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Thread: Great Power contentions

  1. #571

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Turkey and Azerbaijan seem unsatisfied with anything short of the total conquest of Armenia, so Pashinyan has invoked Article 4 (ha. ha. ha) of the CSTO and put Putin in a hard place. Honestly I would have Biden advise the Armenian government that as long as they unofficially abandon any plans of ever relieving NK, NATO forces will tutor tens of thousands of their professional personnel in combined arms defense and irregular warfare.


    Ukrainian air assault in Kharkiv (could just be transport?) [VIDEO]


    As war began, Putin rejected a Ukraine peace deal recommended by aide
    Vladimir Putin's chief envoy on Ukraine told the Russian leader as the war began that he had struck a provisional deal with Kyiv that would satisfy Russia's demand that Ukraine stay out of NATO, but Putin rejected it and pressed ahead with his military campaign, according to three people close to the Russian leadership.

    The Ukrainian-born envoy, Dmitry Kozak, told Putin that he believed the deal he had hammered out removed the need for Russia to pursue a large-scale occupation of Ukraine, according to these sources. Kozak's recommendation to Putin to adopt the deal is being reported by Reuters for the first time.

    Putin had repeatedly asserted prior to the war that NATO and its military infrastructure were creeping closer to Russia's borders by accepting new members from eastern Europe, and that the alliance was now preparing to bring Ukraine into its orbit too. Putin publicly said that represented an existential threat to Russia, forcing him to react.

    But, despite earlier backing the negotiations, Putin made it clear when presented with Kozak's deal that the concessions negotiated by his aide did not go far enough and that he had expanded his objectives to include annexing swathes of Ukrainian territory, the sources said. The upshot: the deal was dropped.
    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency 2/14 View Post
    I don't know, maybe, but it's hard for me to see what Putin can spin as a win if he cuts bait now. An American/EU promise to veto Ukrainian NATO/EU hopes in exchange for observable demobilization in the east (Crimea is a lost cause) is certainly a compromise that I hope our governments have sounded out for what it's worth. But if it were that simple wouldn't the deal have been finalized and publicized long ago? If he just returns troops home following the conclusion to the scheduled exercise with Belarus, what exactly does he tell the public in closing?
    Well understood by those without partisan interest in lying or playing the fool.




    Very quick check (not differentiating between fronts, but likely >90% from Kharkiv): In the week+ 9/6 through 9/13, Oryx recorded roughly 110 tank and 210 AFV* losses by Russia. This includes probably 50 T-72B3 variants (post-Cold War), the pre-war skeleton of the VSRF tank force making up at least 50% of all active service tanks. And remember, the Kharkiv front was arguably Russia's lowest priority for armor deployments given the distribution of forces (other than the 1st Guards Tank Army remnants). The critical piece confirming the semi-organized nature of the abandonment of the Izyum bridgehead is that whole depots stocked with tanks in various states of repair have been found scattered throughout the liberated territory, yet SPGs come in dribs and drabs. If we're speaking of all barrel artillery, my very rough assessment of the force composition of Russians in Kharkiv is that there should be about as many tanks as cannons - yet the documented losses of the former far exceed those of the latter. Perhaps even more telling is that zero Russian SAM systems have been recovered in Kharkiv. Russians really prioritized saving their artillery and air defense (pending the documentation of some prodigious cache). Nevertheless, there's at least another few hundred AFVs and tanks remaining to be logged from Kharkiv.

    If it comes down to human waves of Russian conscripts with AK47s backed by North Korean shells, Ukraine can still retain the balance of power.


    *I categorize all APC, IFV, and IMV as AFV
    Last edited by Montmorency; 09-15-2022 at 02:01. Reason: Typos
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  2. #572
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Guess all the countries in the former Soviet Union are seeing the writing on the wall regarding this current incarnation of Russia and off to do their own things. Beside the Azeris attacking Armenia there's all this:

    China to support Kazakhstan in defending independence, sovereignty
    https://tass.com/world/1507313
    China?s leader Xi Jinping said that his country will resolutely support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity during a meeting with his Kazakh counterpart Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Nur-Sultan, the Kazakh president's press service reported on Wednesday.
    Guess the Kazakhs have found their new friends. Guess in China's view their partnership without limits meant more no limits on how much to infringe on the other partner's 'turf.'

    Two reported killed in clashes between Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards
    https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-p...ds-2022-09-14/
    Kyrgyz and Tajik border guards exchanged fire in three separate incidents in a border dispute on Wednesday, killing at least two people, officials on both sides said.

    The clashes came on the eve of a regional security summit, and a day after new fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan raised fears of instability spreading to other parts of the former Soviet Union while Russian forces fight in Ukraine.

    Kyrgyz border guards accused the Tajiks of having taken positions at a part of the border that has not been demarcated. The Tajik side said Kyrgyz guards had opened fire on a Tajik outpost without any provocation.

    Clashes at the border occur regularly, and last year almost triggered an all-out war between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, both allies of Russia that host Russian military bases.
    With Afghanistan in Taliban hands it'd be nice if the rest of the region could keep it together. Hope this isn't escalated as Russia is in no position mediate as it did last year.

    I know the rumor mill has also got stuff about Georgia eying up South Ossetia and Abkhazia again though that'd be a real dumb move unless Russia really collapses though it was equally dumb last time too. Georgia certainly hasn't been preparing so it'd probably go worse than last time despite Russia's current problems.

    A new Great Game in Central Asia but more a balance of Turkey and India (not united together but generally against China) versus China vying for new influence as Russia's decline continues. Think the US/EU role will really be more investments to try and limit China's influence from the New Silk Road project as neither are really positioned to do more.

    Armenia trying to invoke Article 4 of the CSTO with no response from Russia will certainly be the nail in the coffin for that agreement as Russia is the only member with the means to help Armenia.
    Last edited by spmetla; 09-16-2022 at 03:44.

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    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  3. #573

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Would be a hell of a thing to have three conventional wars raging all at once in the post-Soviet space. Consequences of Russian instability. If we have a full war between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, I also wouldn't be surprised to see Uzbekistan opportunistically join in over Ferghana claims. And then the Taliban decide on a quick foreign adventure and China exerts a police action to clean up the mess huehuehue.

    Contemporary relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1:27:



    The Armenian nationalists really should have used the leverage from their own bout of ethnic cleansing in the 1990s to secure autonomy for NK within Azerbaijan. Now it's far too late and the long-term security of the Armenian state itself is in question. The nationalists still don't seem to recognize this however.

