wish that the Republicans together with Democrats could find a way to bring Venezuela in from its current isolation. Big yes to investing in Green energy and Nuclear to eventually wean off oils for fuel but in the near term we have the ability to reduce the clout of OPEC while also allowing for that oil money to go right into the US and Canadian economies.
Yes, they'll always hate the US and be wary of US military intervention but there must a way forward with the Maduro regime to get them to liberalize a bit in order to get some rule of law concessions and allow sanctions to be eased. Seeing as we have to deal with the sanctions in the form of Venezuelan refugees on the border anyhow it is not something the US can ignore. Same as the continued anarchy in Haiti though that seems to be an unsolvable problem without military force to stabilize the capital and allow for a return to civil rule, something no one including myself wants to undertake as that civil rule will then require the US and France to prop it up indefinitely.

[Montmorency]

Private firms don't want to invest in expanding oil exploitation in the US, because they've made more profit in the past year than in most of the 2010s. It's against their economic interest.

Similarly, when it comes to KSA and many other oil/gas-producing countries, their concern isn't Russia but the Western hostility to the long-term viability of petrochemicals, which is more or less in contravention of the basis for the formers' existence as sovereign states. European countries are currently begging for one last hit of the supply, so that they can finally get around to cutting off their dealers forever (besides actively investing in driving them out of business). Various countries - China, Russia, KSA, etc. - see us as competitors, rather than partners, and when it comes to petro-economies you can't say it isn't for good reason. No wonder Chinese diplomats are currently doing the rounds, whispering that unlike Whitey they'll definitely promise to be loyal gas-guzzling paypigs.

So returning to American or other alternative production... just to simplify the processes on both ends, imagine we started producing 10 million more barrels of oil tomorrow (daily global production has long been roughly 100 million/day IIRC), or increased our refining capacity by some quantity. Why wouldn't OPEC+ immediately respond by cutting actual production by, say, 11 million barrels?

Oil is an extremely liquid and fungible commodity on the GLOBAL market. There is no such thing as "energy independence" on the basis of domestic oil production. It is against the most fundamental interests of petro-economy actors to facilitate the transition of countries away from petro-chemicals, so they're naturally not about to make it convenient.

These points are something I feel those who historically reach for "someone should invest more in domestic oil" don't grasp. It's against the stakeholder responsibility of (American) primary producers in a transitioning economy to do so without the government forcing them to ("Socialism!"), and OPEC producers can counteract any such investment step for step if it comes at sufficient scale to threaten global price trends; OPEC producers are usually in the market at lower break-even prices anyway.

Semi-related because gas more so than oil, but in the 15 years of the "shale revolution" in the US fracking has been routinely unprofitable for companies that undertake it, because the supply grew so high so fast that extractors often can't make back their investment. I reposted an investigation into how these companies manipulate bankruptcy law to dump debt and environmental duties, on the Org in the past few years. This is what oversupply looks like.



Anyway, the next generation will be interesting as India will likely transition from a Russian to Western equipment base for its military, while the Gulf States may do so from an American to a Chinese base.


In other news, there was a big day for flak. Ukraine pushed a Soviet drone strike package into Russia that managed to penetrate to damage two Tu-22 strategic bombers on the ground north of Moscow, whereas one of Ukraine's Gepards shot down a Russian cruise missile.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1599806135850086410 [VIDEO]

Also, the Pentagon is reportedly finally beginning to draw contracts to bring 155mm shell production to 500K annually, I believe at least a doubling of the 2010s average, by 2025. Similar with other munitions.

[Shaka_Khan]

[Shaka_Khan]

[Shaka_Khan]

But I think those vehicles are using desert camouflage.

[spmetla]

They'll probably get resprayed in woodland camo when they get to Europe. Since the 2003 invasion all US vehicles come from the factory new/rebuilt in desert camo. Works out as it's still an easy light base to add woodland to if needed and since the premier armor training happens at the National Training Center in the desert between LA and Las Vegas and most of our armor is based out of Texas the desert works out for most stateside training events.
Mind you, a lot of our kit comes standard in desert now which is frustrating. My brigade's command post tents are all desert tan despite being in Hawaii which is not the best camo pattern here. A lot of our vehicles remain desert tan too as respraying to woodland seems a waste of money and man-hours when those maintenance people could be better used fixing broken vehicles.

