Great Power contentions

[Montmorency]

@spmetla What do you think of this? The Russians have been relying on company-sized assault groups for a long time now, but this is the first in-depth breakdown I've seen of a variation. It seems Wagner really has inspired RuFOR to double down on the schosstruppen branch, as opposed to maneuver warfare doctrine. In American context, a detachment with up to 200 infantry, 13 AFV, and 6 tanks (not counting the two artillery batteries and other integrated arty) would be classified as a reinforced company, yes?

At any rate, this TOE places a very high emphasis on ranged suppression with close-quarters assault in close coordination.

The Assault Detachment is customizable to mission requirements and consists of 2-3 assault companies, a command unit, an artillery support unit, and other groups: recon, tank, EW, AD, fire support, UAV, Medevac, flamethrowing, assault engineering, reserve, equipment recovery

Assault unit armament:
- Three T-72 tanks
- Two Zu-23, and 3 MANDAPS
- 12 man-portable flamethrowers
- Six SPGs (2S9),
- Six Towed artillery guns (D30)
- Two AGS-17
- Two Kord HMGs,
- Two ATGMs
- Two sniper pairs.
- BREM-L

The main unit of the assault detachment is an assault company consisting of a command unit, a UAV team, assault platoons, an artillery support platoon, a tank group, a reserve section, artillery support platoons, medevac section.

Assault company armament:
- Four BMP or BMD-2
- One T-72
- Two AGS-17,
- Two Kord HMG
- Two ATGM
- Two sniper pairs
- Two mortars - either 82 or 120 mm mortar
- One D30 or 2S9

The primary component of the combat formation is the assault platoon, which may consist of an advance party, safeguard, command group, and fire support platoon strengthened by additional firepower: AGS, mortar, D-30 gun, armored group, and evacuation squad.

An assault platoon comprises 12-15 members, divided into tactical groups of 3 people, and equipped based on mission requirements. A reserve section can supplement the platoon with additional firepower - machine gunner, assistant machine gunner, riflemen.

Wagner seems to have regained a measure in the internal influence contest.

There have been only a few counterattacks, so given the acuity of the situation it's basically certain by now that Ukraine is unwinding its presence around Bakhmut.

[spmetla]

@spmetla What do you think of this? The Russians have been relying on company-sized assault groups for a long time now, but this is the first in-depth breakdown I've seen of a variation. It seems Wagner really has inspired RuFOR to double down on the schosstruppen branch, as opposed to maneuver warfare doctrine. In American context, a detachment with up to 200 infantry, 13 AFV, and 6 tanks (not counting the two artillery batteries and other integrated arty) would be classified as a reinforced company, yes?

At any rate, this TOE places a very high emphasis on ranged suppression with close-quarters assault in close coordination.

I imagine it does work, it's quite a mix of combat power and capabilities, though the lack of engineer assets makes me wonder if they have special 'breach' configured forces too. Before there were stosstruppen though there was the Brusilov offensive in which the Russians did use infiltration and assault tactics to great effect.
I just wonder if the scale this is being implemented at is too small or not wide spread enough to have greater effect as it just seems of limited use so far, nothing that will allow a break through or even a local disruption of the defense. A platoon of tanks and a platoon of BMPs seems rather small to deal with a counter attack though with the superiority of equipment I imagine most local Ukrainian counter attacks are predominately infantry affairs.

For the terminology, we'd just call it a Task Force which is a catch all for Company and Battalion sized units with significant enablers or other maneuver elements attached in some manner.
Do also wonder about the training regime and rehearsals, a task organization change isn't alone, close coordination needs to be practiced to be fast and effective.

[Montmorency]

Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi, commander of Ukraine’s Land Forces and Eastern Operational Command, ordered to send more troops to Bakhmut following his trip to the front line on Feb. 25.

I really wish I knew what the hell is going on. Is the plan here to allow the city to be operationally encircled before launching a relief counteroffensive to roll up the flanks of the besieger. (Maps from DefMon and David Lisovtsev respectively)





The only good news for the moment is that the Russian tactical mistakes of the quasi-offensive (since ~January 20) have by observable loss data once again opened up a huge gap in armor losses (Russia lost 7 times as many tanks and 4 times as many AFVs). But the problem is that the absolute number of losses in these categories is far too low to be unsustainable to Russia in the medium term, even if the same is true for Ukraine. The ratio in losses of artillery platforms is still mediocre for Ukraine, even if the medium-term prospects on munitions is favorable. At some point we have to hand over some of our hundreds of collective stored M109s.

To check in on the refugee situation, from current estimates I'm seeing I would calculate there are no more than 30 million citizens left in government-controlled territory (1/5 internally displaced), with 5-6 million refugees around the world and the rest in Russia-controlled areas.

stosstruppen

I was mispronouncing it all along.

Anyway, a clear lesson of battle in Ukraine is that forces driven to rely on small-unit action and organization on the attack are also constrained to defending in the same manner. In other words, mobile defense and defense in depth suffer when detached platoons, companies, or battalions have to carry their own weight.

A Cold-War-inspired heavy division built around Abrams or Leo2 could simply annihilate a series of such groupings in detail, granting heavy initial losses to the effect of enemy artillery and CAS. But once the first and second lines were broken, such a division could comfortably roll ahead at 5-10 km/day, causing cascading failures in enemy organization. Without excellent preparation, the defender would not be able to muster and concentrate sufficient reserves to deliver a decisive meeting engagement.

In an offensive scenario in Zaporizhzhia, the extensive deployment of HIMARS for counterbattery missions would be unavoidable like never before.

The most difficult element of constructing such a heavy division, one I lack knowledge to work through, is what NATO short-range SAM systems would be available for moving up just behind the maneuver units. The second most difficult, though more a matter of training, is how to optimize between safety and availability in the divisional artillery (SPG) assets as the divisional mass advances and diffuses out across territory.


Edit: Add Serbia to the list of countries quietly providing military aid to Ukraine. As I've noted since early in the war, despite Vucic's historically belligerent rhetoric, his policy set has usually strived to balance between the EU, Russia, and China. I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.

[spmetla]

I really wish I knew what the hell is going on. Is the plan here to allow the city to be operationally encircled before launching a relief counteroffensive to roll up the flanks of the besieger. (Maps from DefMon and David Lisovtsev respectively)

I'm curious too, I'm thinking they're just trying to exhaust Russia's short-term offensive power before reverting to the offensive themselves to reduce the danger of Russian counter-attacks etc... Though I don't know if the material/manpower ratios will allow for such a strategy.

The ratio in losses of artillery platforms is still mediocre for Ukraine, even if the medium-term prospects on munitions is favorable. At some point we have to hand over some of our hundreds of collective stored M109s.

Given that the West is still needing to ramp up 155mm ammunition production perhaps the mass of M109s will be shipped once we have the ammo to give that can match the barrels shooting them. The US should also give away its older M198 155mm towed howitzers as there's no point in keep those in inventory anymore with the M777 in service for years now.

Anyway, a clear lesson of battle in Ukraine is that forces driven to rely on small-unit action and organization on the attack are also constrained to defending in the same manner. In other words, mobile defense and defense in depth suffer when detached platoons, companies, or battalions have to carry their own weight.

That's why I'm wondering about the ability to mass power in the rear areas at all. The prevalence of drones and long range artillery makes it so difficult to keep reserve or attack formations near the line of contact that battles seem to devolve into these positional attrition fights.

A Cold-War-inspired heavy division built around Abrams or Leo2 could simply annihilate a series of such groupings in detail, granting heavy initial losses to the effect of enemy artillery and CAS. But once the first and second lines were broken, such a division could comfortably roll ahead at 5-10 km/day, causing cascading failures in enemy organization. Without excellent preparation, the defender would not be able to muster and concentrate sufficient reserves to deliver a decisive meeting engagement.

This is why the US is trying to devise what would form a modern 'penetration division' to do what you suggest. I imagine though that that even were such a force available to Ukraine right now the ability to attrite massing forces near the front line will probably require a penetration division to essentially stage tens of miles from the front-line conduct it's roadmarch, passage of lines straight into the attack in order to negate the ability of artillery, drones, and CAS to attrite them as they posture in assault positions.
Something like this would take the most precise planning and coordination on the front end and the most flexible command structure to exploit any effected penetration for a break through.

The most difficult element of constructing such a heavy division, one I lack knowledge to work through, is what NATO short-range SAM systems would be available for moving up just behind the maneuver units. The second most difficult, though more a matter of training, is how to optimize between safety and availability in the divisional artillery (SPG) assets as the divisional mass advances and diffuses out across territory.