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    Guess the Kazakhs have found their new friends. Guess in China's view their partnership without limits meant more no limits on how much to infringe on the other partner's 'turf.'
    It has been pointed out that Kazakhstan has been a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization since 1996 (as has Russia), and Chinese leadership has been reiterating its stance on the "independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity" of its neighbors for decades. The drift of Kazakhstan toward China's orbit should be expected to be gradual. All the same, the quoted phrase does carry special significance in the context of - now. Not "during-the-Ukraine-War"-now but "at-this-very-moment"-now, during the annual SCO conference, with Russia floundering, the CSTO a dead letter, and violence flaring in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

    A new Great Game in Central Asia but more a balance of Turkey and India
    Iran and India, you mean? Pakistan complicates thing as well.
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  4. #574

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    History of the Soviet borders/maps of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan if you're interested.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 09-17-2022 at 02:53.
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  5. #575

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    To reinforce my comments on the smaller relative increases in capability between tank generations and airfighter generations (Slovenia to supply 28 M-55S tanks to Ukraine):

    T-55S thread for those shocked that this is being sent. Ok 1st and foremost these tanks were updated by a Slovenian Company STo Ravne and engineers from Israeli ELBIT. This was a complete overhaul from new engines and transmissions increasing HP from 500 to 600HP in a tank …
    2/n that isn’t very heavy to begin with appx 36 tons. The main gun is now a L7 105mm NATO standard with a thermal sleeve. A new breech is designed to speed firing having been developed by ELBIT.
    The hull armor is greatly improved using Israeli Rafael ERA blocks that are …
    3/n backed by composite armor of ELBIT design. Completely modern optics and thermal sights. Digital ballistic fire control computer with the gunner having a 2 axis stabilized sight with rangefinder. The commander cupola has the ability to lay and fire the gun independently…
    4/n of the gunner if need be. The driver also has state of the art optics. Here’s the cool part. These tanks are equipped with laser illumination warning system. ie if it’s being targeted by a ATGM or enemy tank that uses laser guidance it warns the crew and can independently…
    5/n fire smoke grenades to allow the tank to maneuver out of hostile weapons sight. All crew comms have been upgraded to allow clear communication. The tank tracks are completely new and have rubber blocks to facilitate road travel. So what does this all mean for the crews ..
    6/n getting these tanks? Well they can engage T-72 on a pretty much equal playing field but most importantly the optics and gun stabilization guarantee that their 1st will be much more accurate. The 105mm L7 can do in a T-72 & I know this from 1st hand experience. Any APFSDS..
    7/b developed after 1985 will send that turret into orbit. Lately the Belgium company MECAR and Israeli IMI have developed rounds that Slovenia uses that match 120mm kinetics. So these upgraded T-55s are better than anything the Ukrs are fielding except for their t-84s and the…
    8/b Polish PT-91 Twardys. Sometimes it’s good to get into the details.
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  6. #576
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    If you're at the receiving end of an old tank's main gun you don't care how dated it is unless you're in a tank that can take the hits, everything else on the battlefield remains vulnerable. With the Russians fielding T62s, that's only one generation after these T55s, both are modernized so at least not total relics and against each other both are capable of knocking out the other.

    If nothing else it frees up other tanks from lower priority areas such as along Moldova and Belarus. All the more reason for Germany to send those Leo1s and Marders, though I saw that they're sending 50x Dingo APCs and 4 more PzH2000s so that's something at least.

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  7. #577

    Default Re: Great Power contentions



    Reviewing the list of upgrades again, it presents a real Ship of Theseus riddle. If the engine, transmission, armor, tracks, and cannon are all new, then what exactly remains of the original platform?



    Kazakhstan's capital's name has been changed back to Astana. Tokaev has a Politico op-ed in which he claims to seek a more open, liberal, and democratic future for Kazakhstan with an empowered and accountable parliament.

    Russia now seems likely to attempt to escalate the war effort and annex Ukrainian territories in the next two weeks. Scour the news.

    Poll of "64 leading experts on the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and cross-Strait relations." Some results at face value:

    *War this decade unlikely, possibly toward or after the mid-century
    *Blockade could be a coercive tactic for the CCP
    *Xi prioritizes non-kinetic methods toward unification
    *China would choose to invade if Taiwan declared independence
    *China would provoke a crisis with its reaction to the US making an explicit commitment to defend Taiwan (do Biden's multiple statements this year count?)
    *Experts unanimously believe that Chinese leadership believes the US would join a war on Taiwan's side to some extent

    (Note that there was a recent official statement from the CIA that claims Xi wants a Taiwan Strait invasion plan to be a feasible option by 2027)

    He has not made the decision to do that, but he has asked his military to put him in a position where if that's what he wanted to do, he would be able to. It's still the assessment of the IC as a whole that Xi's interest in Taiwan is to get control through non-military means
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  8. #578

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    The Kremlin’s annexation plans are primarily targeting a domestic audience; Putin likely hopes to improve Russian force generation capabilities by calling on the Russian people to volunteer for a war to “defend” newly claimed Russian territory. Putin and his advisors have apparently realized that current Russian forces are insufficient to conquer Ukraine and that efforts to build large forces quickly through voluntary mobilization are culminating short of the Russian military’s force requirements. Putin is therefore likely setting legal and informational conditions to improve Russian force generation without resorting to expanded conscription by changing the balance of carrots and sticks the Kremlin has been using to spur voluntary recruitment.

    Putin may believe that he can appeal to Russian ethnonationalism and the defense of purportedly “Russian peoples” and claimed Russian land to generate additional volunteer forces. He may seek to rely on enhanced rhetoric in part because the Kremlin cannot afford the service incentives, like bonuses and employment benefits, that it has already promised Russian recruits.[2] But Putin is also adding new and harsher punishments in an effort to contain the risk of the collapse of Russian military units fighting in Ukraine and draft-dodging within Russia. The Kremlin rushed the passage of a new law through the State Duma on September 20, circumventing normal parliamentary procedures.[3] This law codifies dramatically increased penalties for desertion, refusing conscription orders, and insubordination. It also criminalizes voluntary surrender and makes surrender a crime punishable by ten years in prison. The law notably does not order full-scale mobilization or broader conscription or make any preparations for such activities.

    ISW has observed no evidence that the Kremlin is imminently intending to change its conscription practices. The Kremlin’s new law is about strengthening the Kremlin’s coercive volunteerism, or what Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov called “self-mobilization.”[4]

    The Kremlin is taking steps to directly increase force generation through continued voluntary self-mobilization and an expansion of its legal authority to deploy Russian conscripts already with the force to fight in Ukraine.
    Big oof from ISW yesterday. It's funny that so many Twitter handles were reporting sources or other indications of mobilization concurrently. But really ISW's assessment that annexation is intended to boost patriotism just contains a logical flaw, or oversight; naturalizing Donbass would give Donbassian conscripts rights. It's the opposite of stop-loss. It's why I've long maintained that Russia would never annex territories unless it was close either to "winning" or to losing.

    Unfortunately ISW has always put its resources into collating Russian and Ukrainian statements for its war chronicle, with curation filling most of the space, whereas its in-house analysis has often ranged from trivial (e.g. 'there will continue to be battles for X town in the coming days') to flat wrong (e.g. early war Russian strategy and pacing).
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  9. #579

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Exactly 9 years ago
    The Kremlin has warned Ukraine that if the country goes ahead with a planned agreement on free trade with the EU, it faces inevitable financial catastrophe and possibly the collapse of the state.