Then again, they may end up just being used in desert tan in Europe. At the recent years tank competitions there our tanks were glaringly out of place in Europe in their desert tan color or plain olive drab instead of the old NATO woodland pattern. The US Army isn't the best when it comes to some of the basics of camo and uniform procurement efficiency.
https://youtu.be/FX-sf0UcJRI?t=468

[Montmorency]

A two-parter of some of the best analysis of operational prospects for a Russian winter offensive. GenStab-UA, for their part, has already hinted heavily that they are husbanding their resources for a counter-offensive, or perhaps a preemptive one, leaving some of the strategic initiative in Russia's hands. In my opinion, a serious thrust from Belarus would be the best case for Ukraine, as it would have the least potential for permanent territorial gains, would offer no strategic advantage to Russia, would redouble domestic and international resistance toward Russia, and would generally be a waste of resources towards any of Putin's stated objectives. An attack around the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk border, west of Donetsk City, could be the most dangerous; if very successful it could force a backward correction of the entire frontline by 5-10km. A quasi-offensive with resources split between central Donetsk (Bakhmut/Avdiivka) and the Luhansk border (Oskil-Krasna/Svatove area) may be the single likeliest scenario, though my confidence in the assessment is not that high.

A persistent limitation on Ukraine's side is the lack of complex tactical and operational skill and training, and a similar lack of refinement of command ability and administrative/technical expertise among the officer class. This has left Ukraine rather ineffective against prepared RuFOR defenses of any sort, when despite materiel shortcomings they should be able to achieve more with better tactics and better coordination of the artillery branch to shape local conditions. Of course this was common knowledge before the war, but even during the contribution of hands-on experience is not adequate to develop the appropriate skills. Battlefield experience alone teaches survival, not victory. More training is required for the latter, and NATO training programs during the war can hardly be called the bare minimum. The lack of skill and discipline among typical UFOR units (to say nothing of militias) has been commented on often by foreign volunteers, and is sometimes visible in footage of offensive actions that closely resembles analogous footage of defective Russian tactics.

In 10 months of hostilities, how the collective NATO alliance hasn't absorbed a couple hundred thousand Ukrainian civilians, leavened with a few thousand experienced serving Ukrainians, and offered them a full NATO-standard training course, is one of the great scandals/blunders of the war. Had this been accomplished, alongside training of officers up to general rank, as well as of technical and logistical specialists, the baseline of the Ukrainian military could exceed that of the VDV by now. It is within our capabilities, and would be an irreplaceable exercise and stress test of our capacity to mass-mobilize our own civilians in a world war. Not that we anticipate such a need anytime soon, but it's advantageous institutional knowledge to develop, well worth the initial cost of investing our military resources in such a large-scale program for Ukraine's sake.

Ukraine ends the year with one of the most powerful and skilled militaries in the world, and arguably the best-motivated or willful, but it's still very close to the Russian level in aggregate ability and individual combat power (trending gradually upward with the influx of penal and reservist elements), and just trash by American standards.



Also, apparently this is still happening.

[Montmorency]

Pursuant to the above...
https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/st...37882994819072

Yes, of course, it's ridiculous to try to turn the UA military into a NATO military on the fly, but the thing is that there is a definite lack of skills at all levels that hinders UFOR from reaching its full potential with the resources it possesses or specializes in. I don't think it's unreasonable to say that Ukraine is still poor at, for example, concentrating its technically-superior artillery against RuFOR defenses to suppress enemy artillery and fixed emplacements to achieve a breakthrough. A month's training and 6 months' field experience is great for basic artillery work, but at this point the high-value systems should have had their crews rotated out, at least partially, with personnel with 6 months' training.

I'm not saying it would be enough to ensure a breakthrough to Kharkiv-style deep maneuver in the south, or would have been enough against multiple defensive belts in Kherson in the fall, but it would probably be enough - in combination with better infantry and better officers - to maintain consistent initiative. RuFOR would not have time to dig in and erect sophisticated fortifications across hundreds of kilometers. Because UFOR lost its momentum in the north by early October, RuFOR took the next month to regroup, and more or less since the fall of Kherson they've been conducting more routine attacks than UFOR. And yet many people still speak as though Ukraine retains the initiative. That progression was a failure on our part as much as on Ukraine's, and this is the case whether or not we equip Ukraine with a NATO air force.