The lack of mobile SAM systems is certainly a NATO weakness though I see that being rapidly corrected with the donation of new systems by Ukraine (Skyranger for example).
As for the artillery, the current construct would allow the brigades to use their own artillery for local support while DIVARTY supports the main effort, targets enemy in the deep fight, and conducts long range counter battery fires. The future divisional model takes artillery away from the brigades and puts it all with DIVARTY which will remove some the of the flexibility current brigades have making them more dependent on DIV support, something that may be unwise in EW contested battles.

[Seamus Fermanagh]

...I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.

I recall that being a frequent mode for him in the Backroom.

[Furunculus]

Edit: Add Serbia to the list of countries quietly providing military aid to Ukraine. As I've noted since early in the war, despite Vucic's historically belligerent rhetoric, his policy set has usually strived to balance between the EU, Russia, and China. I wonder if Sarmatian is seething.

would that be because Serbia is providing aid, or because they're doing it quietly?

[Montmorency]

As an example of what I mean about the inadequate absolute losses imposed on RuFOR:



8:1 in tanks, 4:1 in AFVs... These are great ratios, no less for what they imply about infantry exchange ratios. But it's been clear since last summer that an unsustainable rate of equipment loss for Russia would look more like 10 tanks and 20 AFVs per day on average. The data we have, if extrapolated optimistically, demonstrate half that rate. Other than the infamous first phase of the invasion, and September 2022, the average has been stuck at half of the target figure: In April through August, October through February, there's a pretty consistent range of materiel losses over time.

For Russia to just lose on its own, i.e. without any special effort on our part, it was always going to have to fight and execute as badly as in the first month of the war. And for the longest time the evidence has been that no matter how many individual blunders they commit, they will never return to that level of self-own.

Moreover, the artillery system exchange ratio has never been very favorable to Ukraine, at 2-3x against Russia, relative to the starting Russian advantage in inventory.

I'm curious too, I'm thinking they're just trying to exhaust Russia's short-term offensive power before reverting to the offensive themselves to reduce the danger of Russian counter-attacks etc... Though I don't know if the material/manpower ratios will allow for such a strategy.

That's always been the grand strategy, but what remains obscure is the intent regarding Bakhmut. How can the reinforcements to the city and the repeated assurances that it will be defended be reconciled with the very limited - and oddly placed - counterattacks, and the noticeably soft defense of the northern outskirts of Bakhmut.

The battle for Severodonetsk as historical context was quickly obviated by the increasingly compromised condition of the entire Lysychansk salient. Whether or not GSUA planned to fight there forever, they couldn't secure the deep rear; the plan would have had to change regardless. In Bakhmut, well, if they're fighting an extended delaying action that would just resemble what Russia did in Lyman at larger (riskier) scale. It's incredibly risky with the scale of manpower involved, but the cord isn't quite cut for Bakhmut, even with that pincer leaving a gap of only a couple miles. But given all the 'will they, won't they' speculation, and the repeated statements (up to this day) of Ukrainian high command that they intend to keep the city, I'm trying to sort out how the very limited reinforcements and counterattacks of the past month come together in a coherent strategy in light of the extremity of the salient in which the city (and the thousands of UA personnel concentrated there) finds itself. If there is an intent to rescue the defense and restore a stable line, we're very much in the eleventh hour. A complete withdrawal would have to commence no later than the end of the week at this rate. Unlike in Lysychansk moreover, there has been extensive time and reserve capability to devise a response to the deteriorating situation - yet we haven't seen anything of the sort.

I'm thinking the options are:

1. There is no coherent strategy.
2. They've never planned to relieve Bakhmut, and are performing a phased withdrawal as we speak, but for some reason they're willing to take a morale hit by repeatedly hyping their efforts and cutting things close.
3. They're going to launch a diversionary offensive elsewhere on the front, or even a strategic offensive (but March would be a strange time, and I don't see that they've enjoyed the needed influx of munitions recently), so the development of the Bakhmut salient is irrelevant.
4. They're eager to instigate a Kesselschlacht against Wagner/VDV while they're stretched around the city, using a lot of men as bait.

I'm guessing it's a mix of the first two.

Like I said, maybe they'll surprise us again, but it's quite hard to trust GSUA right now.

That's why I'm wondering about the ability to mass power in the rear areas at all. The prevalence of drones and long range artillery makes it so difficult to keep reserve or attack formations near the line of contact that battles seem to devolve into these positional attrition fights.

This is why the US is trying to devise what would form a modern 'penetration division' to do what you suggest. I imagine though that that even were such a force available to Ukraine right now the ability to attrite massing forces near the front line will probably require a penetration division to essentially stage tens of miles from the front-line conduct it's roadmarch, passage of lines straight into the attack in order to negate the ability of artillery, drones, and CAS to attrite them as they posture in assault positions.

The way Putin aimed to resolve this challenge a year ago was to optimize on surprise. He attacked everywhere at once with approximately a quarter to a third of the prestaged forces. In other words, by having concentrations everywhere, he gave up the advantage of a heavier concentration at a main effort.

Perhaps there are holes in the following, but my own speculative OPLAN along these lines begins with:

1. Assemble the two NATO-trained divisions, and other units, loosely throughout the expanse of northern Zaporizhzhia Oblast, preferably in proximity to the T0803, T0408, and T0401 highways.
2. Long-present line units commence probes between the Dnieper and Velyka Novosilka.
3. One brigade from each division is set to march on and open two of multiple preselected directions according to the information collected.

The object would be to create a rapid penetration at points not readily apparent to the enemy, and then to expand them with successive echelons moving up from the rear, until the whole enemy defensive network is compromised and maneuver warfare can begin, which would be a huge disadvantage to RuFOR at that point. This echeloned approach (dispersal prior to joining the forward line) would limit attrition and disruption due to Russian air support and missile strikes. Russia would probably also, in the moment of peril, attempt mass strikes on Dnieper bridges in the Dnipro and Zaporizhzhia regional capitals, as well as indiscriminate bombardment of those cities with the aim of causing chaos in essential rear supply and command nodes, but that's just something to be priced in.

Something like this would take the most precise planning and coordination on the front end and the most flexible command structure to exploit any effected penetration for a break through.

If the US/EU and all its generals and strategists can't train up the personnel and structures necessary for this on a timescale of say even a year, then Ukraine is definitely losing its occupied territory.

More on the need for training of Ukrainian soldiers, officers, and specialists.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

After a year of war in Ukraine, with no decisive Russian breakthrough, many western observers believe in a Ukrainian victory.

That's futile hope, according to one senior Finnish officer who has been in Ukraine since April, observing the war.

In the officer's opinion, troops in the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) do not know how to attack and much of their training suffers from a hangover from the Soviet era.

"Ukrainians think that they are good soldiers. But being scared in the trenches for eight years does not make a skilled soldier. Soldiers are made through training," the officer emphasised.

That is why this Finnish officer has taken on the mission himself to improve the training of Ukrainian soldiers, especially that of non-commissioned officers (NCOs).

I cannot emphasize enough how recurrent this observation is, since the beginning of the war. And given the losses among the ranks of Ukraine's most professional, experienced, or motivated soldiers (it's very hard to estimate, but the very minimum should be a quarter, compared to around half for RuFOR) over the past year, the only factor that really allows UFOR to maintain any qualitative gap over the opposition is the ongoing NATO training program, small-scale as it has been so far.

So far this year, Perun noted that EU training committments for 2023 are 30K, and US 10K, on top of the British 20K catalogued in the thread.

Ukraine needs skills. It needs a high-quality Army. That is something we are well-placed to contribute, and which no one can generate on Russia's behalf. Our national leaderships and military establishments need to wise up already.

The lack of mobile SAM systems is certainly a NATO weakness though I see that being rapidly corrected with the donation of new systems by Ukraine (Skyranger for example).

I was thinking of shorter-range SAM, like Tor or Buk (Ukraine is sorely short of them by now), that would normally be a divisional or army-level enabler in Soviet doctrine. Not that this hypothetical division would be Soviet-style, but it really needs SAM moving with it to counter the Russian ace card, which is to just send waves of whole CAS squadrons of Su-24, Su-25, Su-30, Su-34, to stall any deep penetration in disregard of losses. They've done this a few times, notably during the Kupyansk Offensive, but the lower density and complex terrain seriously hindered VKS targeting efforts even as it incurred elevated losses. In Zaporizhzhia, the large armored formations driving over the southern steppe would be comparatively easy targets.

EDIT: I just remembered the US had Chaparral in the late Cold War, it being the equivalent of the Strela-10 on the Soviet side. Does the US have an answer to the Buk or Tor, something to defeat aerial targets out to mid-range and mid-to-high altitude as part of a mobile force? Are NASAMS or Patriot designed for that kind of mobility? The NASAMS launcher doesn't look too mobile.