    Russia is making a last-minute push to derail the integration agreement, which is due to be signed in late November. Instead, Moscow wants to lure its neighbour into its own alliance, a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan that critics have referred to as a reincarnation of the Soviet Union. Russia has made it clear that Ukraine has to choose between the two options and cannot sign both agreements.
    Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's former trade minister, gave Sergei Glazyev, adviser to President Vladimir Putin, a public dressing down in a discussion session during which the Kremlin man was faced with jeering and catcalls for demanding that Ukraine abandon the EU pact and turn to Russia. The minister said that it was the Kremlin's heavy-handed tactics and threats of a trade war that had made European integration inevitable.

    "For the first time in our history more than 50% of people support European integration, and less than 30% of the people support closer ties with Russia," said Poroshenko. "Thank you very much for that Mr Glazyev."

    Radek Sikorski, the Polish foreign minister, accused Russia of a "19th-century mode of operating towards neighbours", and said that it was only when Ukraine was properly allied with Europe that Russia would begin to respect the country. "Poland's relations with Russia are better now that we are a member of the EU and Nato," said Sikorski. "When the question is open people feel entitled to exert pressure; when the question is closed they have to live with a sovereign country."

    Glazyev, speaking on the sidelines of the discussion, said the exact opposite was true: "Ukrainian authorities make a huge mistake if they think that the Russian reaction will become neutral in a few years from now. This will not happen."

    Instead, he said, signing the agreement would make the default of Ukraine inevitable and Moscow would not offer any helping hand. "Russia is the main creditor of Ukraine. Only with customs union with Russia can Ukraine balance its trade," he said. Russia has already slapped import restrictions on certain Ukrainian products and Glazyev did not rule out further sanctions if the agreement was signed.

    The Kremlin aide added that the political and social cost of EU integration could also be high, and allowed for the possibility of separatist movements springing up in the Russian-speaking east and south of Ukraine. He suggested that if Ukraine signed the agreement, Russia would consider the bilateral treaty that delineates the countries' borders to be void.

    "We don't want to use any kind of blackmail. This is a question for the Ukrainian people," said Glazyev. "But legally, signing this agreement about association with EU, the Ukrainian government violates the treaty on strategic partnership and friendship with Russia." When this happened, he said, Russia could no longer guarantee Ukraine's status as a state and could possibly intervene if pro-Russian regions of the country appealed directly to Moscow.
    I mean, I'm old enough to remember back in 2013 when realists and Russophiles alike would openly admit that Russia's paramount priority was to maintain political and economic domination of Ukraine, and those were the facts of life (though I didn't realize the Russian government literally said the quiet part out loud). It's just no one thought Russia would prove too weak to finish the job, in 2014.

    So weakness was helpfully retconned as strength or savvy, then as entitlement, then as a matter of (someone's!) self-determination. By now the first and only resort is the plain and plaintive, 'Let me win or I nuke you!'

    Many of us memory-holed calculated lies out of deference to discursive coexistence. Lies aren't just a gentleman's game, they're a matter of power. Don't disempower yourself by respecting and tolerating liars in your interactions, domestic or foreign.
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  10. #580

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Meanwhile in Iran...



    Wooooo!!!

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  11. #581
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    I wish the protesters in Iran the best of luck. Unfortunately they've had moments like this several times over the last twenty some years but perhaps this will be more successful though I imagine this is primarily a movement in major cities with not so much support in the more conservative countryside.

    As for Russian mobilization, it will be interesting to see how Russia approaches this. That's a lot of personnel to need to train, equip, and support. With the current force in Ukraine already using up the lion's share of modern equipment and already down to 2nd tier stuff in some areas I wonder what the the recruits will be given.

    This I think will be paired with the referendums to annex the occupied parts of Ukraine after which they will be "Russian" territory and by Russia's standards legal for employing conscripts, at least I think that's how it can work.
    If Russia's battlefield performance continues to be as lackluster and poor even with the influx of new personnel (and who knows on what timeline and quality of training) this may further galvanize dissatisfaction with the prosecution of the war and perhaps Putin himself. I don't think this will lead to any threat to the regime just yet as it looks like the majority of heavy conscriptions are being done outside the urban West of Russia with a focus on Russia's minorities.

    I personally don't think we'll see the effects of these recruits for a few weeks but I imagine that from fall into winter the manpower advantage of Ukraine will be offset. With that, the Ukraine will need to achieve some more significant victories before winter and then somehow get a decisive qualitative advantage in training and equipment on certain fronts by the spring. I hope that the western dithering over more modern tanks and IFVs can come to an end with much more support for Ukraine in these categories.

    Fingers crossed the Ukraine can retake Kherson sometime soon and create another local victory like a few weeks somewhere in the East or South East too.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
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    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  12. #582

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    On paper, the most accessible draftees for Russia would be:

    1. Conscripts who served out their terms by the past April (April '21 cadre)
    2. Conscripts who finish their terms in a week (October '21 cadre)
    3. Contractors who finished or cancelled their contracts during the war

    These alone would fill out a nominal 300K cap 50-90% of the way, depending on assumptions.

    Since like with many governmental functions in Russia, mobilization is highly devolved to the regions, and the federal government has a poor ability to identify individuals who are not available at their last updated address, the Russian government will have an overall difficult time identifying the best prospects for drafting, but the above categories should in principle be easy to work with because all addresses are current as of sometime in 2022.

    OTOH there have been lots of anecdotal reports over the past two days that Russia is executing - in contravention of reported guidelines - a randomized, haphazard draft drawing in everyone from industrial workers to students. If this is the case systematically - and we can only hope so - then Russia will have embarked on the most alienating and least effective variant of conscription, no less since the 2-week training course is presented as a refresher for "fully" trained veterans.


    I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO. 'Free trial' sessions for groups of thousands in such a long timeframe, as has been the case, is a significant missed opportunity. It's not like NATO troops throughout Europe, including American ones, were so busy or otherwise preoccupied.


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    EDIT: A day ago the thought struck me that part of the motivation for mobilization may have been the instability flaring in the Caucasus and Central Asia a week ago, in that Putin saw a need to regenerate some Russian expeditionary capacity with which to intimidate Tajikistan and Azerbaijan, so to speak. The Russian political analyst Atomic Cherry just offered a broader, geopolitical, account:

    Mobilization is a response to the refusal of further support for Moscow from China, India, Turkey and the monarchies of the Middle East. An attempt to resolve the growing international crisis, loss of weight in the political arena and growing economic isolation by moving to a new round of conflict escalation.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 09-24-2022 at 07:53.
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  13. #583
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Mobilization is a response to the refusal of further support for Moscow from China, India, Turkey and the monarchies of the Middle East. An attempt to resolve the growing international crisis, loss of weight in the political arena and growing economic isolation by moving to a new round of conflict escalation.
    It is possible but I see it really as Putin is trying to find a way to end the war on his terms and extract a believable 'win' for domestic consumption and more importantly his own life. The retirement prospects for dictators that lose wars is never long if they even make it to the end of the war. Mobilization is unpopular and may be the end of him but continuing the war with his current manpower pool will certainly result in a loss so he must mobilize, though to what extent and how effective it will be remain to be seen.