EDIT: Pursuant to the previously-mentioned M-55S T-55 upgrades that Ukraine received from Slovenia, it turns out that in fact the upgrade does not come with thermal sights and Ukraine will not have access to the most modern ammo. It can still reliably match the older Russian T-72 and T-80 models if it comes to it however. According to the presenter it should only be considered equivalent to the Russian T-62M.

[Montmorency]

Enemy at the gates. One assumes penal.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

20? 30?

[rory_20_uk]

NATO / The West seems to be treating the war as some sort of video game - when Ukraine gets to the next level new items are unlocked - IFVs now and perhaps tanks later.
Germany seems to view tanks as offensive weapons hence why they're not offered. Why they needed over 2,000 to defend earlier against the Warsaw Pact if they're offensive - and Ukraine does need to attack to recapture their territory.

[Montmorency]

NATO / The West seems to be treating the war as some sort of video game - when Ukraine gets to the next level new items are unlocked - IFVs now and perhaps tanks later.
Germany seems to view tanks as offensive weapons hence why they're not offered. Why they needed over 2,000 to defend earlier against the Warsaw Pact if they're offensive - and Ukraine does need to attack to recapture their territory.

Yes, but. Well, over time we learn how complicated things are. Germany is not singularly miserly, since it has done quite a lot for Ukraine on a per capita basis compared to the rest of NATO, and the Scholz government has always been pretty clear about only taking steps in reaction to collective or American decisions (e.g. Abrams-before-Leopards pathway).

I believe Germany and some others can go without an armored branch, but upon examination it turns out that out of the countries willing to donate more than zero tanks to Ukraine, only a battalion or two of Leopard 2(~A4) could be mustered out of "surplus." Avoiding self-demilitarization is at least an excuse, if IMO a short-sighted one.

Some details I've learned about specifically tank combat in Ukraine are that both Ukraine and Russia rely on late-Cold War APFSDS projectiles for their 125mm cannons, such as the 3BM42 Mango, which achieves 500mm RHAe at 2k. The Russians do not use post-Cold War projectiles at similar scale because 4-500mm is enough to defeat common Ukrainian T-64BVs frontally. Ukraine does not have access to later projectiles in any numbers.

The Russian modernizations of T-72s and T-80s, and even T-62s, achieve considerable improvements in protection against both AP and HEAT shells. Maybe in practice these upgrades don't perform exactly as advertised, and corruption and ineptness sometimes leave Russian modernized tanks without regulation armor coverage, but in general we've seen Russian armor tech working well enough to be worth handling at face value.

It's to the point where NATO Cold War-era munitions of both 105mm and 125mm are simply obsolete versus their armor, since Russia invested in beating NATO tech and Europe mostly relaxed, I guess.

Except the US M829A1 for Abrams, which is what devastated Iraq's early-model T-72s in 1991 alongside the M829, which is comparable to its Russian age-peer the 3BM42. But even those are dated against Russian composites and Kontakt-5/Relikt ERA, which close to doubled effective resistance over early models. 500-600mm RHAe penetration is simply not enough to achieve reliable frontal penetration from 1 or 2km against T-72B3, T-80BVM, and the T-90 series (though there's some chance against various spots, and a decent one from the side). M829A2 I think was specifically tested on T-72B and T-90, that generation of Kontakt-5 and composite, and found to penetrate at 2km. M829A3 was developed specifically to counter Kontakt-5, and I assume A4 offers at least 1000mm penetration at long range, making it competitive against even the most contemporary Russian and Chinese tanks. But while I don't know enough to say, it's possible the US won't send later M829 models (A2/3/4) alongiside Abrams if and when that deal comes through, out of concern that Russia will capture samples and reverse-engineer toward better armor for themselves and China. And the US may be concerned for its prestige, since legacy M1 and M1A1 Abrams can easily be penetrated anywhere by contemporary Russian projectiles and common missiles, and of course any tank can be disabled by a direct blow to the top by artillery shells.

For example, the oft-touted donation candidate Leopard 1 was designed with notably thin armor even for the 1950s, and its ammo performance, similar to that of the just-committed AMX-10RC, is no good against anything but T-62s frontally, even in line with what we should expect from the legacy ammo available for the Slovenian T-55s donated to Ukraine. But the RC has the virtue of much better mobility, making it better suited for recon, infantry support and assault gun roles.