If the effectiveness of this inevitable air campaign could be negated, Russia would very likely be unable to prevent a wide breakthrough.

As for the artillery, the current construct would allow the brigades to use their own artillery for local support while DIVARTY supports the main effort, targets enemy in the deep fight, and conducts long range counter battery fires.

It was more a question of how to safely and effectively implement integrated artillery within a constantly-moving salient. This would effectively be a first for the entire era of mobile warfare (WW2 artillery was rather short of range anyway). I do want some HIMARS batteries assigned exclusively to these divisions, but the main bulk of artillery assigned would probably be M109. Operating these in open terrain, say 20km behind the line of contact, along a front at least 10km across, when the penetration might be expanding 5+km per day, possibly even facing setbacks, is a scary prospect. An immense challenge of flexibility and communication.

Russian Lancet drones have many problems, but so far they have served as the US government probably hoped Switchblade 300 would.
https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/1...-munition.html




I calculated recently that Ukraine should need to reserve half a million 155/152mm shells for a major offensive, accounting for an elevated depletion rate of 10-15K shells/day over a month in the AO alone, plus operational buffer (where the global average depletion has been as 3-4K/day). To repeat, this figure does not include normal usage elsewhere nor a strategic reserve. Realistically then, if Ukraine were to conduct a major offensive from the first day of a given month, it would really want to begin with 750-1000K large-caliber shells available globally.

Ukraine is officially asking for 250K 155mm per month, having received by my estimate around 1.5 million to date.

250K/month in deliveries without raising the ongoing rate of expenditure seems like it would be enough to support a mid-size strategic offensive by the summer, assuming expanded deliveries started ASAP. But worldwide accessible production is nowhere near those levels yet, so the US would have to hand over the remainder of its inventory, or really start raiding South Korea's stockpile.

“According to our estimates, for the successful execution of battlefield tasks, the minimum need is at least 60 per cent of the full ammunition set, or 356,400 shells per month.”

That amount, nearly 50% higher, seems like it would be enough for two or three major offensives per year if current expenditure rates were only doubled - permitting accumulation of up to half a million shells every 4 months. The bottom line is that in order to plan major operations UFOR needs to be able to depend on the presence of a large stockpile months into the future, something that it has been often repeated is not a visible precondition over the past year.

This is why we need long-term planning in developing a strategy for this war, centering the objective needs of the Ukrainian military in maintaining defense and discretely projecting offensive power. Fact is we're still entirely ad hoc in our decision-makingI'm just some keyboard general, but I feel I've long offered a good starting proposal on a mass training mission for standing up a strike corps.

would that be because Serbia is providing aid, or because they're doing it quietly?

Can you elaborate? If the aid weren't quiet, that would be a pretty blatant snub to Russia, but it's hardly the first example of balancing by Serbia, nor is their decision on Mig-29s (there are over 100 Mig-29s in Russia, and at least 500! outside Russia, Ukraine, and the EU, so there's no long-term shortage of spares or replacements to worry about that the decision could be based on, for a country the size of Serbia at least).

[Montmorency]

There is news of a potential covert arrangement blocking the Iran-Russia deal on ballistic missile transfers in exchange for the US blocking ATACMS transfers to Ukraine. At the very least, it fits into the mold of the report from last year that the US blocked Polish Mig-29 transfers to Ukraine in exchange for Chinese mediation on nuclear risks. If one story is accurate, it lends credence to the other.


There has been another slew of articles about the determination of Ukrainian high command to retain Bakhmut. Here's Zelensky himself expressing it.

Prigozhin himself insists that Option 4 (Kesselschlact) from my previous post is the intent, that once Bakhmut is encircled GSUA will initiate an unblocking operation to fracture Wagner. Yet an anonymous NATO official was just quoted as saying that Russia lost at least 5 times as many KIA as Ukraine over Bakhmut; the geographic range is unclear, but the time frame is probably roughly early/mid-December through February. This is not necessarily a US official, but such a ratio, besides being inconsistent with the latest reports from the ground, is probably inconsistent with the recent US estimate of 9K Wagner KIA in one full year. Even assuming other formations were heavily involved in the winter fighting around Bakhmut, and attributing 100% of the estimated Wagner KIA, the derivative KIA figure for UFOR would be something like 20-25 KIA/day in or around Bakhmut. Other sources generally agree that the casualty exchange has usually been between 1:1 and 1:2 in Ukraine's favor.

I just got wind of a thought dropped by Perun in his video on "Russian Strengths & Capabilities":

You could do things like pull thirty or forty thousand Ukrainian recruits over to the United States and say, "I am going to spend 8 or 9 months turning these troops into a modern, capable, NATO-standard family of units. They are going to learn how to maintain the equipment, they are going to learn how to use it effectively, they are going to learn how to fight combined arms.

[Montmorency]

Apparently, every faction in Syria is relying on the HTS Islamists to keep Idlib clear of IS and Al Qaeda.

On top of the Norwegian Leo2 decision, it seems Italy is going all-in on Leo2A7. Also, Romania is bidding on Abrams.

European tank market getting crowded.

Swiss neutrality is more important than ever, President Alain Berset said in an interview published Sunday, defending the controversial ban on transferring Swiss-made arms to Ukraine.

"Swiss weapons must not be used in wars," he told the NZZ am Sonntag weekly.

Preferably, they should only be used in a conflict where both sides are purchasing them.



One of the prolific Ukraine War commentators offers a tactical breakdown of what a southern offensive of the sort I've discussed here would look like. IMO his vision relies too much on the optimization of grunts' safety through firepower, which Ukraine will never get in such massive quantities - the breakthrough element would always suffer high casualties to compensate with bodies and vehicles for lack of firepower. But schematically I agree with pretty much all of what he says. But:

So how would I attack? Depends on the available forces... with nine mechanized brigades, three artillery brigades, two engineer brigades & follow on forces to secure the rear, I would attack, break through & pursue three directions:
1) South to Mariupol
2) West to Bilmak in the rear of the russian front to panic the russian troops there
3) East to Amvrosiivka to make holding Donetsk city impossible for the russians.

Once these objectives are secured I would pursue limited attacks in the East to secure the border with russia and encircle Donetsk from three sides, while throwing most forces into a push towards Berdyansk & Tokmak.

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

I think this approach (put everything into a thrust south of Vuhledar) is overly concentrated, and in an area that lacks road infrastructure behind friendly lines and in the RuFOR close rear.

First, the advantages:

1. Depending on the circumstances, concentrating the entire OOB may be necessary to ensure success (compared to my preference of separating into two forces that attack at locations further west and independently pivoting east and west, respectively, when into the rear.
2. IF the Kerch Strait (rail) Bridge can be disabled just before or during the offensive, then time and resources may be saved in letting RuFOR in Zapo/Kherson wither on the vine, redirecting resources that would be used to confront them more directly toward achieving the largest possible penetration into Donetsk (the strategic endgame).
3. Puts a relatively-large distance between the offensive axes and the large RuFOR strategic reserve in Kherson and around Melitopol.
4. Prioritizes anchoring along the Ukraine-Russia state border ahd destabilizing the broader (Donetsk) central front.

Disadvantages:

1. The enemy will be almost-perfectly supplied so close to Donetsk, and with better situational awareness.
2. The offensive really shouldn't take place without means to disable the Kerch Bridge anyway, and pressuring the Melitopol direction is a good opportunity to cause a rout and secure mass surrenders during a disorderly RuFOR retreat toward Crimea.
3. There is no way to support a deep west-hook into the Zapo rear behind the prepared RuFOR line without the flanks being horribly threatened.
4. Instead of inviting RuFOR to stick their necks out in an effort to maintain the road LOC between Mariupol and Melitopol, all those resources would be devoted to stemming the UFOR opening in the first place.
5. The Donetsk-envelopment component is simply always going to be a bridge too far for a single offensive action to achieve.
6. Low-quality though they may be, I'm pretty sure there is a very large DPR/Rosgvardia cluster of security forces and third-tier reserves right there in the Donetsk City metropolitan area.
7. Higher concentration increases susceptibility to high-risk VKS ground-attack sorties.


In my view a major southern offensive should have the following conceptual goals above all.

1. Penetrate deep into the enemy rear in Zaporizhzhia, cutting off the land bridge to Crimea; if things have gone well then a race to the sea should be inevitable.
2. Ensure unstoppable but steady momentum that can keep RuFOR retreating westward without time to stabilize (e.g. to the gates of Crimea by D+30—60).
3. Achieve a lodgement east of the pre-2022 de facto DPR border in order to bypass the extensive border fortification network and facilitate future offensives.
(4). Cut off Mariupol by land.