    I do think Russia certainly sees itself as more isolated and undoubtedly Putin is upset by the war not going as he wanted, the unexpected unity of the west and the apparently surprising lack of unity by his allies.

    This lengthening war is certainly causing the west to de-couple Russia economically and with China continuing its saber rattling over Taiwan I imagine that investment there will be discouraged from the top down though probably not overtly for now.

    I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO. 'Free trial' sessions for groups of thousands in such a long timeframe, as has been the case, is a significant missed opportunity. It's not like NATO troops throughout Europe, including American ones, were so busy or otherwise preoccupied.
    Whole heartedly agree. Once Russia retreated from Kiev and it became clear that Ukraine has a possibility to win NATO, but the US especially, should have gone whole hog on supporting Ukraine. The debate about escalation over MiG-29s a few months ago seems silly now but understandably it did take a while for decision makers throughout the West to feel comfortable that support for Ukraine is not likely to escalate to general war with Russia or any sort of nuclear war.

    Some of the NATO troops in Europe though I'd say are busy, Russia still does need to be deterred, especially to prevent any adventures into Finland or Sweden once they announced their intentions to join NATO. Same on the Black Sea coast, Romania has legitimate security concerns that its partners need to help with.
    Still more than enough capability to help Ukraine though.
    Last edited by spmetla; 09-24-2022 at 08:32.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  14. #584
    BrownWings: AirViceMarshall Senior Member Furunculus's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Montmorency View Post
    I don't understand why NATO countries haven't been training literally all non-militia Ukrainian military personnel for the past 6 months, however. Or alternatively, offered 20 brigades' worth of Ukrainian civilian volunteers a full basic and advanced course in infantry and combined arms warfare, maturing as of now, to be disposed as needed. Big L for NATO.
    It is a shame that training wasn't expanded, by a greater number of nations, sooner, but the british army has been at it since 2014 on a pretty industrial scale:

    Provided training to over 22,000 Ukrainian military personnel before it was suspended ahead of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orbital

    BoJo offered Ukraine a new training programme located within the UK, with the aim of training up to 10,000 Ukrainians every 120 days:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Interflex
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  15. #585

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by Furunculus View Post
    It is a shame that training wasn't expanded, by a greater number of nations, sooner, but the british army has been at it since 2014 on a pretty industrial scale:

    Provided training to over 22,000 Ukrainian military personnel before it was suspended ahead of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orbital

    BoJo offered Ukraine a new training programme located within the UK, with the aim of training up to 10,000 Ukrainians every 120 days:
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Interflex
    As always, any leadership on the issue by the British is appreciated, but still rather limp.

    If I wasn't clear in my comment, the '30-day free trial NATO membership' courses don't and haven't sufficed. Properly: Since April, on German and Polish bases, many tens of thousands of civilians (inc. from refugee populations) ought to have been recruited, transported to NATO and local military bases, and provided a full professional training course in mass combined arms warfare. Especially officer candidates. These trainees ought to have been coming into service only just now, as a block. And no, NATO/Euro soldiers were not so preoccupied as to be prevented from undertaking this training operation, and doing so would not have fatally injured their readiness to an attack by - Belarus?

    If I'm being harsh, it's only because NATO still hasn't offered that level of commitment, even with the Russian draft setting an admissive environment.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 09-24-2022 at 19:28.
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  16. #586

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    DRM Journal's Iranian protest map:




    Unsurprising.
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  17. #587

    Default Re: Great Power contentions






    It seems that even Russian men who are over 40 are being forcefully conscripted according to him:

    Wooooo!!!

  18. #588

    Default Re: Great Power contentions



    Wooooo!!!

  19. #589
    Backordered Member CrossLOPER's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Looks like things are going great.

    At the very least, governments can finally sever foreign dependencies on critical infrastructure like energy. I never understood that particular aspect of globalism, since it it creates massive security issue, especially for a country that does not possess diplomatic or military leverage, or even infrastructure for reserves.
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  20. #590
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Think there was a lot of naivete in thinking that a large scale war in Europe was impossible after the end of the Cold War. That together with thinking that economic ties with illiberal governments might reform them instead of what we've see of it really just enabling the top to entrench themselves.
    Last edited by spmetla; 10-01-2022 at 01:31.

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    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  21. #591
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    It was impossible until people ceased paying attention and doing their work for 20+ years. It is incredible that nearly a quarter of a century of diplomatic posturing and economic architecture was based off of "everything is fine and will never go wrong ever again".
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  22. #592

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Kerch Strait Bridge damaged, very likely either by kamikaze boat or sappers at the bridge piers. Look at how clean those breaks are. A Zaporizhzhia offensive may be imminent after all, though if not then this event is just another nail in the coffin for the Russian presence in Kherson.

    Ukraine looking shiny.
    EDIT: For reference, Russia claims to have destroyed 5500 Ukrainian tanks, which is greater thanthe number of all active-service Russian and Ukrainian tanks at the beginning of the war.

    My calculations: Russia has the spare/stored armored vehicles to outfit a theoretical maximum of about 50 new brigades, accounting for a modest reserve for replacements. But AFAIK the extremely inefficient ongoing Russian mobilization is almost exclusively dedicated to pushing draftees with 0-4 weeks of training to existing formations anyway. Still, assuming that over 2023 the bulk of storage is reactivated, and at historical loss rates, with a certain amount of new production, Russia as a country will loss all ability to conduct even mobile defense at operational scale by the beginning of 2024, if the war goes on that long. This is also around the time Russia will suffer critical shortages of artillery ammunition and systems in the context of their way of war. The prospects of a long war are increasingly politically and financially untenable for Putin, but if this is one then both sides will be forced to rest and refit throughout 2024 until wholly new production arrives at scale starting from 2025.


    Last edited by Montmorency; 10-09-2022 at 01:24.
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  23. #593
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Crazy seeing Iranian riot police marching with the protesters. Perhaps this will lead to something positive!

    https://twitter.com/dpatrikarakos/st...16102633304064

    Edit:
    My personal prediction for the next significant Ukrainian offensive should be toward Melitopol. I think the Ukrainians will push here to cut the supplies for the current Kherson front and then instead of pushing to the river Dnipro make for Crimea to get a foothold there as fighting through the isthmus would be extremely difficult if the Russians are allowed to set in.
    It'd be a push of about 260km just moving along the roads, with that I think they're currently trying to preserve their strength to build up the forces needed to do a push lasting about a week and half as well as build the op environment by continuing to create multiple crises for the Russians to divert troops to in Kherson and northern Luhansk.
    It's a significantly larger area than the Kharkiv offensive pulled off but given the few railways and means for Russia to resupply it is extremely tenuous if Ukraine even gets to Melitopol. Ukraine would probably need double the maneuver forces used in Kharkiv to make this happen and significant forces to fix the current Russian troops in their positions but would work with the current Ukrainian method of fixing strong points and capturing them by forcing a surrender or withdrawal by threatening their ground lines of communication.
    Getting to the shore of the Azov Sea again would allow the new anti-ship capabilities of Ukraine to make the port of Rostov essentially cut off and restrict the Black Sea fleets operation to the south of Crimea and the Eastern shore of the black sea.
    Last edited by spmetla; 10-11-2022 at 03:02.