Keep in mind, the tanks and IFVs we send to Ukraine are 1960s-80s tech that the Russian fleet has been specifically upgraded against.


Thankfully, in this war the biggest killer of tanks is probably indirect artillery (!), followed by ATGM/MANPAT, and then by mines. Tank duels might be responsible for, I dunno, 10%? 5%? Less? More than drones though, since drones have been reserved for scrapping parked or abandoned tanks most of the time and that's not a traditional engagement. Just before the war, a joint Ukrainian-Belarussian venture developed the Stugna-P (domestic designation) ATGM, which is actually competitive for Top 10 ATGM and whose more advanced missile achieves 1100mm RHAe penetration and is rated to ride up to 5.5km, enough to defeat any tank in Russia's arsenal (and there's footage of it defeating lots of tanks). If only Ukraine could be helped to produce them in any significant quantity.


In good news, factors such as the successful alternative sourcing, global economic slowdown (manifested in downward price pressure), record winter heat (climate change silver linings), and unprecedented private sector efforts to increase efficiency of operations (they could have done that all along?), have kept natural gas storage in Germany and elsewhere close to full. Storages will likely not drop below 50% this winter. There will not be rationing in Europe after all.

[Furunculus]

poland seems to be playing a clever game with Leopard 2's:
they have them, and don't want them - as they play no useful part in advancing its geopolitical and industrial agendas.

working in cahoots with britain - who will trigger the detonation by sending 10 C2's - poland hopes to start an avalanche of leopard deliveries from the many european users.
presuming this hot war continues on for another five years then the entire used market of leapard 2 tanks (very large!) can essentially be seen as 'war attrition' stocks.

this aligns with their industrial strategy:
> local production of licensed K2PL tanks - which could become the default european tank for everyone but France/Germany, i.e. people who want a tank but don't need a $10m dollar super tank, which includes nations up to the scale of italy, and perhaps even (maritime) britain.

this aligns with their geopolitical strategy:
> creating an alternate power-bloc that cuts across its EU/Nato relationships, supporting Ukraine and probably see it become a formal member of the Three Seas Initiative. once all the war attrition stocks are burnt up, i fully expect to see Ukraine equipped with K2PL/K9/Borsuk.

late 2020's looks like a good time for polish industry!

[Montmorency]

Poland and the UK are going to supply symbolic MBT companies - one company each. Actually, as you'll see, Poland hasn't even requested permission from Germany to transfer Leopards, making their contribution even more symbolic so far. Still, this is the most movement on equipment transfers we've seen since the October strategic bombing wave and the Spring Offensive crisis.

It better all be leading to the announcement of an American-trained Abrams tank division next week (at Ramstein)

Chancellor Scholz says deliveries of heavy weapons depend on coordination ‘with our transatlantic partner.’

The chancellor has repeatedly argued against sending Leopards by saying that Germany must not act alone in sending Western tanks

Like I said, this has been well-understood since last spring. I've already fulminated about the failure of the US and European NATO governments to have the foresight to invest in training up several hundred thousand Ukrainians, including officers and specialists, to NATO standards around at least some NATO-equipped formations. E.g. two overstrength divisions, one out of the EU, one out of the US. Imagine one Abrams tank division, and one Leopard 2/Challenger 2/Leclerc mechanized division, self-sufficient operational formations, trained to elite status by the standards of this war, getting ready to ship out to Ukraine right about NOW.

“The British army works off about 50 tanks,” says Mr King. “[They] are extremely old, and they break down all the time.”

You know, the fact that Russia spent the past decade modernizing two thousand of its tanks to be proof against Cold War-era NATO tank/AT tech, while NATO progressively demilitarized, is kind of a telling sign of malice.

The adage of the blade itself inciting to violence remains valid.

*side-eyes Poland*

On the other hand, George Friedman looking some way these days with Turkish assertiveness and a Polish partnership with an East Pacific country (though not a prospective "naval power" nor Japan).

[Montmorency]

Furunc, the theory is interesting but it's hard to see it working.