Thus, building on ideas introduced in earlier posts (light-blue signifies 3rd-echelon movements): @spmetla

Spoiler Alert, click show to read: 

Notes: The east branch from the Orikhiv-Melitopol axis would help ensure the neutralization of the major Russian base at Polohy before being assigned as needed to the push to envelop either Melitopol or Mariupol. The rendered branches of the Hulyaipole-Mariupol axis stop just at the pre-2022 border. The intent is to go somewhat further of course, but where and how would depend on conditions on the ground and more detailed operational planning than I am willing to attempt.

I can't definitively say the commentator's vision is worse, though I prefer my own. He is the one between us with military command experience. Maybe a compromise plan exchanging the thrust out of Orikhiv for one out of Vuhledar? I'm glad that there is finally serious mainstream (among war spectators) discussion of the resources Ukraine needs in order to prosecute a major offensive.

What we can be sure of is that Ukraine is nowhere near to possessing what it needs to execute on any version of the OPLAN. Both the 500K large-caliber shells (which I'm pleased to see the commentator also cites) and the NATO-standard 9+ brigades are necessary.

[spmetla]

1. Penetrate deep into the enemy rear in Zaporizhzhia, cutting off the land bridge to Crimea; if things have gone well then a race to the sea should be inevitable.
2. Ensure unstoppable but steady momentum that can keep RuFOR retreating westward without time to stabilize (e.g. to the gates of Crimea by D+30?60).
3. Achieve a lodgement east of the pre-2022 de facto DPR border in order to bypass the extensive border fortification network and facilitate future offensives.
(4). Cut off Mariupol by land.

I agree with all three of goals there, getting to the Azov Sea would also allow ground based missiles to threaten Russian shipping/naval efforts there essentially closing the port of Rostov ship may shape the efforts for a strike on the Kerch bridge that permanently closes it.

The subsequent defenses that Russia has been building on all fronts though make it difficult to keep momentum up. Exploitation forces need to be 100% capable of breaching/assaulting further defenses lines which will attrit the attackers rapidly.
Unstoppable momentum would require a much larger force as even if the losses are minimal and the equipment and ammo are available the Soldiers themselves can't really keep going beyond 96 hours of high-intensity combat.

I see re-taking Crimea as far more important than the Donbas region as doing so will cross that Russian redline sooner than later and if Crimea is lost or essentially an island I wonder if Russia will have the political will to fight over the comparatively unimportant Donbas region.

Very curious to see what Ukraine does in the spring, the new tanks, the probable MiG-29 donations and so on. Fingers crossed they have the right plan.

[Montmorency]

I see re-taking Crimea as far more important than the Donbas region as doing so will cross that Russian redline sooner than later and if Crimea is lost or essentially an island I wonder if Russia will have the political will to fight over the comparatively unimportant Donbas region.

While that's true to an extent, knocking the extensive manpower pool and military infrastructure (and presumably some separatist units) of Donbass out of the war would severely weaken Russia's ability to make future offensives or launch future wars, while not furthering the defense of Crimea in particular. Moreover, an initial assault into Crimea would inherently be the most challenging and costly initiative of the war (other than some stupid thing, like trying to fight frontally through the Donetsk metropolitan area). Finally, as I've mentioned before, I see Crimea as above all a bargaining chip; a referendum on sovereignty would almost certainly go against Ukraine without extensive ethnic cleansing, and even as war spoils without a referendum would see a lot of ethnic cleansing. While this could be said of any outcome to the war, Crimean irredentism would be assured of becoming a long-term bone of contention in Russian politics. In all of these optimistic war scenarios it would have been Biden's job to step in and find a magnanimous, treaty-bound compromise between the belligerents, probably secured by Russian demilitarization of the peninsula alongside a Ukrainian/UN compliance garrison and water rights. The situation with Donbass on the other hand is self-resolving given the political demography (with those who took up arms to be addressed according to something like the Finnish model of 1918).


I see we lost an entire air force's worth of frames last decade to accidents. It does often seem like Western military establishments, with few exceptions, are only marginally less sclerotic than the likes of Russia's.

[spmetla]

While that's true to an extent, knocking the extensive manpower pool and military infrastructure (and presumably some separatist units) of Donbass out of the war would severely weaken Russia's ability to make future offensives or launch future wars, while not furthering the defense of Crimea in particular. Moreover, an initial assault into Crimea would inherently be the most challenging and costly initiative of the war (other than some stupid thing, like trying to fight frontally through the Donetsk metropolitan area).

It's because the Donbas is a manpower pool with a population that has actually been at war with Ukraine for eight years and will likely resist a Ukrainian reconquest that I think Crimea the softer target. The Donbas has been fortifying for eight years, the military infrastructure is closely tied to Russia already.
Crimea on the other hand has largely been spared the last eight years of hostility besides the water cut off from the Kherson Canal. It's population has not had to have a war mentality for the last eight years and though largely pro-Russian that lack of eight years of war has probably not hardened their stance toward Ukraine as much as in the Donbas.
Not to mention, Crimea's lines of communication (LOCs) can actually be cut off from Russia, the LOCs for the Donbas cannot short of retaking the Donbas entirely.

Finally, as I've mentioned before, I see Crimea as above all a bargaining chip; a referendum on sovereignty would almost certainly go against Ukraine without extensive ethnic cleansing, and even as war spoils without a referendum would see a lot of ethnic cleansing.

That's possible but it could also end up being somewhat like 1944-45 Europe with the ethnic Germans fleeing Westward to escape the Soviets. The Russian population that truly hates Ukraine and believes them nazis may flee of their own accord and just not be allowed to return.

There's also the look at Benes post-war Czechoslovakia's expulsion of the Germans which was done for obvious reasons but was paired with not demanding any substantial reparations from the post-war German states either once those were re-established. Something the Polish government should consider seeing as they got substantial reparations as well as territorial concessions from West/East Germany.

Might even end up with a vague sort of population exchange as happened between Turkey and Greece following the Greco-Turkish War/WWI, those Russians that do remain in Ukraine will likely further identify with them and assimilate into Ukraine, something this war has certainly sped up as not all ethnic Russians have love for the Russian State.

While this could be said of any outcome to the war, Crimean irredentism would be assured of becoming a long-term bone of contention in Russian politics. In all of these optimistic war scenarios it would have been Biden's job to step in and find a magnanimous, treaty-bound compromise between the belligerents, probably secured by Russian demilitarization of the peninsula alongside a Ukrainian/UN compliance garrison and water rights. The situation with Donbass on the other hand is self-resolving given the political demography (with those who took up arms to be addressed according to something like the Finnish model of 1918).

Russia could be given the whole Black Sea coast and they'd still be demanding more. Revenge against any independent Ukrainian State will assuredly be a policy of any future Russian government.
The only real protector against renewed hostilities would be UN manned demilitarized zones on both sides of the border or a formal defensive alliance between Ukraine and the US/NATO and EU.
A UN demilitarized zone would likely never be agreed to by Russia and it would require a substantial force to actually implement. Consider the size of the MFO force between Egypt and Israel was at its peak three full infantry battalions plus many other enabling forces. The major UN contributing nations that are more reliable and capable are typically from NATO countries too so Russia would see this more as NATO on and in their border than the UN.
A more formal defensive alliance and arrangement however is possible, Ukraine must still possess the means to defend itself. A pact with NATO or the EU though with potential future membership would be the best way to guarantee peace short of WW3.

I just look to 1936 Germany, if the will to resist German re-occupation of the Rhineland was there then perhaps WW2 could have avoided. Irredentist attitudes will take a generation or three to no longer be a threat to peace.
The Russian Federation has been a failure as a democratic state just as the Weimar Republic, I see the 2014 actions like the Anschluss of Austria and the Sudetenland and the current war as like the attempt to Occupy the rest of Bohemia and Moravia with a puppet state in Slovakia. If the Czechs had resisted in 1939 and the Allies intervened I see no reason why the Germans would have been allowed to keep the Sudetenland in a negotiated settlement. Though of course it's obvious I'm trying too hard to put the current situation into none-equal historical parallels there are similarities.

I see we lost an entire air force's worth of frames last decade to accidents. It does often seem like Western military establishments, with few exceptions, are only marginally less sclerotic than the likes of Russia's.

Considering that our pilots and air frames get a lot more flight time I'm not surprised we have high accident rates. Even with our volunteer force I'm sure there's problems in maintenance for aircraft due to the constant re-training of crews as well as any failures in leadership and management. Something needs to change for sure but that'd require more oversight which is difficult to implement.