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    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  24. #594

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Maybe it was a truck bomb after all. Or, the truck bomb theory displays the fewest gaps and contradictions. But then, one of the weirdest aspects of the theory of the case would be that someone set up an Azerbaijani suicide bomber against Russia.
    Vitiate Man.

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  25. #595

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    US Department of Defense announces that future Abrams and Bradley/Stryker models and will have a hybrid-electric drive, and there will be full-electric utility vehicle models.


    By an arch-realist on Twitter:

    B/c the ?rules based order? has always been an illusion promulgated by the Wilsonian school. It doesn?t exist, it never did. US/NATO might forced others to play by rules we preferred. Now that that might seems to be waning, that system is under attack.
    Something critics of US foreign policy have always pointed out, but this fellow (a particularly ? frustrating voice of inconsistent insight) openly exemplifies a super-narrow emphasis on an extremely limited and almost-universally counterproductive conception of American power and interests. It's impossible to calculate how much damage this perspective has imposed onto American interests even as self-described, to say nothing of general human welfare.

    But as he admits, the system has always been under attack by the US itself. No more or less so is it under attack by China, which benefits from the American-built architecture but unsurprisingly seeks to gain more influence over it to bends its benefits to the CCP's preferences. (It's only Russia that is recklessly revisionist, maybe because they have more ideology-poisoning over there than most places.) Maybe if there were a robust and vital international system from the outset there wouldn't be such a controversy over who gets to set its conditions! Analogically, such exploitative philosophies are also partly why more and more states across the West are failing internally from a lack of public-conscious and accountable governance and civil society.

    To further call attention to the lack of a coherent vision on interests beyond lack of resistance to the contemporaneous whims of the American executive, this fellow has previously in his interactions condemned the EU for lacking the capacity to set a common agenda and rejected the proposal to establish a common European security architecture on the grounds that if successful it would theoretically increase the scope for dissonance with American security priorities - that is, lessen American primacy in Europe. Yeah... so?

    A strong, stable, unified, confident EU that pays for its own defense and is totally supine to your version of American interests? What, do you want an on-call blowjob service too?

    Pick your "poison" as they say.


    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    My personal prediction for the next significant Ukrainian offensive should be toward Melitopol. I think the Ukrainians will push here to cut the supplies for the current Kherson front and then instead of pushing to the river Dnipro make for Crimea to get a foothold there as fighting through the isthmus would be extremely difficult if the Russians are allowed to set in.
    It'd be a push of about 260km just moving along the roads, with that I think they're currently trying to preserve their strength to build up the forces needed to do a push lasting about a week and half as well as build the op environment by continuing to create multiple crises for the Russians to divert troops to in Kherson and northern Luhansk.
    It's a significantly larger area than the Kharkiv offensive pulled off but given the few railways and means for Russia to resupply it is extremely tenuous if Ukraine even gets to Melitopol. Ukraine would probably need double the maneuver forces used in Kharkiv to make this happen and significant forces to fix the current Russian troops in their positions but would work with the current Ukrainian method of fixing strong points and capturing them by forcing a surrender or withdrawal by threatening their ground lines of communication.
    Getting to the shore of the Azov Sea again would allow the new anti-ship capabilities of Ukraine to make the port of Rostov essentially cut off and restrict the Black Sea fleets operation to the south of Crimea and the Eastern shore of the black sea.
    I?m not so sure, despite the level of speculation focused on that sector since July. It?s obviously a target, with a number of tiered objectives present towards staging the endgame of the war (Tokmak, Mariupol, Melitopol, axis into Kherson, axis into Donetsk), but the prerequisites as I see them just aren?t there.

    So far Ukraine has demonstrated a strategy of attacking where RuFOR is weakest or most vulnerable, and those places are still the current open fronts for UFOR, with about 12 brigades allocated to each by my best guess. The condition of the strategic reserve is still consciously or materially limited enough that the holding forces in Donetsk have continued to cede ground to DPR and Wagner. They've never stopped doing so during the entire war really, except for brief periods in April, July, and late August/early September. It would only be a testament of decisive Ukrainian superiority if the RuFOR advances in the center were permanently halted even as UFOR maintained an advance elsewhere, and we're clearly not there yet.

    By now Ukraine has probably bogged down as well following a month of intense activity, as it struggles a lot against prepared Russian defenses and always has, while the Russian defenses in Kherson and Luhansk are getting firmer than they have been and the supply situation in Kherson remains unexpectedly decent. Moreover, UFOR has repeatedly failed to execute the pursuit phase of maneuver warfare, leaving retreating or routing RuFOR time to consolidate, whether out of command failure, lack of skill or will among maneuver elements, sustainment limitations, a lack of confidence, or other reasons.

    Zaporizhzhia specifically has been getting reinforced continually since August by relatively-strong units, and there's still that substantial strategic reserve between Kherson and Melitopol that's been out of combat for months. A couple NATO-standard divisions with Abrams would be ideally deployed to this front, and I still haven't seen any indication that we're helping stand up such a force.

    It?s just not likely from my understanding of the fundamentals that the resources exist for a third open front that by its attributes in terrain and space demand at the very least a fresh 10 brigades, probably 20, to make significant progress.


    My informal checklist, with presumptuous illustration, for setting conditions to a Zaporizhzhia offensive:

    Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 
    1. Liberate Starobilsk; clear the west bank of the AidarRiver; clear the north bank of the Siversky Donets River.
    2. Isolate/besiege Kherson City, at the minimum.
    3. Isolate Lysychansk; cross the SD River in force to threaten Alchevsk and Popasna from the rear and block the road to Luhansk City.
    4. Finally execute the Great Zaporizhzhia Schlieffen Plan.

    Click image for larger version. 

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    Vitiate Man.

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  26. #596
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    US Department of Defense announces that future Abrams and Bradley/Stryker models and will have a hybrid-electric drive, and there will be full-electric utility vehicle models.
    It will certainly be exciting when that happens. To have tanks sitting in the defense on electric drive mode with the engine off will keep the heat signature low making it much more difficult to find with thermals (assuming that thermal blankets are used to make the hull not grow hot from the sun).
    Also, the reliability of electric drive so long as you have some battery power may save crew members if their main power pack is knocked out.

    But as he admits, the system has always been under attack by the US itself.
    I think the biggest portion of the rules-based world that he US and the West in general has upheld was the concept that war should not be used to resolve issues of borders/sovereignty. From the start it was never about not using force as there are ample examples even in the decade immediately following the establishment of the UN.

    The biggest outlier to this is Kosovo, which was made independent of Serbia against the consent of Serbia.

    The secondary outliers would be the borders of Kashmir and Israel/Palestine. Both of which have histories since their inception that make the opinion of the UN or its member states secondary to who hold the actual land.