1. Since when does Poland want to dump its Leopard 2 fleet anytime soon? It's in the process of modernizing it. While the majority of the pre-war armor branch was composed of T-72 variants, not all of these have yet been sent. That is, media reports indicate they sent 240 by mid-2022, which constitutes a full third of Poland's pre-war fleet. Another third remains (or a quick search hasn't indicated any new deliveries), mostly PT-91 I believe. Is Poland going to suddenly donate the Leopard 2s it's paying to upgrade while holding on to some mid-grade T-72 models? Poland wants Abrams for any transfers of Leopards, as far as I understand it, which would take a little more time to arrange, but would certainly remain in service for at least another decade. One thing I'm sure of is that Poland is not literally going to divest itself of all its tanks before production of K2 replacements can replace them, which would take years. At the very minimum, even if you assume anti-Russian fanaticism, some, including the US admin, would impress that Polish tanks pointed at Kaliningrad and Belarus are more valuable than they would be in Ukrainian hands.

2. Poland has ordered 1000 K2s (for $10+ million per unit??). To be precise, most of them have not been contracted yet, but there is a memorandum of understanding so to speak. In the past decade, only a few hundred K2s have been produced. Last year Poland received a batch of 10 tanks. Even if SK prioritizes export over domestic acquisition, production capacity is likely to be preoccupied with the Polish and domestic orders for the rest of the decade. This is also why indications are that Poland will maintain hundreds of Abrams and Leopards for years to come (beside my recollection that their government has claimed an intention to maintain hundreds of Abrams and L2s for years).

3. As noted above, there are not really many surplus L2s in Europe - 100 for Ukraine this year might be optimistic - and even if in theory some countries such as Poland would demilitarize in exchange for a K2 backfill, there will not be any realization of K2 backfill as a physical factor for years to come. The war will not go on for that long, and there is no question that Abrams would meet Ukraine's needs in such an extended timeframe.

4. Germany isn't going to exchange Leopards for K2s. I don't see why Turkey would. It and Austria aren't even likely to give up any tanks to Ukraine. Czechoslovakia are sources of T-72 for Ukraine, but they seem to be ordering Leopard 2A4, and being small countries make small tank markets. Greece? Possible, but only well into the future, once reliability of production and the platform itself is demonstrated. Even so, Greek surplus Leopards would end up somewhere, likely in Europe. In the meantime, I doubt Greece would exchange Leopards for anything less than Abrams up front. Spain has a lot of Leopard 2, currently in pretty bad condition, but they are 100% of its tank fleet and I suspect it will prefer to restore and modernize its existing fleet - a very viable prospect - than replace it entirely. Moreover, Spain is rather insulated from the defense spending wave affecting Europe. Same applies for Portugal's small fleet. Canada has only a few dozen combat-variant Leopard 2s - doesn't seem like a K2 candidate?

5. That leaves Hungary. Hungary is currently expanding its Leopard force with 2A7s, but maybe they will replace T-72s with K2s. Still, 100 tanks by 2035 seems optimistic. Also, we have the Nordics. Denmark is currently modernizing to 2A7 and has a double-digit fleet; not a candidate. The rest have 300+ Leopard 2, not sure what they've planned for it. Unclear interest, not that much potential. Italy - Italy might just as well be a market for surplus Leopard 2 if divesting of indigenous hardware surely, especially if K2 does make inroads elsewhere. But it is one of the better candidates. Somehow I'm not seeing that K2 fits into the continental defense picture very prominently.

6. I haven't covered the likes of the Baltics - who are too small to matter and currently operate zero tanks as a deliberate doctrinal choice - and the Balkans other than Greece, because I haven't looked into them. K2 for Kosovo?




In conclusion, the K2 and other aspects of the Polish-Korean joint venture represent an interesting inroad into the European market, but between the Leopard 2, the FrancoGerman Eurotank (Main Ground Combat System), and possibly surplus Abrams, there isn't much space for expansion. It's possible the Middle East or Africa become the real market, but I don't know enough to speculate, and that fruits well into the 2030s if it does. If being extraordinarily optimistic I can see European and/or NATO countries other than Poland fielding 500 K2 by 2040. Under 100 is just as likely. AFAICT this joint venture is more clearly a winning industrial strategy for South Korea, which can pursue opportunities globally, than for Poland, which is focused on its near-abroad.


I could be wrong if, like, the EU realizes that Ukraine lacks the resources to defeat Russia outright and goes all-in on Lend Lease to the point of obviating Abrams. But that just creates an opportunity for K2, one that may or may not be taken advantage of if Abrams, L2, and the Eurotank persevere in the face of K2's relative late-mover penalty.