[Montmorency]

Crimea on the other hand has largely been spared the last eight years of hostility besides the water cut off from the Kherson Canal. It's population has not had to have a war mentality for the last eight years and though largely pro-Russian that lack of eight years of war has probably not hardened their stance toward Ukraine as much as in the Donbas.

While this part is true, and could potentially signal difficulties for holding Donbass now that such a large part of the population has been involved in large-scale combat against Ukraine for so long, Crimea is still far more anti-Ukrainian. It tried to secede in 1992/3! Before 2014 you'd routinely - relative to the amount of Ukraine coverage of course - see articles about Ukraine in mainstream Western press musing about how much Crimeans hate Ukraine. While similar refugee outflow effects* would apply in the case of a battle into Crimea (especially of Russian immigrants of the past decade), by now we can expect the vast majority of the pro-Ukrainian population of Crimea, which itself was a smaller base to begin with, has been purged by Russia. Perhaps 90% of the population dwelling in Crimea today is ethnic Russian, and not just ethnic Russian but some of the likeliest ethnic Russians anywhere to be virulently anti-Ukrainian. That's a long-term problem no matter how the war ends.

It is worth analyzing that anti-Russian partisan activity in both the long-term Russian occupation zones has been nearly nonexistent during the war. But even hotspots like Melitopol would be crushed before long if the war ended. (Westerners who hype the power of insurgencies are so weird to me; it's extremely case-specific and insurgencies are usually not very viable).

*If the bridge is down and LOC are reserved for military supply, it really also depends on how much Russia wants to prioritize evacuating civilians

Not to mention, Crimea's lines of communication (LOCs) can actually be cut off from Russia, the LOCs for the Donbas cannot short of retaking the Donbas entirely.

That's why, historically, the only way to capture Donbass is around, not through. In this war Ukraine's maximal strategy would be a double envelopment from North Luhansk south of the SD River alongside South Donetsk north of Mariupol. Luhansk City could not be cut off, but Donetsk City and its metro area could be, thus removing most of the regional population from the equation. We come to recognize the northern front is a stalemate, so the southern offensive with eastward hook is the only viable approach. Donbass is less fortified than you think, from the Russian side - it's only the pre-2022 line of control that has seen extensive work. GEOSINT meanwhile shows that almost all wartime Russian fortifications and trench networks have been constructed near the line of contact in the newly-occupied areas, near Melitopol - as well as Crimea! The LDPR territory has hardly been augmented in the past year. If, in a southern offensive, Ukraine rapidly secures a lodgement beyond that old fortification network, the entire network becomes too compromised to be sustainable to future efforts (ask the Ukrainians fighting north of Bakhmut for reference!). From that point of course, UFOR would need to press the advantage toward gradual movement and not settle down long enough to be contained by new fortified lines, further limiting the resources that could be spared for Crimea.

I urge anyone to look into the geography of Crimea. In this type of war it is extremely easy to defend, as the entryways are only a couple bridges that can be blown, around 10 cumulative kilometers of land, and vast stretches of silty lagoons. If Ukraine had the firepower necessary to suppress Russian defenses (which could still be resupplied by sea and air even without the bridge), then why wouldn't it aim all that into a Donbass penetration? The majority of UFOR would need to be committed to a Crimean operation, along with a year's worth of Western production, all of which seems like it will always be unavailable anyway until the rest of the lost territories can be secured, because to do otherwise would leave too many vulnerabilities.

Russia could be given the whole Black Sea coast and they'd still be demanding more. Revenge against any independent Ukrainian State will assuredly be a policy of any future Russian government.

This is less likely IMO with a just solution to the Crimean question that aligns with "Western values." Such a solution is ultimately backstopped by the demonstrable (demonstrated) military capacity of Ukraine and NATO anyway, since there is no discussion to be had without force of arms delivering us Crimea to begin with. I would suggest that another 'little green men' operation into a demilitarized Crimea garrisoned by a Ukrainian division would go pretty badly for Russia in multiple ways - that's sound deterrence.

As long as we're talking about ridiculous world-war-style imperialism however, I would prefer something like forcible indepedence and demilitarization (including nuclear) for Kaliningrad in exchange for the concession of Crimea.

A pact with NATO or the EU though with potential future membership would be the best way to guarantee peace short of WW3.

NATO/Polish forces setting up shop is close to the ideal, as even Article 5 of NATO doesn't technically require any given country respond more than symbolically. But as I keep telling people, a NATO that is not prepared to equip Ukraine to win is not a NATO that will take up the liability of a Ukraine conceded to disadvantageous territorial losses and/or at permanent war with Russia. If NATO steps up and permits Ukraine to reclaim its territory, settling most of the issues (its not clear which of our views represents the intergovernmental consensus on Crimea most closely), then NATO track is a done deal; even Hungary would want to be on Ukraine's good side.

Currently we're still on track to pointless quagmire, as Ukraine receives only life support and Russia drains its own ability to achieve tactical successes. This is the scenario most favorable to China, of course; let's see how much progress they've made in turning the Gulf into their protectorate (not that I don't see it as a good opportunity to wind down our "ally" status with Saudi Arabia anyway).

[spmetla]

It is worth analyzing that anti-Russian partisan activity in both the long-term Russian occupation zones has been nearly nonexistent during the war. But even hotspots like Melitopol would be crushed before long if the war ended. (Westerners who hype the power of insurgencies are so weird to me; it's extremely case-specific and insurgencies are usually not very viable).

Counter-insurgency is difficult if you're actually trying to win the population over, sadly genocide and repression have proved very effective over the last century. Historical conquest has typically had a lot of post-conquest pogroms. Civil disobedience and disorganized armed resistance don't go very far in police states.

*If the bridge is down and LOC are reserved for military supply, it really also depends on how much Russia wants to prioritize evacuating civilians

I think the Russian State would sooner conscript them into local defense forces and invoke the Battle of Sevastopol in WW2. It's one of the reasons I'd want the Kerch bridge in place until the land bridge is cut off. If it and port activity were the only way for Russia to resupply Crimea it'd cause a flight of people as the AFU work toward Crimea.

I urge anyone to look into the geography of Crimea. In this type of war it is extremely easy to defend, as the entryways are only a couple bridges that can be blown, around 10 cumulative kilometers of land, and vast stretches of silty lagoons. If Ukraine had the firepower necessary to suppress Russian defenses (which could still be resupplied by sea and air even without the bridge), then why wouldn't it aim all that into a Donbass penetration? The majority of UFOR would need to be committed to a Crimean operation, along with a year's worth of Western production, all of which seems like it will always be unavailable anyway until the rest of the lost territories can be secured, because to do otherwise would leave too many vulnerabilities.

A Donbas penetration is certainly more viable, there's zero doubt about that. The Donbas though is just relatively unimportant in comparison. If Crimea were at least under siege it'd more likely drive Russia to negotiate than losing the Donbas.

Given the limited ability of Ukraine in the offense I'd be just happy to see them cut off the land bridge at all. The pre-Feb24th are probably doable the 1991 borders are certainly out of reach at present. The US and rest of NATO have unfortunately dragged their feet far too much on rearming Ukraine and themselves. That scores of Leo2s, hundreds of Leo1s and Marder IFVs aren't already in Ukraine is just inexcusable.

[Montmorency]

I've maintained from the beginning, even here I believe, that the minimum victory condition from the perspective of the West (and arguably also Ukraine) is the restoration of pre-2022 borders. Maybe our governments (other than the Eastern Flank of course) truly believed the minimum level of support we sent Ukraine would be enough to enable that - DoD just crowed about having completed a five-week training course in basic marksmanship and "combined arms" for a UFOR battalion, as though this were Spring '22 or some shit - but it's easier for me to believe in a lack of vision among political establishments, and a lack of competence among military establishments.

Crimea may be more geostrategically important than Donbass, but I do believe control of Donbass is more important to Ukraine as a state and as a society and as an economy. It is also more important for future military defensive arrangement. The status of Crimea is more important to American realist theories of geopolitics than it is to Ukraine's prospects tbh.

You have some cause to believe that a serious prospective threat to Crimea could bring Russia to negotiate, but Russia will never hand over territory it directly controls unless it becomes non-viable. We have seen it do that multiple times over, most climactically with the Three Ks (Kyiv, Kharkiv, Kherson). The necessary factor is for the territory to become militarily compromised and 'more trouble than it is worth.' There is little reason to expect a repeat with the "people's republics" that Putin allegedly invaded to protect and later annexed, without large parts of those already being overrun or cut off.