    No more or less so is it under attack by China, which benefits from the American-built architecture but unsurprisingly seeks to gain more influence over it to bends its benefits to the CCP's preferences. (It's only Russia that is recklessly revisionist, maybe because they have more ideology-poisoning over there than most places.)
    China has pushed it the limits whenever and wherever possible in areas such as Tibet, Korea, its borders with Russia, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Vietnam/Indochina. The only thing that has changed is that China now has the maritime strength to do that for its maritime claims too. The grey zone tactics are a good way to skirt the international order by using non-military force with the Blue and White hull fleets as the first line of defense.

    Russia's recklessness was based of assumed weakness and disunity in the West. I too thought the EU and NATO wouldn't have the will to stand up to Putin, endure the gas shortages, and support Ukraine while erasing economic gains and going back into recession. If Zelenksy hadn't galvanized his country and the West in general in the days after Feb 24th through personal example then Putin's gamble would have paid off.
    I personally think the PRC has more ideological poisoning as its population is in general much less exposed to foreigners compared to Russia which has been consuming Western products and ideas for decades. Russia's recklessness is from trying to regain its former status as under the USSR, the PRC's threat will be when and where they decide to create their own 'Danzig crisis' to determine if the US remains a stakeholder in East Asia/West Pacific.

    The Rules based order does exist, if it didn't more of the world would be in a state of armed uncertainty as all nations were prior to WW2. The threat of intervention by outside countries has deterred most attempts at conquest since WW2.
    The ruling nuclear power/security council permanent members have always had a separate set of unwritten rules of course but part of that was not invading and conquering your neighbors. In general, you were allowed to overthrow countries within your 'sphere' or force them to remain but there seemed to be a statute of limitations.

    It?s just not likely from my understanding of the fundamentals that the resources exist for a third open front that by its attributes in terrain and space demand at the very least a fresh 10 brigades, probably 20, to make significant progress.


    My informal checklist, with presumptuous illustration, for setting conditions to a Zaporizhzhia offensive:
    If the resources don't exist then yeah, you're totally right. However for your checklist, I don't think number 2 can be accomplished without starting number 4 first. I think the Ukrainians continue to apply steady pressure on areas 1 and 2 to try and accomplish as much as possible there. Any major action by Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia area dislodges and threatens the defense of Kherson and Donetsk. I see number four as the area with the biggest danger to overall Russia's objectives. Threatening this area while Russia is still trying to hold northern Luhansk and Kherson with its forces on the far side of the Dnipro could cause a collapse of both those fronts. If Kherson is taken first then an economy of force defense south of the Dnipro should allow Russia to focus its defenses to retain the land bridge. The current Russian effort to defend north of the Dnipro is much more vulnerable and takes far more of its resources.

    Who know for sure though, fall here and the winter snows aren't long off. I'll be curious as to the ability of both sides to sustain limited offenses in winter conditions. I can't see a scenario in which Ukraine lets off any pressure though as news of victories is what guarantees continued Western support and denies Russia time to train its troops properly for next year.

    What do you guys think about the nuclear threat. I personally don't think this threat is real and that it's for the ignorant public to fear and therefore lessen support Ukraine and try and force for a (Elon Musk Style) negotiated settlement. Macron's statements certainly match that of the rest of NATO. I like the current US stance that any nuclear use will result in large scale, decisive, US conventional forces intervening. I'd reserve the nuclear option for only any actions against NATO proper.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
    -Abraham Lincoln


    Four stage strategy from Yes, Minister:
    Stage one we say nothing is going to happen.
    Stage two, we say something may be about to happen, but we should do nothing about it.
    Stage three, we say that maybe we should do something about it, but there's nothing we can do.
    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

  27. #597

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Quote Originally Posted by spmetla View Post
    It will certainly be exciting when that happens. To have tanks sitting in the defense on electric drive mode with the engine off will keep the heat signature low making it much more difficult to find with thermals (assuming that thermal blankets are used to make the hull not grow hot from the sun).
    Also, the reliability of electric drive so long as you have some battery power may save crew members if their main power pack is knocked out.


    I think the biggest portion of the rules-based world that he US and the West in general has upheld was the concept that war should not be used to resolve issues of borders/sovereignty. From the start it was never about not using force as there are ample examples even in the decade immediately following the establishment of the UN.
    From such a realist's perspective as his, the US properly works to enforce its will on the international stage using all available tools, and the problem with Russian actions isn't that they violate some fake independent stabilizing order but that they challenge US primacy across orders. IMO it's all self-fulfilling if you take that sort of realism as prescriptive rather than as a model to help describe state relations. Of course I doubt this person would apply the framework of strict legal realism or critical studies to the domestic realm even though he comports according to their predictions...

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    A true international order does require some voluntary mutual accountability of state actors according to democratic processes. There is some extant level of sub-democratic voluntary accountability that he wouldn't acknowledge in those terms, such as in the possibility of states acting within agreements or rulesets that don't 100% benefit them in the short term for the sake of a broader stability or participation (also a component of social compromise and integration within societies), but very little overall and often undermined by large states such as the US.

    If Zelenksy hadn't galvanized his country and the West in general in the days after Feb 24th through personal example then Putin's gamble would have paid off.
    I tend to agree with the structural bent here that individual leaders can't really have that level of independent influence on historical scale. Other possible Russian rulers may not have been likely to pursue the specific controversial approach Putin took - including the alternate possibility of a more limited and effective war plan! - but the Ukrainian response was inherently driven by collective societal factors in a way that isn't responsive to any individual's proximate action. At best we could speculate that Zelensky helped focus and lock in Western aid early.

    I personally think the PRC has more ideological poisoning as its population is in general much less exposed to foreigners compared to Russia which has been consuming Western products and ideas for decades. Russia's recklessness is from trying to regain its former status as under the USSR, the PRC's threat will be when and where they decide to create their own 'Danzig crisis' to determine if the US remains a stakeholder in East Asia/West Pacific.
    Of course almost by definition the Russian elite has been heavily steeped in Western material, political, and high cultures since birth in a way that has never been characteristic in China beyond like missionary communities and diplomatic children, but the issue of ideological motivation is separate from cultural familiarity. I could be wrong but my impression of the dominant factions of the CCP is that they aren't consumed by the same sort of mythopoetic superiority complex (very much a post-WW2 construction) as in Russia. The 'eternal civilization' meme is just far from the Russian equivalent. It's also very much worth keeping in mind that the 'sticking points' between China and the US are actually fewer than those between the US and Russia/FSU; China may maintain some unpopular and/or unethical domestic and diplomatic policies, but the game only becomes high-stakes over the singular fate of Taiwan. Think of it this way: if the CCP defused the Taiwan question tomorrow, in what sense could they be considered to rise to the level of an enemy? Whereas the Soviet Union was implacably in opposition to the American-led system during the Cold War (even if there were in fact many missed opportunities for detente). To an extent it's also significant that the pre-existing Russian hawk ideology has only calcified post-Cold War into bitter revanchism and resentment of the US, including open contentions of Russian power in the global arena, while the CCP has historically emphasized a self-image at home and abroad as inward-looking and relatively pacifistic. It's not obvious that this is obscuring Russian-style pathologies.