[Furunculus]

There were about 3,600 Leopard 2's made, currently in about a dozen major upgrade tiers depending on when they were last tinkered with.

Poland had many hundreds of legacy soviet tanks, as well as a couple hundred of post cold-war hundred leopard 2.
Poland will have many hundreds of K2PL tanks under licence production, as well as a couple hundred of M1's for geopolitical reasons.

Many of the legacy soviet tanks have already gone to Ukraine, and these are essentially war attrition stocks. They have no long term future for Ukraine. They will be expended over the next few years, as will anything else gifted to Ukraine in the next few years.
Poland has no long term interest in operating Leopard 2s. It is an aging niche fleet when they will soon be operating multiples more of more modern types. I merely suggest here that it is advantageous for Poland for L2's to become war attrition stocks too.

There is no ambition to sell K2PL to Germany or France, they have their own tank industry and will seek to preserve it.
Their product will be v. expensive. Top tier tanks with a top-tier price.
Likewise, there is no intention of selling to Turkey, who will have their own variant of the K2.

Where the opportunity lies in europe for Poland is what the many medium/small nations do when their own aging niche fleets reach end of life. They won't want to spend top dollar for top tier tanks with a top-tier price from France or Germany (or the US):
They simply don't operate at a scale where they have the budget to buy them without soaking up their entire capital budget for a decade.
They simply don't have the ambition to resist - by which I mean having both an existential threat and a scale to do something about it.

They will want something cheaper and NATO standard and preferably 'european'.

KMW will certainly offer to upgrade their existing tank fleet if they operate Leopard 2's.
And other operators of L2 fleets will certainly offer to sell theirs on (as seen by Netherlands and Spain).

The Austrian Army acquired 114 Leopard 2A4s from surplus Dutch stocks.
The Canadian Army acquired 80 Leopard 2A4 and 20 Leopard 2A6 tanks from the Netherlands in 2007.
The Czech Ministry of Defence announced it will get 15 Leopards 2A4 from Germany as an exchange for Czech tanks that will be given to Ukraine to help defend against Russian invasion and may purchase up to 50 modern 2A7+ variants later.
The Royal Danish Army operated 57 Leopard 2A5DK (equal to Leopard 2A6 minus the L/55 gun).
Finland agreed with the Netherlands to purchase 100 used Leopard 2A6NL tanks for approximately €200 million.
The Hellenic Army operates 183 Leopard 2A4s and 170 Leopard 2A6 HEL vehicles.
Hungary did a deal for 44 Leopard 2A7+ and 12 second hand Leopard 2A4 was signed in December 2018.
The Polish Land Forces operate 142 Leopard 2A4s, 105 Leopard 2A5s.
The Portuguese Army operates 37 ex-Dutch Leopard 2A6s, acquired in 2008 for €80 million.
The Slovak Ministry of Defence announced it will get 15 Leopards 2A4 from Germany in an exchange for its 30 tracked BMP-1 IFV's.
The Spanish Army operates 327 Leopard 2s (108 ex-German Leopard 2A4s and 219 new-built Leopard 2A6+ (Leopard 2E).
Sweden has acquired 120 Leopard 2 Improved tanks, upgrading them as the Stridsvagn 122, with 42 Strv 122 tanks remaining in active service.
The Swiss Army purchased 380 2A4s designated Pz 87, 134 of these tanks have been modernised, with the remaining tanks are in storage.

And aside from the above, you have to wonder whether Italy will build a local designed replacment for the Ariete in the 2030's...? I suspect not. They made the ariete because they didn't want top-tier.
You also have to wonder whether the UK's challenger '3' upgrade is a long term solution, i.e. a fleet it intends to fight into the 2nd half of the 21st century. C2's biggest failing is a lack of upgrades, C3 will be the same.

looks pretty good for Poland.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yrbaAKZfjwg

[Montmorency]

But I covered that, including linking to a careful perusal of national L2 stocks. They are not as large as one may think, though that's somewhat tangential.

Poland by all indications will operate L2 at least through the rest of the decade.

K2 could take up to a decade to mature as a product with reliable delivery schedule outside the current early adopters, and in the meantime surplus L2 and ongoing production would be more readily available as well as cheaper for older models. (The contract prices you mentioned in your listing just further emphasize that ATM L2 is far cheaper than K2 ...) If you look at (almost) every European country as I just did, pick out the ones who are candidates to replace their current fleets with K2, and estimate the number of units they would absorb.