Some more considerations:

1. Russians care a lot more about Crimea than about Donbass on a visceral level.
2. There are a lot more influential Russian citizens in Crimea than in Donbass, the kind who would make a fuss (Cuban-style) to the Russian mainstream about being turned into refugees.
3. The separatist die-hards, say 50-100K, are a significant military asset that are clearly willing to keep fighting forever. If they were somehow neutralized as an asset, for example through mass surrenders, it would be easier for the Kremlin to justify cutting their political echelon loose.
4. The ability, the position, to enforce a magnanimous disposition of Crimea would generate enormous goodwill toward the United States around the world, probably even among Russian elites. Ukrainian nationalists would be displeased, but most Ukrainians would support the effort given the decisive nature of American contributions in this scenario (the assumption too is that both DC and Kyiv would present a unified public position on the referenda issue).


ROFL Hungary and Turkey have agreed to approve Finland's NATO application. High-tier trolling. (Erdogan's comment was that with Finland in NATO Sweden is basically a member for all intents and purposes anyway.)

[Montmorency]

20-year anniversary of the Second Iraq War.

Lest we forget:
https://twitter.com/i/status/1637861078645235739 [VIDEO]

[spmetla]

I was one month out of basic training when we invaded. While at basic I saw the 3ID vehicles go from woodland camo to desert to then gone as they deployed over seas with several members of my basic training class immediately deploying with their newly assigned units into Kuwait/Iraq.
I was a big cheerleader of the war at the start though I was surprised it started. I'd though Bush Jr was playing hardball to get more from weapons inspections.
In hindsight, it was a strategic and humanitarian catastrophe with no benefit beyond the death of Saddam and his sons. As a semi-professional military man I'm still absolutely appalled at the lack of a post-invasion plan as well as the unnecessary decisions such as disbanding the Iraqi Army and outlawing the Baath Party.
I'm glad Iraq is in a better place now than in the decade after we'd invaded but still, it's a mark of shame on the country which is curiously mixed with some of the best times of my life as when I deployed there in 2005 I was only 20, turned 21 in country and with the optimism of youth, thrill of dangerous adventure, and comradery felt among our tightknit infantry platoon.

Lots of mixed feelings. Sadly, the way to avoid such things in future is for congress to reassert it's war powers, something our fickle and increasingly divided people don't seem apt or right to do as at the moment.

Shame also that the war allowed Afghanistan to turn into the Bush admin's forgotten backwater, we missed real opportunities to bring the defeated Taliban out of the cold and into the Afghan system instead of in opposition to it.

[Montmorency]

Importantly, not in hindsight! The people who got it right from the beginning were practically persecuted by their government and society, while the ones who - to greater or lesser degrees of involvement - advanced criminal mass carnage were ceaselessly rewarded in politics, media, and beyond. All the Org old-timers should recall.

The raspberry road that led to Abu Ghraib was paved with bland assumptions that people who had repeatedly proved their untrustworthiness, could be trusted. There is much made by people who long for the days of their fourth form debating society about the fallacy of ?argumentum ad hominem?. There is, as I have mentioned in the past, no fancy Latin term for the fallacy of ?giving known liars the benefit of the doubt?, but it is in my view a much greater source of avoidable error in the world.

No one today can supply a simple reason for the invasion of Iraq that stands up to the slightest moral or factual scrutiny. Every attempt to provide a rationale for the war is patent sophistry or self-justification. This groundlessness, this inability to situate the war in anything tangible or concrete, is simply because it was based on a lie. More than a single lie, it was based on thoroughgoing hostility towards reality itself. It was based on an absurdly oversimplified ideological picture of the world. It was based on the willful ignorance and manipulation of intelligence. It was based on the fictitious and fanciful idea that Saddam was somehow connected to Osama bin Laden, a falsehood that played on the fears and anger of a wounded and humiliated nation, ready to lash out. It was based on indifference to the actual history and culture of Iraq, as if we could just easily shape another nation to our will. And, perhaps most disturbingly, it was based on the belief that projecting the image of power, of a tough and vengeful nation, was of paramount concern. The planners clearly thought about the war as it would play out on T.V.: in spectacular scenes that would impress audiences at home and abroad. ?There are no good targets in Afghanistan; let's bomb Iraq,? Donald Rumsfeld remarked to Richard Clarke ? There was just more to blow up. This indifference towards the constraints of reality, this drive to make a fantasy world real, this confusion between the creation of propaganda and war, or rather, the waging of war itself as a kind of propaganda campaign, are the type of things we normally associate with totalitarian regimes. So too the mobilization of vicious public abuse and slander against anti-war sentiment. This was done not out of fear of the secret police but out of sheer enthusiasm: Many of the nation?s journalists and writers gladly volunteered for that work. They set out to make sure an insane thing became common sense among the elite. In doing all this, they betrayed their role as intellectuals for the cheap rewards of clique, career, or conceit.

There is a tendency to try to portray the Iraq War as a ?tragedy,? as a mistake, brought on by hubris or zeal. One should reject this framing, for the reason that it is intrinsically ennobling... All this is improper in the case of the war in Iraq. It is an attempt to use heady incense to cover up a noxious stench. There is a revolting sense of self-pity in this conceit: as if the really important thing lost in the war was the innocence, honor, and reputation of our nation and its leaders. The lesson of Iraq is that it can happen here. We are not immune: The entire nation can lose touch with reality. We saw all this happen with our own eyes. Let?s face it now: We all knew it was a lie. Some people just wanted to believe it or cynically didn?t care. We went to war and killed hundreds of thousands for something that was just not real.

It's hard to imagine today that McCain was even allowed to show his face in public after campaigning - in 2008! - on killing millions of Americans and Iranians. Or:

Last month, at a town hall meeting in New Hampshire, a crowd member asked McCain about a Bush statement that troops could stay in Iraq for 50 years.

"Maybe 100," McCain replied. "As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it's fine with me and I hope it would be fine with you if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al Qaeda is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day."

This collective failure/psychosis needs to be taught starting in primary school, worldwide. We need more instruction in mass psychology and its manipulation if we ever want to inoculate humans against perpetrating the same destructive mistakes time and again. How the "developed" world could produce the War on Terror, the Ukraine War, and climate change and pandemic denialism in the 21st century remains an urgent matter of scholarship and pedagogy.

First we have to overwhelm and neutralize the people who e.g. want to eliminate "secular math" from public schools (preceding the elimination of public schooling altogether)...



In other news, the UK intends to send DU ammo (CHARM 1/3) with its Challengers, probably as a signal to America. Putin vows to retaliate, presumably by permitting the Russian Army to receive DU ammo. So far they have only used tungsten-core rounds, predominantly of Soviet manufacture. But so far the availability and performance of tungsten APFSDS in Ukraine suggests DU will never play more than a symbolic role until M1 Abrams appear in large numbers.

[spmetla]

Importantly, not in hindsight! The people who got it right from the beginning were practically persecuted by their government and society, while the ones who - to greater or lesser degrees of involvement - advanced criminal mass carnage were ceaselessly rewarded in politics, media, and beyond. All the Org old-timers should recall.

They certainly were persecuted and laughed at, coming off the moral high in post 9/11 was difficult for the country. I think Colin Powell's speech though changed a lot of the fence sitters to pro-war, shame he ruined his integrity by doing so though he's still adamant that he didn't know the intel was based off a single source and a flawed one at that.
It is crazy though looking at the immediate post-9/11 talks at Camp David and how some in the administration were already focused on tying it to Iraq.

Once we invaded though, I still think we had an obligation to try and create some sort of stability before leaving. Crazy though that we're still there but this time to fight ISIS in Syria in a indirect support role.

This collective failure/psychosis needs to be taught starting in primary school, worldwide. We need more instruction in mass psychology and its manipulation if we ever want to inoculate humans against perpetrating the same destructive mistakes time and again. How the "developed" world could produce the War on Terror, the Ukraine War, and climate change and pandemic denialism in the 21st century remains an urgent matter of scholarship and pedagogy.

I don't think our nation of 'consumers' wants to be taught that, might not look forward to talking about the best Superbowl commercials. I think the increasing disconnect between the general population and the military is part of the problem. People were happy to support a war that didn't affect them in any meaningful way. This is also see in our elected representatives that truly do not understand anything about the military, it's their be all solution for so many things. Our politicians also don't have any understanding of what guidance the military needs for national policy and strategy, budget forecasting, basing and so on.

In other news, the UK intends to send DU ammo (CHARM 1/3) with its Challengers, probably as a signal to America. Putin vows to retaliate, presumably by permitting the Russian Army to receive DU ammo. So far they have only used tungsten-core rounds, predominantly of Soviet manufacture. But so far the availability and performance of tungsten APFSDS in Ukraine suggests DU will never play more than a symbolic role until M1 Abrams appear in large numbers.