    All of these comments have been to directly and obliquely criticize the quoted perspective, which is that the US has a specified "interest" that it must always seek to roughly impose on everyone else, and China is uncomplicatedly our enemy that we must invest resources in suppressing because they come at cross-purposes to some variants of US foreign policy. Substance and values are irrelevant, all that matters is the US getting its way in every instance. This ideology is short-sighted and self and allo-destructive. Just compare its proven record to, for example, Marxist-Leninism.

    If the resources don't exist then yeah, you're totally right. However for your checklist, I don't think number 2 can be accomplished without starting number 4 first.
    The bridge strike does make sense in combination with imminent operations to cut the other supply route, as I noted a few days ago, but that's on paper, and there may be too many other factors militating against opening another front, including the unnamed factor of worsening weather. Note that levels of rain and mud will probably be lower than average given this year's weather patterns (hot and dry, who'da thunk it?), as they were during the spring, but at the scale of Ukraine's grandest maneuver yet it will be a relevant limitation for the next two months in particular. And while the Kerch rail line seems to be closed for now, by the end of the year the entirety of the damaged road and rail sections will probably have been replaced or repaired (in the absence of ATACMS).

    And yes, restricting LOC to the bridgehead have proven extremely difficult with the inherent weakness of HIMARS against infrastructure and the reality that the Kakhovka dam-bridge essentially cannot be closed without destroying the dam itself, which is not an option. Large-scale supply and reinforcement columns have not been prevented from crossing the river entirely over the past 3 months. But this difficulty can be resolved for the most part by accomplishing another 30km advance and seizing the littoral around the dam, including Beryslav. At that point the rest of the river comes under PGM fire control and regular direct observation, sealing the bridgehead's fate for good.

    I think the Ukrainians continue to apply steady pressure on areas 1 and 2 to try and accomplish as much as possible there. Any major action by Ukraine in the Zaporizhzhia area dislodges and threatens the defense of Kherson and Donetsk. I see number four as the area with the biggest danger to overall Russia's objectives. Threatening this area while Russia is still trying to hold northern Luhansk and Kherson with its forces on the far side of the Dnipro could cause a collapse of both those fronts. If Kherson is taken first then an economy of force defense south of the Dnipro should allow Russia to focus its defenses to retain the land bridge. The current Russian effort to defend north of the Dnipro is much more vulnerable and takes far more of its resources.
    To be clear, in reality all available information shows that Stages 1 and 2 have been proceeding contemporaneously and will probably culminate successfully on a similar timeline, or maybe even non-linearly. I don't want to convey a rigid timeline or process to implementation.

    Stage 3 is actually essential because by crossing the river to entering the rear of the longstanding central frontline in Donetsk a collapse of that front becomes much likelier and forces a redeployment of Russian formations to defend a growing frontline that stretches into territory that has no established defenses or fortifications, and is of paramount political priority. Moreover, the vast majority of forces operating in Donetsk are separatist, not VSRF, and if they were brought to surrender then the entire Russian presence in Ukraine beyond Crimea would collapse with the loss of ~100K personnel across 100 miles. It's also why I envision an eastward hook to any campaign in Zaporizhzhia, to cut off the Donetsk-Horlivka urban agglomeration (representing the majority of the Russian-controlled population in the province) and promote panic among north-facing opposition forces along the line there.

    Separatist forces in aggregate have proven surprisingly resilient, but if their main cities and the main body of their forces are enveloped their position should be untenable to non-fanatics. These separatists aren't just Russia's Italy or Romania, their exit would singlehandedly push Russia out of most of Ukraine, whereas the war probably can't end for Ukraine so long as the separatists field a viable force. We're talking about up to 10% of the pre-war Russian-controlled population that have been put to service, without whom the war would have functionally ended for Russia already by April.

    Meanwhile, if prosecuted properly - and this is an open question given the difficulty UFOR has had in sealing pockets - the Kherson campaign would eliminate the majority of Russia's remaining VDV formations, which are its most capable. Simply put, capturing or destroying tens of thousands of combatants with vastly more fighting spirit than any analogous ten or hundred reservists could ever have will be a net benefit to Ukraine in any economy of force calculation, even without recalling that transferable Ukrainian forces on the west bank in Kherson outnumber transferable Russian forces on the east bank.

    There's also the observation, according to reporting from August/September, that joint US-UA war planning has deliberately avoided high-risk large maneuvers in favor of pressuring Russian weak points. E.g. the alleged wargame that led UA centcom to reject a single large counteroffensive for two smaller ones. By all indications this orientation still holds. They might calculate, by the principle also embodied in the original expectations for the Kharkiv Offensive, that continual small attritional-maneuver progress is preferable to a great gambit that drains resources from current areas of success only to crash underwhelmingly against prepared Russian defenses (which to reiterate have always been and observably remain a serious challenge for Ukraine to overcome) or the limits of UFOR's logistical or C3 capacity.


    Separately, just to recap some Russian advantages we've observed so far:

    1. Institutional resilience.
    2. Strong at prepared defense with artillery.
    3. Usually able to retrieve formations from desperate circumstances at the last minute in semi-orderly fashion (Kyiv, Izyum, Lyman and Kherson this month).

    What do you guys think about the nuclear threat. I personally don't think this threat is real and that it's for the ignorant public to fear and therefore lessen support Ukraine and try and force for a (Elon Musk Style) negotiated settlement. Macron's statements certainly match that of the rest of NATO. I like the current US stance that any nuclear use will result in large scale, decisive, US conventional forces intervening. I'd reserve the nuclear option for only any actions against NATO proper.
    Worth a read for the Russian ultra perspective.
    [The Google translation broke at some point, which is concerning, but the title is "Return fear."]

    In the Anglosphere there have been many good Twitter threads contextualizing Russian bargaining strategies. The bottom line is that nuclear is only on the table if you can envision a scenario where Putin believes that, say, battlefield deployment is the only remaining option he has for freezing or terminating the conflict in a way that is personally survivable.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 10-14-2022 at 04:33.
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    The glib replies, the same defeats


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  28. #598

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    France is going through a fuel crisis:

    Wooooo!!!

  29. #599

    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Reposting here since it's more appropriate:

    Unrelated scandal (NYT, Sky News): Large numbers of British - and perhaps other NATO - specialist veterans have been recruited by the Chinese government to train and advise the PLA. Actually this is a common practice with NATO countries, including the US - officers and specialists by the hundreds hire themselves out as advisors to all sorts of shady countries (WaPo). Sometimes they even advise coups, of which Africa may have experienced a record number in the past year. Indeed, Africa has been getting non-stop more violent and terroristy the more we've gotten militarily involved in it, and I'm pretty sure none of this instability is even a deliberate policy. The US mil-sec establishment is terrible at doing anything other than winning conventional wars. Maybe the government should think up alternative policies to promote stability abr

    I legitimately don't understand how the decision-making of the Russian government could lead them to invest in a military mobilization less well-trained and resourced than the Soviet one of 1941. They still haven't even sent the (by Russian standards) fully-trained conscripts (as distinct from mobilized reservists) into Ukraine yet! Note that I'm not even referring to the wholly-untrained draftees.