It just doesn't add up to a lot. And no, counting every Leopard 2 that exists and assuming that all those countries will affirmatively choose to pay to replace them outright as a rule can't make it work. That's not happening, and even if it were the K2 materially would not and could not fill that vast void. Countries currently fall into several categories, to simplify:

1. No prospect of Polish K2 sales (Germany, France, UK, Turkey).
2. Are not likely to expand their own fleets (no geopolitical need) and/or are currently investing in L2 expansion or modernization (Canada, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Czechia, Slovakia, Hungary, reportedly Romania and Bulgaria).
3. Have money to choose any platform they like and currently operate large L2 fleets (Switzerland, Nordics).
4. Countries too small for tanks or to matter regardless (Belgium, Baltics, Moldova).
5. Italy and Greece.
6. Yugoslavia???

Italy and Greece are merely hypothetical customers, and Greece is currently heavily invested in L2.

Unless you explain how K2 overcomes its production schedule and cost limitations and beats out Abrams and Eurotank and L2 path dependence to make inroads into categories 2 and 3, the prospects within Europe are not strong. That's why I suspect a South Korean outpost in Eastern Europe is of more benefit to its own international arms sales, including looking forward to places like the Middle East, than it is for Polish soft power in Europe. There is already, after all, a proposed Middle Eastern variant of the K2(M).

OTOH I will give you that it is plausible that the current Norwegian bid competition between L2A7 and K2 could create more K2 momentum if Norway chooses it. However, this would at best prove of indirect help to Poland as Norway would license production of K2 domestically for a bespoke variant (K2NO) - following delivery of an initial batch from Korea. Norway might instead go the troll route and decline to purchase any tanks according to current information...

My impression of Latin America is that there is neither want nor need for expensive 21st century tanks, other than Colombia sucking up to the US through a looming Abrams tender (it currently has no tanks). Otherwise, Chile has a surprisingly large fleet of 200+ Leopard 2A4. It would take a hard sell for K2 to make inroads in Latin America. Are there any prospects for escalating regional hostilities unchecked by the US to be aware of?

Essentially it amounts to not a big role for K2 in Europe and not a big role for Poland in K2.

I watched the Perun video previously and recall it carefully avoids making a concrete analysis of K2's potential market penetration, just as it avoids analyzing Poland's payment mechanisms for its proposed arms race.

[Montmorency]

Interesting on the Leopard 2. In terms of armor and firepower, the common variant received by Ukraine, 2A4, would be pretty comparable to the T-64BV, sadly. This is why it was worth it to start revisiting actual protection/penetration values; even assuming superior fire control, optics, comms, and computing on the L2's part, late-Cold War MBT variants other than the M1A1 are just badly outdated in contemporary large-scale battle. I recall being amused at the performance of Turkish L2s in Syria, but that was misguided. Both Turkish L2s and Iraqi T-72s (and Saudi export Abrams) suffered as much from obsolescence of their technical characteristics as user error, and the lesson coming through this war is once again 'Only 21st-c. tanks are worth anything if you actually plan to fight a serious war.'




Extensive report wargaming a China-Taiwan war using open-source data.

The invasion always starts the same way: an opening bombardment destroys most of Taiwan’s navy
and air force in the first hours of hostilities. Augmented by a powerful rocket force, the Chinese navy
encircles Taiwan and interdicts any attempts to get ships and aircraft to the besieged island. Tens of
thousands of Chinese soldiers cross the strait in a mix of military amphibious craft and civilian rollon, roll-off ships, while air assault and airborne troops land behind the beachheads.

However, in the most likely “base scenario,” the Chinese invasion quickly founders. Despite
massive Chinese bombardment, Taiwanese ground forces stream to the beachhead, where the
invaders struggle to build up supplies and move inland. Meanwhile U.S. submarines, bombers, and
fighter/attack aircraft, often reinforced by Japan Self-Defense Forces, rapidly cripple the Chinese
amphibious fleet. China’s strikes on Japanese bases and U.S. surface ships cannot change the result:
Taiwan remains autonomous.

There is one major assumption here: Taiwan must resist and not capitulate. If Taiwan surrenders
before U.S. forces can be brought to bear, the rest is futile.