What do you think of the news of what looks like trainloads of T-54/55s going West for likely use in Ukraine? If that's the case they are certainly scrapping the barrel as unlike the ancient hardware the West gave to Ukraine, these aren't modernized. It's still an armored vehicle with a 100mm cannon that can be of some limited use on the battlefield but vulnerable to all Ukrainian MBTs as well as all modern IFVs.
Can't be great for morale of crews that expected T90s and Armatas and get T-54/55s instead.

The battle for Bakhmut looks to be near the culminating point for Russia and Russia's other little offensives seem to be still ineffective too. I can only hope that Russia really is at a low ebb for ammo, equipment, and manpower so that Ukraine can have more success in the hoped for spring offensive.

Any thoughts on Xi's visit to Moscow? From my seat it looks like Putin is just accelerating his dependence on China for everything. Russia will be resource supplier to China, makes we wonder how long before China retakes the Russian Far East?
Japanese PM, Fumio Kishida's visit to Kiev was surprising as a counter-balance, wondering how else they intend to help Ukraine. They'd provided a lot of money for infrastructure support so I expect more of that. Wonder if Japan will try to get any non-lethal defense aid to Ukraine too as now that they can export military goods again.

[Montmorency]

Ukraine is getting Patriot faster than expected, but since NATO tank transfers are so few and so slow the US is also adding a commitment to deliver some M1A1s on a shorter timeline.

What do you think of the news of what looks like trainloads of T-54/55s going West for likely use in Ukraine? If that's the case they are certainly scrapping the barrel as unlike the ancient hardware the West gave to Ukraine, these aren't modernized. It's still an armored vehicle with a 100mm cannon that can be of some limited use on the battlefield but vulnerable to all Ukrainian MBTs as well as all modern IFVs.
Can't be great for morale of crews that expected T90s and Armatas and get T-54/55s instead.

Some OSINT on the T-54/5 movement. I would wait for more information. On the other hand, we have suddenly seen the reappearance of T-62M on the battlefield this month; previously I would say 99% of combat and loss reports for that platform were confined to the Kherson bridgehead between June and November '22. There are also rumors about the movement of BTR-50s.

We believe that removing such old military vehicles from storage may have two reasons. Firstly, it is likely that a large number of stockpiles were not properly maintained and turned out to be in even worse condition than many thought (similar to the third category munitions [unfit for use in combat] sent to the front). Secondly, armored vehicle factories do not provide the necessary pace of repairs and production that would correspond to the losses on the frontlines (there is no information about the commissioning of new repair factories, which was announced in the fall). It is possible that very old equipment, which is easier to bring into working condition, is being restored now as modern tanks require longer repair time.

I should note that in February the Economist reported on the opening of two new tank repair facilities expected in the immediate future.

Or they could use it as a brutal IFV, or swap turrets as a special weapons or engineering platform, or even as a training vehicle.

If they do deploy T-55s in tank role, with or without simple upgrades, then it still wouldn't be because of an overall shortage of tanks right now IMO. (It might mean the absolute limit has been reached on other Soviet tanks operable right out of storage without refurbishment.) But Russia will completely exhaust 100% of prewar active service, Soviet storage, and ongoing production, as well as whatever they can dig out of Belarus, if the war continues out to 2027 (besides the case of China/NK going all out and delivering thousands of T-62 variants, but see below). Using T-55s as cannon fodder to absorb Ukrainian munitions could delay that for a time.

The battle for Bakhmut looks to be near the culminating point for Russia and Russia's other little offensives seem to be still ineffective too. I can only hope that Russia really is at a low ebb for ammo, equipment, and manpower so that Ukraine can have more success in the hoped for spring offensive.

Latest weekly progress of RuFOR around Bakhmut (yellow line was RuFOR LOC as of mid-March). Mud could explain the issue initially, but they were still advancing in early March when it was muddy, whereas by now conditions should be much more solid.



Wagner Group doesn't have much longer before the outflow of convict 6-month contractors leaves it unable to maintain the role Prigozhin arrogated to himself. This point would certainly come sometime in May even if Wagner was pulled out of fighting entirely. I made some estimates in January, but irrespective of how one estimates casualties these quickly became too optimistic as they were still premised on continued Wagner access to prison recruitment.

I would keep an eye on the situation around Avdiivka however, where RuFOR has been advancing west of the H20 highway this month for the first time.

Any thoughts on Xi's visit to Moscow?

I don't think putative dependence on China is a big worry for Putin given the alternative for him.

My going assumption for China-Russia relations over the past year, and I think it more or less checks out with the coverage I've encountered, is that Xi is happy to find mutual benefit while distracting the West as China layers its partnerships around the world. So Xi should definitely be and remain averse to formally declaring on behalf of Russia, or extending aid beyond stable economic ties. On the other hand, to the extent a greater rupture between China and the West is coming in the aftermath of the Ukraine War, what we're also seeing is China working to shore up its overland access (including infrastructure) to raw resources, which Russia will be happy to provide so long as China is not overtly hostile to it. Xi still has bigger fish to fry than Ukraine.

[Montmorency]

It appears Russia failed to secure clear followthrough on its planned Power of Friendship-2 gas pipeline during the latest summit.

Currently, China intends to import 38 billion billion cubic meters of gas from Russia by 2025, with the final capacity of Power of Friendship-1 (completed a few years ago) and a small pipeline from Sakhalin being 48 bcm by 2027. It would probably be buying similar quantities of gas from Central Asia by then.

Russia wants that second pipeline open by 2030, with a capacity of 50 bcm. In other words, the plan is to sell China 100 bcm of steeply discounted gas as early as 2030, following enormous capital expenditures in running a pipeline across Siberia and Mongolia. And there isn't even a final agreement.

IIRC Russia sold the EU over 150 bcm in 2021, and besides Hungary this must already have approached zero. If Russia's oil industry is on life support, the gas industry continues to appear moribund.



Checking the latest Military Balance catalog again, IFVs are a much bigger problem area for Russia than even tanks. Figure 1500 BMP-series alone lost in one year (net captures). Hundreds could be raided from Belarus in the future, but this is not a renewable resource. IIRC the only troop-carrying AFV of any type still in production in Russia is the BMP-3, which could perhaps reach 300 units per year later on. So far calls to restart BMP-2 production have been rejected as too materially cumbersome. Some number of stored BTR-series can be converted/upgraded to an autocannon design, but this is not meaningfully happening yet and will never produce many vehicles.

Military Balance 2023 reports ~3650 BMP-series in service at the beginning of 2023, revised down from 4600 in 2022, with 4000 in storage, revised down from 8500 (which was an inflated/outdated figure). Figure no more than 3500 in service right now, with 3000 usable hulls in storage (rest for parts or future modernization).

It's unclear how many stored AFVs can be refurbished in a given time period, but as with tanks, it appears to be the case that ready-to-use units are now rare and remaining stored equipment must generally undergo a reactivation process. Russia has not been able to work fast enough to replenish its aggregate, ongoing, losses in the field, and by now they're hopelessly underwater , with denoted-equipment levels in active service well below pre-war levels at this time (this is one of those major reasons why Russia cannot contemplate concentrated breakthrough operations any longer).

So properly standing up and equipping new units while maintaining the army in the field is basically unfeasible already. By the end of 2025 there should be a critical shortage of IFVs, including BMPs,

Introducing two NATO-equipped heavy divisions, at a 4X exchange ratio at least, given skill level, would thus clearly represent the destruction of all Russian offensive capability in Ukraine; losing a thousand tanks/IFVs in a month or two in a major offensive would simply be an order of magnitude greater than Russia's demonstrated throughput from deep storage.

On the other hand, given the slow rate of Western provision of SAM systems, and the gradual attrition of Ukraine's Soviet platforms, the Russian Air Force now seems to be reemerging in a tactical ground strike role, particularly around Avdiivka. Air defense and airpower are arguably the only areas in which Russia is more likely than not to improve its balance over time.

I can't help but emphasize how this war would be on its way to ending, this year, had the EU and US governments mustered keen military-strategic foresight in the aftermath of the Russian retreat from the north.

[Montmorency]

In recent days, UFOR has been carrying out successful counterattacks to regain hardened positions around Avdiivka (those lost this month). Just like in Vuhledar last month, and Marinka forever. Gee, it's almost like it's possible and desirable to invest in stabilizing defensive networks, and UFOR commanders south of Bakhmut (e.g. not Syrsky) understand that!

[Montmorency]

KSA and UAE purchasing Chunmoo. I'm telling you, Korean arms are the Middle Eastern buffer to American, Russian, and Chinese arms, so to speak.

[Montmorency]

Sweden is now surrounded by NATO, and the Baltic Sea is a NATO lake. The Swedish People's Party, which represents the Swedish minority in Finland, is likely to be excluded from government following yesterday's elections.