    According to the Russian government, repairs on the Kerch Bridge are scheduled for completion in way more than half a year, which is longer than I expected and suggests a serious medium-term reduction in ground transit through Crimea, probably including total stoppage of rail trainsit. Recently I have also heard that there is actually no rail connection between Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk oblasts, having been disestablished after 2014 and not repaired since. Throughout the war I had based my analysis on railroad maps that included the Donetsk-Volnovakha-Polohy connection. If the information on the post-2014 changes is accurate, this totally changes the strategic picture for southern Ukraine. Polohy, Tokmak, and even Melitopol lose most of their significance if not transit hubs but net supply sinks and destinations, terminating nodes. Although if the rail lane of the Kerch Bridge is unusable then there's no alternative to the Mariupol-Melitopol road. Lack of a Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia rail link leaves the Kherson bridgehead accessible only by long-distance truck and ferry given the loss of rail service through Crimea. If rail transit is out of commission to Kherson for the foreseeable future, then the only mainland ground route is 500km by truck from Donetsk City (Mariupol-Melitopol), a challenge for any military logistics and insurmountable given the foreseeable loss of the Kakhovka Dam route before the end of the year. The maintenance of rail service to Nova Kakhovka from July through this month is probably singlehandedly what threw off UFOR's expected timetable for the reduction of the bridgehead; without it the anticipated supply depletion of RuFOR would have paid off.

    Although it's worth noting that now that the barge-bridge adjacent to the Antonivsky Bridge has reportedly been completed, a lot more equipment will be able to be evacuated when the time comes. The priority will almost certainly again be special engineering, EW, and SAM platforms. Hopefully GSUA can anticipate this chokepoint and be ready to cover both ends with fire when it is put into mass utilization.


    The one bright spot for Russia is that Iran will supply them with thousands of drones and missiles, over the length of the war. Russia probably retains no more than 2000 PGM missiles in total, maybe even 1000, even when including the strategic reserve against NATO, for nuclear delivery, or for a potential mass strike against Ukraine's power, water, and bridge infrastructure (would require a bare minimum of 500 missiles). Iranian throwaway drones and missiles are a good munitions sink against Ukrainian IADS and a potential tool for overwhelming that IADS before a mass strike with PGM. Even with just a month's worth of steady bombardment Ukraine's energy network has sustained some damage. (The Ukrainian government reports 600 Russian PGMs remaining in stock but I suspect this only applies to missiles allocated for operations in Ukraine.)

    The double-edged sword of modern strategic bombardment is that there are so many targets. It's a disadvantage for the attacker for obvious reasons, but it's also a disadvantage for the defender if the attacker has cheap munitions in bulk (non-PGM) since so many targets can't be shielded by modern air defense branches. Poetically, the best weapon against drones or slow cruise missiles is just WW2-era AA cannon coupled with advanced radar and targeting. The German donation of Gepards seemed laughable during the summer, as they have little place in active combat today, but they're overqualified to defend fixed locations against the likes of Shahed-136. Even so, the problem of too many targets reasserts itself, though in Ukraine's case it's theoretically solveable by combining their excess human resources with some lower-tech targeting upgrades on all the surplus Soviet 23mm cannon they have lying about - but I don't think either Ukrainian or NATO leadership have got on this ball yet. It's promises much more and more effective coverage for a much lower opportunity/financial cost than million-dollar AMRAAMs.



    This translation is not very good, but it's sufficient.



    Rakhmon to Putin sum up: All we hear is sharing information, but what information? Everything is fake, everything is a cover up. Europe and U.S. must know what is happening in reality, and what is happening is that we have problems, we, the Central Asians have problems with you.

    Rakhmon to Putin: We have 2 million ethnic Russians. Russian language is a required study from kindergarten to university. But we don’t have Russian language text books, we ask, and ask, and ask, and I don’t want to offend you, but you don’t care.

    Rakhmon to Putin: Your businessmen come and rob us of our natural resources, they are not interested in anything but oil, gas that will enrich them. But how about our industry? Our national strategic interests? You don’t care!

    Rakhmon to Putin: I was there when the Soviet Union collapsed, I’ve witnessed it. I know why it has collapsed- it is for the same things you are doing now. It did not support the small nations, did not help them develop economically, preserve culture, traditions. Same as you!

    Rakhmon to Putin: We are not a big nation, we are not a hundred million nation but we have our history, we have our culture and traditions and we love them. We do not want your money, we want to be respected as we deserve.

    Rakhmon to Putin: We host your military bases, we do everything you ask for, we really try to be what you pretend to be to us “strategic partners.” But we are never being treated like strategic partners! No offense, but we want to be respected! (Loose translation summary)
    We've heard this language before, pointedly. But according to the campists, the Russian government is the only one in the world who can claim grievance from disrespect.
    Last edited by Montmorency; 10-19-2022 at 05:13.
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  30. #600
    Coffee farmer extraordinaire Member spmetla's Avatar
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    Default Re: Great Power contentions

    Agree with just about everything you put up there. The vulnerability of logistics for Russia in the South but in Crimea specifically is why I'm hoping/thinking that the major Ukrainian attack will happen toward Melitopol as that land route is vital to all their efforts, even if the railways aren't in use. I know they are currently attacking in Kherson but nothing open sources seems to indicate that the pressure is more significant than in the past few weeks.

    The recent threat of false flags is worrisome as Russia has a long history of such claims for their future actions. If that dam is blown then the nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhia loses its water for cooling which together with all the downstream flooding events creates an additional crisis.

    The threats of Mykolaiv having a nuke already staged there for false flag is equally worrying, though I don't think Putin is crazy enough to go nuclear yet, if he does then I don't see how we confine the conflict to Ukraine, and I could see a general state of war in Europe. I'm glad the US has a strong posture against any such attack and has warned Russia fairly clearly of the very real US response such an attack would result in.

    The German donation of Gepards seemed laughable during the summer, as they have little place in active combat today, but they're overqualified to defend fixed locations against the likes of Shahed-136. Even so, the problem of too many targets reasserts itself, though in Ukraine's case it's theoretically solveable by combining their excess human resources with some lower-tech targeting upgrades on all the surplus Soviet 23mm cannon they have lying about - but I don't think either Ukrainian or NATO leadership have got on this ball yet. It's promises much more and more effective coverage for a much lower opportunity/financial cost than million-dollar AMRAAMs.
    Just want to throw out there that Gepards are actually still very effective and potent weapons. As longer ranged weapons push aircraft to the deck the engagement window for fast movers shortens significantly. Enough so that Gepards are some of the few platforms that are a threat to CAS such as Su-25s when positioned on likely ingress/egress routes, especially when paired with a longer ranged platform like Pansir (the Germans would pair these with the French Roland ADA system). Flat land like Ukraine makes it more difficult to predict flight paths compared to western Europe but it remains a useful though not game-changer on the battlefield.
    Absolutely right about AAA with radar or something, that's all it really takes. would really have to saturate around modern urban sprawl which would take hundreds of such systems to really protect Kiev or any major city in Ukraine.

    "Am I not destroying my enemies when I make friends of them?"
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    Stage four, we say maybe there was something we could have done, but it's too late now.

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