This defense comes at a high cost. The United States and Japan lose dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and thousands of servicemembers. Such losses would damage the U.S. global position
for many years. While Taiwan’s military is unbroken, it is severely degraded and left to defend a
damaged economy on an island without electricity and basic services. China also suffers heavily. Its
navy is in shambles, the core of its amphibious forces is broken, and tens of thousands of soldiers
are prisoners of war.

I have no insight about the validity of the results, but the justification of the reliance on OSINT is cogent:

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

This project used only unclassified data so that its results can inform public debate. Some observers,
particularly within the government, might argue that accurate modeling is impossible without access
to classified data. However, classified data is not necessary for the construction of a credible wargame.
Although classified data might help tweak certain parameters (e.g., missile ranges, intercept probabilities,
and submarine detection capabilities), they would not change the fundamental structure of the game or
the outcomes. The reasons are threefold.

First, much information that was previously classified is now available from open sources. For example,
The Military Balance by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) provides detailed
equipment numbers, while Jane’s databases provide detailed information about equipment capabilities.
Google Earth provides information about facilities that required U-2 flights during the Cold War. The
team used Google Earth to determine the number and location of Chinese underground airfields, the
size of parking ramps, and other parameters of air bases. Although classified imagery might refine this
information, unclassified information is more detailed and accurate than ever before.112

Second, classified data is not necessarily correct data. It is vulnerable to a lack of probing and testing
because of restricted access. Indeed, bureaucratic and political forces may require government actors to
accept weapons testing data that does not account for the friction that can greatly diminish weapons
effectiveness in the real world. For example, classified Air Force testing projected a 92 percent hit
rate for the AIM-9J missile before its fielding in Vietnam; analysis after the war found that its actual
hit rate was 13 percent.113 A similar result was obtained in the infamous U.S. torpedo scandal of
World War II.114 These mistakes were possible because projections of future conflicts require making
assumptions about events that have never happened and classification prevented the usual vetting of
these projections. No squadron of F-35s has ever engaged a squadron of J-20s; predicting the result of
such an engagement relies on assumptions, regardless of classification level. Most of the parameters
in the project’s wargame are based on historical data; classified information might help refine these
assumptions but would not replace the importance of historical data.

Third, the appropriate use of historical data can sometimes be more accurate in modeling future
conflicts than classified information about specific weapons systems. Before Desert Storm, classified
models using accurate weapons performance data predicted 20,000 to 30,000 casualties. However,
private commentators predicted fewer casualties, based on data from Israel’s Six-Day War.115 Although
the classified models had more accurate weapons capability data, they modeled the Iraqis as fighting as
competently as the Soviets.116 The open-source models accounted for the poorer operational competence
of Arab militaries, which more than made up for their deficiencies in classified weapons performance
data. Thus, open-source models have value beyond their intrinsic transparency and public accessibility.

[Montmorency]

As I explained, and was well-known since early in the war, Scholz has now made it explicit that he will not consent to the transfer of Leopard 2 to Ukraine unless the US contributes at least a token quantity, even single digits, of Abrams.

Either way, the penny packet bullshit continues.


Of course this month's Wagner discourse has also focused on interbranch animosity between Prigozhin and the MoD, the VSRF's efforts to one-up Wagner, and the possibility of Putin sanctioning reduced interbranch cooperation (to Wagner's detriment).

But there's another complication for Prigozhin, which is that he recruited his convicts (probably at least 50K) for too short a term: 6 months. His earliest recruits, the surviving ones, are reportedly already being separated/graduated. This will reach a critical mass by April if proceeding to the conclusion determined by mechanics. Almost no convicts will be left in time for any putative spring offensive, and those who do remain will be running out the clock. While Wagner should still have a couple brigades' worth of its professional core by then, it will still have to resign itself to low relevance. And perhaps Prigozhin's opponents among the Russian elite have had this in mind while watching his 'use it or lose it' tactics in the Wagner zone of responsibility (North Donetsk). I kind of always just assumed Prigozhin would alter the arrangement Vader-style, but - maybe he can't? Lol.

If Wagner won't be allowed access to Russian deserters, draftees, or separatists (unlike pre-annexation), then he has no plausible source of replenishment at scale.


In connection with some of my other musings:

[Montmorency]

Only a fascist could play himself into prison abolition and mass amnesty.