Sweden has no choice but to invade Finland to secure its interests.

[spmetla]

Lol, glad Finland finally made it into NATO. Sweden is essentially part of it now with it's pan-Scandanavian ties, EU membership, and current coordination with NATO.

Just hope the current European NATO members start to take rearmament a bit more seriously.

[Montmorency]

@spmetla you're going to want to take a look at this. I can't speak to the authenticity, or accuracy, of the documents, but as you may have heard there may have been a major leak of US planning documents with regard to Ukraine's military force generation, training, supply, and other items. The documents are dated March 1, so treat them as (putatively) applicable to one full year of war.

Some excerpts (there are more documents scattered around social media):
https://twitter.com/StrategickeM/sta...60395828363264
https://twitter.com/AricToler/status...39100407054336

Aircraft and vehicle loss claims match Oryx. KIA claims are 16-17.5K for Ukraine and 35.5-43.5K for Russia. I would have said 35+K for Ukraine and 50K for Russia. Listed total expenditure of GMLRS is 9600 (I figured 7-8K +/- 2K, so that's cool) and 953K 155mm (I figured 1.1 million). This suggests a much lower rate of daily consumption than previously attested by UA govt, though still ~100K/month, which is not wildly out of line. Previous 24-hour (i.e. Feb. 28) expenditures for GMLRS are 28, and 1104 for 155mm. Again assuming these are both authentic and accurate figures, we still can't extrapolate from a single day. But they do strike me as high for GMLRS (I'd been working out my estimates on the basis of average daily usage of 10+ rockets from October-February), and very low for 155mm (3000 is the traditional UA govt cited figure for daily usage; 1100 would be closer to my personal estimate of daily 152/122mm usage since mid-2022). It does also imply that Ukraine should have enough munitions stockpiled for one major offensive, since the quantity of 155mm acquired by Ukraine in 1 year (excluding subsequently) should be something like 1.5 million shells. Even if 10% are not HE...

Not sure what to make ofthe OOB for Kherson and Zaporizhzhia being assessed at 5250-10500 UFOR personnel in-theater at the time against ~39K RuFOR personnel, using a reference entity of "maneuver battalion" that seems to contain ~300 personnel. The document on combat power build also accounts for 12 UFOR brigades being generated (to be delivered by end of April). But from official UA channels on new units being stood up, the number is more like 20. Although perhaps some of those were already fully prepared by March 1, or have some other status that would exclude them from recording. One of the odder notes was the 47th Brigade supposedly being trained with both Bradleys and the Slovenian T-55s. What we can say is that pretty much all those brigades under construction are named have been named in public media before.


Can you read this circled bit?



"PDA = USA _____ by 12 Mar"



At any rate, if all of those brigades as depicted with TOE are the spearhead for a Ukrainian offensive - I urge you to peruse the relevant images - and the offensive is undertaken as advertised in May, then it's just far too little, too poorly-trained, to achieve a major breakthrough. Just on paper maybe going as far as taking Tokmak is possible, but...

As for the document itself, my default suspicion is that it's a disinfo operation, even if a lot of the information may be accurate and/or someone's internal product (especially if, as seems to be the case, a lot of it was previously confirmable by public info or analysis). Points in favor of this interpretation are much-lower specificity in reporting UFOR OOB in the theater maps compared to RuFOR breakdowns, as well as the 16K figure for UFOR KIA, which sounds verbatim lifted from Ukraine's MOD.

[Crandar]

A bit late to the party, but yes, McCain was indeed an embarrassment. Sadly he was idealised in his last moments, because of his opposition to Trump, which was commendable, but doesn't absolve him of his past actions.

On the leaked documents. It also mentions that the US are spying on Ukrainian officials, which is expected I guess, although New York Time's positive spin seems a tad clumsy.

[Montmorency]

The mainstream media treatment is, as usual, not detailed or insightful enough for dedicated subject matter enthusiasts, albeit that the NYT is the preferred American outlet for FBI/CIA/DoD sources and communications. There are a few reasons to believe US actors engineered the leak as a false/no flag breach, or there were some reasons at least. A strong counterargument to the disinf op theory is that not only have these documents and similar ones been floating around since even earlier than once believed (lmao that I know one of the Youtube shitposters implicated here), but there has apparently been a large leak of all sorts of intelligence materials and serial analyses pertaining to most major global points of interest for the American IC. There is truly nothing in the content of the Ukraine-related leaks that could meaningfully deceive Russia to the point of justifying cover leaks of even more sensitive material.

I don't want to spend a lot of time hunting for the more obscure leaks in the crevices of the Internet, but if you know where some are hosted, or have them saved yourself, I would appreciate the tip.

[Montmorency]

I've seen this one before, it's a classic!

[spmetla]

Aircraft and vehicle loss claims match Oryx. KIA claims are 16-17.5K for Ukraine and 35.5-43.5K for Russia. I would have said 35+K for Ukraine and 50K for Russia. Listed total expenditure of GMLRS is 9600 (I figured 7-8K +/- 2K, so that's cool) and 953K 155mm (I figured 1.1 million). This suggests a much lower rate of daily consumption than previously attested by UA govt, though still ~100K/month, which is not wildly out of line. Previous 24-hour (i.e. Feb. 28) expenditures for GMLRS are 28, and 1104 for 155mm. Again assuming these are both authentic and accurate figures, we still can't extrapolate from a single day. But they do strike me as high for GMLRS (I'd been working out my estimates on the basis of average daily usage of 10+ rockets from October-February), and very low for 155mm (3000 is the traditional UA govt cited figure for daily usage; 1100 would be closer to my personal estimate of daily 152/122mm usage since mid-2022). It does also imply that Ukraine should have enough munitions stockpiled for one major offensive, since the quantity of 155mm acquired by Ukraine in 1 year (excluding subsequently) should be something like 1.5 million shells. Even if 10% are not HE...

Yup, quite something these leaks. I don't think this was planned disinformation as the impacts of how much our Allies trust the US to keep secrets is more damaging than any effect on Russian planning.

The losses are quite something for the Russians, not quite as high as I'd expected, the Ukrainian casualties are about what was expected though.
As for your major points, yes, I agree this does not bode well for a Ukrainian counter-offensive. Though the Ukrainians have overperformed per US expectations from Day-1. The limits in ammo and equipment though may be why the Ukrainians though intent on holding Bakhmut haven't conducted counterattacks as we'd have expected, those resources undoubtedly being held for a more strategic offensive on a larger scale.

On the leaked documents. It also mentions that the US are spying on Ukrainian officials, which is expected I guess, although New York Time's positive spin seems a tad clumsy.

That I don't find surprising, just like the US spying on its allies. When you've got folks like Merkel making deals with the Russians for Nordstream and Macron ready to have peace at any cost (Ukraine and Taiwan) then you've got to have access to those internal deliberations in order to better do US geo-politics. We saw at the start of the war that there were a fair number of Ukrainian officials that were ready to fold to the Russians for various reasons that largely being the reason Kherson fell to them so early. There's no doubt the smarter less obvious folks doing so remain within the Ukrainian government and may be hedging bets.

The big 'news' that there are US and allied special ops in Ukraine is not surprising in the least. Was expecting as much following the Russian withdrawal from Kiev. I doubt these operators are anywhere near the frontline and imagine they are much more in an advising/training mode as well as intel sharing and assisting in targeting. Certainly not being used in an undeclared war as being accused by MGT and other MAGA/Qanon trolls.

Love the photos of the modified mobile AT-gun. Saw a youtube on it a while back. Crazy to see such old kit put to good use. One advantage with an AT-Gun though is the speed of the round, ATGMs are relatively slow which is what gives active protections systems a chance. Against MBT and AT guns only thick composite armor can provide protection in the various onion layers of protection.

Thought the following video was interesting:
https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1643287639187963904

Looks like mopping up operations after bypassing this trench system but looking at the trench itself, doesn't seem to be tied to terrain or other defensive systems, just to watch obstacles/ the road network. Can see the MBT and IFVs being used to clear the trench line. The defenders don't want to surrender which will require those dismounts to eventually have to do the costly and dangerous business of clearing the trench lines themselves. This is one of the situations for which the US uses a lot of under rifle grenade launchers and why we've spent so much money on 'air burst' munitions for infantry despite those never yet making it into service. A quality foxhole or trench is a lot of protection against direct fire weapons.

Germany: EU 'cannot be indifferent' to China-Taiwan tensions
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-eu-can...ons/a-65298426

Was pleased to see Baerbock have a strong stance in regards to Taiwan and human rights. Given Macron's statements last week I've been hoping to see some direct EU member counters to Macron's stance.